The Year 2012: South Korea's Resumption of Wartime Operational Control. Lieutenant Colonel James M. Minnich, U.S. Army; The United States must unencumber its forces from a peninsula-centric mission in Korea and transform the ROK-U.S. relationship...
90th Anniversary History
Integrating Intelligence and Information: Ten Points for the Commander. Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, U.S. Army; Brigadier General Charles A. Flynn, U.S. Army; The authors provide ten points as an azimuth for...
Development and COIN in Regional Command-East, 2004-2008. Robert Kemp, Department of State; The United States deployed a cadre of talented, dedicated military and civilian officers to RC-- East in Afghanistan. They had a measurable positive...
Tactical leader lessons learned in Afghanistan: operation enduring freedom VIII. Colonel William B. Ostlund, U.S. Army; During its 15 months in Afghanistan, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry Regiment, spent 90 percent of its time training...
This monograph shows how understanding three conceptual tradeoffs of complex versus complicated, complexity at large-scale versus fine-scale, and exploration of potential problems versus exploitation of known solutions can help the military...
This monograph examines alternative approaches to U.S. COIN operations in the eastern Pashtun tribal areas in Afghanistan that are sensitive to and inclusive of the key elements of the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali. The author reviews Pashtuns and...
What is the military’s most effective model for restoring essential services during counterinsurgency operations? That question drove this monograph to compare the most popular restoration model, the SWEAT Model, against a new model, the...
In January 2007, President of the United States George W. Bush announced a strategy called the New Way Forward in Iraq, a departure from the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq announced only thirteen months previous. Additionally, President Bush...
As with a local insurgency, the Global War on Terror requires the US and her allies to win the support of neutral, wavering and hostile audiences in addition to defeating an enemy. At the tactical and operational levels of war, those audiences...
Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that achieving victory in today's ideological conflicts is a task beyond the capabilities of any single U.S. agency. It demands that the efforts of multiple agencies be brought together and coordinated in a whole of...
While the outcome of the Iraq war seems to have validated the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, the war in Afghanistan seems to indicate there are fundamental problems associated with its historical principles and concepts. Dr....
This thesis explores the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine in Joint Publication 3-24, Field Manual 3-24 and Field Manual 3-24.2 to the Lebanese Hizballah and Taliban insurgencies. In particular, this thesis examines the Cold...
This monograph examines the execution of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) by operational forces and offers a methodology to better its execution. This study asserts that CERP is a necessary and appropriate program for operational...
Introduction By Dan G. Cox and Thomas Bruscino
Failed State: A New (Old) Definition By Major Kenneth D. Mitchell Toward Development of Afghanistan National Stability: Analyses in Historical, Military, and Cultural Contexts By Lieutenant Colonel...
The problem is how to employ a limited amount of CMSEs in a theater of operations in order to develop and maintain a partner nation’s military CMO capacity. The purpose of this research is to identify best practices in developing partner nation...
The preponderance of literature and scholarly debate on counterinsurgency (COIN) focuses on the strategic or operational approach: leader-focused; large group-focused; special operations; conventional operations; enemy centric; and the latest,...
Considered the first documented commitment of a Western-style army facing a nation-wide insurgency, the Peninsular War deserves a critical examination of French pacification methods. In spite of a severe defeat, the Grande Armee achieved success...
From the initial invasion in 2001 through the ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has been challenged with truly understanding the socio-cultural dynamics of the local populace which has become known as the...
With the advent of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, a debate has arisen concerning the manual's origins and its applicability to today's insurgencies. Critics, such as Colonel Gian Gentile, claim that the manual is overly influenced by...
The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the...