This monograph examines the origins of the concept of conveying the intentions of the commander to subordinates from its initial appearance in Army doctrine in 1905 until the present day. While many believe they understand the genesis of this...
Why has an S2 never won a wargame when playing predicted enemy courses of action against a friendly course of action during the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)? Why did the V Corps commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) respond to...
This monograph examines tactical initiative and the types of information the commander's intent should provide to guide it. initiative became increasingly important beginning in the l8th Century as the dispersed, fast-paced nature of the modern...
This monograph finds that the US Army's decision making process taught in its schools and branch courses relies too heavily on an iterative analytical method called the Deliberate Decision Making Process or DDMP. Within this process there exists a...
The purpose of this monograph is to examine the concept of Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and determine if the doctrine is suitable for particularly complex operations like counter-insurgency operations (COIN). Commanders...
This monograph analyzes the manual wargaming portion of the U.S. Army's decision-making cycle in order to determine if the process deduces the optimum course of action. The monograph begins by examining game theory, which is the theoretical basis...
The construct for predictive analysis is based on the unfounded assumption that technologies and sound analysis will dissipate uncertainty in war. U.S. military doctrine shows an expectation for prediction from the intelligence process; it assumes...
This study contrasts two opposing theories which have shaped the U.S. Army's tactical intelligence process since 1940. One theory holds that the best kind of tactical intelligence is predictive in nature. The other theory states that tactical...
The continuing rise of Chinese political and military power has made Americans suspicious of China's intentions in the space domain. For many in the American defense community, the 2007 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test was the smoking gun that proved...
This monograph discusses whether U. S. Army operational commanders are still susceptible to surprise. The principle of surprise remains an important consideration for campaign planners. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm relied heavily on...
This monograph examines the ability of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to provide predictive intelligence. IPB is the foundation of tactical intelligence and plays a major role in tactical planning prior to the battle. There is a...
Colonel (retired) Oliver G. Haywood suggested in his brilliant 1954 article, "Military Decisions and Game Theory" that game theory techniques were relevant to preparing the military commander's estimate of the situation. He based his article on...
Many soldiers feel that their fringe benefits are being gradually but steadily worn away. The benefits themselves exert a significant influence on an individual's decision to make the Army a career. This study, aimed at Regular Army officer...
In November, 1950, the United States Army suffered one of its most devastating defeats ever, in the frozen mountains of North Korea at the hands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This defeat fundamentally changed the nature of the Korean...
This monograph addresses the research question: are military intelligence failures inevitable? If so, what are the causes and effects of intelligence failures and how can these causes and effects be mitigated or minimized in order to contain the...
This monograph examines Carl von Clausewitz's theoretical concept of the defensive culminating point and the ability of Army doctrine and its analysis system--Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield--to determine an enemy's courses of action...
The purpose of this study is to determine why intelligence officers acting as battalion S-2 have difficulty predicting the enemy. It hypothesizes that two causes: lack of experience of the principal officers conducting IPB and inadequate emphasis...
Historically, fog and friction have exacerbated the best laid battle plans of even the most intuitive wartime commanders. To mitigate these ever-present elements, the U.S. Army emphasizes the decentralized execution of AirLand Battle. Paramount to...
This monograph discusses the nature of tactical intelligence prediction in military operations. Such prediction is extremely complex and involves a broad range of factors from traditional military ones such as terrain and doctrine to more...
This monograph analyzes George Washington as the Intelligence Chief, Spy Master, and Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. It investigates the critical role he played in shaping the American Revolution with the use of espionage, deception,...