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Close air support for the field army.

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Collection	Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title	Close air support for the field army.
Author	Ianni, Frances A.
Abstract	The purpose of this study is to examine the doctrine for providing close air support to the field army in the North African., Mediterranean, and European Theaters of Operations during World War II. The study attempts to show the forces and events which affected the formulation of this doctrine of close air support. The study covers three broad periods: (1) the early developmental period of close air support doctrine, (2) the first test of doctrine in Africa, and (3) the period after the radical change in doctrine which took place in Africa. The roots of the close air support problems encountered by the American Army fighting the Nazi forces in World War II are found in the early history of American military aviation. The American air arm in World War I had only a few months of combat experience. This was enough, however, to convince its leaders of the tremendous potential of aviation as a weapon of war. One of these leaders was General William Mitchell, who soon came to believe that it was possible for an air force alone to win wars by means of long range strategic bombing. He felt that it was necessary to have a separate air arm in order to carry out this type of warfare. In his efforts to have the air arm established as a separate force, General Mitchell was guilty of indiscreet actions in his public utterances. His court-martial and the resulting attitudes which it left within the armed forces complicated the problem of arriving at a satisfactory integration of air and ground warfare. The War Department doctrine reflected the limited capability of the available aircraft. The mission of the air arm was to aid the advance of the ground forces. Meanwhile, Air Corps doctrine showed the influence of General Mitchell's concept of long range bombing and strategic air warfare. With the advent of the B-17 bomber in the 1930's, the development of aircraft and doctrine for close support of ground forces was to be retarded. Strategic air operations were given primary emphasis. The outbreak of World War II found the doctrine of close support to be inadequate and untested. Attempts to gain sufficient experience by means of joint maneuvers in the early 1940's were unsatisfactory because of shortages of equipment and trained personnel. There were also differences between the Army and Air Corps over the need for close air support and the requirements for extensive training in this area. Before the question could be resolved, U.S. forces were engaged in combat in Africa in late 1942. The basis of air-ground cooperation for the operations in Africa was found in FM 3l-35. This document was prepared from the limited experiences obtained from the joint air-ground maneuvers of the preceding year. The manual prescribed that ground force commanders would control aviation assigned to provide close support for the ground unit. The first test of the doctrine in Africa was complicated by severe logistic and political problems. The U.S. 2d Corps was committed over a wide front alongside French and British forces. The air units assigned to support 2d Corps were not adequate for waging a battle for air superiority unaided or for providing satisfactory close air support. Provisions for integration of total U.S. and Allied air effort were inadequate. The result was a lack of success in the overall air effort. The airmen charged that the lack of success was due largely to the system of command which permitted Army control of supporting aviation. A reorganization to coordinate the air effort in February 1942 resulted in supporting air being removed from ground force control. The ground force commanders were then to complain that they were not being properly supported by air. They felt that they were properly entitled to close support and that integration of air and ground effort was absolutely essential. At the completion of the African Campaign, the War Department published FM 100-20. This document gave official sanction to the independent role of the Air Corps. The subsequent invasion of Sicily got off to a bad start with the Air Corps conducting its operations without regard to the Army plan. Little progress was made in integrating the air and ground effort during the rest of the campaign in Sicily. The first concrete step toward providing better and more closely integrated support was taken after the invasion at Salerno, with the integration of air and ground staffs at Fifth Army headquarters. Progress after this was slow. Ground commanders' attempts to obtain some form of mission control to provide better integration of air effort were met by Air Corps reluctance to release control of aircraft to ground units. As the war progressed, air commanders began to show a greater interest in the problems of close air support. Rapid strides were made in the late summer of 1944 with the near simultaneous experiments with forward air controllers conducted in Italy and Normandy. The use of forward air controllers and other forms of decentralized air control were responsible for the success of close air support in late 1944 and 1945. The significant shortcomings of the close air support effort were the lack of night fighters and night intruders, the lack of sufficient reconnaissance aircraft, and the failure to make greater use of bombers in the tactical role. The problem of who should control the air arm has been a paramount question throughout the history of U.S. military aviation. The struggle extended from General Mitchell's early attempts to free aviation from ground force control to the climax reached with the publication of FM 100-20. In striving to obtain its goal of an independent mission, the Air Corps neglected its additional requirement of being able to support the ground effort. The emphasis on its independent mission was a major factor in its failure to have a well-developed system for providing close air support at the beginning of World War II. The failure of the early air effort in Africa was not due to the system of ground control of supporting air. It was due to the logistic and political problems as well as Air Corps doctrine and practices which prevented the full application of the Allied air effort. The subsequent declaration of independence contained in FM 100-20 prevented effective utilization of air power in the land battle. It was not until the air commanders took a greater interest in the needs for close air support and loosened their control over air missions that an effective system of close air support was developed.
Keyword	Close air support; Tactical air support; Field army; World War, 1939-1945; World War Two; WWII; North Africa; Mediterranean Theater of Operations; Military doctrine; European theater of operations
Series	Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher	Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original	1964-06-12
Date, Digital	2008
Resource Type	Textual
Format	PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 156 p.; 9.25 MB.
Call number	ADA 365797
Release statement	Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository	Combined Arms Research Library
Library	Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created	2008-10-03

Title	Part_1
Format	PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; Part 1, pages 1-77; 4.44 MB.
Release statement	Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Date created	2008-10-03

Close air support for the field army.

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Close air support for the field army.