The introduction briefly relates the background and need for the practical analysis of combat power. A review of doctrine highlights a lack of practical "how to" for the analysis of combat power. The monograph reviews the Force-Ratio method and...
This study examines the twenty-nine capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) to determine their relative validity. The methodology utilizes a multiple criteria decision-making model to determine the...
In 1999 GEN Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, initiated the Army Transformation program attempting to both enhance the timeliness of employment for ground forces and to leverage technology to maintain our ground dominance. . The first phase of...
Currently the United States Army does not have a standardized, realistic methodology for determining the correlation of forces (COF). This study investigates this issue by examining different methods currently being used to determine the COF. The...
Quantification in tactical decision making is the application of mathematical measurements and estimates to tactical considerations of time, space, and relative combat power. The United States and the Soviet Union are remarkably divergent in the...
In the wake of the Cold War, the U.S. Army increasingly finds its institutional focus shifting away from preparing for sustained mechanized land combat. This trend serves the Army’s immediate operational needs and addresses its perceived need to...
This paper discusses the nature of war and warfare. It contends that unclear policy objectives and a lack of strategy contributed to strategic defeats in Vietnam and Somalia despite tactical successes. This was in part the result of a tendency to...
Future operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010 and the accompanying service level concepts emphasizes full spectrum, full dimensional dominance, allowing the application of force in time and space that cannot be equaled by a potential...
Two future-oriented publications of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, and a draft...
The 1993 version of FN4 100-5, Operations, formally added the theoretical term of decisive points to our professional warfighting lexicon without providing a useful methodology for their identification. This monograph undertakes a study of decisive...
In the wake of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, T.E. Lawrence's description of counterinsurgency (COIN) analogous to "eating soup with a knife," has new meaning in our contemporary military. It describes our kinetic conventional army (the knife)...
The requirement for review of current division night attack doctrine is found in the apparent inconsistencies, ambiguities, and omissions of current doctrine. Present division night attack doctrine is alleged to fall short of a coherent, organized...
Contains: a letter sent to senior commanders and intelligence officers titled "Enemy relative capabilities", with accompanying questionnaire, a summary of replies, selected comments and complete replies on the discussion of gathering intelligence...
The realist paradigm is the USG's dominate perspective for conflict analysis. Historically, this perspective has served the United States well, leading to its ascension from colonial possession to global hegemon in less than two centuries. There is...
Since 1999, the European Union has significantly increased its effort to create a viable military force. A natural part of a military force in the contemporary environment is Special Operations Forces. The purpose of this monograph is to determine...
Historically, the United States Army has had difficulty articulating and justifying force requirements to civilian decision makers. Most recently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reinvigorated the debate over estimated force requirements. Because...
This monograph sets out to prove that Geoffrey Blainey's theory about a disagreement over relative power between nations explains the causes of the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. Blainey describes the diplomatic crisis leading to war 'like a crisis...
Is the nature of winning at the operational level different than that of the tactical level? The author explores this question and determines that there is a fundamental difference that cannot be explained by the combat power model presented in FM...
This monograph discusses the components and characteristics of decision-making that are necessary to achieve the tactical agility required in AirLand Battle. As one of the four tenets of AirLine Doctrine, agility - the ability to decide and act...