In 1989 and 1991 the US Army dramatically proved that it had learned from its failure in Vietnam. Just as FM 100-5 Operations represented a fundamental shift in Army's approach to warfare, so too Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm offered clear...
This monograph examines how the task force commander and executive officer can enhance the training and professional development of the battalion coordinating staff. The National Training Center continues to report that task force staffs continue...
Through learning and enhanced capacity to learn faster than its adversaries, a military organization increases its chances for success within an increasing complex and chaotic environment. The complex and chaotic nature of military conflicts...
This monograph explores the validity of current United States Army Doctrine as it relates to enabling the future United States Army Objective Force in achieving the qualities outlined in the 2001 Objective Force White Paper as the Army begins its...
Peter Senge introduces the subject of team learning in The Fifth Discipline as one of the necessary disciplines that a group must foster if it is to become a learning organization. It is the fifth "discipline" that organizations must master in...
An organization learns only if it measures. This is the simple underlying idea of this monograph. It is important because the current international system, with all of its conflict and tension, requires the U.S. Army to learn a great many things in...
This monograph examines battalion commander and staff performance in conducting the tactical decision making process. The National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center continue to report battalion commanders and staff have...
This monograph maintains that the military is only one part of the peace operations environment, and not always the centerpiece. In addition, peace operations occur simultaneously at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This holds true...
This monograph focuses on the gap in operational command and control for unconventional warfare operations (UW), and the organizational elements required to mitigate this gap. In the 20th Century and beyond, the United States conducted UW in the...
The challenge is in deciding what to automate (effective use of technology) and what remains a human function. The 1999 US National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of information technology. However, the decisive point of all future...
This monograph assesses the process of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for humanitarian assistance operations. Three case studies of operations conducted overseas for which humanitarian assistance was the primary focus serve as...
This monograph asserts that phasing as a tenet of operational art has outlived its usefulness. Phasing as a component of campaign design worked effectively in the industrial age of symmetrical opponents, but has lost its usefulness in the...
This monograph defines blitzkrieg as a way of operational-level systems thinking that evolved over a twenty-year period. In the on-going debate over whether blitzkrieg was operational or tactical in nature, much of the discourse centers either on...
On 12 October 1999, the U.S. Army began a journey down a new path to innovation, when General Eric Shinseki presented his vision of Army Transformation at the 45th annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army. In this speech, General...
This monograph examines whether the addition of design to U.S. Army doctrine, along with other changes, can clarify the concept of the learning organization and make it more achievable by operational units at the battalion and brigade levels. While...
This monograph analyzes doctrine relating to the creation of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and its role in providing direction to units in combat. It compares doctrine to theory to assess it's doctrine's applicability in the...
The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the U.S. Army battlefield distribution system from a “Systems Thinking” perspective. The method involves a holistic analysis of the distribution systems as it functions within its environment. Because...
The purpose of this monograph is to determine whether or not Army air and missile defense planning and employment--air and missile defense design--has an operational art cognitive foundation. It combines the theory of operational art with a case...
This monograph is attempted provocation an intellectual dare from the author to the reader to think about how the Army views risk taking by its tactical leaders. More specifically, this monograph attempts to answer whether the Army's capstone...
The Army must develop leaders who are capable of managing uncertainty and change; leaders who can intellectually innovate. Intellectual change and innovation is the basis of appropriate and enduring physical/organizational change. How an...