The focus of this monograph is the evaluation of the principles of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as listed in the June 1993 edition of U, S. Army Field Manual 100-5 in peacekeeping operations. Military commanders and decision makers must...
By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the...
The Interim Strike Force Headquarters organizational concept has emerged as the experimental platform upon which the U.S. Army will examine how to reorganize the Army in the near term to meet the conflicting demands of National Security Strategy,...
This monograph addresses what operational level military factors enabled the North Vietnamese Army to defeat the former South Vietnamese Army during the Vietnam War's final campaigns of 1975. The Vietnam War covered the full spectrum of conflict...
This monograph will examine the Mesopotamia campaign up to the British surrender at Kut in April, 1916. The purpose of this monograph is to answer the following research question: What are the modern implications of the operational failures of the...
This monograph studies the failure of Operation MUSKETEER to achieve both its military and political objectives. The study examines an important facet of combined warfare, the conduct of a combined contingency operation. The monograph utilizes a...
This monograph discusses planning for the post-conflict phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. More specifically, it examines whether a disparate focus on war-fighting operations during the planning and execution phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is to...
This monograph discusses the role of operational art in the Sioux War of 1876, the U.S. Army's largest campaign between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. This campaign, often overlooked in the historical study of operational art,...
The Army must develop leaders who are capable of managing uncertainty and change; leaders who can intellectually innovate. Intellectual change and innovation is the basis of appropriate and enduring physical/organizational change. How an...
FM 25-101 defines the After Action Review (AAR) as "a review of training that allows soldiers, leaders, and units to discover for themselves what happened during training, why it happened, and determining solutions to correct the problem." The AAR...
An unstable global environment where the threat is ambiguous requires warfighters to recognize the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy. This monograph provides an alternative definition which emphasizes the...
The rise of industrialization coupled with the growth of technology have contributed to creating a complexity to modern warfare that far exceeds the primitive conditions of earlier periods. Defined as the creative use of distributed operations for...
This monograph examines the relationship between physical forces prevalent on the modern battlefield and the causes inherent to US armored battalion failure since World War II. Given the complexity of today's battlefield in terms of technology,...
In the complex modern environment, the importance of doctrine to a single national service is obvious. It is the glue that binds the military together in the face of an ever widening spectrum of conflict, ever more influential technology and an...
Deception has been a part of warfare throughout history and has proven a very effective force multiplier when employed correctly. Many esteemed military theorists have espoused the merits of deception including; Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Mao...
Developing a strategic bomber in today's budget constrained environment is a challenging prospect. The design requirements must address conflict across the spectrum and remain relevant regardless of the enemy America faces. The operational concept...
Complexity theory has attracted considerable interest from operational artists in recent times. However, because it is still an emerging field, there are few -- if any -- historical case studies that show how complexity applies to military...
This monograph analyzes the shift in tactical doctrine in the US Army between 1968 and 1986. These dates bracket a period of major change when the Army struggled to match its tactical doctrine with the realities of late twentieth century armored...
Military operations are complex and chaotic phenomena. Current theoretical models inadequately deal with the increasing complexity and inherent uncertainty of modern warfare. Relying on mechanistic paradigms and reductionist methods of analysis,...
Many historians give William Sherman total credit for the success of the Atlanta Campaign, when in fact it was the success of the Federal team as an institution. Conversely, many blame Joseph Johnston for the Confederate loss in that campaign,...