This monograph addresses the employment of conventional military force against insurgency. First, it provides a model to analyze insurgency in terms of Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity." Secondly, the monograph assesses this model's validity by...
The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the...
In 1986, the US Army introduced Carl von Clausewitz's concept of center of gravity in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and defined it as the ""hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends."" The manual explicitly stated that the...
This monograph discusses whether classical military theory as developed by Clausewitz in On War remains relevant in light of military technological advances. The monograph specifically challenges whether the claim that the defense is the...
This monograph examines the cumulative effect which improvements in information technology have had at the operational level of war. Specifically, it uses the Clausewitzian theory of war to analyze how modern methods of information processing and...
Perhaps one of the most controversial theories proposed by the l9th century military theorist and historian, Carl von Clausewitz, was the proposition that the defense, not the offense, was the stronger form of war. This is the second of two...
This monograph examines the U.S. military operations in Beirut, Lebanon 1982-1983 and Somalia 1993 in the context of Clausewitz's theory of a culminating point of victory. The dynamics of peace operations present a unique challenge to military...
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States' armed forces and its coalition of allies have become deeply entrenched in the counterinsurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan. These struggles are not just counterinsurgencies, but they also...
Emory Upton believed that politicians should leave war to professionals. This led to two assumptions that became conventional wisdom: first, an apolitical army represented a more professional force; and second, the problems at the tactical and...
The monograph explores US intervention in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti as case studies to determine how the concepts of operational design were applied to peace operations. It also reviews the theories of Clausewitz and Jomini with a comparison to...
This monograph searches for an answer to the question: "What is the relationship between strategies and operational culminating points?" It begins by examining the theoretical position of Hans Delbruck and his dual strategies of annihilation and...
Nearly twenty years ago, as a new student in the Army's Command and General Staff Officer's College, Infantry Branch officers introduced to me the relatively newly codified doctrinal term "center of gravity." Throughout the "best year of our lives"...
The problem is, valid but incompatible service theories of operational warfighting inhibit rather than promote jointness. One cause of this problem is the joint definition of the center of gravity, which is vague and ineffective. This monograph...
This monograph analyzes whether dislocation theory is an appropriate military theory for the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to use in developing its warfighting doctrine. It argues that the IBCT’s unique mission, force structure, strengths,...
The purpose of this monograph is to provide an in-depth study of how the U.S. miscalculation of Iraqi will to fight during the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom contributed to post major conflict operational problems. The specific nature of these...
This paper examines the question whether systems theory, and the concepts of systems-shock and the center of gravity are compatible and have any utility in military planning. Currently there is a debate between systems theory proponents who argue...
Understanding and leveraging the media has become critical for operational level commanders conducting urban combat operations. The insatiable public appetite for information has created conditions where tactical actions can have severe strategic...
This monograph analyzes the Iran-Iraq War to determine the role of society--the government, the people, and the army--in forming a state's strategy and action in war. It applies the writings of two classical theorists--Clausewitz and Delbruck--to...
This monograph examines Jomini's theoretical components of a theater of operations, including decisive points, lines of operations, pivots of maneuver, and pivots of operations, to determine their contemporary significance to operational design....
The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in...