Central to the design and conduct of campaigns and major operations is the concept of gravity. However, a thorough understanding of this concept seems to be lacking within the U.S. Army. While some of this misunderstanding exists because of the...
This monograph explores the issue of whether or not the United States Army should have an institutional mechanism to collect, interpret and apply the lessons of operational combat in order to correct the inevitable errors of peacetime planning and...
Skoglund, Lars A.
Hendon, Milton
Herman, Richard
Hull, David E.
Hyman. William L.
Thesis Statement: Poor analysis of battlefield information, political/ethnic bias, and military tactical errors resulted in the Soviet defeat at Kharkov.
Discussion: In January 1943, Soviet forces defeated the Axis powers occupying Stalingrad....
This paper examines the adequacy of current AirLand Battle doctrine in assisting the operational commander in making his decision on when to counterattack at the operational level against Warsaw Pact forces in a war in Central Europe. It provides a...
This study uses an historical analysis of German pre-World War II tactical command and control doctrine and documented field experience from the intense fighting on the Eastern Front, November 1942 - March 1943, to identify tactical command and...
The U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine has contributed greatly toward codifying a comprehensive and widely accepted operational concept. With a new emphasis on fundamentals and principles, the essence of AirLand Battle doctrine is expressed in...
Railroads have played an important part in wars throughout modern history. Today, the contributions rail can make to America's national defense include U.S. commercial rail help with mobilization of military units stationed in the United States....
A key theoretical proposition offered by Clausewitz in On War was that the defense was the stronger form of war over the offense. Members of the military, theorists, and historians have intermittently grappled with this proposition and have tended...
This monograph examines the role of initiative in Soviet operational level command. It seeks to answer the question: Do Soviet operational commanders have the personal initiative and latitude to react to unexpected or changed situations on their...
This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither...
This monograph examines the theory of operational art in light of economic growth and societal development. The study uses W.W. Rostow's five stages of economic growth as a framework for analysis and examines how operational art is manifested as...
This monograph examines the 1914 Marne and 1943 Kursk campaigns to determine, from the operational perspective, the reasons for decision failures and how intelligence influences them. Part I defines operational level intelligence, establishes the...
In early October 1990, President Bush asked General Colin Powell to present him with military options to liberate Kuwait. For General Powell, the President's request significantly altered his approach to the crisis in the desert. His problem had...
The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a principle of U.S. military strategy. Modern concepts of quick decisive victory form the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These concepts originated from the...
Throughout history, a common phenomenon of warfare has been the encirclement of the forces of one or both warring factions. The nature of future war -- taking place in a battlefield that will be characterized by fluid activities, greater confusion,...
This monograph examines the adequacy of the current rear operations command and control (C2) doctrine at theater army that is contained in FM 90-14, Rear Battle. Specifically, this study seeks to determine if the TAACOM commander is the best choice...
Combat Studies Institute developed this bibliography in response to a growing interest by the Army in the operational level of war. Defined in FM 100-5, Operations (1982), as the planning, conducting, and sustaining of larger units to obtain...
The reliance on technology to replace manpower is a dominant aspect in the development of U.S. Army force structure and organization. The decreasing numbers of infantry dismounts in U.S. heavy divisions, especially under the Army of Excellence...
This monograph examines operational level logistics and deception in an effort to determine whether a coherent deception plan can be formulated undergirded by creative logistical arrangements that will allow the commander to deceive an alert...