This study examines counterdeception capabilities in U.S. Army operational forces. The research question asks, “what should be the U.S. Army's capability to counter Soviet deception at the operationa1 level of war?” The study first examines...
This monograph discusses whether U. S. Army operational commanders are still susceptible to surprise. The principle of surprise remains an important consideration for campaign planners. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm relied heavily on...
This monograph seeks to determine if the moral domain of battle for guerrilla soldiers is different from that of conventional soldiers. The works of classical and contemporary military theorists address various factors that impact on the moral...
Using the scientific method, this monograph combines the concepts of surprise and information superiority to create a hypothesis that explains the principle of war. The hypothesis rests on the belief that omniscience, a state of perfect...
This paper examines the relationship between the theory and practice of operational deception, and our new Battlefield Deception doctrine. The paper begins with an examination of the art of war focusing on what both ancient and modern theorists...
In the years since WWII the subject of deception has received scant attention in the U.S. Army when compared to other subjects relating to warfighting. Consequently our doctrine for deception lags behind other developments, especially at the...
One of the most complex challenges facing the U.S. military today is the problem of imposing stability over the chaos that follows major combat operations. Despite the U.S. military’s predilection to distill warfare into the linear, Newtonian...
The Army of the future will assume an increasing role in force projection through the conduct of peacetime contingency operations. In preparation to accomplish these crisis-oriented, time-sensitive missions, soldiers and units will have to maintain...
This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither...
This monograph examines the operational deception plan used in Operation Desert Storm from 17 January to 28 February 1991 in relation to U.S. Army deception doctrine. Using the deception plan from Operation Overlord in World War II to illustrate...
This paper analyzes the concept of operational tempo from the Soviet perspective. It examines the nature of high-tempo operations, the dynamics of these operations, and proposes ways to counter a future Soviet high-tempo operation in Europe. By...
Seeing Red: Creating a Red-Team Capability for the Blue Force. Colonel Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired; Red teaming, a structured process executed by trained and practiced team members, is uniquely suited to...
Effects based operations (EBO) are defined in this thesis as the synergistic employment of all instruments of national power, as interdependent and supporting systems to achieve desired national policy. EBO are a continuous process, applied from...
This paper examines the role of British intelligence operations during the American Revolutionary War as they apply to the British defeat at Yorktown. It begins with a brief history of British intelligence prior to the war, discusses strategic...
Prior to 1950, the Army restricted the service of blacks to limited roles in a racially segregated Army. During World War II, black America fought for an increased combat role, believing that contributions on the battlefield would lead to increased...
Following protracted campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the British Army must restructure for the future amidst significant financial restrictions. Since 9/11, the character of warfare appears to have shifted; theories of hybrid warfare are...
This monograph proposes that one of the Army's primary doctrinal concepts, combat power, requires modification to keep pace with the changing environment of conflict. It argues that the Army's combat power model, defined as the combined effects of...
This monograph maintains that the military acting alone can never achieve a comprehensive solution to a crisis situation. For success, the military must work in conjunction with diplomats, politicians, and humanitarians. The monograph begins by...
Currently, law and policy preclude women in American armed forces from serving in ground combat duty positions. This monograph discusses both the trend to reverse the combat exclusion policies and the opportunity which currently exists to try...
This monograph examines the intelligence requirements of logistics planners at the operational level of war. Specifically, it analyzes what information is available to sustainment planners, the form of that information as it is used in the staff...