This monograph addresses whether current doctrine adequately prepares armor and mechanized infantry forces to successfully conduct the final assault of a prepared position. Offensive operations culminate with actions on the objective, yet...
This monograph examines the problem created for control when changes occur to the operational capabilities that enable non-contiguous operations. The problem exists because an operational control structure optimized for non-contiguous operations...
Contents include: World War II and Battle of the Bulge chronologies; WWII allied conferences; Allied Command architecture and order of battle; the U.S. Army in December 1944; biographical sketches- senior allied commanders; German command...
The United States Army is transforming from its Legacy Force, to the Objective Force. Until the Army completes this transformation, the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) are likely to conduct the bulk of the workload during stability operations...
"This memorandum will be devoted to a general discussion of the construction of field artillery materiel. The scope of the discussion is sufficient to provide a background for the future study of all field artillery officers. The purpose,...
If strategists do not follow Clausewitz’s lead as a critical historian, then they risk failure by founding future policy, strategy, and operations on Kosovo myths. One must ask, was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to...
The purpose of this monograph is to determine if transformation to a light armor force is in the best interest of the Army. Since the Objective Force attains the ability to meet the ninety six hour deployment capability by drastic reductions in...
Volumes I and II are both contained in this document (German and Japanese). There is a practical reading and translation of Japanese characters, tables of basic key characters for Japanese ordnance, instructions for translating Japanese markings,...
This document is based on a study made by the French General Staff immediately after the armistice. The first section discusses basic principles: decisive character of tank action; the tank as a strategic rather than tactical weapon; theory that...
Even though Combined Arms is the way of future Counterinsurgency, Combined Arms will not work in counterinsurgency operations because there are not proper communications capabilities between the branches of the Army to use combined arms operations....
Units are going to suffer casualties in combat. It is important how the unit reacts and overcomes these traumatic events. In Iraq, Crazy Horse Troop suffered its first two causalities at the same time; this was a traumatic event for everyone in the...
Differences between civilian and tactical information systems in the areas of user service and available communications support make feasible treatment of information transport facilities of a tactical information system as an entity. Hence, the...
Addresses the hows of Army-Marine Corps Integration (AMCI) in joint operations. It describes the capabilities and limitations of selected United States Army and United States marine Corps units and provides methodologies in the form of tactics,...
Surrendering the Initiative?: C2 on the Digitized Battlefield. Captain Jim Dunivan, U.S. Army; On the battlefield leaders make decisions in the midst of great uncertainty, demonstrating adaptability, independence, and creativity as they plan...
The purpose of the Student Guide is to acquaint the student with the mission and organization of the United States Army Artillery and Missile School, organization for and evaluation of instruction, and those procedures necessary for the proper...