Emerging Threats
CONTENTS

Editorial

2 Military Retention Intangibles: Esprit, Morale and Cohesion
by Congressman Ike Skelton

8 Emerging Threats: Imminent Concerns

9 Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter
by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired, and Jacob W. Kipp

18 The Brazilian Amazon: Controlling the Hydra
by Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired

by Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

40 Emerging Threats: Ominous Horizons

41 Trouble in North Caucasus
by General Anatoliy S. Kulikov, Former Russian Interior Minister, as translated by Robert R. Love

52 Russia's Northwest Strategic Direction
by Jacob W. Kipp

66 Kashmir: Flashpoint or Safety Valve?
by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired, and Ali A. Jalali

72 Insurgencies, Terrorist Groups and Indigenous Movements: An Annotated Bibliography
by Captain Gerard Gato, US Air Force, Retired

83 Insights

Heaven, Bless This Mess! A Mother's Thoughts on War
by Patricia Gallagher
84 Review Essay

Insecurity and Violence in Colombia
by Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Ramsey, US Army Reserve, Retired

87 From My Bookshelf

Bosnia Reading List
by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, US Army

87 Letters to the Editor

88 Book Reviews contemporary readings for the professional
From the Editor

In this issue, Military Review is honored to resume a longstanding tradition of featuring articles from the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Congressman Ike Skelton, long a friend and ardent supporter of the US Armed Forces, opens this edition with an inspirational look at three enduring traits of successful militaries—Esprit, Morale and Cohesion. Skelton reminds us that if we are to remain the world’s most potent fighting force, we must actively promote these intangible force multipliers to retain the military’s “best and brightest.”

With the unrelenting high operations tempo and diverse spectrum of missions and deployments that challenge our Armed Forces, it behooves all of us to become and remain knowledgeable about today’s “global village.” In that spirit, we are pleased to provide a venue that showcases the analytical talents of the experts at FMSO.

This issue marks my return from Bosnia-Herzegovina, where I spent six months as the chief of Public Information for the NATO-led Stabilization Force. While I welcomed the challenges of coordinating the various public information efforts of US and allied forces there, I am glad to be back at the helm of Military Review.

This issue also signals the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Mike Roddin, MR’s managing editor for the past five years. Mike adroitly steered MR through numerous “troubled waters” during his tenure. He is an immensely talented individual, totally dedicated to quality and service in the fullest measure. Just as those qualities made a lasting difference in his Army, they will surely benefit his new employer in the private sector.

LJH
Military Retention Intangibles: Esprit, Morale and Cohesion

Congressman Ike Skelton

As the US Army approaches its 225th birthday in the year 2000, it is of critical importance that all service members do their utmost to stem the tide of experienced noncommissioned officers and junior officers leaving the service. As the author maintained before the House Armed Services Committee: “Congress can help with military retention via pay and recognition, but only the military can build and maintain Esprit—that indescribable something—that makes them want to stay.”

The shift in the 1970s from a conscript military to an All-Volunteer Force helped build one of history’s most dominant militaries. Yet, despite battlefield successes with minimal casualties in the 1990s, the US military is losing a battle of attrition. The military can no longer retain the number of experienced noncommissioned officers and junior officers it needs to maintain required end strength.¹⁰

Many leave the military to take higher-paying jobs in the private sector. Industry seeks talent and is willing to pay for it during strong economic periods, and talent abounds among the military’s “best and brightest.” Military members constitute a loyal, self-disciplined work force, superbly trained and educated to run a high-tech military that is the envy of the world. The military must compete with industry to retain those it needs, yet it does not have the power to negotiate salaries in the same fashion as the private sector. In this year that I have labeled the “Year of the Troops,” Congress will do its part to help keep military pay and benefits competitive. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 authorizes a 4.8 percent pay raise across the board, with selected midgrade raises as high as a 9.9 percent. This is the single highest pay raise since the 1979-1981 period, when Congress was grappling with the ghastly manpower problems of the “hollow force.” Congressional action to reform retirement pay should also help with retention.²⁰

It’s not just about money, however. A more oft-cited factor for leaving the military is that—after winning the Cold War and downsizing—our military finds itself busier than ever, protecting American interests around the world. This translates to longer and more frequent periods away from home for those fewer personnel remaining. Simply put, a higher operations tempo is wearing out the troops, and in the aggregate, they are giving notice with their feet.

In spite of this, retention and morale have been highest in deployed units. I have had the opportunity to talk with troops in the field, most recently in
Bosnia, and their morale was sky-high. Their retention numbers were equally as impressive. Why? They weren’t getting paid much more, and they were separated from their families. Yet, by and large, they were happy and they were re-enlisting. Maybe the extra pay, such as hazardous duty pay and family separation allowance, made a difference. Maybe it’s because they were doing what they signed up to do, making the world a better, safer place. Maybe. But, judging by the gleam I saw in their eyes and the pride they displayed, I say that Esprit was the difference.

As I stated in the 24 February 1999, House Armed Services Committee hearing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress can help with military retention via pay and recognition, but only the military can build and maintain esprit—that indescribable something—that makes them want to stay. I’m not just talking about leadership by the service chiefs; I’m talking about deckplate leadership—leadership in the field and on the runway—at all levels of command, from junior enlisted to senior officer.

**Esprit, Morale and Cohesion Defined**

In my statement it to the Joint Chiefs, I talked only about esprit. In addition to esprit, morale and cohesion may also be important to retention, while most certainly being key to combat effectiveness.

Most military personnel know esprit as unit pride, that common spirit of enthusiasm, devotion and collective honor. A shared sense of unit accomplishment can strengthen esprit, particularly, when overcoming adversity. This shared success binds individuals not only to their unit but also to each other.

**Morale** is the mental and emotional condition of an individual or group in terms of enthusiasm, confidence and loyalty. Morale is a subjective end state directly attributable to leadership and its manifestations, such as a leader’s genuine concern for the welfare of the troops. Among esprit, morale and cohesion, morale is the most volatile, turning on things both seemingly small and historically significant, such as mail, chow, hard work, victory. Whereas esprit and cohesion are the principal province of military leadership, forces outside the military can affect morale. For instance, Congress influences morale through pay, benefits and other environmental factors.

While soldiers may draw real strength from unit pride and collective attitudes, their ability to endure, persevere and remain determined in the face of mounting combat stress is primarily a function of **Cohesion**. When morale and esprit combine with cohesion, the military payoff occurs. Unit pride and the urge to protect comrades help reduce psychological and physiological fear. Trusting comrades to do their job and cover one’s backside—and working so as never to let them down—allow training to kick in. Together military members are able to accomplish the task at hand, despite life-threatening individual fears. Stated simply, esprit, morale and cohesion lead to greater combat effectiveness.

**Esprit, Morale and Cohesion in Combat**

An example of decisive esprit, morale and cohesion in combat can be found in the famous American Revolution naval battle between the USS *Bonhomme Richard* and the British frigate HMS *Serapis*.

On 23 September 1779, off Flamborough Head, England, and an hour into the sea battle, the British commander hailed Captain John Paul Jones and asked if the *Bonhomme Richard* was ready to surrender. An experienced seaman’s eye could clearly make out a mortally wounded ship, punished beyond normal physical endurance, ready to strike its colors.

From his blood-laden decks and with a portion of his ship literally blown out from under him, Jones shouted his immortal response, “I have not yet begun to fight!” This fierce determination infused Jones’ officers and crew with renewed spirit and vigor. Fueled by fighting elan, confidence in their leader and trust in one another, the American sailors fought ferociously, ultimately seizing victory from the jaws of defeat. The *Bonhomme Richard* would later sink, but not before Jones had lashed his ship to his defeated enemy’s and claimed it as his own.

Jones tapped into something that night that had been created long before. In the months prior to that battle, Jones, his officers and crew had sailed many
The cornerstone value is trust, for without it there can be no confidence between the member and the group. Moreover, trust is a prerequisite for retention. Individuals will not stay in an institution they do not trust. Leaders must dedicate themselves to maintaining the integrity of trust within a unit. It takes only one faithless act to destroy trust and monumental effort to reinstall it.

miles at sea and conducted long hours of training together. Through good leadership and attention to esprit, morale and cohesion, Jones had forged the Bonhomme Richard and the men under his command into a combat-effective unit much greater than the sum of a converted French merchant ship and an otherwise-ordinary crew. At the critical moment, the reservoir of esprit, morale and cohesion turned the tide of the battle.

Another example of powerful esprit, morale and cohesion resounds in one of the most dramatic battles in military history—the Battle of “the Frozen Chosin” during the Korean War. In mid-November 1950 the First Marine Division was tasked to take the Chosin Reservoir, an important hydroelectric plant. The cool autumn temperatures had just given way to bitterly cold weather when advanced Marine elements reached Hagaru-ri at the southern tip of the reservoir and made contact with Chinese forces.

Eight Chinese divisions surrounded the First Marine Division, intent on destroying it. Many senior military leaders and the press immediately gave the First Marine Division up for lost. Most would have lost heart in such a desperate situation but Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, the only Marine to win the Navy Cross five times for heroism and gallantry in combat, doggedly pointed out: “We’ve been looking for the enemy for several days now. We’ve finally found them. We’re surrounded. That simplifies our problem of getting to these people and killing them.”

Despite being outnumbered 60,000 to 12,000, the Marines never lost their spirit. They ferociously fought the Chinese, finishing with a 78-mile fighting withdrawal to an amphibious evacuation at the port of Hungnam, Korea. There all casualties were evacuated, and all salvageable equipment was brought out. The Marines suffered 4,000 casualties while inflicting nearly 25,000 on Chinese forces.

Major General Oliver Smith, commander of the First Marine Division, drew on esprit, morale and cohesion, saving the First Marine Division for its next fight. Where others saw the Marine withdrawal as a retreat, Smith explained it in typical Marine spirit, “Retreat Hell! We’re just attacking in another direction.” First Marine Division esprit, morale and cohesion were critical as to the division’s fighting spirit in the face of overwhelming odds. The Marines had faith in one another and in their outstanding leaders such as Smith and Puller.

A more recent example of the contribution of esprit, morale and cohesion to combat effectiveness was displayed by the 75th Ranger Regiment in Somalia on 3 October 1993. Part of the Ranger creed states, “I will never surrender. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.”

One hundred and forty-two Rangers of the 3d Battalion had just captured 22 supporters of Mohammed Farrah Aideed when a supporting Black Hawk helicopter was shot down by Somali rocket-propelled grenades. A Ranger platoon leader saw the helicopter crash and immediately led 13 men from his platoon on foot four blocks to the crash site. The streets of Mogadishu erupted in a hail of small-arms fire and grenades. In the streets, automatic fire from behind walls, rooftops and windows showered the rescue patrol. Five of the six Rangers killed in the fire-fight died en route to the helicopter, and three of the Somali captives in one Ranger truck were killed. The fire was so intense that the Ranger commander ordered the rescue convoy to retreat back to the airport.

At the crash site, the Ranger platoon was augmented by 15 more Rangers from a search and rescue helicopter that had to limp back to base after being hit. Still under unrelenting fire, the 29 remaining Rangers hunkered down and went to recover the fallen pilot and co-pilot. They remained engaged the entire time, fighting for 6 straight hours until a relief force arrived.

Eighteen Americans died in the fire-fight, with another 77 wounded. Somali casualties included at least 300 killed and 700 wounded. The Rangers stayed true to their creed that fateful day—they did not surrender when outnumbered. They did not embarrass America—they made it proud. They protected their comrades’ lives at the risk of their own, in some cases at the cost of their own. The Rangers’ actions personified esprit, morale and cohesion.
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Leadership Factors That Affect Esprit, Morale and Cohesion

Through esprit, morale, and cohesion, a leader builds a combat-ready team of professionals who take pride in their work and in their unit and care about one another like a family. The factors that a leader orchestrates to build esprit, morale and cohesion are well known: “Lead from the front,” “be firm but fair,” “lead by example” and “take care of your people.” Such leadership actions directly shape morale, esprit and cohesion.

Factors that affect esprit relate members to their unit and institution. Unit accomplishments, particularly in the face of adversity, build esprit when members feel their contribution was valuable. Because “success has a thousand fathers, but failure is an orphan,” leaders acknowledge subordinates’ contributions to mission success and shoulder the blame when things go awry. Appropriate awards and recognition cost little but go a long way in building unit and institutional affiliation.

While unit accomplishments provide identifiable events for which members can be proud, a more important esprit factor is the institutional value system. Values make members feel good about belonging to the unit—that it is worth being proud of. Values such as the Navy and Marine Corps’ Honor, Courage, Commitment, and the Army’s Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage—LDRSHIP—reflect institutional expectations both of what the member can expect from the institution and vice versa. The cornerstone value is trust, for without it there can be no confidence between the member and the group. Moreover, trust is a prerequisite for retention. Individuals will not stay in an institution they do not trust. Leaders must dedicate themselves to maintaining the integrity of trust within a unit. It takes only one faithless act to destroy trust and monumental effort to reinstill it.

Morale is affected by a host of environmental factors, not all controllable by a leader. Controllable factors include support services such as pay, food, rest and shelter. Congress has an impact on morale through many of the support service factors since money for support services must ultimately be authorized and appropriated. Nonetheless, it is the deckplate leader who ensures pay problems are
Factors that build cohesion for combat often conflict with efficient peacetime administration. Speedy and efficient replacements and individually managed career patterns have become the peacetime priorities.

fixed expeditiously, quality meals are served on time, subordinates get enough rest and appropriate shelter is provided. Resources to complete a mission, such as fuel for adequate training and spare parts and tools to fix and maintain equipment, are also important to morale. Other environmental factors that affect morale outside the control of the military leader are weather, the stress of combat and casualty rates. To maintain morale as high as appropriately possible for the situation, a good leader keeps tabs on all environmental factors, controlling them as much as possible or mitigating the effects otherwise.

Cohesion during combat reduces fear. Responsibility to the group subordinates one’s own fears to the welfare of all. The factors important to cohesion are mutual social recognition and attachment. Units achieve social recognition and attachment over time through realistic training and team building. Unit members gain confidence in their own ability to act in the face of danger and gain trust in their comrades’ ability to do the same. Repetitive, progressive training and performance in combat cement strong bonds among unit members, so that comrades will risk their own lives for one another. Not only must leaders facilitate the forging of these bonds between members, they must also gain their members’ trust and confidence in their own competence and leadership. Building cohesion normally takes time, mentoring and a personnel rotation policy that maintains stable units with little turnover.

Institutionalizing Esprit, Morale and Cohesion

Although the powers of esprit, morale and cohesion are well known in the military for their historic contributions during combat, in the modern era only esprit and morale have been consistently institutionalized during peacetime. Factors that build cohesion for combat often conflict with efficient peacetime administration. Speedy and efficient replacements and individually managed career patterns have become the peacetime priorities.52

In 1980, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer instituted the New Manning System (NMS), designed specifically to bolster cohesion in Army units. The NMS consisted of two structural components: the unit replacement system and the regimental system. The unit replacement system stabilized personnel in units, with nominal tour lengths of three years, to prevent a constant turnover within a unit. Additionally, instead of replacing individuals piecemeal within units, units were rotated together. The regimental system permanently affiliated personnel with regiments they would serve in throughout their careers and provided home bases where the regimental history, traditions and mementos would reside.

The regimental system wasn’t really new. It was actually a throwback to the days when regiments were area-based. Regiments recruited soldiers from the same locale, so they already knew each other and each other’s families and lived together in local barracks when in garrison—built-in cohesion. I once had a conversation with a Scottish brigadier about the famous Scottish Black Watch Regiment. I knew of its 200-year heritage and considerable combat reputation. I asked him how they were able to fight so fiercely in battle after battle, often in the face of insurmountable odds. What was it that made them leave the safety of their shell holes and advance against unrelenting, lethal fires? He explained that it was their shared home roots. Shoulder-to-shoulder with their friends and neighbors from home, no one wanted to disgrace himself or his family in combat. The cohesive effects of area affiliation produced endemic courage and valor.

The US Army’s NMS was implemented through Project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training) in March 1981 with the activation of COHORT companies, and later, COHORT battalions. They were a great success according to those who served in them. General John Keane, current US Army vice chief of staff, served in a variety of COHORT units at various levels of command. According to Keane, good leaders developed into outstanding leaders, largely by association with COHORT units. Units achieved individual goals more quickly, and to a much greater degree, than normal units. Standards of military bearing and courtesy were higher and disciplinary problems were fewer. The only drawback was that, while good leadership was amplified, so were the effects of bad leadership. The Army has since abandoned the NMS, reverting to an individual replacement system.

The Marine Corps, a service long noted for its esprit, has embarked on a program to institutionalize cohesion. The Marine Corps approach consists of four phases. It begins with recruiters, who carefully screen applicants, accepting only those with
solid character and those “empty vessels” the Corps can mold into Marines. The second phase takes place at basic training, which culminates in a team-work exercise known as “the Crucible” that earns a recruit the right to wear the eagle, globe and anchor. In the third phase, cohesion is strengthened through the further bonding of teams formed at the Corps’ skill-producing schools and kept together through their first enlistment. The teams train together, garrison together, deploy together and may be ultimately called upon to fight together. The final phase consists of sustainment. Marine leaders conduct business and accomplish missions in ways that support and reinforce both core values and team building.

The Navy’s system of deploying ships and air squadrons at sea for six months, coupled with the unpredictability of naval surge deployments, probably precludes implementation of an NMS-type system for the sea service. However, in 2000, the Navy plans to experiment with a one-year rotation lock-in period to maximize combat readiness. Sailors assigned to the George Washington Battle Group will remain with their ships or squadrons for the one-year period extending from six months prior to deployment through the battle group’s return to home port.

**Esprit, Morale, Cohesion and Retention**

There is little doubt that improved esprit and morale have a positive effect on retention. I have seen the effects of both in the eyes of troops on the front lines and witnessed the retention figures. Logically, cohesion should also have the same effect—building service members into a cohesive family should make them want to stay. Nonetheless, research in this area may be warranted as there is little scientific evidence of a correlation between cohesion and retention. Even granted that a causal relationship between them can be established, the institutionalized means of achieving cohesion may act to harm rather than help retention. For example, the Navy’s lock-in strategy may act to increase combat effectiveness during deployments, but sailors unhappy with not being able to rotate at the Projected Rotation Date or End of Active Obligated Service may opt to leave the service.

**All the pay and benefits in the world won’t stem the tide of experienced noncommissioned officers and junior officers leaving the service if they are poorly led and not taken care of. We cannot tolerate an indifference toward retention. The post-Cold War downsizing is over. We must work doubly hard to retain the “best and brightest” in the military—not just because it makes good economic sense, but because they make more combat-effective units.**

However, if it is done right, I have every confidence that troops in cohesive units, infused with esprit and good morale and led by caring leaders, will want to stay in the military. All the pay and benefits in the world won’t stem the tide of experienced noncommissioned officers and junior officers leaving the service if they are poorly led and not taken care of.

**The Leadership Challenge**

We cannot tolerate an indifference toward retention. The post-Cold War downsizing is over. We must work doubly hard to retain the “best and brightest” in the military—not just because it makes good economic sense, but because they make more combat-effective units.

As Congress and the services join to build esprit, morale and cohesion, together we will restore gleam in the eyes of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. They will want to stay. In the short term, a few more quality service members will provide continuity, cohesion and esprit. In the long run, we will have an even more dominant military. And whenever duty calls, the intangible strengths of our warriors and units may prove decisive in combat. Regardless of your service perspective, this is the military its members deserve and upon which our nation depends.

**NOTES**

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

The Honorable Ike Skelton, US House of Representatives, Democrat, Missouri, has represented Missouri’s Fourth Congressional District since 1977. He is the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee. He has written several articles for Military Review over the years. His most recent contribution, “International Engagement—Why We Need to Stay the Course,” appeared in the March-April 1999 Military Review.

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AS THE US ARMED FORCES restructure and decrease, their missions are changing from those of the Cold War's forward-deployed force to more complex missions of a post-Cold War expeditionary force. For the US Army and Marine Corps, these new missions will likely involve urban combat, what one contemporary author has called "combat in hell." Although urban combat has been a constant throughout history, its frequency and scale are likely to increase as emerging threats such as urban guerrillas, terrorists and underdog armies seek cover in the cities.

From early history on, urban combat has required masses of dismounted infantrymen, a significant amount of time, combined arms and astonishing quantities of ammunition. The assaulting force runs the risk of its own attrition by combat, insufficient supplies and epidemic diseases. Assaults on cities have resulted in heavy military and civilian casualties and shattered cities. Modern urban combat has often destroyed operations tempo, drained logistics stockpiles and ruined the reputations of promising commanders.

Urban combat of the future will prove no easier, presenting the commander with additional strategic and operational challenges—few of which "silver bullet" technology can resolve. Soldiers tend to think about combat in cities as just a matter of different terrain and tactics, but the US Army's term "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain" (MOUT) understates the unique difficulties. However central terrain may be to the solution of tactical problems—a city's complex set of systems and high population densities poses the most daunting problems in urban combat. Historically, the city presents a very special type of problem for strategic and operational commanders and their staffs. As Michael Walzer observed, civilian populations frustrate the "war convention"—those rules that guide military conduct. The war convention is the moral underpinning of war and forms the basis for combat's rules of engagement (ROE). Walzer discusses the problem of military utility and proportionality against the backdrop of human rights for noncombatants. By definition, the war convention imposes limits, even as it recognizes the power of necessity. Modern urban combat can assume many forms, including siege, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. In the latter two cases, the political content of the acts may involve its own code of action. Soldiers dealing with these threats find themselves drawn into the limbo between the war convention's organized violence and the limits imposed in performing a police function in a civil society.

"In its modern manifestation, terror is the totalitarian form of war and politics. It shatters the war convention and the political code. It breaks across moral limits beyond which no further limitation seems possible, for within the categories of civilian and citizen, there isn't any smaller group for which immunity might be claimed."

Focus on urban terrain cannot illuminate this core issue of disintegrating military and political codes. Yet, it presents the greatest challenge because urban warfare constantly changes military and political dynamics. Cities are social organisms—the centers of gravity for military and political struggles. A core
Challenge for modern soldiers will be the very changing nature of the city, especially the global scale of urbanization, increasing complexity of urban life and growing international interdependence.

Welcome to Megapolis

For the bulk of man’s history, cities represented the wealth and power of their states and empires and constituted logical objectives in warfare. Cities formed on rivers, roads and seaports to facilitate commerce and control the countryside. Often cities grew around forts and castles on militarily advantageous terrain. From early history, states fortified and garrisoned their cities to preserve their wealth, administrative control and power. Although the bulk of the population was rural, the urban centers were the heart of political, economic, cultural, military, educational and religious activity within the country. Wars began and ended with attacks or lengthy sieges against cities. The scientific construction of city fortifications emerged as a dominant branch of military science. Its corollary, the conduct of successful sieges, also emerged as a rigorous area of scientific theory and practice. But, as sociologist Max Weber pointed out in his study of

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the evolution of the city, different civilizations developed very different cities.4 Weber makes the point that in the Occidental city, ancient and medieval, the military qualities among the citizens of the city and its self-defense were indispensable parts of urban life.

This emphasis on cities changed with the Thirty Years War. With the rise of the nation-states, standing armies and the gun powder revolution, cities ceased to have military integrity, such as the ability protect themselves from penetration and becoming battlegrounds. By the 18th century, the opposing army, not the opposing cities, became the immediate objective, and field commanders aspired to bring the enemy army to the one decisive battle that would end the war. Forcing that battle might be accomplished by maneuvering to threaten a capital or an economically important city.

Possession of intact, undamaged cities remained the ultimate political goal, and so, during war cities were often declared open and battles were fought outside the walls to avoid the economic and social chaos of prolonged sieges and vicious urban combat. Military commanders, more interested in maneuver than in attrition warfare, avoided fighting in cities when possible. Whenever cities were contested, the civilians were usually evacuated or encouraged to leave, allowing urban combat in largely “empty” cities. The burning of Moscow by its defenders and Atlanta by its attackers marked a shift in this policy, a hint of Tolstoy’s ferocious “people’s war” and Sherman’s deliberate “hell.” Siege warfare in a modern industrial city, rife with class antagonisms, risked incubating social unrest and revolution as when the German siege of Paris in 1870 produced the Paris Commune in 1871.

The Industrial Revolution turned cities into the forges of national armies and potential battlegrounds. In the 20th century, cities endured aerial bombing and ground combat. At the beginning of World War II, there were a few efforts to avoid urban destruction. The French declared Paris an “open city” to save it from destruction in June 1940. General Douglas MacArthur did the same for Manila during his withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula in 1942. But these actions were the exception. Warsaw, for example, became an urban battleground three times: in September 1939 as Wehrmacht’s lightning campaign culminated; April 1943 during the Jewish Ghetto uprising and the Nazis’ retaliatory “final solution”; and in August-September 1944 during the Armija Krajowa’s general insurrection. By January 1945, when the Red Army finally took the city, 85 percent of Warsaw’s buildings had been razed and its population was gone—either killed or carried off into captivity.

In most cases, operational prudence prevailed throughout World War II, and ground commanders avoided urban combat when possible. Circumstances often dictated otherwise. Strategic decisions by Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin turned Stalingrad and Berlin into their own hells on the Volga and the Spree. Postwar strategic decisions about nuclear weapons have also threatened urban devastation. Still, ground forces have developed their combat doctrines avoiding cities whenever possible and fighting only in empty cities when forced into urban combat. But reality interfere with doctrine.

The world has changed vastly since World War II. Rural population has dramatically decreased and urban population has sky-rocketed. Describing the city’s role in the 21st century, Jacqueline Beaudeau-Garnier wrote, “The great metropolis is the symbol of our epoch.”5 The most rapid urbanization is in Asia and Africa. The UN projects that by 2025, 60 percent of the world’s population (5 billion people)
will live in urban areas. Urban sprawl blocks many operational lines, preventing military bypass, as illustrated in Korea’s western corridor, the German Ruhr, the Shanghai-Beijing approach, the Ganges valley and the Boston-Washington approach. Many cities are now too big to evacuate and there is no place for displaced residents to go, as is apparent in Singapore, Hong Kong, Calcutta, Tokyo, Seoul, Lagos, Mexico City and Los Angeles.

Even during World War II, urban combat occurred in cities with dense populations still in place such as Manila, Warsaw, Budapest and Berlin. Nor were horrendous civilian casualties necessarily the result of direct assault. By Hitler’s orders, von Lee’s Army Group North never mounted a prepared assault on Leningrad but imposed a 900-day siege that cost well over 400,000 civilian casualties. Since World War II, the presence of large numbers of indigenous civilians seems a constant feature of urban combat as evident in Seoul, Hue, Beirut, Kabul, Panama City, Mogadishu and Grozny.

Urban combat is increasingly likely, since high-precision weapons threaten operational and tactical maneuver in open terrain. Commanders who lack sufficient high-precision weapons will find cities appealing terrain for maneuver, provided they know the city better than their opponent does and can mobilize the city’s resources and population to their purposes. This turns contemporary maneuver warfare on its head. Maneuver by forces may now be possible only in the cities as long as high-precision systems dominate the open countryside. Maneuver by fire may be the only maneuver possible in the countryside. The presence of noncombatants and the nature the city itself may render precision fire problematic. Precision strikes can target specific industries, facilities, military infrastructure and sectors as part of an overall plan of maneuver by fire, but they cannot occupy and hold a city. The high-precision attacks on Baghdad during the Gulf War and more recently against the Sudanese capital and Baghdad, as well as Belgrade, again inflicted limited punishment but did not impose the will of the attacker on the targeted regime.

The US Armed Forces’ change in posture from forward deployment to expeditionary force increases the probability of urban combat in our future. The first two things an expeditionary force needs are an airfield and a port, facilities usually found in or adjacent to a city. If these facilities are located in an allied country, there should be no problem. If they are located in a non-allied country and the locals welcome US forces, that feeling may change and fighting break out, as illustrated in Mogadishu. If
the locals are not initially happy with the arrival of US forces, the first battle may well be urban.

**Spectrum of Urban Combat**

Urban combat can be waged at varying degrees of intensity and commitment. Urban combat can include the actions of an outside force intervening to rescue its citizens from a hazardous urban setting, such as the US Marine Corps noncombatant evacuations at Tirana, Kinshasa, Monrovia and Freetown. Urban combat may include the actions of a peace enforcement force when local police have lost control and criminals or rival factions have seized control, as evident during the Los Angeles riots, Mogadishu, Beirut and Rio de Janeiro. Urban combat may be the result of armed insurrections like Budapest in 1956 and Monrovia, Herat in 1979, and it certainly includes the actions in a city under martial law where urban guerrillas oppose the armed force and engage in terrorist acts similar to Kabul, Dublin, Kandahar and Jerusalem. City fighting between two distinct armed forces is the most obvious form of urban combat, as demonstrated in Seoul, Hue, nation—and the planet. Military actions in other cities may have only local consequences. Still, military actions will have greater political, economic, sociological and commercial consequences in cities than in the countryside. Consequently, the operational commander will probably be constrained by various political dictates, limitations and ROE. Political decisions made far from the scene may change the mission or insert other forces with different missions into the city— with perilous results.

Operational commanders must weigh many considerations before attempting to seize a city. Traditional urban operations begin by surrounding the city, a daunting operation itself. Shanghai and surrounding environs contain over 125 million people and 2,383 square miles, and its police force approaches the size of the US Marine Corps. If the operational commander faces a city that he can physically encircle, the next question is how to reduce it.
vided into small, controllable areas to reduce in turn. This manpower-intensive method, which has changed little from World War II, consumes a great deal of time and logistics support.

One recent approach suggests that the commander can use urban penetration tactics to move on multiple axes to seize an important objective and then isolate and protect it from the enemy. This was the initial approach by Russian forces in the battle for Grozny. They moved on multiple axes to seize the presidential palace, railroad station and radio/television center. They moved unopposed until they were deep in the city, where they attacked and destroyed. The Chechen opposition learned not to provide any permanent strong points that would provide a focus for Russian air, artillery and maneuver forces. Rather, the Chechens employed temporary strong points and a great deal of internal mobility to deploy and redeploy strong points throughout the city. The Russians learned that they had to secure lines of communication to the captured deep objective or the occupying force would quickly be cut off.

Another recent tactic is that of urban thrust, an assault on a narrow axis that frequently changes to confuse the enemy. The Russian forces’ second advance into Grozny was a variant of urban thrust, but difficulties in coordinating supporting fires and actions of adjacent units prevented changing the direction of the thrust. It was hard enough getting everything pointed in and maintaining the same direction. Changes in direction only invited confusion and fratricide.

Yet another recent tactic is urban swarm, in which small units patrolling assigned areas are on call to respond to actions in neighboring sectors. This is a tactic appropriate to a low-intensity battle not on the scale of Grozny.

Another approach to seizing a city is the classic siege—surrounding it and cutting off food, water, power and sanitation services while suppressing information sources. Civilians wanting to leave might be channeled into a “controlled environment.” But such a decision is in the hands of both attacker and defender, who may each have reasons for keeping some or all civilians in the city. Attackers hit decisive points within the city from the air but avoid sustained close combat. The siege would be maintained, the proponents argue, until the remaining civilians have had enough and force their army to capitulate. This approach mirrors Giulio Douhet’s failed theory of strategic bombing in the 1930s and the Gulf War’s premise that a defeated Iraq would rapidly overthrow Saddam Hussein. While civilians may lose heart and demand surrender, history has shown that civilians more often have as much determination as their military and prefer to have their own countrymen in charge instead of a foreign force. Paradoxically, starvation and disease can often strengthen their resolve. Civilians may even join the military in conducting the battle rather than surrender, as they did at Leningrad and Warsaw.

Commanders who lack sufficient high-precision weapons will find cities appealing terrain for maneuver, provided they know the city better than their opponent does and can mobilize the city’s resources and population to their purposes. This turns contemporary maneuver warfare on its head. Maneuver by forces may now be possible only in the cities as long as high-precision systems dominate the open countryside. Maneuver by fire may be the only maneuver possible in the countryside.

Soviets managed to evacuate the children during the siege of Leningrad, further hardening the resolve of remaining civilians.

The Russians finally took Grozny using the World War II approach—they flattened the city with artillery and aviation strikes, slowly pushing their way through the rubble. The destruction of a nation’s own city suggests an utter disconnect between the political objective—ending armed conflict and reconciliation—and the military means, a war of annihilation.

The operational commander must prepare to deal immediately with the civilian population. If the water system breaks down or becomes polluted, an epidemic will follow. If the commander surrounds the city, the populace will quickly run out of food. The news media will quickly photograph hungry or diseased children. The commander does not have the luxury of claiming that military necessity precludes consideration of civilians’ survival. He must prepare to restore or provide food, water, health care, public health services and public safety. Therefore, a greater than usual number of engineer, civil affairs, hospital and military police units must deploy with the initial-entry forces. In fact, the bulk of logistics support may go to supporting the civilian population rather than the armed force. Urban combat traditionally consumes supplies at a much higher rate than maneuver warfare, and the additional burden of supporting the civilian populace may seriously strain the logistics system.

Yet an army’s support system may not sustain a city. Without a well-developed road network, a city may depend on rail, barge or ship transport to sustain its populace in peacetime. Should this trans-
deploy rail-restoration and port-rehabilitation units to ensure logistic support.

“Destroying the city to save it” with artillery and aerial bombardment will often not be an option. Fire support will most likely be constrained for political, economic, public relations or humanitarian reasons. Attacks against cultural objects, such as museums, ancient structures, monuments, temples and cathedrals, will often be proscribed, regardless of enemy activity. This loss of indirect-fire support places the infantryman further in harm’s way. Helicopter gunships will prove the most responsive and effective aerial support for urban combat and are effective against snipers and enemy forces in upper floors. However, enemy short-range air defenses will probably constrain their use forward of friendly positions and restrict their role to popping up behind captured high-rises to engage targets. Losing helicopters behind enemy lines in a city requires attempting recovery of downed crews under the most difficult circumstances.

The best sources of intelligence in urban combat are the local police force, city engineers, utility workers, hospital workers and shopkeepers—provided they are friendly. If not, enemy human intelligence advantages will place attacking forces at great risk. Urban masking and access to communications traffic limit technical intelligence. Current maps in scale 1:12,500 are the most useful but frequently the hardest to find. City maps are usually out of date and the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) system is almost useless in a city. Thus nonstandard location systems predominate, such as “the informant will meet you at the corner of Kaiserdam and Einsiedlerhof” or “there is an ammunition cache at 1512 Cinco de Mayo street.” The precise location of underground metros and tunnels and conduits for electricity, gas, fiber-optic cable, steam, sewage and emergency drainage become essential items of information, and these passages may become key terrain.

Guarding the expeditionary force’s health is a challenge. Endemic disease and epidemics resulting from the collapse of civic services can infect and decimate any force. The Russian force in Chechnya suffered from cholera, viral hepatitis, shigellosis and enterocolitis. During the cold-weather months, up to 15 percent of the Russian force was incapacitated by viral hepatitis. Psychiatric casualties are much higher in urban combat, necessitating an accelerated schedule of unit rotation for rest and recuperation as well as integrating replacements and conducting training.

Force reconstitution will be a constant concern for the operational commander. Urban combat requires large numbers of soldiers, and battle casualties are typically higher. Units will have to rotate regularly and in fairly short intervals, with divisions taking responsibility for integrating replacements, retraining units and handling unit rotations. This probably means that a division will have no more than two brigades in the fight at any time during sustained urban combat.

Communications within a city will prove a constant problem. If the local telephone system and cellular phone system are intact, they must be safeguarded since they are the most reliable communications available. Unfortunately, they are also unsecure. Battle command is threatened since tall buildings, power lines, electric trains and trolley lines and industrial power lines interfere with FM radio transmissions. There are only a few FM frequencies, most in the lower bands, that work in cities; thus both sides will be trying to use the same part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Communications units will need to install redundant nets, direction antennas and retransmission units. Wire communication will be the primary mode in urban combat.

Once a city is captured, it normally must be occupied and defended so that, if the defending force meets a setback, it may retreat into the city to defend its port and airfields. The type of defense will depend on the nature of the enemy and the characteristics of the city. The enemy may be irregular guerrillas like those in Belfast, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Beirut and Jerusalem; standing armed forces like in Seoul and Hue; or a combination of the two, as in Saigon and Grozny.

**Tactical Considerations of Urban Combat**

Technology will have only a marginal impact on the operational resolution of urban combat, but it can produce tactical advantages. Some older technology is more applicable in urban combat than newer technology. For example, the .223 bullet common to most modern infantry weapons will not penetrate many walls—unlike the venerable .30-06 or .308
City fighting between two distinct armed forces is the most obvious form of urban combat, as demonstrated in Seoul, Hue, Panama City, Grozny and Sarajevo... Activity at the lower end of the urban combat spectrum is more probable than at the upper end. Thus, planners should consider how to fight criminal gangs, armed insurgents and urban guerrillas.

cartridges that chew through brick, wood and adobe. Tanks will have limited utility in the city, particularly among high-rises, where the elevation of the main gun and co-axial machinegun are insufficient. Self-propelled howitzers will provide better direct-fire support to the infantry. The Russians found the venerable ZSU 23-4 armored, antiaircraft quadruple machinegun an excellent weapon against basements and upper floors in Grozny. During the fighting in Herat, the Soviets found that the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher was an effective direct-fire weapon against guerrilla strong points during urban combat.21 Artillery is very useful in providing smoke screens—every fourth or fifth Russian artillery round fired in Grozny was smoke or white phosphorus. The Russians noted benefits of white phosphorus smoke—it is toxic, readily penetrates protective mask filters and is not banned by any treaty.23 The Russians found that wheeled armored personnel carriers (BTRs) were often better suited for urban combat than tracked armored personnel carriers (BMPs).

Protecting armored vehicles will be a primary concern for the small-unit leader. In combat in Grozny, the Chechen lower-level combat group consisted of 15 to 20 soldiers subdivided into three- or four-man fighting cells consisting of an antitank gunner armed with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG), a machinegunner, a sniper and perhaps an ammunition bearer/assistant gunner. Deploying as antiarmor hunter-killer teams, the sniper and machinegunner would pin down supporting infantry while the RPG gunner engaged an armored vehicle. Cells deployed at ground level, in upper stories and in basements. Normally five or six hunter-killer teams simultaneously attacked a single armored vehicle. Kill shots were generally aimed at the top, rear and sides of vehicles, and Chechens dropped bottles of jellied gasoline on top of vehicles. The Chechen hunter-killer teams tried to trap vehicle columns in narrow city streets by destroying the first and last vehicles, trapping the column and allowing its gradual destruction. The Russians countered this technique by moving dismounted infantry in front of the armored vehicles, including ZSU 23-4 antiaircraft guns in the column, mounting reactive armor on vehicles and outfitting them with wire mesh cages that provided a 25-30 centimeter standoff to defeat RPG shaped charges.24 This arrangement’s effectiveness against the new RPG tandem round is a matter of conjecture.

Russian doctrine called for a 6:1 advantage in personnel for urban combat. In Grozny, some 60,000 Russians battled 12,000 Chechens. The Russian 5:1 advantage was not enough. Initially, the Russians did not mass sufficient combat power forward, and the tactical correlation of forces favored the Chechens. The Russians learned that every building they captured had to be garrisoned or else the Chechens would retake it and use it to cut off the Russian advance. The requirement to garrison everything seized meant that a battalion ran out of combat power after advancing only a few blocks.25
Urban combat expends huge amounts ammunition, particularly fragmentation grenades, smoke grenades, tear gas grenades, demolition charges, disposable one-shot antitank grenade launchers, artillery smoke rounds and artillery white phosphorus rounds. This severely stresses the logistics system. Further, the Russian experience in Grozny showed that a good supply of ropes with grappling hooks, lightweight ladders, pyrotechnics and tank-mounted and dismounted searchlights were very valuable in urban combat. Getting the supplies forward to the engaged forces proved a problem for the Russian forces in Grozny, since unarmored trucks were too vulnerable to Chechen fire, and scarce BTRs had to be substituted. This caused supply bottlenecks in the Russian “push” supply system, since BTRs had to withdraw from combat for hauling supplies. There was a clear need for a wheeled, armored supply vehicle.

Urban combat is small-unit combat conducted primarily by companies, platoons and squads. Dismounted infantry contingents, the primary combatants, require combined arms augmentation and reinforcement. Armored vehicles provide direct-fire support, engineers supply crossing and demolition support, and mortar and artillery pieces provide smoke and fire support. Antiaircraft machineguns, smoke generator personnel and flame thrower operators offer essential support.

Tactics, of course, vary with the type of enemy and city, intensity of combat and unit mission. Urban terrain and ROE strip away many combat multipliers of a modern army. Aggressive patrolling, ambushes and raids will probably be key in any urban combat. Skilled marksmen and snipers will prove devastatingly effective in the urban tactical fight.

Modernized city centers can hinder attackers. Many cities have rebuilt their key centers using control architecture. This modernized architecture, while appearing to improve access to the area, is actually designed to allow a small security element to control or deny access to the area. Television monitors can detect the presence of any unwanted elements, microphones can monitor conversations, escalators and elevators can be shut off remotely and electronic barriers can be activated on access ramps. Defenders seal intruders into holding areas that appear to be normal entries into modern buildings. Many city centers are self-contained, with their own water and electrical supplies. Although primarily designed to withstand criminals and rioting, modern buildings with control architecture can prove effective deterrents to outside forces.

Fraticide will be a constant concern, particularly along unit boundaries. In Grozny, the Russians learned that troops need to wear something distinctive and easily changeable, particularly during assaults. Marking panels or other readily identifiable markers can identify captured rooms and buildings to friendly forces. Unit sectors must be readily identifiable and avoid turns that could lead to one force’s moving in front of another friendly force.

“Don’t go there” remains the best advice for urban combat. However, urban sprawl, the high-tech battlefield and the expeditionary role for US Armed Forces make this axiom problematic. On the modern battlefield, an enemy aware of US advantages in maneuver by fire may well choose to go there, precisely because the city negates technological advantages and imposes constraints.

Urban combat is a daunting challenge to prepare for logically and methodically. CINCs should identify those cities in their areas of responsibility that could become urban battlefields and direct their staffs to prepare detailed studies for those contingencies. Divisions and brigades need to tailor urban combat training to their projected areas of operation. Developments and refinements in force structure, equipment design, logistics procedures and deployment sustainment should support the divisions’ and brigades’ missions. Reserve Component training readiness to support these projected urban deployments should also reflect the realities of this difficult form of warfare. Training should be specific to the urban environment.

Planners should determine the type of cities in which US forces may become involved. Preparations should include giving attention to each city’s complex social system reflecting social, ethnic, religious diversity and contradictions. Civil affairs and psychological operations training will assume paramount importance. Russian authors stress that one of the key battles lost by the Russian Army was the information battle. It was lost in both Grozny and Moscow. An urban combat training center, similar to the combat training centers, should be developed to teach urban tactics, techniques and procedures. Such a training center would need to incorporate training models that include social, cultural, ethnic
and political dynamics as well as urban terrain features—modern stone, steel and concrete cities with intensive subterranean features; sprawling cities that combine modern buildings and jerry-built slums; ancient adobe cities with crowded bazaars and tangled road networks; lightly built tropical cities that spill out onto the waterways; and crowded coastal cities which stretch for miles and push up the sides of coastal mountains.

MOUT training facilities should reflect these models, but they are inherently expensive, high-maintenance and too small. Thirty buildings do not constitute a city. Simulations can play a valuable role in training operational commanders and staffs for modern urban combat and for the tactical training of small units in this demanding environment. In urban warfare computerized war games, a world-class opposing force should contest Blue Forces for the loyalty and support of the indigenous population. Computerized training systems, such as JA-NUS and WARRIOR, should incorporate city models that allow interaction at ground level, at various building heights and in subterranean passages. Computerized training models that currently generate all locations using the UTM system should incorporate nonstandard location systems.

The US military must prepare now to avoid a Grozny later. Yet even with the best preparations, future urban combat will remain “combat in hell.” Unfortunately, it also will remain unavoidable.

**NOTES**

3. Ibid., 203.
7. After Warsaw (1939) but before Stalingrad (1942), Hitler was very reluctant to commit his troops to prepared assaults on cities.
12. A prime example is the US mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, which began feeding a starving populace and then switched to taking an active side in a civil war. A US Army ranger battalion was sent into the United Nations area with a purely combat mission. In an unprecedented development, after President Clinton’s emissary (former President Carter) had met with Aidid, the US State Department was engaged in diplomatic overtures with Aidid at the same time that the rangers were sent to capture him. A complicated coalition and US chain of command further contributed to the ensuing debacle.
14. The Chechens made an exception of the presidential palace and held this as a permanent strong point for its symbolic value.
15. Gange, 53.
16. Ibid.
18. Blockades do not always achieve their intended purpose. The ongoing blockades and embargos of Cuba, Libya, Iran and Iraq have not resulted in dramatic policy shifts by the leaders of these states. The people have learned to adjust to economic hardship. They can also learn to adjust to the demands of war.
20. For a look at Russian communications work-arounds during the battle for Grozny, see Lester W. Grau, Urban Warfare Communications: A Contemporary Russian View, Red Throst Star (July 1996), 5-10.
26. Ibid., 3-4.

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The Brazilian Amazon

Controlling the Hydra

Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired

THE FRONTIER where the Amazon River forms the border between Peru and Colombia, then flows into Brazil, has become one of the critical “hot spots” in South America—and not just because it is near the equator. Here, the Brazilian city of Tabatinga (alongside sister-city Leticia, Colombia) is the nexus of transnational activities that make this region an exemplar for regional un- governability.1 Dangers to security and managed development in the Brazilian Amazon abound. Brazil will need modernized, mobile forces and sound operational concepts to control the Amazon.

Brazil’s interests throughout the Amazon include defending the territorial integrity of a huge area, over half the size of the country; maintaining a Brazilian spirit of citizenship (and ascendancy of the Portuguese language) in border communities; and promoting sustainable development. Advancing these strategic interests hinges on cultivating cooperative relationships with neighboring countries and actively defending against transnational threats that have blossomed at remote jungle borders.

The Threat

Threats to Brazilian interests include the criminal activities of narcoguerrillas and drug traffickers, smuggled contraband ranging from guns to bird feathers and direct assaults against the environment and economy by illegal loggers, gold miners, fishermen and hunters. South American nations hold each other responsible for these coterminous border areas in traditional, geostrategic terms, but they have been unable to maintain control. The Alto Solimões region of western Amazonas state, which Brazil guards with a battalion of jungle infantry, some platoon outposts and a handful of federal po-

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1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

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2 This area represents the challenges found all along the border of Brazil’s Região Norte (northern region), and thus, the Alto Solimões is the main focus of this article.

3 The Area of Operations

The Brazilian Army’s Solimões Frontier Command (CFSol)/8th Jungle Infantry Battalion is responsible for providing security throughout the Alto Solimões and along the open frontier. This section of the frontier is 1,300 kilometers long, running north and south from Tabatinga on the border with Colombia and Peru. The area of responsibility is about the size of Pennsylvania, and it sustains about 130 thousand people who live in and around seven small fluvial townships or counties. About 30,000 of these are indigenous people who continue to live in 90 outlying tribal societies. Officially there are about 200 foreigners registered in Tabatinga, but local officials estimate that 10,000 Peruvians and Colombians reside throughout the municipality. Many of these foreigners are directly or indirectly connected with drug trafficking, illegal fishing and wood cutting.4

Although the CFSol area of responsibility has a relatively small population, it is rich in natural minerals, trees and fish, attracting Brazilian and foreign
businesses. The river transportation system supports ocean-going ships that travel from Iquitos, Peru, via the port at Tabatinga, on through the Brazilian Amazon to the Atlantic Ocean. Not one major road exists in this region linked by rivers.

The river network, stretching into the center of South American drug, gold and wood-producing areas, has attracted criminals to Tabatinga and the Alto Solimões region. Indeed, the Brazilian Antidrug Secretariat (SENAD) regards the Tabatinga area as a critical drug-trafficking pathway to the Atlantic and has given priority to preventing Colombia’s narcoguerrillas from infiltrating the Brazilian Amazon.⁶

Narcoguerrillas

Tabatinga and other border communities in the Brazilian Amazon face a serious armed threat from narcoguerrillas, elements of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC). Throughout Colombia, the FARC may total as many as 15,000 armed combatants in perhaps 80 units, called fronts. Established in 1966 as the military arm of Colombia’s Communist Party, the FARC today is a big criminal business, bringing in approximately $363 million annually through kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking and money laundering.⁶

The spillover of guerrilla activity into Brazil’s Alto Solimões is repeated all along the Colombian border, causing concerns in Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela has reinforced its border posts against FARC guerrilla actions, plus ELN (National Liberation Army) and AUC (United Self-defense Force) paramilitary units. Panama, Ecuador and Peru have also increased military and police presence on their Colombian borders.⁷

Throughout Colombia, FARC fronts have moved into areas connected to coca, petroleum, opium poppies, cattle ranching, bananas and gold. For example, the 11 fronts of the FARC’s southern bloc are involved in growing, processing and marketing cocaine along the San Miguel and Putumayo rivers, which form part of Colombia’s southern border with Ecuador and Peru.⁸ The bloc’s 14th Front reportedly controls coca labs in the Peruvian jungle.
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between the Napo and Putumayo rivers.9 These rivers flow directly into Brazil, with the Napo River offering easy access into Brazil at Tabatinga via the Amazon River. Around Tabatinga and in the Alto Solimões region generally, FARC elements have been attracted by the profit potential of drug trafficking, money laundering and illegal gold mining.10 The FARC threat to Brazil is not new.

In February 1991, a 40-man FARC guerrilla unit attacked across the Trairá River from Colombia into Brazil, killing three Brazilian soldiers and wounding nine other members of a 17-man Brazilian Army detachment. The detachment was at an outpost on the Trairá, 400 kilometers north of the Brazilian Army’s Frontier Command headquarters at Tabatinga. The FARC attack responded to Brazilian Army efforts to establish law and order in an Indian region of illicit gold mining, where FARC had been extorting miners and raiding a local mining company. Cooperative Brazilian-Colombian military operations eliminated the offending FARC unit.11

In September 1996, the Frontier Command went on full alert because of FARC guerrillas in Leticia, Colombia, and reports elements had crossed the border into Brazil near Tabatinga. About 1,000 soldiers of the CFSol, and the 8th Jungle Infantry Battalion deployed throughout Tabatinga to guard border locations, military installations and the airport. The Colombian Army Southern Command took similar actions in neighboring Leticia.

While the operation only lasted two days, it established a contingency procedure. This is important preparation, because threat analysis by both Brazilian and Colombian army officers indicates that the US Andean Ridge Strategy, which effectively put pressure on narcotraffickers in coca-growing areas of Peru, has pushed drug activities into the Amazon Basin. Federal police believe that a large drug trafficking organization has centered its activities on Leticia and Tabatinga.12

On 1 November 1998, the Brazilian Army faced the narcoguerrilla threat, when about 1,400 FARC
combatants attacked Colombia’s Vaupes Department capital, Mitú, less than 20 miles from the border with Brazil. Mitú serves as a transhipment point for chemicals essential in making cocaine. The contraband chemicals move up the Vaupes River from Brazil to production areas in Colombia.

In a loosely coordinated combined effort (which later sparked Brazilian protests), the Brazilian Army border platoon outpost at Queraré refused aircraft and supported ground operations. About 500 Colombian troops counterattacked from Brazil to retake Mitú on 4 November. In the battle, 150 Colombian combatants, seven civilians and five FARC guerrillas were reported killed and the FARC captured 40-45 police. Beyond the scourge of ongoing narcoguerrilla activities, the Brazilian Amazon faces an even wider range of transnational dangers that contribute to the border’s lawlessness.

**Gold Mining and Logging**

Gold mining poses both a direct and indirect threat to the Alto Solimões. Garimpeiros, clandestine gold prospectors working along the Rio Puruê and Rio Jutai, create ecological problems with jungle clearing, mercury pollution and contamination of the fish. In addition, the garimpeiros often consort with drug traffickers as laborers or money launderers.

The decline in clandestine gold mining in recent years in the nearby Brazilian states of Rondonia and Para has stranded thousands of jobless destitute garimpeiros. The clandestine mining industry and its workers are shifting to new areas such as Tabatinga, and these workers are readily recruited to log Bigleaf Mahogany and other fine woods. This is the principal threat to the flora of western Amazonas state, where loggers have cut into indigenous lands, national parks and wildlife preserves. About 80 percent of Brazil’s mahogany is logged illegally; worse, loggers cut down 27 other trees to harvest just one hardwood tree.

Wood illegally cut from the Brazilian Selva (jungle) floats along the rivers during the rainy season (September through March) to sawmills in Brazil and Peru before shipment via the Amazon River to world markets. The Brazilian Army has tried to stop clandestine logging and its destruction of Indian lands and culture. But the Selva is immense and the army presence is too small to secure the Amazon.

What is the army’s role and how does it operate to defend Brazil’s interests in security and development? The purpose for an army presence in the western Amazon dates to 1637, when Portuguese Capt-

tain Pedro Teixeira explored the length of the Amazon Basin. His expeditions begat the doctrine of *uti possidetis* (sovereignty resulting from settlement). By 1776 the new Brazilians had established Fort San Francisco Xavier de Tabatinga to defend the frontier and support settlement in the western Amazon region. With few disruptions, Brazil’s soldiers have maintained Fort San Francisco for over 200 years to ensure ownership of the frontier.

**The Army’s Role**

The idea of “sovereignty and settlement” in modern times is embodied in the Calha Norte federal consolidation initiative for security and development in areas ranging to the north of the Brazilian Amazon.
and Solimões rivers. Efforts are concentrated within a 100 mile-wide zone along the northern border, protected by border platoon outposts and other units. The government of President José Sarney approved the 1985 project for bringing “order and progress” to the Amazon by settling people in the remote Brazilian jungle areas. Initially seen as a high-priority interagency effort, in recent years support for the Calha Norte project has waned, and the armed forces, especially the army, have done most of the work. Brazil’s National Defense Policy (PDN) intends to revitalize the Calha Norte project with the aim of settling and controlling Amazon borders.

The army’s peacetime operational concept for the Brazilian Amazon involves four Jungle Infantry brigades, six Frontier Command Headquarters, their integral jungle infantry battalions, and a series of 20 border platoon bases in remote areas. Jungle infantry battalion troops conduct security operations along the frontier, while the border platoon outposts anchor community and economic development at remote sites.

The CFSol and 8th Jungle Infantry Battalion make up an integrated force designed to provide security while supporting development missions along the border. Operating out of Fort San Francisco, it is typical of the six Frontier Commands in the Brazilian Amazon, containing two companies of jungle infantry, a headquarters company and a base administration support company. Also located in Tabatinga are logistics and service units, a navy port captain’s office, an air force detachment and a large army hospital.

The base administration support company oversees and supports the command’s four border platoons, located far from Tabatinga. With nearly all transportation by boat, the 3d Border Platoon, 320 kilometers to the north at Bittencourt on the Japurá River, is a week away. The 1st Border Platoon at Palmeiras on the Javari River, 340 kilometers southwest of Tabatinga, is six days travel by boat. Travel southwest to the 4th Platoon at Estirao do Equador on the Javari River, or northward to the 2d Platoon at Ipiranga on the Icã River takes about four days. When air transportation is available, the four pla-
The federal police in the Alto Solimões region are few, and military support is often essential to control the flow of cocaine and other contraband through the area. At Anzol base, located on a constricted reach of the Rio Solimões, police officers search boat traffic headed down river. The jungle infantry secures the small outpost against retaliation by narcoguerrillas.

Jungle Combat—the Jungle Operations Detachments

The Jungle Operations detachments (DOS) are formed into groups of about 12 highly trained jungle infantry soldiers skilled in long-range reconnaissance and combat patrolling. The DOS provide surveillance of the open frontier between border platoon positions and within the interior of the Selva. They also provide a limited quick-reaction capability for civil and military emergencies.

The DOS are organized like a US Army special forces A-Team, with one or two company grade officers leading sergeants and soldiers highly trained in areas such as communications, medical care and demolitions. Combat-equipped with folding-stock para FN FAL 7.62mm rifles, an FN MAG 7.62mm machinegun, ammunition and supplies, the DOS can patrol the jungle for about 10 hours a day, advancing perhaps 10 kilometers.

A typical DOS direct-action mission supports the federal police efforts against drug traffickers in the Brazilian Amazon. The DOS can neutralize small, clandestine airstrips that narcoguerrillas often build to move the coca product. The team accompanies federal police in medium-size boats to drop-off points along the river network, then moves inland to locate the airstrips using Global Positioning System instruments and aerial photographs.

In similar missions, other jungle infantry detachments deploy to assure security for law enforcement. The federal police in the Alto Solimões region are few, and military support is often essential to control the flow of cocaine and other contraband through the area. At Anzol base, located on a constricted reach of the Rio Solimões, police officers search boat traffic headed down river. The jungle infantry secures the small outpost against retaliation by narcoguerrillas.

The DOS is most important to the CFSoI for its reconnaissance patrolling. These teams habitually...
operate in the same river basin areas, including the Rios Javari, Qui xo, Itaquai, Itui, Curuça and Branco. They develop a thorough understanding of the area and its people and maintain a strong intelligence capability. Because many of these jungle infantry soldiers’ families reside in the Alto Solimões, the local Indians and caboclos keep the DOS well informed about guerrilla and criminal intruders.27 With this expertise, the DOS have also proved essential for search and rescue operations in the Selva.

In recent years the DOS have been the Frontier Command’s point teams and assist various federal agencies in protecting and developing the region. The DOS support the Brazilian Environment and Renewable Resources Institute (IBAMA) against clandestine hunting, fishing and logging.28 They help the National Foundation for Indian Affairs (FUNAI) locate unauthorized miners, farmers and loggers operating on Indian lands. Interestingly, these soldiers bring in special and dangerous plant specimens for the National Institute of Amazon Research (INPA) to evaluate as medicine or food products.20

To accomplish their demanding tasks, the jungle infantrymen receive specialized training that extends beyond the typical military experience. Army Land Forces Command instruction on “environmental care” trains them to look at areas where miners, loggers and poachers are polluting the rivers, burning the Selva and killing game—while focusing on the current military mission.30 The DOS missions are essential to Brazil’s strategy for Amazon security. But the outlying Border Platoon bases and their surrounding communities represent the quintessence of Brazil’s National Defense Policy “to develop and populate the border.”

Army Frontier Settlements

The Border platoons establish a physical presence along the Amazon frontier to reinforce Brazil’s commitment to regional security. As long ago as the 17th century, Brazilian military outposts provided a base for communities, and the platoons attract development around their positions today. A senior infantry lieutenant, assisted by his noncommissioned officers, usually commands the platoon bases. Each base also includes an army doctor, dentist and laboratory assistant who also serves as a pharmacist. The CFSol/8th BIS Border platoons’ average strength is 150 military and dependents, with another 200-500 local people settled around the bases. Thus, total population at each of CFSol’s four platoon communities ranges from 350 to over 600.32 A platoon base Self-Defense Force is organized, trained and armed as light infantry to provide quick reaction to emergencies and community security.33 The Self-Defense Force comprises farmers, laborers and fishermen, and their close ties to the local area affords good access to human intelligence. They receive routine training from the Border Platoon commander and form an effective unit for local defense.

Soldiers are encouraged to settle their families at the Border Platoon bases, bringing a sense of Brazil’s culture from hometowns all over the country. The frontier communities attract local inhabitants (otherwise given to nomadic lifestyles) to settle and build homes nearby so that they can take advantage of health care and schooling. The frontier community manages electricity and treated water systems and strives to pave the streets with asphalt. The homes are typically small, two- or three-room buildings, complete with thatch or tin roofs and a satellite antenna to capture Brazilian television. Each Border Platoon community has a primary school, with officers’ and noncommissioned officers’ wives serving as teachers. Often, the soldiers serve as teachers too, and everyone can take advantage of the long-distance education programs via TV.

The health clinics at the Border Platoons provide a doctor and dentist for outpatient care. Because of limited medical evacuation to the army hospital at Tabatinga, the doctors, supported by a small but well-stocked pharmacy and laboratory, also handle serious medical emergencies.34 In the Alto Solimões malaria, tuberculosis, hepatitis and cholera are prevalent, along with other diseases such as leishmaniasis, oropouche fever and yellow fever. Snakes and leeches can be hazards too, and it is common for the army doctors to treat snakebite victims.35 The clinic staff at the platoon outpost see about 3,000 patients each year. Treatment for food-borne and water-borne illness is common, and a medical team from the army hospital at Tabatinga conducts
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field trips to attack the underlying causes of cholera outbreaks. It is normal for Peruvian or Colombian jungle dwellers to appear at the platoon outposts seeking medical care, which they are provided as a humanitarian gesture. While active in humanitarian and civic actions, the jungle soldiers focus on their primary missions: to maintain vigilance on the border and attract settlement and development.

The Frontier Command promotes municipal development throughout the Alto Solimões. Its reforestation program enlists local workers in a legal regimen against illegal and destructive logging business. In 1996 the command confiscated over 9,000 logs of quality wood headed to collection points in Peru. It envisions a logging center near Estirão do Equador that will manage a forestry program with IBAMA.

The Frontier Command also searches for new medicines and foods. Scientists at the University of Amazonas and INPA in Manaus have been working with the army to integrate modern methods of biotechnology with traditional Indian knowledge of the therapeutical effects of various jungle plants. At Tabatinga, army pharmacist First Lieutenant Giovanni Carlo Guercio has cataloged and tested over 50 plant specimens for their usefulness and to find out which plants can be grown commercially. A light industry may develop from processing these special plants for medical use.

Brazilian President Cardoso unfolded a vision for national security and development that depends on a “ring of peace” around the Amazon and the rest of the country. Despite the Calha Norte plan and other initiatives designed to assure security and development throughout the Legal Amazon, the damage to the environment, abuse of Indians and their lands and ubiquitous criminal activity suggest the strategy is failing.

Continuing Dangers and New Threats

Economic and social reforms supported by vigorous military and police activities can mitigate dangers to the Amazon. Some solutions reside
squarely within the domain of the National Congress. The army’s role “to protect the Brazilian Amazon Region with the support of all of society and by utilizing the military presence” requires reassessing its force structure and operational concepts for defending the jungle patrimony. The border platoons will remain essential for serving the Brazilian people, but they are insufficient. Operating concepts exploiting modern weapons and technology and capable of countering new, emerging threats should augment the 300-year-old core strategy of *uti possidetis* (sovereignty resulting from settlement).

As the $1.4 billion System for the Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM) comes on line in 2002, it will need an up-to-date operational backup. SIVAM is envisioned as an integrated system of 10 giant radars (radomes), 100 weather stations, surveillance aircraft, communications monitoring and digitized satellite imagery, supported by a satellite-based radio and telephone network. Computers at three operations centers (Belem, Manaus,

(Above) Soldiers prepare a *Bandeirante* aircraft to shuttle priority cargo and an Indian woman suffering a difficult pregnancy to Tabatinga. River travel from the headquarters at Tabatinga southwest to the 4th Platoon at Estrada do Equador takes about four days, but when air transportation is available, the platoon can be reached within an hour. (Left) An army dentist treats a woman at a temporary dental clinic established in the schoolhouse at Tacuna Indian village located on the Solimoes River.

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Porto Velho) will integrate data from 860 sites and pass it to the General Coordination Center in Brasilia. The future network offers information about weather hazards, jungle fires and criminal activities, as well as airspace control over the Legal Amazon.103

Still, mobile police and military forces are necessary to respond to the integrated, multi-source information. Developing ample airmobile force structure (especially helicopter units), repositioning some elements of the strategic Rapid Reaction Capability force to meet the emerging threats and providing funds to support a high tempo of operations and training are concepts familiar to Brazil’s military planners.

With sufficient funding by the National Congress, the Brazilian army will be able to start modernizing its force and fully leverage SIVAM’s technological advantage. However, given Brazil’s recent financial crisis, the surveillance system will likely come on-line long before law enforcement and the military are ready to fully exploit it.41 Military commanders will be able to see the battlefield better but still not act effectively.

The Brazilian army pursues its security mission as “the main defender of the Amazon.”42 Energy and enthusiasm aside, the Amazon is vast and army resources are limited. MR
summer98.html

5. The account of guerrillas "taxing" drug trafficking operations see "Tirinco's Cartel," Semana (Bogota: 13 Feb 96), 34-36 available from FBIS FT19960213000299. Internet. Also see El Tiempo (15 July 1996) and FBIS, El Tiempo (15 July 1996), which lists specifics regarding the activities of FARC's 14th Front. This front significantly taxes drug activities in Caqueta.


7. "Documentos de la Version Alemana," Semana, 769 (Bogota: 20 January 1997), 48. The FARC seems to be growing in strength over the past five years; from 5,000 guerrillas in 1992 to about 7,500 combatants and 66 fronts (100-200 men each) today, but the numbers vary. depending on who is providing them. With the number of FARC guerrillas, the 70-year-old criminal gang leader, at his. own advice, and Maria del Marlanda Vejel (Tirofijo-Sure Shot) claimed in a June 1998 interview see Pacoich Echeagaray, "Oscurito Panorama En Colombia Tiro Fijo," La Jornada (8 Jun 96, 57) that the FARC's 60 fronts are the same as "Colombia Terrorismo, 1957-1996," Latin American Special Report, 5 Jun 96; Vol. 1 No. 1. a front is al- leged to have between 130 to 200 people. Thus, one could estimate FARC's strength to be between 7,600 to 12,000. For a government account of the guerrilla strength, see Semana's "Los Cocaos de la guerrilla," Cambo 16, 6 Jul 1992, titled "Sources, Amounts of Guerrilla Funding Noted," FBFS FT19980707001747, 7 June 1998. See also "The Big Guerrilla Business," Semana 531 (Bogota, 7-14 July 1992), as translated by Robert T. Buckman, RMRSO Report No. 10 (Fort Lenawee, Kansas: Foreign Military-Sharing Office, 8 December 1998).


12. "El sindrome de Jaco.," Semana, 6 November 1998, 50-3. Also:Colombia Declares Casualties From Avengers Attempt, Bloomberg News, 1 November 1998, Internet. "Colombia Rebels, Anti-Terrorist Drug," Miami Herald (2 November 1995), Internet. "Assina guaneta a 70 policias," El Norte (3 November 1995), Internet. A Brazilian government ambassador recalled their trial-dress display of pique for Colombia's inadequate coordination with Brazilian authorities. In the late ´90s, thousands of Colombia's guerrillas infiltrated into Brazil's border areas. These people are Colombians and Peruvians who bring with them Spanish culture and the criminal language. The Brazilians claim that infiltrating the border (typically around the border platon locations) is to promote Latin American citizenship and use of the Portuguese language.

13. "Jose Antonio Braga, Colonel, Brazilian Army, Commander, Colombian Military Region of 8th Region in Colombia, 1994, 58-79. The Brazilian run military operation aimed to maintain these units at a state of increased readiness, the Parachute Brigade, 12th Light Infantry (Airborne) Brigade, the Aviation Brigade and the 1st Special Forces Bat- talion (which responded to the 1991 Train River incident mentioned earlier in this article). The RRC has top-quality units by world standards, but it has been sign- ificantly cramped in recent years by budget shortfalls. It does have sufficient aviation assets to adequately accomplish the Amazon protection mission.


15. "The Descarted Operaciones de Selva (Jungle Operations detach- ments), or DSOs, Caracas are typically the people who are born in the Amazon (other indigenous people still living in tribal units), often described as mixed breed people by anthropologists. They are usually small in numbers. Many have been drawn into Brazil's border areas. These people are Colombians and Peruvians who bring with them Spanish culture and the criminal language. The Brazilians claim that infiltrating the border (typically around the border platon locations) is to promote Latin American citizenship and use of the Portuguese language.

16. "Motorcycle forces are used in contra operations (9 Noveb 1998), 50-3. Also:Colombia Declares Casualties From Avengers Attempt, Bloomberg News, 1 November 1998, Internet. "Colombia Rebels, Anti-Terrorist Drug," Miami Herald (2 November 1995), Internet. "Assina guaneta a 70 policias," El Norte (3 November 1995), Internet. A Brazilian government ambassador recalled their trial-dress display of pique for Colombia's inadequate coordination with Brazilian authorities. In the late ´90s, thousands of Colombia's guerrillas infiltrated into Brazil's border areas. These people are Colombians and Peruvians who bring with them Spanish culture and the criminal language. The Brazilians claim that infiltrating the border (typically around the border platon locations) is to promote Latin American citizenship and use of the Portuguese language.


18. Snakes that are common to the area are the hemorhoca jaraca, or the ne- utricolic coral snake and the especio jaco. Brazilian jungle soldiers learn about these snakes in their Jungle Warfare Training Center (CJFT) course. Manaus and how to care for snake-bite victims. When on jungle patrol, each soldier carries a spe- cial kit containing fixes and antidotes for snake-bite that can be applied to the patient. See: "Author's visit to squad-size position on the Javari River (west of Benjamin Constant), 3 May 1995. Here soldiers were holding several hundred confiscat- ed guns until they were licensed and shipped to Brazilian mills. The wood ap- pear to me was mahogany.

19. "Giovanni Carro Guercio, First Lieutenant, Brazilian Army Medical Corps, inter- viewer by author, Tabatinga, Brazil, April 1996. "I was first chartegraphic representation of Brazil and the Torodesgles line (about 64° west longitude).

20. "Jorge de Braga, Sao Paulo, Brazil, April 1996, Se: Also: The hemorhoca jaraca and especio jaco. Brazilian jungle soldiers learn about these snakes in their Jungle Warfare Training Center (CJFT) course. Manaus and how to care for snake-bite victims. When on jungle patrol, each soldier carries a spec- ial kit containing fixes and antidotes for snake-bite that can be applied to the patient. See: "Author's visit to squad-size position on the Javari River (west of Benjamin Constant), 3 May 1995. Here soldiers were holding several hundred confiscat- ed guns until they were licensed and shipped to Brazilian mills. The wood ap- pear to me was mahogany.

22. "General of Brigade Sylvio Hecter Ramos, interview.

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US-Mexican Border Security
Civil-Military Cooperation
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

An increasing US and Mexican focus on border security issues is changing the structure, employment and deployment of law enforcement and military establishments on both sides. This article considers the continuing debate surrounding US military support to border law enforcement, focusing most directly on little-examined changes in Mexican policing and military assistance along the border that have brought US and Mexican forces into closer proximity and fostered varying levels of cooperation and uncertainty. Before looking at Mexican military and police interaction and their border presence specifically, it is instructive to briefly review analogous US developments and address how the evolving border security environment shapes law enforcement.

Border Policing and the US Military

The US Border Patrol celebrated its 75th Anniversary on 28 May 1999. This old and distinguished federal law enforcement organization performs an increasingly demanding and complex mission—preventing the smuggling and unlawful entry of undocumented aliens into the United States, apprehending immigration law violators and serving as the primary agency responsible for drug and contraband interdiction between ports of entry. These challenges exist in all of the Border Patrol’s 22 US and Puerto Rican sectors, but the 2,000 miles of shared border with Mexico remain the most critical, most publicly visible, most dangerous and the most rapidly evolving. This is reflected not only in high rates of illegal immigration, but in mounting cross-border violence, internationalized drug, arms, and alien smuggling and fundamental changes in the border environment itself.

A spectrum of federal, state and local law enforce-

The basic shape of the current US-Mexico border was established in conflict more than 150 years ago and remains challenged… border raids associated with the 1910-1920 Mexican Revolution—and especially Pancho Villa’s 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico—had real substance and sparked General John J. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico to curtail the Villa threat.

ment organizations join the Border Patrol in many aspects of border region policing, particularly drug interdiction. But the most controversial partner, as viewed from both sides of the border, clearly has been the US military. For years, US Active and Reserve Component military support to drug law enforcement along the border has sparked protests in the United States and from Mexican official and media sources. Charges that the border is being “militarized” became increasingly common in the mid-1990s. These protests peaked in May 1997, when a US Marine patrol/observation team supporting the Border Patrol near Redford, Texas, shot and killed an 18-year-old American citizen, Esequiel Hernandez, who had fired in their direction. An investigation found that the Marine corporal who fired the shot acted in accord with existing rules of engagement and he was not charged. However, the incident has become a familiar topic in debates about using US military forces to support law enforcement.

The prospect of increased and broader border security roles for the military has surfaced periodically over the last few years and emerged forcefully again on 10 June 1999. On that date, the US House of Representatives approved an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 that would modify Title 10 rules governing...
military support to law enforcement. The House identified the US-Mexican border as a weak point in protecting the US homeland from a range of

transnational threats. The amendment called for the secretary of defense—with the agreement of the attorney general and the secretary of the treasury—to “assign members of the Armed Forces, under certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) [including the Border Patrol] and the United States Customs Service in the performance of border protection functions.” This amendment would explicitly extend military support beyond counterdrug duties and include “preventing the entry of terrorists” and “illegal aliens” as well as other law enforcement functions. It would not, however, bestow powers of arrest and search and seizure.

There was some negative domestic reaction—reportedly including Pentagon opposition—but the most rapid and vociferous response was from Mexico. Mexican articles and editorials decried the vote, characterizing it as “unacceptable militarization of the border, offensive and disproportionate” and incompatible with constructive bilateral relations. They questioned the implication that Mexico served as a base for foreign terrorists and invoked the name of Ezequiel Hernandez as a warning of what might befall migrants and border residents.

The eventual success of this House initiative was far from assured. But while a similar effort failed two years earlier in the Senate the latest amendment had far more resonance than past attempts. This was largely due to the 1998 signing of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 (Combating Terrorism), PDD-63 (Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure), as well as the US military’s ongoing developments of Homeland Defense concepts and approaches. Although Homeland Defense continues to evolve in content and scope, it clearly has implications for the Armed Forces’ role in border security.

While the United States contemplated military support to law enforcement over the last several years, substantial changes were taking place in military and police interaction in Mexico. Before addressing these developments, it is necessary to define past and recent border security developments.

**Evolution of Border Security Issues**

The basic shape of the current US-Mexican border was established in conflict more than 150 years ago and has been challenged ever since. Creation of the Texas Republic from Mexican territory by force of arms in 1836, its subsequent annexation by the United States in 1845, the 1846-1847 war with Mexico and the resulting Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 collectively led to “more than half the territory of Mexico becoming one third of the territory of the United States.” This period was also punctuated by other armed border-altering efforts, notably, the short-lived Republic of the Rio Grande (1840) and abortive efforts by armed groups of Americans in the years after 1847 to establish a “Republic of the Sierra Madre” in Mexico’s Tamaulipas state and annex it to the United States.

The new border remained unsettled in the mid-19th century. In 1859 and 1860, parts of the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas were marked by the “Cortina War,” led by Brownsville area rancher and later governor of Tamaulipas state in Mexico, Juan Nepomuceno Cortina, who challenged the appropriation of land by North American Anglo and the treatment of Mexicans and new Mexican-Americans. His forces took over the town of Brownsville, Texas, and for a while controlled portions of the Lower Rio Grande Valley. The “war” was terminated by the Army and Texas Rangers, but the violence Cortina encouraged from inside Mexico lasted for nearly two decades. By the mid-1870s, continuing bandit raids on US territory from Mexico prompted the formation of a special Texas Ranger force—McNelley’s Rangers—who, with US Army support reduced raids and with uncompromising force established general order in the area.

Twenty years later, the 1898 Spanish-American War stirred continuing anti-US sentiments in Mexico, sparking a Mexican newspaper’s proposal for a clandestine force to incite rebellion on US Indian reservations, mobilize disaffected US black citizens and exploit other perceived fault lines to “liberate us from the unsupportable Yankee yoke.” While such overheated language was rightly judged absurd by most contemporaries, border raids asso-
The US border today remains a dangerous environment for law enforcement officers, with armed confrontations and planned or random shots frequently fired from across the border, often with deadly consequences. Eighty-six Border Patrol agents and pilots have been killed in the line of duty since the force was created, six of them in 1998. . . . Like other law enforcement organizations, the DEA points to the increased targeting of US government personnel and police counterparts in Mexico.

Associated with the 1910-1920 Mexican Revolution—and especially Pancho Villa’s 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico—had real substance and sparked General John J. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico to curtail the Villa threat.

Less well known, but significant, were efforts to implement the 1915 “Plan de San Diego.” The plan was drafted under hazy circumstances in San Diego, Texas, and called for conspirators to “reclaim for themselves the territory comprising Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and California,” promote a race war and put to death every North American male over the age of 16. As many as several thousand Mexican adherents in Texas and Mexico carried out numerous raids and attacks in the Lower Rio Grande Valley for several years, striking isolated ranches and farms, attacking trains or tearing up tracks and hitting other targets of opportunity. The raids were eventually put down—sometimes brutally—by Texas Rangers, the Army and other law enforcement elements that were for a time all put under the control of US Army General Frederick Funston’s Southern Department.10

These irredentist hopes and plans still echo from time to time on the Internet home pages of anarchist and other dissident groups. Some of these formulations seek to reestablish a mythical “Azatlan”—the supposed origin of Aztec, Mayan and Inca peoples that some assert encompasses US territory formerly belonging to Mexico.20

As the 20th century progressed, border law enforcement became more regularized in dealing with cross-border criminality and border control generally. Prohibition-associated smuggling and other contraband smuggling were prominent concerns in the first half of the century as was military cooperation in World War II.21 In the United States, the oft-romanticized 19th- and early 20th-century history briefly addressed above has receded into the past but still illustrates the more intense kinds of military-law enforcement along the US-Mexico border. For many Mexicans and some Mexican-Americans, however, the period is regarded as one of North American abuse and disenfranchisement, making current border law enforcement and control initiatives all the more sensitive.
The border is... marked by urbanization and burgeoning border communities, vibrant economic growth and cultural activities and varying cooperation on US-Mexican central issues. It is also marked by enormous, coexisting disparities in wealth and opportunity. Increasingly, specialists characterize the border region as an area “different” from both the United States and Mexico, an area where the border is disappearing and a new culture is emerging.22 Indeed, the press and public affairs minister for the Mexican Embassy in Washington, José Antonio Zabalgoitia, opined that “the border is the third country between Mexico and the United States. It’s the fourth member of NAFTA.”23 Some specialists have postulated recently that the easier movement of goods and services under the North American Free Trade Act will eventually generate free labor zones as well, with an open US-Mexico border allowing the free movement of people.24

These kinds of formulations by sociologists, political scientists and other specialists on both sides of the border may provide insights into the region and its development. However, border issues on the eve of the new millennium—some redolent of far earlier times—present concrete and growing security problems on both sides of the border.

The US border today remains a dangerous environment for law enforcement officers, with armed confrontations and planned or random shots frequently fired from across the border, often with deadly consequences. Eighty-six Border Patrol agents and pilots have been killed in the line of duty since the force was created, six of them in 1998.25 In this regard, US Border Patrol Agent Alexander Kirpnick was shot and killed on 3 June 1998 while attempting to arrest five Mexican marijuana traffickers two miles north of Nogales, Arizona. Well-organized and armed drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico and other cross-border criminals have increased violence along the border over the last few years.26 These range from armed robberies sometimes taking place many miles inside US territory to car thefts and other planned or random crimes of...
various types. On the other hand, heavy fencing and other security measures along high-crime areas of the border have reduced cross border crime in some sectors. For example, the frequent mid-1990 attacks on Southern Pacific railroad trains near Sunland Park, New Mexico, resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars lost annually, have now been sharply curtailed.  

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA’s) Congressional Testimony in March 1999 detailed the drug dimensions of the problems. The testimony noted that two-thirds of the cocaine entering the United States comes across the Mexican border, along with nearly 30 percent of the heroin and huge quantities of methamphetamines and marijuana. Like other law enforcement organizations, the DEA points to the increased targeting of US government personnel and police counterparts in Mexico.

Continued high levels of illegal immigration—facilitated often by innovative alien smuggling gangs which may have international connections—constitute a continued challenge to territorial sovereignty. The flood of illegal immigrants in some areas has concerned US border ranchers and other residents, sparking self-defense measures. In Douglas, Arizona, for example, border residents report large groups of 30 to 40 illegal immigrants commonly moving across their property throughout the night, a problem developing apace over the last year. Some residents carry weapons, and one has acquired night vision goggles to check for intruders. Residents hint at taking matters into their own hands if necessary, and some have requested National Guard troops and increased law enforcement presence.

Recent cases show that the internationalized alien smuggling now links the US-Mexican border with areas far removed from the Americas. INS personnel have noticed a rise in high-quality forgeries of entry papers and other identification. The potential for entry by foreign terrorists through busy ports-of-entry is enhanced by this development. In addition, natural disasters like Hurricane Mitch, which badly damaged Honduras and other parts of Central America, can generate thousands of unanticipated immigrants who travel through Mexico up to the border. Efforts to deal with the changing nature of illegal immigration have been largely behind increasing the Border Patrol from around 6,000 agents in 1996 to over 8,000 today—more than 7,000 on the US-Mexican border alone. Plans are reportedly underway to add another 1,000 agents, most to be assigned along the southwest border.

The posture of military and law enforcement resources on the other side of the border has also changed as efforts to deal with drug trafficking, arms trafficking and criminal violence—as well as to mitigate endemic police corruption—have seen a greater military presence on the border. These changes and associated developments are reviewed below.

South of the Border: Mexican Military and Police Interaction

Mexico’s mid-1990s’ preoccupation with insurrections in Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca and other impoverished states soon broadened to include skyrocketing criminal violence, institutional corruption, drug operations and other organized crime. Along the US-Mexico border and in the Mexican interior, drug traffickers and other criminals frequently targeted police and other law enforcement personnel.
A well-beaten path marks a favorite Rio Grande crossing site for illegal immigrants moving from Mexico (straight ahead) to the Laredo, Texas area.

*Armed Mexican military units and police patrols occasionally cross into US territory along the often-unmarked border, raising concerns about risky, surprise encounters with the US Border Patrol, other law enforcement bodies and even US military units supporting national drug law enforcement.*

for intimidation or elimination. In this environment, Mexican authorities sought to better use their law enforcement and defense resources to control security threats ranging from insurgency, to drug and arms trafficking, to violent street crime. At the same time, the US government was reportedly insisting that Mexico get tough with drug traffickers and pushing for a more active role by the Mexican military in drug eradication and interdiction. The resulting actions by the Mexican government changed Mexican military-law enforcement interaction generally and altered the composition of Mexico’s security presence at the border.

The Mexican government determined to employ the Defense Secretariat (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional—comprising the army and air force) and the Marine Secretariat (Secretaría de la Marina—constituting the navy and amphibious elements) far more prominently in internal security and law enforcement roles. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Mexico purged, reorganized and reinforced elements of the federal and state police establishments and modernized training and equipment in the growing Mexican armed forces. Increasingly the military bolstered the struggle to restore and sustain adequate internal security and public safety. While judged necessary by hard-pressed Mexican authorities dealing with multiple problems, involving the military also intensified internal debate about its proper role in countering vigorous, growing threats to Mexican stability.

Police corruption has been revealed at every level of administration in every Mexican state. There is scarcely a criminal enterprise without police complicity—major or minor, commonplace or bizarre. Police collusion with drug and other criminal organizations, extortion, bribery and the commission of robberies, assaults and kidnappings is widespread and has affected police, customs and immigration officials on the border as it has in the interior. The Mexican government hoped that military discipline and integrity would help root out the culture of police corruption.

As a consequence, Mexican authorities began a dramatic restructuring of Federal Judicial Police (Policía Judicial Federal [PJF]) and analogous State Judicial Police (Policía Judicial Estatal [PJE]) establishments throughout Mexico, as well as the capital’s Public Security Secretariat (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública [SSP]). Large numbers of cor-
rupt officers were dismissed and many top leadership positions were filled with military personnel. Some military officers were assigned to police establishments in border states such as Baja California, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas among others. Overall, some form of military involvement in law enforcement exists in most of Mexico’s 31 states (in addition to the Federal District). The Mexican army continues to train new generations of PJF agents in physical fitness, weapons skills, rappelling, land navigation and counterdrug and counter-terrorism techniques.

With the aim of better interdicting drug and arms traffickers, Mexican army units simultaneously redeployed in some states, including along the border. Employing Mexican military units in counterdrug operations—for interdiction, eradication and support to the police in drug sweeps—is far from a new phenomenon. Army and police counterdrug interaction gained some momentum during the administration of President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982). It developed into a more “systematic campaign” during the tenure of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and his successor, Carlos Salinas Gotari (1988-1994), and has intensified all the more under current President Ernesto Zedillo. From the mid 1990s on, however, the Mexican army has been more prominent in border areas counter-drug patrols.

Mexican military personnel are now directly active and visible in counterdrug and other anti-crime activities than was earlier the case, including along the US-Mexico border. Despite legislative and other challenges to using military forces in these roles, the Mexican Supreme Court determined in March 1996 that the army, air force and navy may intervene in public security matters “as long as civilian authorities, even the government itself, request it.” The National Defense Secretariat set out important future changes in its 1995 “Mexican Army and Air Force Development Plan,” also identifying “the fight against drug trafficking” as a task in which the military would participate more directly. Regrettably, hopes that the military would remain relatively uncorrupted by the drug trade were dashed with the early 1997 arrest of army General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, the just-appointed head of the National Institute to Combat Drugs (Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas [INCD]). When appointed, Gutiérrez Rebollo was commander of Military Region V, covering several states in west-central Mexico, to include Jalisco’s Military Zone 15 headquartered at the drug trafficking center of Guadalajara. Initially reputed to be a tough officer with strong personal integrity, the general had extensive experience in running Army operations against drug traffickers in the Guadalajara area. His reputation as a tough, honest commander with more than 42 years of distinguished military service was shattered in early February 1997 when Mexican authorities announced his arrest as a direct collaborator with the notorious head of the Juárez cartel, Amado Carrillo Fuentes.

Aides and associates were also arrested in the weeks ahead, and through mid 1999, other military officers—including general officers—have been charged or convicted of complicity with drug cartels.

While the military confronted security problems within Mexico, for the United States, the most
This proliferation of organizations shows that the identity of armed and unarmed groups encountered along the border is problematic; they may be military, law enforcement, local residents, migrants, drug traffickers or criminals, or some combination thereof. The uncertainty has placed increased importance on improving the limited and uneven coordination among law enforcement and military organizations operating on both sides of the border.

apparent dimension of Mexican military activity against criminals has been in the border area. As noted, Mexico announced that army units would be redeployed in Chihuahua and tasked to perform a more assertive role in counterdrug and patrolling activities along Mexico’s northern border. Indeed, over the last year Mexican army units have begun to more visibly patrol sections of the US-Mexico border—not only in Chihuahua, but also in other areas from the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico. Dismounted or in light transport vehicles, including US-supplied HUMVEES, these units perform counterdrug missions in some sectors and also search for arms being smuggled from the United States. Armed Mexican military units and police patrols occasionally cross into US territory along the often-unmarked border, raising concerns about risky, surprise encounters with the US Border Patrol, other law enforcement bodies and even US military units supporting national drug law enforce-
By most objective standards—numbers of arrests, drugs and other contraband seized, illegal immigrants detained, incidents of cross-border violence or other statistics—border security is a far more serious problem than it was just a few years ago.

The Mexican government determined to employ the Defense Secretariat and the Marine Secretariat far more prominently in internal security and law enforcement roles. . . . While judged necessary by hard-pressed Mexican authorities dealing with multiple problems, involving the military also intensified internal debate about its proper role in countering vigorous, growing threats to Mexican stability.

Toward Border Cooperation

Views on the significance of US-Mexico border security problems and proposals for remediation differ sharply. On the one hand, the security environment along the border is viewed by some as an existing national security emergency requiring immediate action—even the dispatch of thousands of troops in roles not previously sanctioned for the military. Others characterize border law enforcement primarily as a manageable public safety problem that can be met with better law enforcement. By most objective standards—numbers of arrests, drugs and other contraband seized, illegal immigrants detained, incidents of cross-border violence or other statistics—border security is a far more serious problem than it was just a few years ago. Since the border is a vector for the most pernicious forms of transnational security threats, the position of border security as an important element of Homeland Defense seems assured.
Deciding on the proper approach and balance is another matter. Among the most difficult tasks is determining the roles of the U.S. military establishment in dealing with border security issues, a problem that Mexico has as well. Topics include the types and extent of employment, forms of interaction with law enforcement and the balance of security requirements with commercial, cultural, personal and other cross-border movement restrictions and control.

As the United States addresses these issues for the future, it is clear that current border security efforts will benefit immediately from closer cooperation with Mexican law enforcement and military counterparts. Existing venues range from the highest government policy-making levels to informal, ad hoc coordination in the field with counterparts. High Level Contact Group (HLCG) meetings, for example, are intended to resolve bilateral policy issues such as drug control and arms trafficking. The May 1997 US/Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat Assessment is one result of the HLCG program as are some of the newly formulated Mexican counterdrug efforts discussed above. Annual US-Mexican military Border Commanders’ Conferences address major issues affecting both military establishments for senior leaders of both militaries, though at the field-operating level there seems to be only limited interaction. International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs bring Mexican officers into US military-educational academic venues and security assistance programs and are valuable on both sides of the border. US officers’ attendance at Mexican military institutions has been instructive and useful, but Mexican law enforcement corruption continues to hinder effective US-Mexican working relationships. Nevertheless, the various bilateral border task forces in the principal border cities may represent a point of departure by bringing together Federal Anti-Drug Judicial Police, agents of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) and DEA, FBI and Customs personnel. Some law enforcement training and information exchanges are contributing to Mexican police professionalism, and less-formal working-level, cross-border coordination is worthwhile.

Security along the US-Mexico border clearly will become a prominent and growing focus of US strategic planning, unilateral law enforcement, military actions and cross-border cooperation. For the present, the many complex issues associated with controlling the southwest border present a special challenge to those law enforcement and supporting military resources that constitute the front line of US efforts to confront real challenges to US national interests.

NOTES

1. The House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution, “Recognizing the United States Border Patrol’s 75 years of service since its founding,” 27 May 1989, took note of the occasion. The resolution reviewed the organization’s history, from its inception as the Mounted Guard composed of “Texas Rangers, sheriffs and deputies from all parts of Texas” through its modern, technologically equipped Border Patrol consisting of over 5,000 agents.

2. These groups include the US Customs Service, Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization enforcement officers, Drug Enforcement Administration agents, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms elements, state police organizations, county sheriffs departments, municipal police from border communities, and a number of others.

3. Since 1989, the planning and coordination of Department of Defense (Title 10, Active and Reserve Component) operational support to counterdrug law enforcement along the US southwest border has been the responsibility of US Forces Command’s Joint Task Force 6 under US Atlantic Command.


5. Conflict stories and rumors surrounding this event abound. The young man, who was herding his father’s goats, had reportedly fired shots in the patrol’s direction knowingly or unknowingly. See Thaddeus Herrick, “Marine on anti-drug duty shoots, kills student,” Houston Chronicle, 22 May 1997, and William Branigin, “Questions on Military Role Fighting Drugs Rocchetto From a Deadly Shot,” Washington Post, 22 June 1997, among many accounts.

6. Joint Task Force 6, Operational Support Planning Guide, 1 July 1985; 5; this guide indicates, in this regard, that “Title 10, Active and Reserve Component military support to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) is governed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of Engagement. Military personnel, when deployed to border areas are authorized to be armed with their issued weapons for self-defense only. They may return fire when threatened with deadly force to defend either themselves, accompanying law enforcement personnel or others present. Title 32, National Guard, military support to LEAs is governed by similar rules as modified by each state governor.” See also S.C. Gwynne, “Border Skirmish,” Time, 25 August 1997, 40.


8. The amendment provided for law enforcement training for military personnel, stipulated that military personnel would be accompanied by law enforcement personnel and was not to supersede the Posse Comitatus Act (see section 1385, Title 18). The National Guard, it should be noted, are not subject to Posse Comitatus, though policy restricts their role in arrests and search and seizure. They do, however, conduct port-of-entry vehicle searches in support of the Customs Service.


10. In 1997, Representative James A. Traficant won House approval of a program to station up to 10,000 troops on the border. However, the proposal was eventually dropped due to Senate opposition. (“House Approves Troops on Border with Mexico,” Washington Times, 6 September 1997, and “A Job for the Border Patrol,” Los Angeles Times, 30 October 1997.) Still earlier calls for expanded military use along the border—often in the course of national political campaigns—received lukewarm receptions. In 1998, for example, Senator Robert Dole’s (R) Kansas, presidential campaign highlighted the need for increased military power against drug trafficking, but gained little general interest. (Katharine Q. Seelye, “Dole Calls for Military Role in Fight Against Drugs,” New York Times, 26 August 1998.)


13. The treaty transferred what is now California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Colorado and parts of Utah and Wyoming from Mexico to the US and ratified the earlier annexation of Texas. The Gadsden Purchase in 1853 transferred an addi-

A spectrum of federal, state and local law enforcement organizations join the Border Patrol in many aspects of border region policing, particularly drug interdiction. But the most controversial partner, as viewed from both sides of the border, clearly has been the US military. . . . [Meanwhile] substantial changes were taking place in military and police interaction in Mexico.
IMMINENT CONCERNS

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Trouble in North Caucasus

General Anatoliy S. Kulikov, Former Russian Interior Minister
Translated by Robert R. Love

As Commander in Chief, Internal Troops of Russia’s Interior Ministry, this article’s author, General Anatoliy S. Kulikov, commanded Russian forces in Chechnya following their capture of the capital city, Grozny. He also directed pacification operations in the rest of the republic. Hence, when he writes about Chechnya and the North Caucasus, he speaks from firsthand experience. More recently, he served as minister of the interior, where he was responsible for combating Russia’s staggering organized crime. He draws on that experience, describing here the impact of crime in the North Caucasus.

Although his professional life has involved maintaining internal order, Kulikov does not see military force as the solution to the problems in the North Caucasus. He believes that military action alone, without accompanying political and economic measures, may provide a short-term solution, but it will not resolve the underlying causes. Rather, he favors political, economic and international diplomatic measures in the region.

A hot spot and likely locale of future conflict, the volatile Caucasus region represents a situation that an American expeditionary force might face. In this region the central government has lost control, crime is rampant, law and order are nonexistent and religious extremism has made dramatic inroads. Further, problems in this region imply that Moscow could eventually lose central control of the federation, a circumstance whose impact could reach well beyond the borders of the North Caucasus.

Kulikov wrote this article in the summer of 1998, and problems in the North Caucasus continue. Although a 1996 accord halted the war in Chechnya, it did not resolve the problem but merely postponed (until 31 December 2001) the question of whether Chechnya will remain a part of the Russian Federation or gain full independence. In March 1999, Russia’s top envoy to Chechnya, a general officer from the Russian Interior Ministry, was kidnapped. In response, the Interior Ministry deployed more troops to the Chechen border region and threatened force if the hostage was not released. Later that same month, an explosion rocked a public market place in the North Caucasus city of Vladikavkaz, killing 60 people. Vladikavkaz is the capital of the North Ossetia region and lies just 30 miles from the Chechen border. In general, tension continues throughout the region, particularly in Dagestan, where the Russians worry about Chechen separatist activities and the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism.

—Robert Love, Translator

THE ENTIRE CAUCASUS region, including Russia’s North Caucasus, is a hub of intense economic and political problems. These problems concern Russia, its neighboring states and the entire world. Today the North Caucasus is a segment in a ribbon of instability stretching from Yugoslavia to Tajikistan. Unlike the Transdniestria or Tajikistan, the potentially explosive North Caucasus is a conflict zone where Europe and Asia come together, a place where Islamic-Christian and Indo-European-Turkic civilizations meet.

The Chechen separatists’ publicly stated intent to create a unified Muslim state to oppose Russia and other Christian states is an important factor in the North Caucasus’ political instability. Dagestan, Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, Kabardino-Balkariya, Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia would all be included as part of this Muslim state. The Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus, in which the Chechens play the leading role, regards a unified Islamic state as the union’s primary purpose.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army; the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor
The volatile Caucasus region represents a situation that an American expeditionary force might face. In this region the central government has lost control, crime is rampant, law and order are nonexistent and religious extremism has made dramatic inroads.

This attempt to create a unified Muslim state is gaining increased geopolitical importance, especially in Russia and other states in this zone. This situation will probably affect other nations, since it will doubtless cause general international instability. The smoldering centers of conflict in the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus, including those in the areas of the Armenian-Azerbaijans, the Chechens, the Ossetian-Ingush, the South Ossetians, the Abkhazians and the Lezgins, are already negatively affecting the situation in the North Caucasus region, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan. All of this exacerbates economic difficulties in the region’s republics, increases crime and criminality, damages the social environment and spawns profuse political, economic and social problems.

The factors behind this crisis situation are historical, ethno-national, economic, religious and cultural. Some are deeply rooted in time, while others emerged only recently. However, it is difficult to agree with those who state that today’s problems and troubles in the Northern Caucasus owe exclusively to Russia’s centuries-old colonial policy in the region. The causes underlying this potentially explosive situation are broad and multilayered. Certainly the Russian government’s mistakes did impact on the developments in the area. These mistakes began in the czarist era and continue to the present day. The so-called imperial factor in Moscow’s policies toward the North Caucasus had a decided impact, particularly during the Soviet period and even in this past decade. The Russian leadership has not had a clear and consistent policy that would posit acceptable solutions to the complex and confused tangle of ethno-national, political, religious and social relations in this region. Instead, Russian policy has oscillated between using military force and tolerating extreme nationalists.

Because of their geography and socio-economics, the peoples of the Caucasus have traditionally leaned toward Russia as an economically and militarily powerful state. They have sought support and protection from their stronger neighbors. At one time or another, most peoples of the Caucasus have voluntarily expressed a desire to join Russia. It was Russian involvement and support that allowed these people to preserve and develop their political system and economic base, particularly crucial for those who had been living at an essentially primitive-communal level. They could now meet the demands of modern civilization—survival but also enhanced national self-awareness and culture. Russia’s arrival on the scene meant that a powerful industrial base and scientific potential could develop alongside traditional trades and vocations. Science and industry provided the economic basis for development in the Caucasus, refuting any contention that Russia exploited the North Caucasus as a colony.

Without a doubt, Moscow’s mistakes in its North Caucasus policy negatively affected the current situation. However, since I am familiar with the Caucasus peoples’ way of thinking, I believe the current destructive processes in the region are due primarily to Russia’s own weaker economic and political situation, rather than to Moscow’s policy mistakes in the region. Russia’s weakened state is the reason certain forces in the North Caucasian republics seek new, wealthier and more influential patrons outside Russia’s borders. This search is disguised according to a well-known scenario—as a struggle for so-called national self-determination. For example, the Chechen leaders publicly state that they have been fighting a war of independence with Russia for 400 years. However, no large-scale armed clashes with the Chechen population were recorded until the middle of the last century. Further, the Chechen leaders are silent about Russia’s preeminent role in developing the republic’s economic and industrial complexes, which provided for the well being of the population. In addition, as a constituent member of the Russian Federation, Chechnya has received and continues to receive material and financial help from Russia. Its citizens are educated in Russia, and it avails itself of other social benefits. Russia has been and remains a benefactor for other states in the North Caucasus as well.

In turn, the mistakes of Russia’s political leadership were a unique catalyst in hastening the negative processes in the region. However, this process was typical throughout the former Soviet Union, and once the Baltic states began to pull away, others followed. The situation is similar in Chechnya today.

Indisputably, the greatest problem for Russia in the North Caucasus is the “Chechen issue,” the fact
that a state within the Russian Federation’s borders does not recognize Russian federal laws and therefore threatens the integrity and security of Russia. Russian authorities seek to resolve the Chechen issue so as to overcome separatist trends in the region, strengthen the federation and fortify Russia’s political and military-strategic positions in the Caucasus as a whole. Resolution would prevent armed banditry, terrorism and narco-trafficking from spreading into other regions of Russia, as well as into countries of the Near and Far Abroad and protect Russia’s economic interests in Caspian Sea oil.2

The problems in the North Caucasus headline the complex political relations between Moscow and the Chechen Republic. The situation is acute because the Chechen leadership does not want to postpone a decision on Chechnya’s status and has tenaciously pursued full diplomatic relations between Russia and Chechnya, despite previous agreements. To achieve its goals, the Chechen leadership uses political and criminal terrorism.

The Chechen hotbed is the epicenter of the vast troubled region that includes the entire eastern sector of the North Caucasus: Dagestan, which is destabilized by neighboring Chechnya and multiple ethno-national conflicts; the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone; and the areas of the Stavropol region [krai] bordering on Chechnya. The socio-political environment in the region’s western sector (Kabardino-Balkarian, Karachay-Cherkessiya, Adygeya and the Krasnodar region [krai]), though less tense, is also difficult and requires constant attention.

The Chechen leadership has already begun to force the formation of an independent Islamic state stretching from Georgia to the Caspian Sea. This “Great Imamate” would control a key sector of the Caspian region.3 The Chechen leaders’ efforts have led to the region’s critical situation. In the summer of 1997 the Chechen leaders founded the “Islamic Nation” movement, whose goal is to unite Chechnya and Dagestan as an imamate inside “historical borders.” Thirty-five Islamic parties from both of these republics have joined the movement and elected a parliament, called the medzhlis. This parliament actively propagates the historic memory of the Chechen and Dagestan mountain peoples with tales of the Caucasian War (1834-1859) and the heroic deeds of their common great leader, the Imam Shamil (1797-1877).

For the 200th anniversary of the imam’s birth, leaders of the Avarian People’s Front and the Lak movement, called “Kazi-Kumukh,” traveled from Dagestan to the Chechen village of Vedeno, the imam’s birthplace. Their celebration’s mottos included: “Chechnya and Dagestan—forever together and free,” and “Peace is not given—it is won.” Among groups from Dagestan that joined the “Islamic Nation” were the “Caucasus” movement; the party of the people’s movement of Dagestan; the Islamic Party of Dagestan; the Socio-Political Organization of Dagestan, “Nur”; and the Dagestan branch of the Union of Moslems of Russia.

Due to increasing instability on the Dagestan-Chechen border, different ethnic groups, such as Laks, Russians and Terek Cossacks, are leaving these areas. Other groups are moving in to take their
The Russian leadership has not had a clear and consistent policy that would posit acceptable solutions to the complex and confused tangle of ethno-national, political, religious and social relations in this region. Instead, Russian policy has oscillated between using military force and tolerating extreme nationalists.

place, such as the Chechens-Akkins. While most of them reside permanently in Dagestan, they nevertheless consider themselves citizens of Chechnya and support the most aggressive elements there. Increasingly, Chechen fighters are finding their allies in Dagestan among the members of the most radical Islamic fundamentalists, the Wahhabis. The Wahhabis see Chechnya as a practical beginning of a Moslem state and applaud the establishment of Islamic order there. Shari’a courts and public executions have been introduced in Chechnya. Each new demonstration of power by the Chechen fighters in Dagestan reinforces those committed to reuniting Dagestan with Chechnya. Chechnya’s influence on Dagestan is spreading incrementally. The Wahhabis purchase weapons and store them in hidden caches, simultaneously seeking to move their own people into positions as mullahs and village mullahs, often successfully.

One basic mission of Dagestan separatists is to force federal structures from the republic and to weaken Dagestan law enforcement bodies. To carry out these tasks, Chechen extremist use multiple tactics:
• They fire on posts, mine the travel routes of mobile groups, take military service personnel hostage, and conduct other acts of intimidation.
• They encourage the inhabitants of Dagestan to hold mass demonstrations calling for the withdrawal of federal forces.

Analysts forecast Chechnya’s most likely actions to destabilize the general North Caucasus situation. The first will be strengthening and expanding Chechnya’s sphere of influence in the Northern Caucasus region through political extortion and other provocations, including hostage taking. It is highly probable that specially trained, armed personnel will use terrorism and raid critical facilities on Russian territory. The second likely step will be activity to draw the peoples of Ingushetia and Dagestan into the “liberation struggle against the Russian occupiers.” Finally, Chechnya will continue to force recognition of its sovereignty.

To assess the danger that Chechnya poses for the North Caucasus and Russia as a whole, it is important to look at the processes occurring inside Chechnya itself. The socio-political situation in the Chechen Republic remains unstable. After signing the 31 August 1996 Khasavyurt accord, Chechnya almost immediately began abrogating the agreements it had made, demonstrating to the world its goal—complete independence. Unfortunately, Moscow’s vague position on Chechnya, including its self-determination, allows Chechnya to engage in these activities virtually unhindered.

In February 1997, Chechnya held free elections with Moscow’s consent, and many international observers were present. Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the Chechen Republic. Neither the elections nor the presence of the observers enhanced the authority of the Russian president or government. Further, the Chechen population thinks these events legitimize their country’s independence. Most Chechens are buoyed by this pride in defeating big Russia.

Because the Chechen public perceives any doubts about independence as an act of national betrayal, none are expressed. Chechen politicians exploit Russophobia, the memory of the war and Chechen casualties in it. Even moderate Chechen politicians view Russia as merely an economic benefactor obliged to compensate Chechnya for the damage Russian troops inflicted. In January 1998 Shamil Basayev, who Russia considered a criminal and terrorist, took office as head of state. Neither Maskhadov nor Basayev is agreeable to even the weakest confederation with Russia, even if Chechnya were to become an equal partner with Russia. They expect and demand nothing less than Russia’s full and unconditional recognition of Chechnya’s independence.

Moscow has no control whatsoever over state bodies formed in Chechnya. Shari’a courts, for example, are replacing secular judicial bodies in Chechnya. Judges will now be guided by the Koran, the sunna and the traditional Moslem law of the Shari’a, backed by leading Islamic jurists’ interpretations of these laws. Chechen jurisprudence has made only one concession to international norms. On 18 April 1997, Chechen Vice-Premier Mowlad Udagov announced the decision to halt public firing-squad executions of condemned criminals.

Militarization of Chechnya is ongoing, and a regular army (up to 2,500 men) is being formed and armed. Along with official force structures, includ-
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The power that the leaders of these major armed formations wield further attenuates the already limited power and authority of the Chechen president. Moreover, he faces the constant threat that his office and authority will be abolished altogether, to be replaced by the declaration of an imamate and a religious form of rule.

Maskhadov’s attempts to obtain additional authority from the republic’s parliament have failed. The more extreme forces have strengthened their positions in the new government, taking advantage of the support of international terrorist organizations and organized crime groups.

The territory of the Chechen Republic is currently divided into five zones that principal field commanders control. Chechnya’s economy, budget and industrial infrastructure are also divided among the spheres of influence of the largest clans, whose criminal interests reach far beyond the borders of the republic.
Increasingly, Chechen fighters are finding their allies in Dagestan among the members of the most radical Islamic fundamentalists, the Wahhabis. The Wahhabis see Chechnya as a practical beginning of a Moslem state and applaud the establishment of Islamic order there. Shari'a [Islamic law] courts and public executions have been introduced in Chechnya.

Given Chechnya’s extremely difficult socio-economic situation, its society is increasingly criminal. Criminals have virtually no fear of any action by law enforcement bodies. Organized crime members are largely former fighters and have fiercely resisted even feeble official attempts to control crime.

In the meantime, Maskhadov’s opponents (Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Salman Raduyev and a number of field commanders) believe they have as much right as Maskhadov to govern the republic. They further believe that Maskhadov is departing from the policy of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Raduyev’s authority is growing, because his bluntness has made him the spokesman against Maskhadov’s policies. He has often declared his dissatisfaction with the pace of Chechnya’s movement toward independence. He imposes on the population his opinion that the government and president are incapable of stabilizing the situation. In many areas, “headquarters” for insubordination to Maskhadov are being created. In addition, to discredit Maskhadov as leader of an independent state, rumors are spread among Chechnya’s fighters and the civilian population that Maskhadov has ties to Russian special services. Meanwhile, Raduyev and other Chechen separatist leaders view terrorism as an efficient means of fighting for Chechnya’s recognition, and they claim to be preparing for terrorism in Russia.

Meanwhile, many of Chechnya’s socio-economic problems go unresolved. The economy is not being rebuilt, and a significant portion of the population is unemployed. Unemployment among young people is at a critical level, and graduates of various educational institutions have no job prospects. The population has a large stock of illegal weapons and the flow of these weapons continues. In recent years a significant portion of the region’s population has come to believe that political, economic, social and everyday problems are best solved by violence, and a cult of “troublemakers” has emerged. Formation of illegal armed groups continues, including those springing from individual social and political movements. The criminal nature of armed groups under Chechen field commanders is readily apparent by their hostage taking and demands for ransom. Chechnya may threaten large-scale terror inside Russia to extract the greatest possible sum from the Russian investment in the Chechen economy.

Chechen leaders cannot influence the field commanders or their armed formations, nor solve any of the republic’s everyday socio-economic problems. Hence, they attempt to distract the people and quell their growing dissatisfaction. They do this by further igniting anti-Russian sentiments, inculcating extremist Islamic ideology and carrying out “cosmetic” reorganizations in the government that supposedly show the official government becoming stronger. With the goal of forcing Russia out of the Caucasus completely, foreign fundamentalist Islamic organizations and the special services from a number of states are helping Chechnya move toward becoming an Islamic state. These same organizations are in no rush to help Russia resolve any of Chechnya’s social or economic problems.

Attracting foreign investors is the primary task of Chechnya’s foreign policy today. On his trip to the United States and Turkey, Maskhadov sought such investments. The Chechen government places great hopes on an alliance with Georgia and has widely advertised its intent to lay a gas pipeline parallel to the planned Chechnya-Georgia highway. According to Maskhadov this plan would enable Chechnya to turn its back on Russia and its face toward Georgia. The harsh official Chechen policy toward Russia and the Islamization of Chechen society seek to unite the people in the face of a “general threat”; curry favor with the rich and influential Islamic world; comply with the recommendations of foreign “sponsors”; and work off the funds received from the latter, to repay their debts, so to speak. Betraying this policy means losing power.

Using all means possible, Chechen foreign policy actively seeks international recognition of the republic’s independence and funds to help form such a republic. However, it is unlikely that Chechnya will win the international community’s approval in the near term. Without Russia’s consent, it is improbable that any members of the international community will recognize Chechnya’s independence. First, such an action would set a precedent for yielding to similar separatist demands in
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other parts of the world. Second, Chechen leaders do not control the situation in the republic and cannot eradicate the republic’s international terrorist centers or curb its unprecedented crime. Third, there are concerns about growing Islamic fundamentalism, Wahhabism in particular.

Increasingly, Chechen leaders are learning that they lack the economic basis necessary for sovereignty. Hence, they have decided to wrest Dagestan away from Russia by force and bring it into Chechnya’s sphere of influence. They fully understand that if their plan succeeds, Chechnya gains access to Caspian Sea oil resources and establishes control over the region’s key transportation nodes and communication lines. They assume that having control of these resources will bring recognition of Chechnya’s independence by states interested in developing economic relations with the North Caucasus. Even if recognition fails, at the very least large-scale foreign investments would flow into the region.

To implement this plan, the Chechens enlist forces from inside Dagestan, primarily from among ethnic Chechen-Akkins and followers of Wahhabism. Like the Chechen separatists, these groups are financed by international extremist organizations and by the special services in a number of countries.

Chechnya is constructing military facilities along its borders with Dagestan and moving detachments of fighters into those areas. Nevertheless, considering the disposition of forces and the complex ethno-national relations in Dagestan, these armed groups are unlikely to intervene openly. Therefore,
Because the [Chechen] public perceives any doubts about independence as an act of national betrayal, none are expressed. Chechen politicians exploit Russophobia, the memory of the war and Chechen casualties in it. Even moderate Chechen politicians view Russia as merely an economic benefactor obliged to compensate Chechnya for the damage Russian troops inflicted on it.

Chechen separatists, the national extremists and the external groups supporting them all inflame anti-Russian sentiment and trumpet Moslem solidarity.

Russia has set a unique course to resolve the crisis in its relations with Chechnya. This course is new militarily, as well as new relative to the accepted practice in resolving similar conflicts. When a central government is unable to reach an agreement with separatists in a given territory, it does not usually recognize the separatist leaders as having any legal authority. Nonetheless, this does not mean that it cannot negotiate peacefully with such a regime. On the contrary, history shows that such negotiations can continue for decades. However, negotiations are held with a “party to the conflict,” not with a lawful government.

Everything is reversed in the conflict between Russia and Chechnya. Russia recognized the legitimacy of Chechnya as a constituent member of the Russian Federation at a time when Chechen authorities recognize neither Russia’s laws nor its authority on its own territory. Moreover, the Chechen leaders are happy with this position, since they receive tangible economic and political benefits from their membership in the federation but are free of any obligations in return. Chechnya, whose ties with all regions of the Russian Federation are both legal and broad, is not subject to the laws of Russia. Hence, it is a magnet for the most dangerous kinds of criminal activity. According to available data, Chechnya receives more funds from Russia via illegal channels than it could receive legally from either Russia or the Islamic states.

The majority of Russian citizens express dissatisfaction with their government’s Chechen policy. However, this dissatisfaction is largely passive and does not lead to open protest in areas not adjacent to Chechnya. The most widespread desire is simply to forget about Chechnya and halt any federal investments there.

However, Chechnya does not let itself be forgotten. Chechen armed raids on neighboring border territories are becoming the norm. These raids reflect the immediate economic interests of individual outlaw groups (cattle theft and kidnapping), as well as the strategic goals of Chechnya’s influential political circles. They spread fear in the border areas and force non-Chechen peoples to leave.

Moscow’s lack of a clear position leaves the border with Chechnya inadequately protected. In this circumstance, the residents of territories adjacent to Chechnya (Dagestan, Stavropol and the Krasnodar region (krai)) attempt to defend themselves.

In Dagestan, the head of the Dagestan Security Council, Magomed Talboev, favors forming self-defense detachments. He would arm a home guard manned by border village residents. This would essentially mean only people from the Avarian and Lak villages, since neither the Dagestan Chechens nor the Turkic peoples of Dagestan would join such detachments. Initially, both Moscow and Makhachkala viewed this idea with suspicion. They had misgivings about creating another militarized, non-state organization formed along ethnic lines (like the Cossacks). Dagestan authorities were more concerned about the domestic consequences of such a step. Once created, such detachments could easily become an important trump card in the power struggle now heating up in Dagestan. However, the border-village residents were dissatisfied about their vulnerability to attack and forced Dagestan authorities to allow the so-called people’s hosts of the Soviet period. More than 3,000 people have joined these hosts, and although the state has not yet armed them, they all have their own weapons.

Like Dagestan, the Stavropol region (especially its predominantly Cossack-populated Kursk area that borders on Chechnya) sustains enormous moral and material harm from Chechnya. According to the governor of the Chernogorov region (krai), in 1997 alone armed bandits from Chechnya stole just under $200 million in animals and farm machinery from the animal husbandry farms, motor pools and farms immediately adjacent to the Chechen border. The indigenous inhabitants leave the settled areas, which are then immediately taken over by new settlers from Chechnya. Chechen control posts have encroached on Stavropol’s territory, facilitating Chechen occupation of farm lands. The police provide virtually no security for the local residents. In late 1997, 500 border-region residents met in a Stavropol Cossack village. The ataman of the
Without Russia’s consent, it is improbable that any members of the international community will recognize Chechnya’s independence. First, such an action would set a precedent for yielding to similar separatist demands in other parts of the world. Second, Chechen leaders do not control the situation in the republic and cannot eradicate the republic’s international terrorist centers or curb its unprecedented crime. Third, there are concerns about growing Islamic fundamentalism, Wahhabism in particular.

Terek Cossack Army took part, as did regional administrative officials. The assembly adopted an appeal to the president of Russia seeking protection from relentless raids by Chechens who take hostages, steal equipment and rustle livestock. Cossack villages also demanded the right to form self-defense detachments.

Ingushetia (also called the Ingush Republic) claims an area known as the Prigorodnyy region (raion) in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. Chechnya’s influence on Ingushetia’s claim is growing. Although it is very unlikely that armed Chechen formations will overtly “liberate” the Prigorodny region and the right-bank portion of Vladikavkaz, Chechnya’s involvement in the conflict is growing markedly. Armed Chechen groups have been spotted in outlying areas in both the Prigorodny region and the Ingush Republic.

Chechen separatists and criminals see the territories adjacent to the Russian Federation as a source for criminal profit. The most prevalent crimes include hostage taking; kidnapping; robbery; and theft of livestock, agricultural equipment and vehicles. According to data from the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry, approximately 700 organized criminal groups made up of North Caucasus emigrants are active in Russia. A significant portion of these are either Chechen or have Chechen involvement.

In the meantime, the federal government recognizes Chechnya as a normal constituent member of the Russian Federation, making it almost impossible to guard the border effectively. The armed forces have no legal grounds to control the flow of people and cargo in and out of Chechnya, nor do they have any clear rules of conduct.

Moreover, the Russian federal government has no economic whip or carrot for Chechnya. Chechnya, on the other hand, has a tiny section of the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline that it can use as a weapon for extortion.

Moscow’s options for action in Chechnya are limited. A renewed attempt to solve the Chechen problem through military force is out of the question, as is recognizing Chechnya’s independence. In addition to contravening the federal constitution, recognizing Chechnya would also entail several extremely dangerous consequences for Russia, the most serious of which would be losing control over Chechnya’s foreign relations. Accordingly, Russia would be unable to prevent Chechnya from becoming a transit base for weapons, narcotics and contraband into Russia or a laundering area for dirty money. Rather than solving all the problems discussed above, recognizing Chechnya would probably only exacerbate them.

The way out of the North Caucasus crisis is through solid economy in the region. Without this, prospects for stabilizing the situation are not promising. Naturally, raising the region’s economic level will take time, because this issue is closely linked to the Russian Federation’s overall situation. If we expect an instant fix for the economic problems underlying the crisis in the region, we deceive ourselves.

Russia needs to clearly define the parameters of a unified national policy for resolving the Chechnya problem. In fact, Russia already has a very clear policy: Chechnya remains a constituent member of the Russian Federation, and a decision on the republic’s status has been postponed until 31 December 2001.

Russia has maintained this same approach throughout the entire Chechen conflict, a fact documented in accords, memorandums of understanding and statements signed during the negotiation process. President Boris Yeltsin has signed approximately 40 executive orders and decrees to settle the crisis. To implement them, the Russian federal government has adopted some 50 resolutions and created special government commissions.

Both the Russian and international press often portray me as a hawk, advocating forcible resolution of the Chechen issue. This is not the case. As deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation, minister of the Interior, I was responsible for Russia’s public safety. Chechnya is a part of Russia. Because of well-known circumstances, Chechnya is temporarily outside the federation’s jurisdiction. Nonetheless, events in that republic and
In addition to contravening the federal constitution, recognizing Chechnya would also entail several extremely dangerous consequences for Russia. . . . Russia would be unable to prevent Chechnya from becoming a transit base for weapons, narcotics and contraband into Russia or a laundering area for dirty money. Rather than solving all the problems discussed above, recognizing Chechnya would probably only exacerbate them.

the constant threats to public security issuing from there kept my constant attention and forced me to respond. In those instances when the Chechen leadership was unable or did not wish to curb crime and terrorism on its own, I was bound by my office to address those threats.

At the same time I would like to emphasize that I stood directly at the headwaters of the negotiation process as early as 1995. Even today I believe that all the critical issues must be solved with negotiations, not with cannons or machineguns. The specific approaches to settlement, the best forms for resolution of disputed points and how the negotiations should be organized—these are all a different matter. Even the best options do not always prove acceptable. Chechnya’s inconsistent positions, ambitious pretensions and constant abrogation of previous understandings require different negotiation tactics. The result is often a stalemate in the negotiations.

In my opinion, conceding to Chechnya and consenting to full, legal separation without resolving even one key problem of the crisis could worsen conditions in the conflict zone. It could also substantially restrict Russia’s ability to influence the area and forestall the dangers arising from it. At the same time, we cannot continue a policy that ignores obvious facts. For instance, if Chechnya secedes from Russia, it could become a hothouse for international crime.

To settle the situation, we must first achieve a dramatic shift in the mass consciousness of the Chechens themselves. We must restore their confidence in Russian state institutions. Russian participation in Chechnya’s social and economic restoration would help bring about this dramatic change in thinking. In arranging this help, we must assure that all funds reach their intended consumers, the average citizens of Chechnya, who are also citizens of Russia.

It would be unwise to invest funds in Chechnya without ensuring that these funds would not be used to Russia’s detriment. Hence, such investments should be clearly linked to the results of negotiations.

It is also very important to involve the Chechen diaspora in the peace process, those in Russia and elsewhere, to help monitor the distribution and use of incoming funds. As Russia negotiates, it cannot ignore the interests of citizens of other nationalities living in Chechnya. Many of them were forced to leave Chechnya, but that fact does not strip them of their right to participate in deciding the republic’s fate.

As it pursues its Chechnya policy, Russia should make extensive use of its diplomatic capabilities and also seek international condemnation of terrorist and criminal activity in the Chechen Republic. It must attempt to win public support from the world’s leading countries, including those of the Islamic world. Russia would benefit from these nations’ support of its peace initiatives and its recommendations to Chechen leaders that they act in accordance with international law. Many well-known foreign political leaders and diplomats view a settlement in Chechnya as Russia does. This important factor can affect the course of negotiations.

If the Chechen leadership continues to push for immediate Russian recognition of Chechnya’s independence, sooner or later we will have to make a choice. We will have to accept their demand (and as noted earlier, this will not resolve the overall problem), or we will have to compartmentalize the situation. In other words, we will have to recognize the republic’s special status as a “rebel territory,” with all the inherent consequences. Such an approach would change any impression that foreign political activity by Chechen separatists is legitimate. It would also limit separatist contacts undesirable to Russia. At the same time, this approach would make it possible to provide a legal basis for guarding the borders with Chechnya. Because of its location and the nature of its demographic and economic development, Chechnya is fated to have an alliance with Russia. It simply cannot survive otherwise. Time will put everything in its place. However, the government needs more than just patience; it needs wisdom and political will. Unfortunately, the latter are in short supply. Be that as it may, Russia cannot jeopardize its national interests in the North Caucasus. It must do everything it can to
protect the population from crime and terrorism. The negotiation process will certainly continue. In addition to continuing this process, Moscow's ability to react to any complications should be further enhanced. In the talks with the leaders of the Chechen Republic, we must address the issue of eradicating terrorist training centers located in Chechnya, and we should propose combined forces to achieve this goal. In the event that the Chechen side refuses, then Russia must reserve the right to act unilaterally to destroy these centers using all means available, including military and technical means. This is Russia's natural and accepted role, to safeguard its national security.

To settle the Chechen and Northern Caucasus problem, Russia needs to involve religious leaders and elders, the heads of the tribes (teip) and other similar organizations and the leaders of the Cossack communities. These voices must promote tolerance and accord. They must also serve as catalysts to mobilize the citizenry against crime and as mediators to reconcile the parties to conflicts that may arise. The media also have an important role to play in stabilizing the situation. The media often side with one of the parties and fail to provide objective information, sometimes merely carrying out a social agenda.

Regardless of what may happen, as it expands the negotiation process, Russia should not force the Chechen leadership (militarily or economically) into signing a treaty that suits only Moscow. The leaders need time to consider the wisdom of self-determination, to experience all the consequences of the isolation into which they are driving the republic. This would also allow formation of a government that expresses the interests of the nation rather than one which simply asserts the right to govern. Such a government could pull people together to establish order and build something, rather than engage in terrorism, robbery and traffic in human beings.

Moscow should not openly emphasize Chechnya as an object of primary attention. It would make more sense to focus on and support this region's other Russian Federation members, which would significantly lower the social tension in the republics and regions (krais) of the North Caucasus. It would also force the Chechen leaders to be more tactful when receiving Russian assistance.

The federal center cannot allow obstinacy and lawlessness to occur with impunity. It would be highly beneficial to demonstrate the real economic and social advantages of loyalty and stability. Moscow could best demonstrate those advantages in the areas of the North Caucasus that have already developed a favorable political climate for economic growth. "

NOTES

1. General Kulikov wrote this article in the summer of 1998 for a working visit to the United States. He wrote it as an oral presentation titled 'The Chechen Problem as a Destabilizing Factor in the North Caucasus: Threats to Russia's Security.' The original text has been edited here for style. [Translator's note]

2. Russia uses the term 'Near Abroad' to refer to the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union, and the 'Far Abroad' here refers to any country beyond the bounds of those newly independent states. [Translator's note]

3. An Imamat is a region governed by a Moslem scholar-leader, or Imam. [Translator's note]

4. Wahhabism is a religious-political movement in Sunni Islam. It arose in Arabia in the mid-18th century based on the teachings of Mohammed ibn-Abdul Wahhab. Modern Wahhabism is a politicized expression of Islamic fundamentalism and preaches the affirmation of its own supreme authority in Islam, as well as that of Islam over society. The idea of the jihad, or holy war against infidels, occupies a prominent place. [Translator's note]

5. The Khasavyurt agreement mentioned here refers to the peace treaty worked out between then Russian Security Council Secretary General Alexander Lebed, and Aslan Maskhadov, then Chechen chief of staff. The agreement may have stopped the war, but it only shelved until 2001 the question of whether Chechnya would remain part of the Russian Federation or become independent. [Translator's note]

6. At the time of his death, Dzhokhar Dudaev was by far the most popular Chechen national leader, having won a 1991 presidential election by a huge majority. Dudaev was killed by a Russian rocket in April 1996. [Translator's note]

The village was Galyugayevsk. [Translator's note]

Until March 1998 General Anatoly S. Kulikov held the dual post of Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Prior to becoming Interior Minister, he commanded Russia's MVD Internal Troops, a force that numbered in excess of 400,000 troops when he accepted that post in 1992. In 1995 he became commander in chief of all Russian forces, both MVD and Ministry of Defense, in Chechnya. A graduate of Russia's Frunze Academy and the General Staff Academy, he has twice visited Fort Leavenworth, once in the summer of 1994 and again in the summer of 1998.

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Russia’s Northwest Strategic Direction

Jacob W. Kipp

A UNIQUE SET of security issues has emerged from Russia’s northwest strategic direction in the post-Cold War era. The conjunction of Russian transformation and crisis has recast security issues in the Baltic and Nordic regions, reducing the risk of military conflict but raising a host of issues associated with Russia’s Baltic relations, especially the status of the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia and the dangerous legacy of a nuclearized Kola peninsula. The Western response to these issues, particularly in the Nordic countries and international institutions, has introduced a new subregional security system in Europe.

Given other European crises in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, one could ask whether the issues associated with the northwest constitute a hot spot in the absence of open hostilities and military confrontation. The sensitive Baltic issues make the case. There is potential for linkage to other concerns, notably the proposed union of Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia, which sophisticated Russian commentators have labeled a “hysterical” response that does not reflect Russian long-range interests in the region or in Europe. In a recent essay the eminent historian of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, asserts that the post-Cold War world is noteworthy for the shifting tectonic plates of international security. Gaddis suggests that a “geological” approach, reading the past history of seismic events, could help us to foresee where likely “earthquakes” would shape 21st-century geopolitics. He suggests that we are all now “living in Candlestick Park,” alluding to the 1989 San Francisco earthquake.

While Gaddis focuses on the macro aspects of geopolitics and past patterns, his point also applies to regional security problems, especially those affecting Russia and the successor states. These new shifts are best examined in their regional context and not from a global or ideological context. In the new geopolitical context, hot spots may include overt tensions and also ecological challenges that threaten peace and stability. With NATO involved in its first large-scale combat operations in Yugoslavia and the ensuing chill in relations between Russia and the West, the northwest may not seem a serious issue on a global or even European scale. Closer examination shows that such subregional security issues will have their own profound impact on European security and global stability. Indeed, the much-touted military exercise, ZAPAD 99, which the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff initiated on 22 June 1999, explicitly linked the threat of regional conflict in this region with nuclear escalation in response to the threat of mass, precision strikes against military targets in the theater.

For the first time in a decade, Russian super-sonic, cruise-missile-armed Tu-160 “Blackjack” bombers streaked down the coast of Norway while Tu-95 “Bears” probed Iceland’s airspace. As Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev noted, “The exercise tested one of the provisions of Russia’s military doctrine concerning a possible use of nuclear weapons when all other measures are exhausted.” Russia’s military crisis has raised security challenges in the northwest direction, causing a different subregional dy-

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency. — Editor
namic in Europe. Here the ethno-national tensions and ecological dangers challenge neighboring states as much as conventional military threats.

With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia finds itself in a complex and protracted process of internal reform and international adjustment. The threats that gave structure to the Cold War military confrontation across Europe have disappeared, but new challenges have emerged. Ethno-national conflicts, economic dislocations, political instability and massive demographic changes have become pressing concerns for the international community. In the absence of ideologically driven competition, geopolitics and broader definition of issues involved in national security have brought about a new conceptualization of international security. As Jakub M. Godzimirski argues, geostategic space, historical experience, national identity and economic framework shape and delimit Russian foreign and security policy in general and its regional dimensions in particular. Godzimirski suggests that five core issues have shaped the debate on Russian foreign and security policies:

- Protection of Russia’s territorial integrity.
- Protection of Russian minorities in the near abroad.
- Participation in international organizations.
- Safeguarding support from the west for economic reforms.
- Maintaining a strategic balance with other great powers, especially the United States.

In the current context of Russia’s domestic situation and international environment, some commentators have argued that the relative importance of military versus Russian national security has declined. As K.S. Gadzhiev observed:

“The concept of security includes identifying, systematizing, and evaluating all possible sources and parameters of threats. Today, national security does not depend on the armed forces alone, but on a number of other factors as well: economic might; the ability of industry to compete; the quality of the education system; the well-being of the citizenry, their mind-set, etc. Sources of real-world threats to the security of most, if not all, states include: terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; ethno-national conflicts and inter-religious conflicts; environmental degradation; the slowing or halting of economic growth. Four decades ago, despite the harm they brought, narcotics smuggling and various epidemics could be considered non-political. As such, the use of force was inappropi-
The public health crisis unheard of in a peacetime industrial nation, has led to an absolute decline in population by two million since 1991, declining male life expectancy and an epidemic rise in certain communicable diseases. However, some key health problems, such as alcoholism, are not amenable to easy solution short of profound changes in the national life style. Insufficient investment in public health only makes this crisis and its consequences worse.

Russian military has made sporadic attempts to reform and reduce forces. The armed forces became victims of what one author called “a time of troubles.” Reduced in numbers and underfunded, the Russian armed forces are a hollow shell of the Soviet armed forces. With an official strength of 1.2 million men, this current force goes unpaid and has become the step-child of a government in crisis.

Military reform under current Minister of Defense Marshal Sergeyev has involved bureaucratic consolidation and rationalization, primarily emphasizing sustained strategic nuclear forces as the ultimate military guarantee of great power status. These measures included consolidating all strategic forces under one command, unifying the air forces and air defense forces, abolishing the command of the ground forces, reducing the number of military districts from eight to six and reorganizing the ground forces into 10 active divisions. Budgetary constraints and a declining GDP suggest further manpower reductions to a force of 600,000. The Ministry of Defense budget over the last several years has not even been sufficient to pay the salaries and allowances of its officers and men. Reform has amounted to nothing more than restructuring and force cuts to save money. In short, planning for reform has continued, but funding has delayed actual execution.

Diagnosing the Patient

The Russian military’s problems are chronic, numerous and deep. Low morale reflects the military’s diminished status in society. The top-heavy officer corps has a shortage of junior officers and leads a conscript pool based on a small portion of eligible age cohort drawn from Russian youth with health and social problems. Brutal hazing in the barracks causes suicides among recruits, and criminalization and corruption permeate the force. Grossly inadequate training, minuscule procurement of new weapons and looming block obsolescence in the first years of the next century, and the officer corps’ disdain for and distrust of the current government complete the picture of a dying military. As an acute observer noted, the military’s inability to deal with its own decline into chaos and disorder has gone hand-in-hand with remarkable marginalization in Russian national politics. Disgruntled officers perceive their caste as sheep going to the slaughter. Each time the sheep complain of starvation, the political shepherds respond with another round of cuts in manpower. One of the Yeltsin government’s most vocal critics, Colonel Viktor Baranets, used precisely that language to describe Russia’s “lost Army.”

The much-publicized film Chistilishche [Purgatory], written and directed by nationalist journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov and produced by the oligarch Boris Berezovsky, carries the metaphor even further, depicting the Russian army in Chechnya as a crucified Christ.

Indeed, the Russian National Security Concept, published in December 1997, plays down military threats to Russian security and emphasizes internal (economic) threats as the predominant national security concern. Under these circumstances the Ministry of Defense has sought to maintain about one-third of Russia’s conventional military equipment operationally ready for the Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy. In the Ground Forces only three divisions and four brigades stationed in the Moscow, Leningrad, North Caucasian and Siberian military districts are maintained in permanent combat readiness—fully equipped but manned at 80 percent. By assuming low risk of a general war, these forces prepare to deal with widely dispersed regional contingencies.

The financial meltdown of August 1998, coupled with a deepening crisis of state finances and a political leadership’s vacuum sustain the vector, and momentum of military reform, nailed shut the coffin on Yeltsin’s Russian Armed Forces. They now occupy a limbo between the militarized edifice of the Soviet armed forces and the transformed armed forces needed for Russia and its society today. Failing to overcome the legacy of the former and achieve the latter has created significant problems for Russia and dangers to international security and stability. Now, according to Prime Minister Yegeniy Primakov, Russia is engaged in a process of stabilization and reform. Internationally, it is “gathering strength” to reassure the role of a great power...
The present crisis of the Russian military should be analyzed not from the perspective of a “zero-sum” game that translates declining Russian military power as an inherent benefit to its neighbors, but as a problem affecting national, regional and global stability and security. The collapse of the Russian military and the unresolved legacy of Soviet militarization pose a very different set of dangers and risks.

in Eurasia. Military reform has not emerged as a priority for the prime minister, and President Yeltsin, for all his statements and promises over the last six years, has proved more adept at restructuring the national security apparatus and playing “musical chairs” with his national security leadership than at genuine improvements. Unless Russia collapses, which informed observers still see as unlikely, one can anticipate the rebirth of its military power in the first decades of the 21st-century. But the armed forces and the institutions that will support them will be different—a far cry from the mass industrial army and militarized industrial order of the Soviet past. Whether the military is an instrument of a democratic Russia, a benign presence in the international security environment or an instrument for undermining the current international order in a particular region will depend to a significant measure on the way the armed forces emerge from their current limbo. Further cuts without a rational reform program carry grave risks for Russia and its neighbors. As Hans-Hermann Hoehmann and Christian Meier have pointed out, the Soviet Union was “a security risk by strength,” and Russia has become “a security risk by weakness.”

The militarization of the Soviet state and society make it impossible to overcome the serious problems confronting the Russian military without addressing the profound political, economic, social and spiritual problems facing Russia during this transition. While noting significant positive changes in Russia, Ambassador Rene Nyberg recently outlined problems that contributed to the risks associated with Russia’s current weakness. Many of these problems have deep roots in the Soviet period but have become much worse in the last decade.

First, there is the unresolved legacy of collectivization: land reform is not progressing to revive agricultural productivity.

Second, the public health crisis unheard of in a peacetime industrial nation, has led to an absolute decline in population by two million since 1991, declining male life expectancy and an epidemic rise in certain communicable diseases. However, some key health problems, such as alcoholism, are not amenable to easy solution short of profound changes in the national life style. Insufficient investment in public health only makes this crisis and its consequences worse.

Third, there is a demographic crisis associated with the migrations of dislocated populations within Russia and the other Commonwealth of Independent States. Significant population flight from the Russian north and far east are direct consequences...
In the Baltic/Barents region maritime issues assume capital importance. . . . The ["World Ocean"] program places special emphasis upon key littorals, including the Baltic and Barents, as foundations of Russian maritime power and the base from which to exploit oceanic resources. It addresses mobilizing national resources to support Russian naval/maritime protection of national and geopolitical interests.

of the disappearance of state subsidies to sustain these regions and their substantial defense-industrial complexes. Nyberg estimates the population exodus from Murmansk in the last decade at nearly 20 percent. 23

- Fourth, Russia has witnessed a dramatic process of de-industrialization during the same period. The gigantic Soviet industrial complex with its emphasis upon military effectiveness collapsed with Gospplan and Gossnab. Privatization brought profits to the new owners as they disposed of their enterprises’ resources but did not introduce production based on market criteria. Indeed, Nyberg asserts that privatization has gone hand-in-hand with “primitivization”—collapsing infrastructure that supports the national economy. 24 This claim is raised by concerned officials from the Russian north. In October 1995 Igor Shkiper, president of the Union of the Far North and Polar Cities, warned the union’s congress that the region was dying as a result of insufficient funding. On 10 October, the Federation Council announced that the government had provided the northern territories with only 77 percent of the oil, 63 percent of the coal and 64 percent of the food allotted to them in the 1995 budget. 25

- Fifth, the central state’s authority has collapsed and devolved many aspects of state power to the oblasts and republics by default rather than design. Only in Chechnya, however, have local authorities taken up arms against the center in a drive to leave the Russian Federation.

- Finally, men—not laws—rule Russia. Without the rule of law there is no foundation for structuring the complex competitive relationship among the federal authorities, the oblast/republic governments and local authorities. Without a binding contractual-constitutional relationship cementing these relationships, Russia cannot effectively govern itself toward democratization or rejuvenate the national economy on a market basis. 26

While these weaknesses affect all of Russia, there are compelling reasons to address the problem regionally. Russia remains a vast country, but in this “time of troubles” it also must face problems with a weakened central government. Regional dynamics affect both the internal reform prospects and Russia’s immediate neighbors’ security prospects. Indeed, Alexandr Nemets argues that this weak central government has abandoned its responsibilities to peripheral regions in what he calls “a horizontal crisis shifting.” The center’s policies of neglect have devastated and robbed peripheral regions, “especially the Russian Far East, Eastern Siberia, the regions of the Russian North, and the North Caucasus zone.” 27

The Northwest—Baltic/Barents Region

The rationale for a subregional approach to the problems associated with Russia’s weakness thus has several foundations. The subregional approach reflects the primary focus of Russian national security policy, in which subregional and regional interests and threats have gained importance over global concerns. 28 Moreover, military literature has focused on threats of local conflicts that could escalate into regional wars and general conflicts. 29 Russian and Western military system analysts also stress the importance of regional threats in determining levels of defense sufficiency. 30 Other policy areas reinforce this military component of sub-regional security. Tensions between the regions and the center threaten to disintegrate the state itself. Godzimirski examines Russian security policy in the Baltic Sea and Barents area, noting:

“The situation may deteriorate further if central authorities are unable to fulfill their economic obligations to the regions. If so, the regions may be forced to end their cooperation with the centre, and may further decide that they are better served by horizontal cooperation with other federal subjects or even with other states.” 31

Godzimirski also points out that there are few ethnic threats to Russian integrity in the Baltic/Barents region and that the federal subjects in the region are relatively dependent on the central authorities for their economic survival. He concludes that “the most substantial danger for witness a sovereignty parade in these areas is thus a lack of transfers from the central authorities.” 32 He identifies two federal subjects in the Baltic/Barents region that might join
such a parade—Karelian Republic, some of which had been part of interwar Finland, and Kaliningrad, an enclave (geographically separated from Russia proper). Both might find cooperation with neighboring states an appealing solution to local problems as support from the center evaporates. The problems of the Russian Arctic are particularly stark because the Soviet regime fostered intensive settlement. The dense population in the Arctic depends on defense industries and cannot be sustained without cash transfers from the center so depopulation is a likely consequence. A Finnish assessment foresees returning to an agriculture economy and an intense crisis in the nickel-producing city of Noril’sk, which had to be partially evacuated during the winter of 1995. Noril’sk is also one of the most ecologically threatened cities in Russia. The hope for the region is Western and Russian private investment in the vast mineral, timber and energy resources.33

Thus, while central support and foreign investment loom large as factors in sustaining Russia’s territorial integrity, the current financial crisis makes such support and investment seem more and more remote. In the Baltic/Barents region maritime issues assume capital importance. Thus, the Federal-Target Program “World Ocean,” announced in January 1997, has a significant regional component and focus. The program places special emphasis upon key littorals, including the Baltic and Barents, as foundations of Russian maritime power and the base from which to exploit oceanic resources.34 It addresses mobilizing national resources to support Russian naval/maritime protection of national and geopolitical interests. The program also seeks socio-economic development of coastal regions and a stabilization of its maritime commercial complex, including merchant marine and fishing industries, oceanic mineral resources and Russia’s oceanographic research. Indeed, the program notes that more than 80 percent of Russia’s oil and gas reserves are located in the shelf of its northern seas. The program focuses on cooperation among the various agencies and institutes of the Russian state to sustain the study and exploit maritime resources and potential. At least one program supporter considered the establishment/re-establishment of a Naval Ministry as vital to the success of the World Ocean Program.35 The program was announced at a time of significant problems precisely in the Baltic-Barents littoral.

**Baltic Security Issues**

The perception of security issues in the Baltic/Barents region has profoundly changed since the end of the Cold War. In the Baltic, which was a Soviet *mare nostrum*, geopolitical changes have recast the region. After the Baltic states regained their independence, Russian troops withdrew from their territory. Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast is now isolated by land from Russia and depends on transit through Lithuania. Progress to update the Conventional Forces, Europe, CFE agreement has been substantial, and it appears that Russia will agree to a cap on treaty-limited items in Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts as part of a general demilitarization.
The decline of the Northern Fleet highlights the reduced military significance of the Barents area. In part, the fleet’s decline manifests Russia’s decreasing investment in naval forces. Compared with the decline of Russian naval power in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Pacific, the Northern Fleet is arguably more important, particularly its SSBNs, because the deep decline in Russia’s general forces has so eroded its conventional forces’ combat power.

of Baltic security issues. A unified Germany has emerged as a major player in the Baltic, while Sweden and Finland, Cold War “ neutrals” and non-aligned states, have joined the European Union and NATO’s Partnership for Peace. There is even an persistent debate in both capitals about the advantages of joining NATO. With Poland’s recent admission to NATO Lithuania borders an alliance member. On the basis of a German-Danish initiative, the Baltic Sea States Council was established in 1992 with a membership of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway), Germany, Poland, Russia and the European Commission. This forum has served to enhance democratic development and address environmental issues in the region.

The Baltic states have not only joined the Partnership-for-Peace but have also sought to enhance their relations with the West on the basis of developing joint peacekeeping forces, the BALTBAT (Baltic Battalion) and sending a company of that battalion to join the NORDPOL Brigade with Multi-National Division (North) in IFOR/ SFOR. They recently opened a joint defense college (BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. The Nordic states, led by Denmark, have assisted in these endeavors and have provided leadership for the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTROON) and the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), all of which link the Baltic States to the West and provide for greater rationality and burden sharing. Denmark has been particularly active in this process, but the other Nordic states also see the security of the Baltic States as an important and necessary part of their own security in post-Cold War Europe.

For the Baltic States NATO membership remains the final goal of their national security strategies. As Valdis Birkavs, the foreign minister of Latvia, recently stated before the Finnish Parliament, NATO and the Trans-Atlantic link are vital pillars of Baltic security. “So long as NATO remains the pillar of European security, Latvia will strive for full membership. We will be full members of Europe and as such, we expect to contribute to the alliance which forms the backbone of the security architecture.” In January 1998 the United States signed the Baltic Charter with the Baltic States. While the charter brought greater US support for integrating the Baltic nations into Western institutions, including NATO, it did not promise support for admission to NATO in the immediate future. State Department spokesman James Rubin characterized the charter as a framework for developing US-Baltic relations and a clear statement of US support for “Baltic integration into European and transatlantic institutions.” Rubin stated that the US welcomes and supports Baltic aspirations to join NATO, but “the charter is not a security guarantee [and] does not commit the United States to Baltic membership.” Reaction in the Baltic States was generally positive toward the Charter because it enhanced their negotiating posture over minority and border issues with Russia. Some press reports expressed disappointment over the failure to achieve support for immediate entry into NATO, calling the Charter a “consolation prize.”

“Soft security” issues have not replaced “hard security” concerns as the littoral states seek enhanced regional stability. They recognize that credible national defenses are a necessary security component. Such defenses would not stop a major assault, but they would provide time for international intervention and impose costs upon an aggressor. The armed forces of the three states are quite small. Lithuania has a standing force of 5,250 and a reserve of 11,000; Latvia has a regular force of 4,500 and a reserve of 16,000; and Estonia has 3,510 regulars and 14,000 reserves. Given the limited financial resources of the Baltic States, there is an inherent tension between those programs that promote integration into international security structures and those that support national defense.

Russians in Latvia and Estonia present a core stability issue. In Estonia there are about 409,000 Russians among a total population of 1,453,000, but the Russians are heavily concentrated in the cities and the northeast region of the state around Narva. In Latvia the Russian minority numbers around 700,000 in a population of 2.4 million. However,
The single greatest security danger in the Baltic region from the Russian perspective comes from the further enlargement of NATO [linking Nordic and Baltic security]. . . NATO expansion, especially a second tranche that would include the Baltic States, as the greatest military-political threat to Russia in the region. Such a development would inevitably draw a new dividing line in Europe and isolate Russia.

both countries have large concentrations of Russians in their capitals. The Baltic nations perceive these populations as Soviet colonizers. Linguistic restrictions on citizenship have been a source of contention in each state. Russian observers have castigated the nationality policies of Latvia and Estonia as introducing apartheid to Europe. This issue has stood in the way of resolving border issues between Russia and the two states. All three Baltic States have witnessed a shift in their exports and imports toward European Union members over the last five years, and the European Union has given Estonia priority for admission. However, the Baltics remain heavily dependent upon Russia for energy.

Some Russian observers see the emerging “soft security” regime in the Baltic as the best chance for the future stability of the region and Europe. Dmitri Trenin has stressed the advantages of multilateral dialogue. The single greatest security danger in the Baltic region from the Russian perspective comes from the further enlargement of NATO. Ambassador Yuri Deryabin, director of the Center of Nordic Studies of the Institute of Europe, links Nordic and Baltic security, referring to NATO expansion, especially a second tranche that would include the Baltic States, as the greatest military-political threat to Russia in the region. Such a development would inevitably draw a new dividing line in Europe and isolate Russia.

**Barents Security Issues**

While the political boundaries in the Russian north have not changed as radically as in the Baltics, the geostrategic significance of the region has been transformed and security concerns radically recast. During the Cold War, the Kola Peninsula emerged as the basing area for Russia’s most powerful fleet with the largest component of the Soviet Union’s sea-based strategic forces. Naval and air forces operating from Kola posed a threat to Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and provided the surface, subsurface and airborne forces to protect the north bastion of Russian strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs). Soviet ground forces were of sufficient...
Northern Fleet finds itself trapped between declining funds to procure and maintain warships and the impact of new technologies that transform the role of maritime forces. . . .

As of December 1998 the Russian Navy had taken 170 nuclear-powered submarines out of operation, but 130 have not been dismantled and between 110 and 115 still have operating nuclear reactors on board.

size and quality to threaten northern Norway, making that country the key to NATO’s northern flank.54 In the post-Cold War period, the importance of the Kola peninsula has changed radically. As Ingemar Doerfer noted, the military significance of the Northern Fleet has declined and with it the military importance of the region; “Kola is not as important as conventional wisdom proclaims.”55

The decline of the Northern Fleet highlights the reduced military significance of the Barents area. In part, the fleet’s decline manifests Russia’s decreasing investment in naval forces. Compared with the decline of Russian naval power in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Pacific, the Northern Fleet is arguably more important, particularly its SSBNs, because the deep decline in Russia’s general forces has so eroded its conventional forces’ combat power.

As a consequence of START I, block obsolescence and slow pace of SSBN construction, the Northern Fleet’s SSBN force has declined significantly in numbers. The Delta I and II boats have been retired from service. Seven Delta IV SSBNs remain with Northern Fleet, along with a portion of the Delta III force.56 The number of Typhoon class SSBNs has declined from six in 1996 to four in 1997 because of operational costs and design problems.57 Doerfer estimates that only one Typhoon will be in service in 2003.58 The first of the replacement SSBN class (Borey), the Yuri Dolgorukiy, will not enter service until at least 2003, followed by one Borey each year up to 2010. Critics in the Ministry of Defense newspaper, Krasnaya zvezda, however, were less optimistic. Given the level of funding provided in FY 1997, they estimated that the Yuri Dolgorukiy would take 50 years to complete.59 Regardless of future numbers of vessels, very few SSBNs now in service go to sea on patrols.

Northern Fleet finds itself trapped between declining funds to procure and maintain warships and the impact of new technologies that transform the role of maritime forces. On the one hand, state funding for ship building and major refits was slashed to the bone. On the other hand, a revolution in US conventional force capabilities, as announced in Operation Desert Storm, posed a new threat to the fleet. With the revolution in military affairs, the vulnerability of its dock yards, infrastructure and ships in port has increased markedly with the advent of long-range, precision-strike weapons from the sea. As Russian Navy retired Vice Admiral Yuri Kviatkovsky points out, by the year 2000 the US Navy will possess over 7,300 sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) launchers and Russia will have 16.60 Moreover, the Kola peninsula installations are also at risk from stand-off ALCMs. In the face of such a conventional deep-strike threat, Russian forces would have to respond with nuclear forces. At least one observer has suggested that under current conditions the foremost role of the Northern Fleet is political, demonstrating Russia’s preparedness to defend itself when it is more vulnerable to conventional attack than it has been for many decades.61

Both Russia and the West see such a conflict as unlikely in the new European security environment. The military dimensions of the Barents region are thus not as significant as they were during the Cold War. In their place a new set of dangers and risks associated with nuclear systems have become too prominent. They are an indelible part of the maritime image of the post-Cold War world.

Each great 20th-century conflict has had distinct naval images. With World War I, it was the German High Seas Fleet sailing for Scapa Flow and its scuttling by its crews, followed by the Washington Naval Conference to limit the size of the major navies and stop the then ongoing capital-ship race. With World War II, it was the signing of the Japanese surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, followed by the sinking of many old ships as a result of atomic tests in the Pacific. The end of the Cold War had its naval dimensions too. One was the Bush-Gorbachev summit at Malta aboard the cruisers Belknap and Slava. The follow-on image in this case is a large number of nuclear submarines awaiting decommissioning, decorating, and break-up. The Barents region provides the backdrop for much of that image.

The rise of Northern Fleet to a position of preeminence in the Soviet Navy under Admiral Sergei Gorshkov was associated with nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The Northern Fleet became the primary basing area for the largest concentration of
One of the most pressing nuclear problems of the Barents region is the disposal of obsolete nuclear submarines and their reactors. The former Soviet Union had more nuclear-powered submarines than the rest of the world combined. Of 100-115 Russian nuclear submarines in a state of decommissioning and awaiting decoring of their reactors, estimated 50-70 are with the Northern Fleet.

Soviet nuclear-powered surface and submarine forces. The Soviet Union developed the world’s largest fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers. Nuclear power plants provided the electricity for the region’s vast military-industrial complex. As Torbjorn Norendal pointed out “northwest Russia has the highest concentration of nuclear installations in the world with more than 300 reactors, the great bulk of them in nuclear submarines.”62 Awareness of this issue in all its complexity began with the meltdown at Chernobyl in 1986 and the loss of the SSN Komsomolets in 1989. Both events sharpened Nordic public awareness of the serious problem. By the late 1980s the Soviet Union faced the challenge of decommissioning and decoring obsolete nuclear submarines. National preparations were inadequate, reflected in persistent rumors about nuclear waste dumping in the Barents and Kara seas.

The end of the Cold War provided greater transparency and more opportunities for international cooperation on complex issues involving Russian nuclear facilities in the Barents region. One manifestation of this transformation was the creation of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in January 1993. A Norwegian initiative, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council was established at Kirkenes, Norway, with the aim of the member countries’ replacing earlier division and European confrontation with partnership in Northern Europe. Its initial members included Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. With Sweden’s and Finland’s admission to the European Union, the European Commission became the seventh member of the Council.63

The security environment has been transformed. Norwegian Defense Minister Dag Jostein Fjærvoll, speaking on “Norway, NATO and North Europe,” recently observed: “Today, Russia does not pose a military threat to her Nordic neighbors, but the High North is still very important in a strategic geopolitical context.”64 Given the strained economic situation facing Russia and the size of the problems associated with nuclear safety and radioactive waste disposal, the threat from Russia’s nuclear hazards has loomed ever larger in Nordic national security strategies. Norway has mounted a large number of bilateral and multilateral programs to deal with various aspects of the problem.65 Tomas Ries of Finland has ranked a nuclear accident in Russia as both the most severe and most probable security threat facing Finland.66 Air Chief Marshal Sir John
Both Russia and the West see such a conflict [on the Kola Peninsula] as unlikely in the new European security environment. The military dimensions of the Barents region are thus not as significant as they were during the Cold War. In their place a new set of dangers and risks associated with nuclear systems have become too prominent. They are an indelible part of the maritime image of the post-Cold War world.

Cheshire, commander in chief AFNORTHWEST, has suggested that NATO forces in the north must prepare to respond to a nuclear disaster in Russia. Cheshire pointed to the 10 nuclear power plants in Northwest Russia and Lithuanian and the 160 nuclear submarines awaiting decommissioning with the Baltic and North fleets. He noted that while civilian agencies have the lead in this area of disaster prevention and consequence management, military forces must prepare for their role because of the scale of the potential disaster and the likelihood that such a catastrophe would develop without much advanced warning.57

As of December 1998 the Russian Navy had taken 170 nuclear-powered submarines out of operation, but 130 have not been dismantled and between 110 and 115 still have operating nuclear reactors on board.58

Considerable evidence confirms the risks from nuclear materials in the Russian Northwest. There were two confirmed attempts to steal fresh nuclear fuel from the North Fleet in 1993, and in 1998 the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety reported eight cases of missing spent fuel rods.59 In 1996 a nuclear submarine reactor faced meltdown when a local power company cut off electricity to a dock where nuclear submarines awaited decommissioning. Only the speedy intervention by naval personnel avoided a serious incident. Finally, in September 1998 at the naval base near Gadzhievo, a disturbed sailor on an Akula-class SSN killed eight of his fellow crewmen and barricaded himself in the boat’s torpedo room. When troops stormed the torpedo room, they reported that the young man had committed suicide.60

As a result of these concerns, a wide range of international and bilateral projects have emerged to assist with the Barents region’s nuclear dilemma. Indeed, the nuclear power plant problem extended not only to the power station on the Kola Peninsula but also reached the station near Leningrad and the plant at Ignalina, Lithuania. The European Recovery and Development Bank made available funds to improve nuclear safety at all these plants.61 According to Ambassador Nyberg, such programs are obviously logical but unfortunately limited.

It remains an incontrovertible fact, however, that the risks entailed in the operation of Russian nuclear power plants represent the greatest physical threat to the European Union. This fact also necessitates the conclusion that Western programs for improving nuclear safety can never be a substitute for Russian efforts to improve the safety of their own installations.62

The nuclear safety problems are daunting and systemic. One cannot address the facilities without also finding solutions for the problem of nuclear waste storage and disposal, which involves regional facilities and more distant complexes, such as the Mayak reprocessing plant near Chelyabinsk in the Urals.

One of the most pressing nuclear problems of the Barents region is the disposal of obsolete nuclear submarines and their reactors. The former Soviet Union had more nuclear-powered submarines than the rest of the world combined. Of 100-115 Russian nuclear submarines in a state of decommissioning and awaiting decoring of their reactors, estimated 50-70 are with the Northern Fleet.63 While an optimal program would involve decommissioning and decoring 10 boats per year, Russia has only completed three to six per year. Slow progress increases costs because the boats must be maintained and a partial crew deployed on each vessel awaiting decoring, substantially exceeding the $3-4 million tabbed for the dismantling process. Progress has also been slowed by a host of problems with nuclear waste disposal sites in the region and beyond. The Northern Fleet’s nuclear waste site at Andreya Bay is full and risks spilling into the sea. The Lepse, a vessel used for storing spent nuclear reactor fuel, contains fuel rods that are stuck in its storage facility. Russia needs to acquire a vessel and railway cars capable of carrying containers with spent naval nuclear fuel. A more distant but critical source of potential nuclear contamination is the nuclear storage facility at Mayak, where vast amounts of radioactive waste are stored in reservoirs. Joint Russian and Norwegian teams have begun assessing the scale of the problem and the risk that a dam break could pose to the Arctic region via the Ob River into the Kara Sea.64

62 MILITARY REVIEW
International cooperation in dealing with the problem of nuclear submarine decommissioning and decontamination has been a hallmark of the new security problems in the Barents region. With the signing of the START I and START II treaties and their significant reductions in US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals, the problem of disposing of fissile materials from nuclear warheads led to a bilateral agreement to construct a fissile material storage facility. In 1991 the United States initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to fund projects that would address a wide range of nuclear disposal issues. The FY 1993 program included $10 million for studying, assessing, and identifying nuclear waste disposal by the former Soviet Union in the Arctic region. Since 1992 the United States has invested $90 million from Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to pay for its half of the costs of financing the design and construction of a new facility at the Mayak, which is to have the capacity to store 12,500 dismantled nuclear warheads and 50,000 containers of fissile materials. This measure was initially a US-Russian effort to control strategic nuclear arms, but the problem has taken on broader dimensions.

In 1994 a Norwegian White Paper on problems relating to nuclear activities in the northern region brought parliamentary action to formulate an inclusive plan to deal with the most pressing problems and allocate 403 million kroner for the program from 1995 to 1998. The plan addressed both nuclear safety and radioactive waste management projects, with the bulk of funds devoted to the latter initiative. Norway collaborated with Russia to improve nuclear safety at the nuclear power station on the Kola Peninsula and supported similar Finnish and Swedish projects at the St. Petersburg and Ignalina, Lithuania, nuclear power stations. Norway is involved in the Nuclear Safety Account program for Chernobyl in Ukraine. Norway also participates in a project to find alternative power sources [solar cells] for 155 strontium battery-powered lighthouses in Murmansk oblast.

Among the waste-management projects was a joint Norwegian-Russian expedition to the sunken SSN Komsomolets to determine the radioactive leakage from its reactor and two nuclear warheads on board. The investigation established that the release was negligible. Norway also has the leading role in an international project to repair the damaged nuclear storage vessel Lepse at Murmansk. This project is part of a larger Norwegian-Russian framework agreement that provided for a joint commission to promote cooperation. The agreement provides for tax and customs exemptions on equipment imported to support Norwegian-funded projects and limits liability of foreign participants in case of nuclear accidents related to the project. Norway has also taken an active role in getting Russia to agree to a multinational framework that covers all partners. The framework fosters broader international cooperation in such efforts and Norway brought such a proposal to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council meeting in March 1999.

Norwegian-Russian programs have focused on the problem of nuclear waste associated with the Northern Fleet. Among the major assistant programs are the following:

- Emptying and decommissioning the nuclear storage facility for naval nuclear spent fuel at Andreyeva Bay.
- Establishing an interim storage site for spent naval nuclear fuel at Mayak.
- Constructing a vessel for transporting containers with spent naval nuclear fuel.
- Building four railway cars for transporting containers with spent nuclear fuel.
- Delivering a mobile facility for the treatment of liquid radioactive waste.

As these programs suggest, Norway has given primary importance to spent nuclear fuel issues that threaten its security. At the same time the programs address all aspects of the Russian nuclear waste system and promote international cooperation in the Arctic region. One key manifestation of such international efforts is the trilateral cooperation among Norway, the United States and Russia.

The tripartite Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) agreement, signed on 1 September 1996, aims to eliminate the military’s environmental consequences in the arctic region and

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MILITARY REVIEW • July-August 1999
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Involves both nuclear and non-nuclear projects. The nuclear projects include the developing casks and containers for transporting and storing radioactive waste and spent fuel, a mobile purification plant for liquid radioactive waste and intermediate storage for solid low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has become the chief executive agent for all aspects of the submarine decoring and spent naval nuclear fuel programs. Norway has also coordinated its assistance in disposing of Russian SSNs with the US Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for decommissioning and scrapping Russian SSBNs. During a visit to Moscow in February 1999, Ross Gottemoeller, director of the Office of Non-proliferation and National Security at the US Energy Department, reported progress in bringing Russian SSNs under the Defense Department’s CTR program for dismantling submarines for FY 2000.

One of the most recent initiatives, tying together Baltic and Barents Sea security concerns, is a Finnish proposal launched in 1997 and adopted by the Council of the European Union at its Vienna Meeting in December 1998. “Northern Dimension” encompasses both relations within the EU and external matters involving Russia and the Baltic Sea region, and it seeks to promote stability and well being through economic cooperation and positive mutual dependency. The Vienna meeting raised a number of issues, and looked forward to further progress on handling spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste in Northwest Russia. This was also the topic of EU-Russian conversations in Moscow, where Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, president of the European Union, and Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission, met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation via the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Schroeder and Santer stressed the important contribution that the Northern Dimension initiative could make to regional relations. Both sides agreed to seek means to enhance cooperation on environmental issues, especially spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste in Northwest Russia. With Finland slated to assume the EU Presidency next year, the Northern Dimension will certainly get even greater play in EU policy. In preparation for that leadership role, Finland plans to host a conference on Northern Dimension issues later this year.

In the Russian Northwest, regionalized and civilianized security issues have dominated post-Cold War international relations. The military security dimension has declined in importance. Nordic, EU and NATO initiatives include Baltic and Nordic concerns and address Post-Cold War security challenges. In the Baltics the primary focus has been on democratic construction and economic development to achieve political-economic stability and successfully integrate Russian minorities. The Barents Sea region has focused on enhancing safety at nuclear installations and disposing of the Soviet Union’s nuclear legacy. A wide range of new bilateral and multilateral initiatives deal with nuclear safety, radioactive waste disposal, and nuclear submarine decommissioning, decoring and scrapping. Future progress in these areas will depend on Russia’s experiment with democracy, military stability and relations with the West.

NOTES

1. The northwest strategic direction is a term used by Russian military reformers and analysts to refer to the Baltic-Barents region. The five other strategic directions are western, southwestern, Caucasus-Caspian, Central-Asian and Far Eastern.
2. “The Kosovo Crisis and Russia’s Interests: A seminar organized by the EastWest Institute (EWI) and the Institute for World Economy and International Politics (IMEMO)” Moscow, May 17, 1999. In Johnson’s Russia List, #3303 (25 May 1999), davidjohnson@erols.com
5. Ibid., 8.
20. Rene Nyberg, "Russia and Europe," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (17 February 1999). Nyberg mentions as positive developments the absence of a messianic ideology, the absence of press censorship, the absence of terror as an instrument of state power, and Russia's open borders and extensive contacts with the outside world.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. OMRI DAILY DIGEST, Part I (19 October 1995).
26. Ibid.
28. M.I. Abdurakhmanov, V.A. Barshpolat, V.A. Manilov and V.S. Pinromov, Osmanly bezopasnost Rossi (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Drucha", 1996), 111-155. The authors discuss regional interests in the context of relations with the West.
31. Ibid.
34. Yu. A. Bystrov, 'Federal 'World Ocean' Programme——The Maritime Strategy of the Russian State,' Peace to the Oceans Bulletin, Nos. 11-12 (1997), 140. Implications for Russia had a naval college and naval ministry from the reign of Peter I to the October Revolution and the Soviet Union had a brief flation with a peoples commonwealth in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
35. Roland Eggleston, "New Arms Agreement aims to Ease Russian Fears," Reuters Newsline, 5/25/99. The preliminary agreement was concluded in late May and will be presented for signing in November 1999 at the OSCE meeting in Vienna and will be signed in November 1999 at the OSCE meeting in Vienna and will be signed in November 1999.
36. "The Barents Euro-Arctic Council," Nine other states hold observer status with the Council: United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the USA, Canada, Japan and Italy.
38. Nordisk Sikkerhet, 75-81.
40. "The Barents Euro-Arctic Council," Nine other states hold observer status with the Council: United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the USA, Canada, Japan and Italy.
42. "NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA. I wish to thank Tamara Robinson for calling my attention to these materials.
44. Nordisk Sikkerhet, 77-79.
47. Norendal, 3-4.
48. Norwegian Institute of International Studies, NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.
49. Nordisk Sikkerhet, 75-76.
50. Ibid., 76-79.
51. Ibid., 79.
52. Norendal, 4-5.
53. Ibid., 4.
54. Nordisk Sikkerhet, 82.
55. Norendal, 6.

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The contentious issue of Kashmir has been a constant in India-Pakistan relations since the independence and partition of British India in 1947. The two countries have fought three wars—two of them over Kashmir. Since India and Pakistan conducted politically spectacular nuclear tests last year, many observers wonder whether Kashmir might trigger a South Asian nuclear war. Historically, Kashmir has been both a flashpoint and a safety valve. Both countries have raised issues relating to Kashmir’s status and security as a safety valve for diverting their public’s attention from domestic problems. The danger is that both sides may raise these issues simultaneously, turning the safety valve into a flashpoint. As India and Pakistan develop and field nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the potential danger of this flashpoint increases.

The modern states of India and Pakistan resulted from the division of the British Indian Empire in 1947. The bloody division left a bitter rivalry and hostility. At the time of independence, the princes ruling the 560-some Indian states were given the choice of joining India or Pakistan. Most quickly decided based on their state geographic location and the religious majority. India ended up with a Hindu majority and the largest Muslim minority community in the world. Pakistan’s predominately Muslim population was physically separated by 1,000 miles of India between West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was a problem at the time of partition. Its Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist communities lived in relatively distinct areas, with the Muslims inhabiting the Kashmir valley adjacent to Western Pakistan. The maharaja who ruled Jammu and Kashmir wanted full independence. Partitioning of the state might have been a better option, but the British refused to allow Jammu and Kashmir independence, and partition was not an option. The Hindu maharaja, with a Muslim majority of subjects, signed a one-year “stand still” agreement with India and Pakistan to maintain the status quo.

Pakistan still demands that the plebiscite required by the 1949 Security Council resolutions be held. India refuses, stating that the regular elections conducted within the state of Jammu and Kashmir have supported parties that favor integration with India. These elections are a surrogate for the plebiscite. Neither India nor Pakistan will budge from its position and compromise is highly unlikely. Kashmiri self-determination takes a back seat to both positions.
Indian Army countered by crossing the cease-fire line and seizing key terrain and mountain passes allegedly used as infiltration routes. Pakistan responded with a major attack into southern Kashmir. Indian troops then thrust south of Kashmir into Pakistan itself. The fighting in the Second India-Pakistan War was brutal, with India the tactical victor but the war a strategic stalemate. The UN-brokered cease-fire led to another agreement under which both sides withdrew to prewar positions.

The Third India-Pakistan War erupted when Indian troops entered East Pakistan in late 1971 while a brutal civil war was already in progress. India invaded to depose the Pakistani government and allow the breakaway faction to take control. An independent Bangladesh took the place of East Pakistan. Kashmir was not a factor in this war, but the 1949 cease-fire was somewhat modified by the 1972 agreement.

Kashmir’s Political Influence on Pakistan and India

Kashmir is a constant thorn in Indo-Pakistani relations. Pakistan still demands that the plebiscite required by the 1949 Security Council resolutions be held. India refuses, stating that the regular elections conducted within the state of Jammu and Kashmir have supported parties that favor integration with India and these elections are a surrogate for the plebiscite. Neither India nor Pakistan will budge from its position and compromise is highly unlikely. Kashmiri self-determination takes a back seat to both positions.

Kashmir is a very pleasant area and a tourist center when calm. The climate is mild and the scenery spectacular. However, India and Pakistan regularly engage in artillery exchanges along the border, and there has been a decades-long guerrilla movement among Muslims in Kashmir. The Indian police, border forces and military have conducted counter-guerrilla actions to suppress this movement. Kashmir is also a safety valve for both India and Pakistan. Whenever domestic crises mount or domestic politics get too difficult, both sides find it convenient to “beat the Kashmir drum” and focus national problems on the intractable Kashmir problem. It is therefore useful to examine the Kashmir question from three principal points of view: Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri.

An Indian Point of View

The insurgency in Kashmir has continued over the decades, but intensified following the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan and military activity peaked in 1994. The guerrillas, habitually trained, armed and supported by Pakistan, include many mercenary (India’s term) outsiders. The typical Kashmiri guerrilla is tired of the struggle, disillusioned with Pakistan and not a tenacious fighter. It is clear that the war will not gain independence for Muslim Kashmir. The guerrilla war has damaged the economy of Kashmir and driven the tourists away.

Mercenaries from the Muslim nations constitute the major guerrilla threat. Pakistan has pushed itself into the conflict by backing these mercenaries and fanning the flames. The bulk of the mercenaries are Pakistanis and Afghan Mujahideen, but there are also Algerians, Chechens, Egyptians, Libyans and Bahrainians. (The figures on page 70 are extracts from Indian documents detailing the origins of killed and captured foreign guerrillas during the 1990s.) The mercenaries are very dedicated since this is their Jihad (holy war). Although they are supplied and supported by Pakistan, their goal is not simply to annex Kashmir to Pakistan but to install an Islamic state from Kashmir to Central Europe.

As the support and interest of the local Kashmiris flagged, the local guerrillas were replaced by Mujahideen. Initially this created problems since the Mujahideen instructions were not clear, and their womanizing and extortion cost them support among the local Kashmiris. Later groups of Mujahideen entered the area with tighter discipline and new instructions to pay for what they took, pay for services, leave the local women alone and conduct themselves honorably. This policy paid dividends for the guerrillas, garnering local support and even allowing them to set up some local governments. These successes portend long-term problems for the Indian police, military and border guards. India expects the insurgency to intensify once the Taliban conquer all of Afghanistan, freeing up forces for Kashmir.

The Indians pursue counterinsurgency in Kashmir slowly, methodically and carefully—avoiding harshness and brutality. They try to attack only hostile elements and thus not turn the populace against India. Economic development and restoring the democratic process must go hand-in-hand

During the Soviet-Afghan war, political Islam spilled across Afghanistan’s borders, intensifying religious-based struggles and Islamic militancy in the region. During this period, hundreds of Kashmiris joined the Afghan Mujahideen in their Jihad against the communists. . . . After the communist regime in Kabul collapsed, most Kashmiri combat veterans returned home to continue their Jihad or were mobilized by Pakistan to become part of the Kashmiri Mujahideen.
Kashmir has triggered two of the three India-Pakistan Wars and may do so again. Whenever domestic crises heat up or domestic politics get too difficult, both sides divert national attention to Kashmir. Border clashes occur and the insurgency or counterinsurgency efforts mount, but open warfare is avoided. As long as Kashmir remains a safety valve for both countries, nuclear conflict is unlikely. However, if both sides raise the Kashmir issue simultaneously, or if local events promote outrage, the situation could escalate.

with the counterinsurgency. The Indians are trying to instill the “Spirit of India” in the Kashmiris and have them identify with a group beyond their tribe and religion. The Indians see the local populace as the primary source of intelligence, particularly local women. Indian medical treatment programs, flood relief and other emergency relief programs have built rapport and made the local populace more willing to supply information.

The Indian Army in Kashmir includes various ethnic and religious groups and has a professional non-commissioned officer corps. Local commanders generate rules of engagement and are responsible for excesses by their forces. Besides regular army units, which take their turn at Kashmir service, special counterinsurgency units, such as the Rashtriya Rifles, are in Kashmir for the duration. The Indian Army does not deploy armed propaganda teams but does have some psychological operations forces involved, and police always accompany military raids. Thick vegetation restricts helicopters primarily to administrative movement of VIPs and forces. The Indian Army has formed popular Kuka Parry units, composed of former Kashmiri guerrillas. During their standard two-year enlistment, they fight the guerrillas on their own terms, but their actions have also generated some complaints among the local populace.

India feels that China, not Pakistan, is its main threat and discounts Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir since India considers Jammu and Kashmir a part of its sovereign territory, beyond negotiation or mediation. In India’s view, Kashmir is an Indian state being subverted by an externally promoted revolt. India is a powerful secular state that can withstand guerrillas and external pressures from Pakistan and elsewhere indefinitely.

A Pakistani Point of View

The plebiscite ordered by the UN Security Council in 1949 has yet to be conducted and India refuses to conduct these elections since Kashmir clearly would vote to join Pakistan. The plebiscite resolution is now 50 years old—the longest-lasting noncompliance in UN history. India did not produce the instrument of accession before the UN in 1948 and refused to do so until the 1960s. The maharajah’s signature may well be forged. Pakistan has a duty to support fellow Muslims pursuing self-determination. Ironically, Indian democracy denies democratic determination to Kashmir.

The only Muslim-majority state in India is Kashmir, which India wants to retain as a symbol of national secularism. Pakistanis feel a moral obligation to keep the issue before the international community. India, clearly Pakistan’s main threat, is much larger and militarily well equipped. Pakistan could shrink from contact with India and try to mollify its powerful neighbor, but it has a moral obligation to keep the issue alive by supporting the oppressed Muslims in Kashmir.
A Kashmiri Point of View

The Kashmiris want the Indian-Pakistani dispute over their land settled justly by considering the wishes of Kashmir’s residents. The Kashmir upheaval goes back to 1931, when the Kashmiri people rose against the feudal ruler Britain forced on the colony. The feudal ruler turned Kashmir over to India, provoking nonviolent uprisings against the Indian occupation in 1953 and 1964-1965, which the Indian Army cruelly crushed. The current revolt signals a people’s desire for freedom, not support from Pakistan. Kashmiris demand an end to Indian occupation and a free vote to decide their status. Kashmir, the only state of the former British Indian Empire to be treated as mere chattel, is not a mere territorial dispute between India and Pakistan to resolve by their compromise; the people of Kashmir must decide their own fate: independence, accession to India or accession to Pakistan.

Indian soldiers occupy Kashmir in strength, making it probably the most densely garrisoned disputed territory on earth. The major opposition is not from Pakistan, Afghanistan or anywhere else outside Kashmir. Kashmiris themselves provide the main opposition, and should these outsiders leave, Kashmir would remain in turmoil because of Indian oppression and denied self-determination. The genuine political voice of the Kashmiri people, the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) categorically rejects violence and terrorism and is dedicated to the peaceful resolution of the conflict on any terms consistent with the right of self-determination.

Religion is not a prime reason for strife in Kashmir, where Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs lived in harmony for decades before the Indian invasion of 1947. Today there is intense popular sentiment for independence by Kashmiris of all religions and ethnic groups. An independent Kashmir would not be isolated from India and Pakistan but have close links to both and gladly provide a meeting ground for their negotiations.

The Authors’ Viewpoint

During political and military involvement in Kashmir, Pakistan has emphasized the religious aspects of the conflict and “freeing” the Kashmiri Muslims from the “infidel” Hindus. Since the partition of India, fighting in Kashmir has been considered a religious duty, particularly by the Pashtuns who straddle the Afghan-Pakistani border. They want to help fellow Muslims struggle against perceived Hindu hegemony in Kashmir. Hindu-Muslim clashes in other parts of the subcontinent, immediately following the partition, increased Pashtun commitment. In later years, Pashtun volunteers spearheaded Pakistani incursions into Indian-occupied Kashmir.

India and Pakistan regularly engage in artillery exchanges along the border, and there has been a decades-long guerilla movement among Muslims in Kashmir. Kashmir is also a safety valve for both India and Pakistan. Whenever domestic crises mount or domestic politics get too difficult, both sides find it convenient to “beat the Kashmir drum” and focus national problems on the intractable Kashmir problem.

During the Soviet-Afghan war, political Islam spilled across Afghanistan’s borders, intensifying religious-based struggles and Islamic militancy in the region. During this period, hundreds of Kashmiris joined the Afghan Mujahideen in their Jihad against the communists. Some 500 Kashmiris reportedly took part in the Mujahideen’s capture of the eastern Afghan city Khost in April 1991. After the communist regime in Kabul collapsed, most Kashmiri combat veterans returned home to continue their Jihad or were mobilized by Pakistan to become part of the Kashmiri Mujahideen.

Foreign analysts have noted that rising of Islamic fundamentalism worldwide coincided with deterioration of social and economic conditions in Kashmir. This made the area an attractive battlefield for Jihad freelancers, including members of fundamentalist Afghan Mujahideen groups, particularly the Hesh-e Islami led by Globulin Hekmatyar. At the same time, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and increasing political clout of the Hindu Bharatiya 性 alterations:
Janata Party (BJP) allowed a more hawkish element to influence India’s policy vis-à-vis Kashmir. Using force against those suspected of harboring the Mujahideen and reported widespread violation of human rights further polarized communities.

Consequently, the Kashmir situation is now inextricably tangled and draws unofficial international players. It has become too complicated to resolve through bilateral negotiations, nor do internal Kashmiri political factions speak with one voice. Paradoxically, the resulting complexity discourages India and Pakistan from again resorting to a military solution. The governments cannot ignore the problem because it is a popular issue with the electorates, but they can hardly risk a major military confrontation that offers only limited results.12 While the dispute continues to influence domestic and foreign policies of both sides, it serves as a safety valve in India-Pakistan relations. A comprehensive solution is distant at best. Eventually the control line may turn into a permanent border between India and Pakistan with the Muslim Kashmir valley given a special status, while the Jammu and Ladkh areas with their predominantly Hindu and Buddhist populations could remain closely connected with India. Such a second partition may not be the best solution, however. Unless a settlement satisfies those who want Kashmir independence regardless of religion, an incipient Kashmiri independence movement may continue to trouble relationships between India and Pakistan.

Enter the Nuclear Genie

Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons have further destabilized southern Asian relations. When the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China developed nuclear weapons, they all required time to develop attendant doctrine. At first, they viewed nuclear weapons as very powerful artillery and thought that battles could be fought more effectively by incorporating nuclear fires in the scheme of maneuver. Over decades, strategic, operational and tactical nuclear weapons were fielded. Simultaneously, the nonutility of nuclear weapons and their unacceptable collateral effects became more and more apparent. Such concepts as Mutual Assured Destruction were developed to prevent the use of these powerful weapons.

These newer nuclear states have not yet experienced that intellectual evolution. At present, some officials in India consider nuclear war achievable and survivable. High-ranking Indians have declared India and Pakistan may go to war over Kashmir in the future. Both sides could use nuclear weapons. India would survive such a war, but Pakistan could not.13 Should such thinking dominate policy decisions, South Asian security will be tenuous in the coming decades.

India and Pakistan have not openly discussed their approaches to nuclear command and control procedures, nuclear surety, safeguards, and doctrine for employing nuclear weapons. These issues, naturally, concern their neighbors and the international community.
The Kashmir issue has been a point of contention between India and Pakistan for over a half-century. Little headway toward resolution has been made during that time despite three wars, a protracted guerrilla war and perpetual animosity. Nuclear weapons in both state's arsenals further complicate the issue.

Kashmir has triggered two of the three India-Pakistan Wars and may do so again. Whenever domestic crises heat up or domestic politics get too difficult, both sides divert national attention to Kashmir. Border clashes occur and the insurgency or counterinsurgency efforts mount, but open warfare is avoided. As long as Kashmir remains a safety valve for both countries, nuclear conflict is unlikely. However, if both sides raise the Kashmir issue simultaneously, or if local events promote outrage, the situation could escalate and indeed become a flashpoint.

Kashmir seems an unsolvable conundrum. Yet, US-Sino relations were equally difficult several decades ago. The developing business and trade partnerships improved official relationships. Perhaps, if India and Pakistan opened their borders for trade and economic contacts, their governments could review policy options. Once India and Pakistan have economic interests in each other’s well being, the specter of future conflict might subside. But state economic ties alone cannot avert war. Economic actions must couple with political and military actions to ensure stability. Free, internationally supervised elections in Jammu and Kashmir could provide an independent partial buffer zone between India and Pakistan. However, neither India nor Pakistan would agree to such a solution today.

Perhaps the best hope for the Indian subcontinent is that India and Pakistan will shift their nuclear weapons policies from warfighting to deterrence as they develop and field warheads and delivery systems. Apparently, only after both sides have developed a nuclear warfighting capability will the possibility of internationally brokered arms ceiling talks occur. Nuclear weapons may never be eliminated from the region, but perhaps their number can be reduced. For now, the emerging nuclear threat endangers the Indian subcontinent. MIR.

Eventually the control line may turn into a permanent border . . . with the Muslim Kashmir valley given a special status, while the Jammu and Ladakh areas with their predominantly Hindu and Buddhist populations could remain closely connected with India . . . However, unless a settlement satisfies those who want Kashmir independence regardless of religion, an incipient Kashmiri independence movement may continue to trouble relationships between India and Pakistan.

NOTES


4. This section is based on a series of conversations Mr. Grau had with a reliable highly placed source within the Indian government in July 1998.

5. "Mercenary" is the pejorative Indian description of these guerrillas. Most of the guerrillas appear to be unpaid volunteers fighting Jihad. A mercenary does not fight Jihad since he is fighting for the highest bidder and not his religious convictions.

6. The authors thank Major Ahmad Mahmood Hayat and several other Pakistan citizens for sharing their views on the Kashmir situation.

7. The instrument of accession is the agreement by which the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir joined his state to India.

8. It is difficult to present a representative Kashmiri view with any degree of certainty since the Indian government has not published any open polls on either accession or independence conducted in Jammu and Kashmir. The authors thank Dr. Ghulam Nabi Farooq, a member of the Kashmiri American Council and other Kashmiris for sharing their scholarship and views.


13. Conversation Mr. Grau had with a highly placed Indian official in July 1998.

THE FOLLOWING annotated bibliography uses an interdisciplinary, multicultural approach to assess the current literature on highly complex issues in Latin America. To that effect the bibliography has been divided into four topics: Social, Economic and Political issues; US-Latin America issues; Drug Trafficking; and Insurgencies, Terrorist groups and Indigenous Movements.

A complement to the bibliography is “Primer on Latin America Insurgencies and Guerrilla Movements.” The sources listed roughly encompass the period 1968 to 1999, providing background information on the most important revolutionary movements in Latin America, such as the Montoneros of Argentina, the Tupamaros of Uruguay and Carlos Marighella’s Action for National Liberation of Brazil. Many of these organizations sought to overthrow their respective national governments through violent means and blamed the incursion of foreign capital as a form of economic imperialism. Even after their demise, they continue to inspire terrorists and revolutionary movements throughout the world, particularly in Latin America. Parallels are evident between some of 1960s’ and 1970s’ movements and those currently active in Latin American countries such as Colombia and Mexico. Understanding the ideas and tactics of the previous Latin American revolutionary movements could help gauge today’s movements and uprisings.

The section “Social, Economic and Political issues” provides background for the insurgencies, terrorist groups and revolutionary movements flourishing in Latin America today. The great social and economic disparities that gave rise to revolutionary movements in the 60s and 70s have changed little since then, except for some democracy advances. Pervasive misery and destitution, marginal existence, corruption and injustice and deterioration of state institutions persist. Most Latin American countries are emerging from a period of social, economic and political unrest and slowly progressing toward democratization. Yet, progress is tenuous and fragile. Insurgencies and revolts have not disappeared entirely as witnessed by Colombia’s insurgencies, Mexico’s indigenous revolt and Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement. Although Peru’s MRTA and Sendero Luminoso have been practically stamped out, terrorist cells continue to thrive in Peru and hundreds of terrorists languish in its prisons.

Most countries in the region have not recovered entirely from the financial crises and economic woes that befell them in previous decades. Economic problems have enormous impact not only on the domestic economy but also on economic ties with other countries. In August 1998, the global financial crisis that swept from Asia to Russia to Latin America hit Brazil full force. Brazil is the world’s eighth largest economy and a leader in Latin America by every measure—land, population and economy. Its economic ailments directly affect its Mercosur trading partners, other Latin Ameri-
can countries and those US companies which have billions of dollars invested in Brazil. National disasters have also had a bearing on the region’s economies. In 1998 El Niño wreaked havoc along the Pacific coastal region of the Western Hemisphere, affecting Peru and Ecuador particularly hard. In early 1999, Central America was devastated by a hurricane of historical proportions. The social, economic and political elements are indispensable for formulating a credible strategic assessment of Latin America’s hot spots.

The section “US-Latin America Issues” provides current literature on US-Latin America relations, covering a range of topics from economic, trade and security relations to human rights, military issues and national security. US policy vis-à-vis Latin America has far-reaching repercussions in the region. Likewise, political, social and economic instability in the region undermines US security and economic interests there. Because Latin American issues are seldom considered serious threats to US security interests, important dangers are often underestimated. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger dismissed its importance, equating Latin America to a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica, a place of minimal importance. He failed to mention that approximately 20 percent of US trade is done with Latin America—certainly, negative economic developments there would affect US external trade. Most illicit drugs entering the United States today come from Latin American countries—illicit drug trafficking and consumption exact a heavy toll on US society. This section provides a glimpse of the intricacies of US foreign policy toward Latin America and the difficulties of advancing democratization in the region while standing firm against human rights violations, dictatorships, drug trafficking and violent revolutionary groups seeking to violently overthrow governments.

The “Illicit Narcotics Trade” section is closely linked to those above. Some of the more unstable areas in Latin America have endemic drug problems—either with illegal cultivation or trafficking, or both. For several years, the illicit drug trade has destroyed local communities, threatened social cohesion, distorted economies and destabilized governments in both producer and consumer nations. Some estimate drug revenues as high as $400 billion a year, greater than the gross domestic product of many developing and some developed countries. This fact alone gives the organizations who control this trade substantial economic and political power. For researchers and analysts, this power to influence governments and peoples is one of the most important variables to keep in mind when attempting to determine causes and effects of instability in the most troublesome regions of Latin America. For example, relations among some of the Latin American countries have been particularly affected by drug abuse and trafficking, which in turn have led to damaging distortions in foreign and domest-
Mexico, the indigenous uprising in Chiapas is another insurgency that bears close watching. The elements that originally gave rise to the rebellion still exist. Furthermore, the government response has exacerbated the problem, leaving the conflict dangerously close to exploding again.

The sources listed in this annotated bibliography provide a variety of related literature to help assess current and future instability in the region. Latin America faces numerous challenges: political instability, social ills, drug trafficking and economic weakness. This bibliography provides a window into some of these issues.

Social, Economic and Political Issues


Celis Noguer, Carlos E. Geopolitica Regional (el área del Caribe, área Andina y área Amazónica). Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1994. Analyzes the geographical and political order of the Caribbean, Andes and Amazon regions as it relates to regional security, interdependence and social and economic integration.


Fuentes, Claudia and Carlos Martin, eds. El Mercosur de la defensa: estudio estratégico de América Latina y el Caribe. Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1998. Examines the security and defense environment of and cooperation among Southern Cone Common Market countries, including background on military relations, armed forces and defense expenditures of Latin America and the Caribbean region. Prepared jointly with the Centro Latinoamericano de Defensa y Desarme (CLADDE) and the Programa Paz y Seguridad en las Americas, Wilson Center—FLACSO Chile.


Grindle, Merilee S. Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Based on the notion that economic and political development require capable states, traces the ways in which state capacity is built, destroyed, and at times, rebuilt. It indicates how, for some countries, a decade of deep and sustained crisis also became a decade of innovations in ideas, policy directions, political coalitions and government institutions.

Inter-American Development Bank. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (1998-1999). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Argues that macroeconomic stability and the adoption of free market economic policies over the past decade have not brought greater equity to Latin America. Poverty levels are unabated, salary gaps have widened and social services in many countries remain inadequate. Examines the factors that contribute to inequity, discusses the outlook for income distribution and proposes strategies to better distribute the benefits of development.
Helpful guide to the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Features statistical appendix with year-by-year consolidated data for the past decade on population, national accounts, central government finances, balance of payments, external debt, exchange rates and inflation.

Krujilt, Dirk. "Politicians in Uniform: Dilemmas about the Latin American Military." European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (December 1996), 7-19. Examines the role of the military against insurgent movements, its political nature, civil-military training institutes, and the control of the military over the national intelligence system, police forces and local development programs.


"Latin America's Backlash." The Economist (30 November 1996), 19-21. Online 18 February 1999 at <http://www.economist.com/tsf/archive_tframeset.html>. Argues that a malaise exists in Latin America and that if the region’s macroeconomic reforms are to endure and flourish, they need to be backed by social reform as well.

Le Bot, Yvon. Violence de la modernite en Amerique latine: Indiante, societe et pouvoir. France: Editions Karthala, 1994. Studies difficulties faced by Indian peasant communities in maintaining their identity and autonomy within modern societies of Latin America, cases of their insurgency and violence inflicted on them; Central America and the Andean region, chiefly. Some focus on Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru.


Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Addresses the current debate regarding the liabilities and merits of presidential government. Examines variations among different presidential systems and skeptically view claims that presidentialism has added significantly to the problems of democratic governance and stability.

Mares, David R., ed. Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Examines the claim that civilian domination is the only form compatible with democracy and regional peace. Disputes this claim but clarifies the conditions under which a partnership between civilians and the military can help promote both. Provides in-depth analyses of the normative and institutional aspects of the civil-military relationship to demonstrate that it is the politics of the relationship rather than its form that influences the likelihood of democracy and regional peace.


Millet, Richard L. and Michael Gold-Biss, ed. Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. Examines nature and roles of the region’s armed forces following the end of the Cold War case studies. Published by North-South Center Press. Issues include hemispheric and regional security, peacekeeping and confidence building, guerrillas, narcotics and terrorism; case studies include Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina and Peru.


provided by the media.


Radu, Michael. “Venezuela: Back to the Third World?” *E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute* (8 December 1998). Claims that corruption permeates Venezuela and that Chavez’ victory bodes ill for Latin America and that his fondness for Castro and his affinity for Colombia’s Marxist guerrillas could easily deepen the serious political crisis of Venezuela.


Ryan, Jeffrey J. “The Impact of Democratization on Revolutionary Movements.” *Comparative Politics* 27 (October 1994), 27-44. Includes case studies of Venezuela, Guatemala and El Salvador—some focus on coalition building.

Sautter, Hermann, and Rolf Schinke, ed. *Stabilization and Reforms in Latin America: Where Do We Stand? Mexico: Editorial Iberoamericana, 1996. Reviews economic change since the 1980s, and analyzes and prioritizes ongoing needs; examines economic stabilization, foreign trade, institutional reform, social development and other topics. Papers presented at a symposium organized by the Ibero-America Institute, Goettingen, Germany, November 1995. Subjects include good governance, monetary policy, bank regulation, exchange rates and regional trade agreements, social reforms and prospects for long-term economic change. *

Skocpol, Theda. *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Regimes that are susceptible to the growth of revolutionary movements and vulnerable to transfers of state power to revolutionary challengers are identified in this updated sequel to the author’s 1979 book, *States and Social Revolutions*.


**US-Latin America Issues**


of the US Army School of the Americas on Host Nation Militaries: An Effective Instrument of Policy or Merely a Scapegoat?” *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 7 (Summer 1998), 47-70. Addresses the problems posed by the creation of a military educational institution designed to transfer US doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to armed forces of Latin America. It stresses the fact that the school is an instrument of US foreign policy.

Isaicon, Adam. *Altered States: Security and Demilitarization in Central America*. Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 1997. Exhaustive survey of military sizes and roles in Central America, the entire range of threats to the region’s security, the extent of current US military assistance and linkages and the building of collective-security guarantees. Argues that because continued peace, democratization and integration, Central America’s existing armies are without a mission to justify their large sizes and political roles and thus should be significantly reduced or even abolished.

Machillanda, José. *Nuevo intervencionismo: la desmilitarización en el continente*. Caracas, Venezuela: Italgráfica S.A., 1996. Argues that the United States is intervening in Latin America by seeking to modify the function of the armed forces, changing it from protecting sovereign nations to protecting the region. Some focus on the armed forces of Venezuela, Chile, Peru and Colombia.


**The Illicit Narcotics Trade**


Douglass, Joseph D. Jr. “Narcotics Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism (Aspects None of Us Want to Face),” *Conservative Review* (Summer/Fall 1996), 4-10. Examines connections between drug money, organized crime, terrorism and political corruption in Russia and Latin America; and implications for the United States.


Riley, Kevin Jack. *Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996. Looks at policies intended to control the production and export of cocaine from Latin America and their limitations. Disagrees with analysts who believe that source country control policies can lead to permanent victory and suggests a better strategy would be one that recognizes the severe limits facing interdiction, eradication and other source country policies, focusing instead on directing source country resources where they will be most useful.


**Insurgencies, Terrorist groups and Indigenous Movements**


Bender, Bryan. “Colombia’s Internal Security.” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (27 January 1999). Points out that Colombia has been battling the insurgent FARC and yet the group has become stronger and presents serious threat to the government. Attributes success in part to a new military leader, Jorge Briceno, partly to the ineffectiveness of the Samper government and mainly to FARC’s links with Colombian drug cartels and the money it receives from protecting cartel operations.


Chepesiuk, Ron. “Guerrillas in the Midst.” *National Review* (1 September 1997), 27-30. Analyses of Colombian guerrillas’ drug ties. Asserts that revolutionary groups filled the gap when the Colombian government eliminated several of Colombia’s largest drug cartels. Presents several viewpoints; the guerrillas’ drug ties are described as everything from a convenient source of funding to the real reason for the movements’ existence.

de La Grange, Bertrand and Maite Rico. *Marcos, La Genial Impostura*. Santillana USA Publishing Company, Inc., 1998. Account of the Chiapas conflict in Mexico. Covers all aspects of the conflict—its origin, the bloodshed of the indigenous people, the involvement of the Mexican government and the role of the Catholic church; discusses how Rafael Guillen (Commander Marcos) allegedly deceived the world. Discusses the Chiapas uprising reportedly fueling the birth of other guerrilla groups, such as the Popular Insurgent Revolutionary Army, the Mexican Peasant Worker Front of the Southeast, the Popular Movement of National Liberation and the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Southeast.

“Doctrinal Change Indicates Serious Evolution in Colombian War.” Global Intelligence Update, STRATFOR, 3 March 1999. Online 4 March 1999 at <http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/030399.asp>. Looks at plans by the Colombian armed forces to reorganize and revamp the military. Proposes that operational changes represent a doctrinal shift in the Colombian military’s strategy, a shift based on its perception that it no longer chasing a rag-tag band of rebels through the jungles of Caqueta. Discusses current US involvement and argues the United States is at a loss on the Colombian situation.

“Fronteras Calientes: ¿Qué hay detrás del envío de tropas de Ecuador y Perú a las zonas linitrofeos con Colombia?” (Colombia) Revista Semana (15 February 1999). Online 23 February 1999 at <http://www.semana.com.co/users/semana/seman99/feb15/nscion7.htm>. Brings into front-page presence several fronts of FARC and ELN along the Peruvian and Ecuadorian border with Colombia. Reactions by these countries and the United States to increased insurgency, paramilitary and drug traffic activities along the border regions.

González Posso, Camilo. “La guerra virtual.” QuelHacer (Peru) (January/February 1997), 72-76. Compares guerrilla warfare of the MRTA in Peru to that of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Mexico and the conditions that precipitated these armed movements.

Kovaleski, Serge F. “Rebel Movement on the Rise.” Washington Post, 5 February 1999, A27. Online 15 March 1999 at <http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/Wplatex/1999-02-05/0101-020599-idx.html>. Explains that despite Colombia’s military successes against the FARC in first part of the 1990s, FARC has returned stronger than ever and is seriously threatening the government. Suggests that although the insurgents’ turnaround seems remarkable in an age when at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have hastened the demise of leftist insurgencies elsewhere in Latin America and beyond, the movement’s current status may have less to do with ideology than with military strength and criminal enterprise—including kidnapping, extortion and a growing involvement in the drug trade.


Isacson, Adam. “A Difficult Few Weeks in Colombia.” Demilitarization Program, Center for International Policy (22 February 1999). Online 9 March 1999 at <http://www.ciponline.org/demilit.htm>. Overview of the Colombian government peace process with the guerrillas started on 7 January 1999 and ramifications. Topics discussed are the peace process itself; the paramilitaries; deployment of Ecuadorian and Peruvian military troops to Colombian borders to block incursions by Colombian guerrillas; human rights violations and reports; and US response to these topics.


La Rotta M., Jesús E. Las Finanzas de la subversión Colombiana: Una forma de explotar la nación. Bogota: Ediciones Los Ultimos Patriotas, 1996. Excellent documentation on how the insurgencies in Colombia finance their struggle, pointing out in particular their involvement in the drug trade. Although the documents and sources used to establish the financing trail are somewhat dated, the modus operandi remains unchanged.


Montemayor Aceves, Carlos. Chiapas: La Rebelión Indígena de México. Mexico: Joaquín Mortiz, 1997. Multidimensional look at grass-roots uprisings and evolution of the one at Chiapas. Focus is on perceptions of movement in national and international community, way in which it was reported in press and contrasting, unexpressed or unperceived realities at its heart.

Montoya, David. “Ruidos en la Jungla.” Revista Caretas (Peru) (16 July 1998), 33-34. Discusses fallout between the Sendero Luminoso and the “Sendero Rojo” faction over relations between drug traffickers operating in the Huallaga valley, farther north from Ayacucho and out of direct control of Sendero’s leader, “Feliciano.” The Sendero Rojo has been linked to well-known drug traffickers and allegedly has received from the traffickers massive donations of weapons and equipment for use in antigovernment operations.


———. “Political Cleansing in Chiapas.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, (May/June 1998). Online 2 March 1999 at http://www.bullatomsci.org/ussies/1998/ma98/ma98nadal.html>. An update to “Terror in Chiapas.” Contends that the situation has worsened and in contravention to a Zapatista-government agreement reached in 1996, the Mexican army has continued to encircle and harass Zapatista communities, establishing new bases and consolidating old ones. Claims that carelessness with which Mexico’s most serious political conflict since the 1910 revolution has been treated will negatively affect Mexico’s future.

Padgett, Tim. “The Backyard Balkans.” Time (18 January 1999). Maintains that the United States regards Colombia as something less than a national security threat despite the presence of violent drug cartels in the country. Asserts that because of the boiling 34-year-old civil war, there is a real danger that Colombia could become divided into three volatile, Balkan-like states, and thus become a “Yugo-lombia.” To support this assertion it points out that much of north is already ruled by right-wing paramilitary groups linked to drug traffickers; that the federal government is dysfunctional and the military demoralized; and that more than 20,000 Marxist guerrillas control the vast south and Colombia’s borders and are making a fortune on kidnappings and cocaine growing and trafficking.

———. “Brazil’s Landless Rebels.” Time International Edition (19 January 1998). Online 9 March 1999 at <http://cgi.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1998/int/980119/latin_america.brazilis_1a5.html>. Contends that the radical Landless Workers Movement (MST) has adopted “guerrilla capitalism” in its bid to transform the face of the nation. Claims movement to be stridently socialist in its public pronouncements but yet has also become a force for corporate entrepreneurship. Cites arrays of sources and avenues for tax revenue, which netted the movement $50 million in 1998, comparable to those of many midsize corporations. Argues MST strategy is to become an economic force that the Brazilian government will not be able to ignore any longer.

Palmer, David Scott, ed. The Shining Path of Peru 2nd ed., New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Compilation of articles by leading Sendero scholars, including Degregori, McClintock, Tarazona-Sevillano and Gorriti. At times criticized for not providing any new scholarship on the movement, it remains a convenient source for a broad overview of many aspects of Sendero Luminoso—origins, thought, rural and urban strategies and expansion into the coca market. The editor and Mcleintock argue that the insurrection had more of a popular base than commonly believed. (See Poole and Renique, authors of “Peru: Time of Fear,” for a different point of view).


Poole, Deborah and Gerardo Renique. Peru: Time of Fear. London: Latin American Bureau, 1992. Reputed to be one of the most authoritative texts in English on Sendero Luminoso, these two well-known Senderologists provide an informative and well-documented background of the “dirty war” in Peru. It brings together history, governmental policies, the birth and support of Sendero, the Peruvian military and US interest. Unsympathetic to both the Peruvian military and the guerrillas.


the rise of the social netwar, the information-age behaviors that characterize it, such as extensive use of the Internet, its effects on the Mexican military, its implications for Mexico’s stability and its implications for the future occurrence of social netwars elsewhere around the world.

Sánchez Gómez, Gonzalo. “Violencias, contra-insurgencia y sociedad civil en la Colombia contemporánea.” Theme Electronic Magazine (April 1998). Online 5 March 1999 at http://colombia-thema.org/avr98/sanchez.htm>. Account and statistics of violence in Colombia in last 10 years. Discounts Colombia’s insurrections going the way of Central American insurgencies, brushes aside New World Order issues affecting Colombia and post-Cold War security concerns. Claims Colombia’s problems and issues are unique and must be looked at from that perspective. Aim is to provide a platform for discussion of issues affecting Colombia today—insurgency, drug trafficking/production, crime and poverty.


Tellis, A.J., T.S. Szanyi, and J.A. Winnefeld. Anticipating Ethnic Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation. Abstract: MR-853-A, 1997. A practical tool—guidebook and methodology—to help intelligence analysts determine the long-term potential for social and ethnic conflict. Based on a conceptual model of group conflict, the three-stage model traces the development of ethnic and communitarian strife, beginning with the conditions that may lead to the formation of an ethnic group, then the group’s mobilization for political action and ultimately its competition with the state.


“Venezuela Challenges Verdict in Murder of Americans in Colombia.” Global Intelligence Update, STRATFOR. Online 10 March 1999 at http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/daily.asp>. Makes a case for possible motives for each major player in the internal strife in Colombia for committing the murders. Repercussions and consequences for the peace progress and, most important, how the United States may become more involved in the Colombian quagmire.


Primer On Latin America Insurgencies and Guerrillas Movements

Che’s handbook on how to be a guerrilla fighter. The Guerrilla Warfare, and two of Che’s later pieces, Guerrilla Warfare: A Method and Message to the Tricontinental, are nested between an introduction and essays describing the struggles in seven South American countries whose guerrilla movements were inspired by Che Guevara’s writings and beliefs. Loveman and Davies also provide in-depth case studies that apply Che’s theories on revolution to political situations in seven Latin American countries from the 1960s to the present. Work is quite useful to understand the terrorism and insurgency in Latin America.

Hamil, Hugh M., ed. Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America. University of Oklahoma Press, 1995. Presents conflicting interpretations of caudillismo in 27 essays written by an international group of historians, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, journalists and caudillos themselves. Twenty-two chronologically arranged essays follow the theoretical arguments in Hamil’s introduction and the first five chapters on individual caudillos. The selections represent revisionists, apologists, enemies and even a victim of caudillos. The personalities discussed include the Mexican priest Miguel Hidalgo, the Argentinian gaacho Facundo Quiroga, the Guatemalan Rafael Carrera, the Colombian Rafael Nunez, Mexico’s Porfirio Diaz, the Somoza family of Nicaragua, the Dominican “Benefactor” Rafael Trujillo, the Argentinians Juan Peron and his wife Evita, Paraguay’s Alfredo Stroessner, Chile’s Augusto Pinochet and Cuba’s Fidel Castro.

Marighella, Carlos. The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. June 1969, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Introduction by Lenny Flank Jr. Eyes on the World online posting, 11 March 1999 at <http://eww.orac.net.au/articles/urban.html>. Carlos Marighella was a prolific writer of essays and articles on revolutionary method. His most famous works are “The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla” and “For the liberation of Brazil.” The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla has been translated into several different languages and has been a classical handbook for terrorist movements all over the world. It was the official training manual of the Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction and the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

Porzecanski, Arturo C. Uruguay’s Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrillas. NY: Praeger Publishers, 1973. A historical account of the Tupamaros from their beginnings to their demise in 1972. Discusses the social, economical and political conditions that gave rise to the movement and the government measures that dealt it the deathblow.

Spencer, David E. From Vietnam to El Salvador: The Saga of the FMLN Sappers and Other Guerrilla Special Forces in Latin America. Wesport, CT: Praeger Publishers Inc, 1996. Examines special select forces by the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front to attack strategic objectives in its insurgency against the government; links to Vietnamese, Cuban and other revolutionary movements. Training and operations of special select forces by FMLN groups, including the Popular Liberation Front (FPL), Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) and Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL).

Tomuschat, Christian, Edgar Balsells and Otilia Lux Coti. Guatemala, Memory of Silence. New York: Historical Clarification Commission of Guatemala, United Nations, 25 February 1999. Independent investigation commission of Guatemala’s 30-odd years of civil war, which ended in December 1996, with a death toll of 200,000, mostly Mayan Indians. Finds military governments and armed forces responsible for 93 percent of Guatemala’s violence and 3 percent for the guerrillas. States Cuba provided the guerrillas political, logistic and training support—though never enough to give them a military advantage. Outlines social, economic and political conditions that gave rise to the war and fueled it.


Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956. Princeton University Press, 1992. Explores the origins and outcomes of rural insurgencies in nearly a dozen between since 1956 and the early 1990s. Explains why guerrillas emerged strongly in certain countries but not others. Considers circumstances under which guerrillas acquire military strength and why they do—or do not—secure substantial support from the peasantry in rural areas.

Captain Gerard Gato, US Air Force, Retired, is a technical information specialist with the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from New Mexico State University and a M.S. from Troy State University. He was previously a language instructor at New Mexico State University and at the Catholic University of Ecuador. During his active duty service, he held a variety of command and staff positions, including executive officer, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, March Air Force Base, California; and commander, Air Force Criminal and Counter-intelligence Investigations Detachment, Lajes Field, Azores, Portugal.
Heaven, Bless This Mess! A Mother’s Thoughts On War
by Patricia Gallagher

I was about to begin my task—to organize my mess—a place for everything. All clutter would be conquered. Today I would move it, spray it, clean it, wash it or throw it away. I would begin with the cedar chest. I had not opened it since 1970. I quickly became sidetracked. The chest held a treasure trove of memories—diaries, ticket stubs from concerts, pressed flowers, souvenirs from proms.

There was something else near the bottom of the chest—a manila envelope titled “LETTERS FROM GUYS IN VIETNAM.” As I picked it up, memories came flooding back: Da Nang, Chu Lai, Nui Ba Den, Saigon.

Rewind to Vietnam

In 1970 I was a teacher. For one class project, my fourth-grade students corresponded with Pennsylvania servicemen whose mailing addresses had been listed in a Philadelphia newspaper. As I re-read each letter, I realized that many of the young soldiers had only been two years older than my daughter’s present age. I never allow my daughter to go to the mall alone, let alone on a mission to a country where there are tanks, bombs, land mines and artillery. Documented on the wrinkled pages of the letters from those young soldiers were snippets of their feelings of being young, vulnerable and far away from home.

19 March 1970. “Each of us, as Americans, have jobs to do no matter where you are or how old you are. Those letters from the kids showed me that we truly do have little Americans back home that care. I have a three-month-old daughter back home that I have only seen in pictures. I have 11 days left and that problem will be solved.”—Robert Magan

8 April 1970. “I’m a helicopter pilot here in Viet Nam. I fly Huey Cobras which are helicopter gunships. It’s our job to protect the troops. We fly quite a bit, usually about 10 hours a day.”—Kevin O’Brien

14 April 1970. “Hang in there and thanks for making my mail-call. It’s real nice to get a lot of scribble from a bunch of little kids that you don’t even know. And then on top of it all, they rap like you are GI Joe or some movie hero, but in the Green Machine in the Mekong Delta, it’s all too real.”—Vance Bordeaux


30 May 1970. “I got your letters today, and the kids made me feel like a million bucks. I wish I could get your class a little something to show my appreciation. Here are patches ripped off my shirts. This is our company patch. I am enclosing one for the third grade and one for the fourth. Could you pin [them] up on the bulletin board? It’s the best I can do. Take care and for all of us here in the Nam, thanks for thinking of us.”—Ron A. Cavelli

June 1970. “Here is a picture of me out in the field. I thought the kids might like to see it. It was taken right after I ate a can of C-rations. That’s the reason I don’t look too good in it. I was sick to my stomach.”—Carl Ruzinski

July 1970. “I am not the soldier the kids have in mind, but I do pull guard all night. It gets depressing. Oh, heck, enough of my problems. I’m sure you have enough of your own.”—Ronald Templeton

26 July 1970. “I’m too young to spend my time playing war games. I was drafted into the Army and sent to a country I have no desire to be in. But, I’m here to do a job, and I’m doing it to the best of my ability.”—Edward Breiner

Then there is the letter from Robert Balog of Bensalem. He was the only soldier I actually met after his return. He paid a great sacrifice for all of us. He no longer had his strong legs—an explosion of some sort—too painful to talk about. Wherever he is today, I hope life has been kind to him.

Fast-Forward to Kosovo

Although these letters were written three decades ago, the sentiments are much the same for soldiers involved in Operation Allied Forces in Kosovo. As I read headlines about NATO air strikes, enemy territory, tricky terrain, surface-to-air missiles and F-117 stealth fighters, I watch my little boy, not one care in the world, playing baseball safe and sound within my reach.

The soldiers who go to war are also precious and irreplaceable. Each is a parent’s treasure—a collage of cute little fingers and toes, crazy riddles, unfinished projects, baseball games, catching lightning bugs—bits and pieces of childhood.

My son asked me, “Can they call time out? Like in a war, when they are shooting and there are too many bullets? Can’t they just quit and call ‘time out’?” I wish wishing would make it so.

My gratitude is long overdue. To all veterans who have served our country, I pay tribute to you. To those who lost family members, I honor you. I whisper a prayer for my son and your children: “May the Lord bless them and keep them, and may the Lord make His face to shine upon them, and be gracious to them, and give them peace.”

Patricia C. Gallagher, mother of four children, lives in Philadelphia. She received inspiration for this article after speaking with another mother whose son was serving in Kosovo. That son’s twin brother was fighting his own battle with leukemia, and her third son, also in the military, was to leave soon for the Balkans. Gallagher is the author of the poem “A Team of Angels for the United States Armed Forces.”
Insecurity and Violence in Colombia
by Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Ramsey, US Army Reserve, Retired

Some would argue that the drug war in Colombia is the greatest national security challenge in the Western Hemisphere. General Alvaro Valencia Tovar’s 1997 book Inseguridad y Violencia en Colombia [Insecurity and Violence in Colombia] is an effort to diagnose the problem and prescribe a solution.1 Had Tovar, considered to be Colombia’s preeminent soldier-statesman, been born elsewhere, his career would have followed trajectories etched by such World War II figures as Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, George C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur or diplomat-historian George F. Kennan. Tovar’s long postmillitary career as historian, strategic analyst and civil-military affairs commentator invites career comparisons to retired US Army General Colin Powell’s public leadership role; historians Donald Kagan’s, Martin van Creveld’s and Paul Kennedy’s literary works; and Charles Moskos’ and Samuel P. Huntington’s landmark studies in civil-military relations.

Having regularly reviewed other books and publications concerning the drug war and written articles for such journals as Parameters, Strategic Review and the Journal of Comparative Strategy, I am aware that this melancholy literature can be divided etiologically into two categories: works whose authors identify the supply side—the makers and distributors of illegal narcotics—as the cause of the drug plague and those whose authors point to the demand side—the drug consumers—as being the true villains. I expected Tovar to assign at least part of the blame—not with racism but with his customary objectivity and candor—to the demand side (essentially the United States), which provides the shower of money that buys corruption, murder, economic convulsion, political havoc and destruction of the family within Colombia.

US drug users sent $1.2 billion to Colombia in exchange for cocaine products in 1990 and over $6 billion in 1997. While this flood of cash corrupts Latin America’s oldest two-party democracy in fundamental ways, the Colombian army and national police suffer 300 battle deaths per year, more in sum since 1985 than the US Army and police forces suffered during all post-Vietnam Cold War events. US Congress discussions over the pittance of security assistance and drug-war training funds accorded to Colombia does little more than debate ways to shift the moral blame from Washington to Bogota.

Given that Tovar has worked closely with the US Army throughout his long career, one might well expect him at least to discuss the US role in the Colombian drug war as at least part of his analysis. But just as Colombian historians refrain from Yankee-bashing in school texts that present the well-known US intervention into Colombian sovereignty to create the Republic of Panama in 1903, so too does Tovar refrain from criticizing or even mentioning the incalculably destructive US role in causing the narcotics plague within Colombia.

In his book, Tovar shows Colombia as a divided country—simultaneously a modern political democracy and a narcotrafficking-driven society in near-anarchical condition. His linking of the second Colombia to the first is excellent. He traces Colombia’s lamentable history of civic violence, which I described in the 1946-1965 section of the 1981 book Guerrilleros y Soldados [Guerrillas and Soldiers].

The Enemy Inside
Tovar shows how both domestic and Cuban-exported communism penetrated the Colombian culture erupting into rural violence during the Cold War and leaving structures in place that today are fully integrated with the narcotraffickers. Tovar gives a factual description of the armed subversive groups operating in Colombia since the 1970s and traces the diabolical union of communist guerrillas with rural bandit groups and their subsequent complete integration with criminal groups. The US news media regularly—and wrongly—portray these groups as narcotraffickers. In reality, narcoguerrillas consist of a loose coalition of murderous, pseudo-revolutionary criminals, who receive billions of illegal dollars from producing and selling drugs. They are armed with the best weapons and technology and hide under a deception that is so sophisticated most US journalists and even many scholars have not the slightest idea they are or have been deceived and “used.”

There are three main strategic deceptions narcoguerrillas have imposed on most North American journalists and on many US drug-war policy analysts. First, there is no legitimate reason for armed guerrillas to exist in an open political democracy such as Colombia’s. However, US writers regularly present the so-called Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (acronym FARC in Spanish) as an ideological group fighting for a cause that has some kind of moral justification. Second, so-called guerrillas—former bandits...
and now narcotics—who are heavily armed, operate from a sanctuary “state-within-the-state” from which they kill, maim, intimidate and control virtually every sector of Colombian public and private life. Third, within Colombia there is no network of government-sponsored, right-wing paramilitaries whose existence creates a legitimate need for armed self-defense by citizen resistance groups. This entire idea is a strategic fantasy created by narcoguerrillas as a way of confusing US policy makers and weakening external support for the Colombian armed forces and police—the only organs narcoguerrillas can neither corrupt nor defeat in battle.

These three cruelly distorted ideas dominate virtually every story about Colombia in the US news media. Tovar clearly shows the evidence by which he concludes that these three ideas are the Western Hemisphere’s most effective operation in strategic deception yet seen, but he mentions nothing of this almost universal distortion. He merely describes the structure by which the narcoguerrilla acts out events—complete with real killings and torture—capturing on videotape uniformed narcoguerrillas in the process of pretending to be abusive soldiers or police and arranging delivery of polished “audience-ready” media packages through respectable intermediaries.

Tovar offers a summary of how the narcoguerrilla machine operates politically, militarily and economically as a state within the state, then launches into a prescriptive analysis suggesting a six-step approach to taking corrective measures.

- Colombians must understand the entire problem.
- Colombians must understand that multiple forces are producing a threat to the national existence.
- Colombians must admit that there is an ideological dimension—collectivist revolution—to the narcoguerrilla program, then fight it on a political level.
- The Colombian government must respond with timely, adequate force when force is required.
- Colombians must develop the political will to combat the narcoguerrilla on every level.
- After creating a national strategy for defeating the narcoguerrillas, Colombia must develop an implementing military strategy and carry it out.

Tovar also offers two great national choices: change the way Colombian society thinks or declare an all-out national war against the narcoguerrilla, fighting to win—however long it takes, however high the cost. He shows clearly the magnitude of these two choices. The educational approach seems more humane, but it is more difficult to orchestrate and could require 40 or more years to carry out. The politico-military choice carries a price tag of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. Neither choice is for the faint at heart. Tovar lays out a factual description of the threat sufficient to support the lamentable conclusion that there is no cheaper answer.

The Enemy Outside

For 30 years I have watched US news media and some—not all—of the US academic community wrongly portray the Colombian army as a human-rights abuser. Knowledgeable scholars, Colombian public opinion polls and military experts portray the army as a world leader in humane backcountry operations and peacekeeping. The Colombian army is not only the victim of the murderous and cowardly narcoguerrilla in the field but of irresponsible US journalists who will not admit they are being deceived by a clever mix of radical leftist, political distortion and drug profits that are doled out to people at all levels who will say anything for a price.

Municipal mayors in the Sinai region, policed by the multinational and observer force, report the Colombian sector to be miraculously free of strife and violence. Colombian public opinion polls always show the army to be the most trusted national institution after the priesthood. Tovar clearly shows that called right-wing para-militaries, which the US news media try to portray as a repetition of events in El Salvador in 1981, are in fact semitrained groups of farmers living outside the army’s protective influence—people trying to protect themselves from daily occurrences of extortion and murder.

Nearly a decade ago I showed how the narcoguerrilla was forming and destroying Colombian society in an article I wrote for the British Army Quarterly & Defence Journal. Since then, US political liberals have advocated decertifying the Colombian army from receiving security assistance and drug-war financial assistance based on falsified narcoguerrilla evidence created with paid killer-thug actors and supporting press interviews bought with money and intimidation. Many US conservatives have countered with such irresponsible proposals as spraying toxic chemicals and raining high-explosive bombs across the Colombian backlands. An alternative wrong solution proffered by US conservatives is to cancel Colombian security assistance as a budget reduction measure. This idea is a cruel hypocrisy, since American drug users created the Colombian drug problem and remain its principal financial bulwark.

I reviewed Tovar’s autobiography in the November-December 1992 issue of Military Review. Summarizing Tovar’s prescient analysis of several world crisis spots—recorded well before the events matured—I concluded the review with this sentence: “As events in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia now show, we should have been listening all along to military scholar-practitioners [like Tovar] who understood the Fulda Gap scenario and the Cold War paradigm, but who also knew the importance of coping with multifaceted conflict.” Six years later Tovar prescribed two choices for rescuing his country: 40 years of suffering while Colombians learn to think differently or 10 years of bloody armed conflict while the narcoguerrilla is defeated.

An Ally for an Ally

When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, President Harry S. Truman sought allies, and Colombia was the only Latin American nation to send a fighting force, one that acquitted itself with great distinction. When the Arab-Israeli Conflict of
1956 posed a threat, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought international allies, and the Colombian Battalion again was the only Latin American contingent. In 1981, the Soviet Union blocked UN peacekeeping efforts during the Arab-Israeli crisis. President Ronald Reagan again sent out the call for allies. The Colombian army once again responded, and it remains one of the few successful institutions keeping peace in that tortured region.

Of all Latin-American nations, Colombia most closely resembles the United States. Civilian control of the military and the posse comitatus principle—soldiers at the borders, police on the streets—came to Colombia in 1832. Civilian presidents have historically tried to select the best features of the US civil-military structure for application to Colombia’s needs. Many analysts consider Colombia’s army to be the best small war and peacekeeping force in the world.

But, when Colombia asked her North American friend and mentor for help with the drug war—a war caused by mass US drug consumption—we replied by sending still more money to the narcoguerrilla, spouting moral lectures to the people doing the fighting and providing plenty of “news” stories useful to the narcoguerrilla in his scheme to neutralize the legitimate government and rule through narco-anarchy. Now Tovar advises his countrymen to go it alone; the old mentor up north finds it inconvenient to admit to being the cause of the cocaine problem.

Thus, this—the best book on the Colombian drug war ever written—is really a moral statement, however unintended it might be. The reader can conclude that the United States will take help if it is offered, but it will not provide reciprocal assistance even if the US drug consumer is responsible for the death of an ally. **MR**

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### CGSC Notes

The report urged the establishment of rotational assignments, a structured educational system, enhanced opportunities for civilians to attend military service schools and backfills for long-term training. DLAMP provides the framework for developing future civilian leaders with a DoD-wide capability. It also nurtures an environment of shared understanding and sense of mission among civilian employees and military personnel.

The official Army-wide announcement for the DLAMP Class of 2000 is imminent via the FY2000 ACTEDS Catalog, which will be found on line at http://cpol.army.mil. Advance notice was sent to MACOM Civilian Personnel Directors, Functional Chief Representatives and Proposants by e-mail on 22 June. The e-mail alerted the addressees to the HQDA deadline of 7 September 1999; encouraged commands to establish local application deadlines; and provided guidance on what interested candidates could do now to get started on their applications.

The Army faces the loss of civilian leadership expertise at crisis proportions because many senior leaders are eligible to retire now or in the near term. We must have a cadre of individuals who are well-prepared to step up to the ongoing challenges of the Army of the 21st century. To that end, we ask for your support of this exceptional program. Increased marketing efforts are required to produce the desired results. Due to limited response, the Army has 100 fewer participants than our cumulative allocation permitted. Our 200 current participants should number 300.

Please publicize this program among your eligible population ensuring that those nominated are representative of the diversity of your organization.

For more information, please contact Penny Berardelli at 703-325-7261 (DSN221) or by e-mail at berardep@asamra.hoffman.army.mil.

### MR Says Farewell to Associate Editor

*Military Review* bids a fond farewell to Major Robert S. Larsen who departed *Military Review* and Fort Leavenworth in July to begin his new assignment as commander of the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) in Atlanta. During his tenure as XO, associate editor and Webmaster, Larsen substantially improved the quality of the magazine and organization.

Larsen quickly mastered digital layout and production and revolutionized MR’s on-line presence. His most recent contributions came during production of three magazines in 58 days, a task that normally would take 180 days. Most significant were his efforts in the design, layout and production of the tribute to retiring Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer.

Larsen leaves a lasting mark. His dedication and impact extended to the community, where he logged more than 100 volunteer hours each month. We appreciate his friendship, commend his selfless service and wish him and his family Godspeed and good luck in Atlanta.
Bosnian Reading List
by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, US Army

The following is a list of books I found to be useful while preparing for and during my deployment in Bosnia from December 1995 to June 1997. Each book gives insight into the history and mind-set of the area and its main actors. Although some of the books are not current, they are still useful to the reader who wants to become more familiar with why and how the current crisis began. The books are listed by utility and recommended reading order.

The Bridge on the Drina, Ivo Andric and Lovett F. Edwards (translator), Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 314 pages, $12.00. This excellent work won the Nobel Prize for Literature. It is an intense historical novel that spans Bosnian history from the time of the initial Turkish occupation in the 15th century to World War I. Authors Andric and Edwards capture the ethos/gestalt of Bosnia-Hercegovina better than any other English-speaking writers. The book received a near-unanimous recommendation by Bosnian Serbs and Croats alike when I asked:

“If I could read only one book, what should I read to better understand your history?”

Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Laura Silber and Allen Little (contributor), New York: Penguin USA, 1997, 384 pages, $13.95. This book gives the best overall account of the conflict between the Bosnians and Serbs. It covers the breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflicts from the late 1980s through the Dayton Peace Accords and helps explain why US troops are now in Bosnia. The book and video are powerful indictments of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. Recently, Silber, who is the New York correspondent for The Financial Times, did a short piece on the same topic for the History Channel.

Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica—Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II, David Rohde, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, 464 pages, $18.00. If you want to know what happened at Srebrenica, you must read this book. Without doubt, it is the most detailed and objective—despite a somewhat anti-Serb bent—account of the long buildup to and eventual demise of the Srebrenica “enclave.” Rohde captures Naser Oric’s and Muslim complicity better than does any other writer. I met the writer during war crimes-related missions in the Drina Valley. Rohde’s only failure is his incomplete understanding of the extent of the US Army’s role in the investigations. We could not tell him, of course.

Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both (contributor), New York: Penguin USA, 1997, 204 pages, $11.95. This good book details the fall of Srebrenica and the origins of the pocket/enclave. It details Oric’s role and the Muslims’ side of the battle. However, don’t bother with this one if you read Rohde’s book.

Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia, Rebecca West, New York: Penguin USA, 1995, 1,200 pages, $21.95. This is the story of West’s journey through Yugoslavia in the late 1930s. However, do not let the original publishing date deceive you—this book is relevant. Despite its length, it is well worth reading.

The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, Misha Glenny, New York: Penguin USA, 1996, 313 pages, $12.95. This is another fairly objective account of Bosnian conflicts dating from the late 1980s through the Dayton Peace Accords. It is easy and quick to read, but it is not as comprehensive as Silber and Little’s book.

popularized when US President Bill Clinton mentioned he had read it. It provides background on the peoples and motivations in the Balkans and is quick, interesting and easy to read. However, it is not as scholarly as most of the other titles on this list.

*Why Bosnia? Writing on the Balkan War*, Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz (editors), Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteers Press, Inc., 1994, 353 pages, $22.00. This book is an interesting compilation of articles written by international authors on the conflict. It is decidedly pro-Muslim.

*The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate*, R.G.D. Laffan, New York: Dorset Press, 1989 (out of print). This book was written by a pro-Serbian British officer during World War I and is biased. But it is still useful in understanding the Serbs and their fortress mentality or, as a Muslim linguist once told me, “the whole Serb thing.”

*Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, Susan L. Woodward, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995, 536 pages, $19.95. This book is not easy to read, but it details the conflict up through January 1995. It is also “heavier” than the others are when detailing political-economic factors.

*Seasons in Hell: Slaughter and Betrayal in Bosnia and Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia’s War*, Ed Vulliamy, New York: Penguin Books, 1993. These companion books are out of print, so they are available only in library copies. However, to further understand the Balkan situation, they are worth checking out. **MR**

**MR** Book Reviews


It is hard to argue with the purpose of David Evans’ book, which is “to re-examine the principles of war that have guided military commanders over much of this century and to validate, add or change as might be necessary to meet the challenges of the late 1990s and the twenty-first century.” One is, however, less inclined to accept without question Evans’ conclusion that current British and US principles of war need to be updated to incorporate new thought, correct imprecise language and reflect new weapon systems and political realities.

Remarkably, however, Evans does overcome our initial skepticism to convince us that some changes are necessary. In particular, he convincingly argues that the US military services should adopt “morale” and “administration and logistics” as new principles of war because of their profound effect on the planning, conduct and outcome of combat operations. Evans also persuasively argues that “flexibility” should replace “maneuver,” because the former is more all encompassing than the latter. For example, Evans explains how commanders should use flexibility in planning and decision making at many different levels, such as in the initial development of weapon systems, not just at the tactical or maneuver level.

Evans recommends many other changes of a more minor nature. Although most are justified, they might strike some readers as somewhat trivial, academic or already implied by existing principles. For example, he recommends that the “objective” be modified to reflect the fact that the military aim is subordinate to and selected to achieve the political aim, which is the main and overriding aim. He also suggests “mass” be retitled “concentration of combat power” to emphasize the principle’s focus on combat power rather than numerical superiority.

Evans’ background serves him well in addressing his subject matter. In the 1980s, he served as Air Marshal, Chief of Joint Operations and Plans, at the Australian Joint Services Staff College, Adelina, at the time the college was conducting a review of British war principles. He felt the chiefs of staff showed a “conservative attitude” by rejecting all proposed changes, which likely spurred him to write his book. Evans does, in fact, acknowledge that “a significant part” of the information and discussion in his book was derived from the Australian review.

Evans’ book is extremely readable, thought-provoking and well organized. Each chapter addresses a principle of war, presents the full verbiage promulgated by each of the British and US services and is followed by a relevant article written by a distinguished military author or academic, such as Admiral Elmo R. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Zajac is Commander of the 3d Battalion, 69th Armored Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.A. from the University of Louisville. He is a graduate of US Army Command and General Staff College and received an M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and in Germany, Croatia, Bosnia, Egypt and Kuwait.
Zumwalt Jr. and others. More important, despite my initial resistance, many of his recommendations are worthy of serious consideration for adoption.

LCDR Janet Goldstein, USN, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Sea Power in the Twenty-First Century: Projecting a Naval Revolution, author Charles W. Koburger Jr. takes on the difficult task of predicting the future of naval warfare. His thesis is that the US Navy’s present configuration must change in response to the rising challenges presented by littoral warfare and post-Cold War budgetary realities.

Koburger presents the case for a fuller realization of the potential offered by the ongoing technological revolution. To fund the technological revolution required to achieve the four key operational capabilities of littoral warfare: command, control, intelligence and surveillance and communications; battlespace dominance; power projection; and force sustainment,” Koburger argues for a phased reduction in high-cost and increasingly ineffective Cold War naval weaponry to “meet the challenges we immediately face.”

Koburger briefly reviews current and projected naval operational environments, injecting points of potential future conflicts in such areas as proliferation of small but more lethal navies, strains in uses of the sea stemming from diminishing resources and the inadequacy of enforcement of the “law of the seas.” He also reviews the Navy’s roles and missions, noting those areas needing increased “expedientary” emphasis. Returning to future challenges, Koburger briefly describes the future threat environment of littoral warfare, emphasizing that a fundamental change to a more expeditionary Navy is required to face the threat posed, for example, by diesel submarines, fast-attack craft and mines. Adding to his vision of the future, he offers thoughts on future technical developments and a future model for the Navy.

The book’s value rests in the realistic framework it projects for achieving the more revolutionary change to expeditionary warfare it espouses. The book’s single flaw is that by covering such a large scope of time in such a short space, it lacks detailed discussion and documentation. Hopefully, blue-water naval enthusiasts will not focus on the author’s brown-water Coast Guard background, choosing instead to gain from his rich experience as a naval historian and his thought-provoking vision for the US Navy’s future.

LCDR John S. Pritchett, USN, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Supposedly, most of the CIA’s still-classified historical files relate to the sensitive topic of spying on friends and allies. Knowing Your Friends concerns an often-neglected theme and with the broader one of inter-allied intelligence relationships. These cases studies of perception and misperception are certainly relevant today, when the United States has more seeming allies than overt enemies. Awareness of their capabilities, limitations and agendas is vital.

Knowing Your Friends contains an introduction and 10 essays by competent specialists in intelligence studies. Although the editor hoped to provide focus by limiting topics to the World Wars and Cold War eras, the essays are still quite diverse. Some concern the tactical and operational levels of warfare, others with strategic and diplomatic relationships. Military readers will find some contributions more relevant, but there are topics here for many interests.

Martin S. Alexander’s introductory essay calls for more research in this field and points to some key questions. Is intelligence about allies different (better, worse) than about enemies? Are there preconceptions or biases that are taken for granted but should be questioned? Do political views warp objectivity? How do national styles affect the collection and sharing of intelligence?

Relationships at the tactical level are portrayed in essays on French liaison with the newly enlarged US Army in 1917 and on World War II
OSS operations in British India. The problem of intelligence being distorted by decision makers is a theme in the chapters on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Indochina policy, British operations in wartime Greece and French intelligence operations in 1950s’ Vietnam. Two essays on 1920s’ and 1930s’ Anglo-French military relations detail the problems of reconciling national styles and attitudes.

Do dictatorships behave differently than democracies in these areas? Three case studies provide different situations and answers. The evolving “brutal friendship” between Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Adolf Hitler’s Germany during the 1930s reflects their changing power relationship. The Syrian-Egyptian intelligence partnership from 1934 to 1967 reveals a political culture more interested in plots and conspiracies than in combating against common enemies. The KGB-Stasi relationship in East Germany during the Cold War sheds light on the nature of Soviet control.

These essays are far removed from the theme of military intelligence, but their political and diplomatic focus is still important. Anyone who has worked with allies or in combined operations will find much thought-provoking material in this collection.

LYC Fred Christensen, USAR
Retired, Urbana, Illinois


War and morality have been the subjects of countless books, but few have achieved the intensity and unique perspective of Gettysburg. With an unsalable display of 1990s’ angst and fanny-pack philosophy, Kent Gramm takes the reader on a provocative walking tour of the mind and conscience as he explores the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg and what it means to us.

Gramm, a college instructor strongly guided by the philosophy of Henry David Thoreau (“It is the province of the historian to find out, not what was, but what is”), compares the Civil War-era’s moral courage with that of today. As expected, today’s society comes up short.

However, Gettysburg is a book with a split personality. Gramm’s analyses of the battle are the strength of this book, crisply written and refreshingly perceptive. His portrayal of people and events is smart and lively, and his efforts to view the battle as a moral barometer are certainly original.

Gramm carefully and accurately describes the importance of selected battlefield events—actions at Seminary Ridge, the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, on the Round Tops, at Culp’s Hill and the magnificent folly of Pickett’s Charge. Gramm praises and pans the notables who fought at Gettysburg: If you wanted a man to save your country, it would be John Buford. John Reynolds was the smartest man on the battlefield. Steadfast George Meade did not make a mistake. George Custer was a “circuit rider gone mad,” and Dan Sickles was a “murderous bungler.” Dorsey Pender was the purest and most noble warrior of the day. Robert E. Lee was the “worst brilliant general in American history,” who fought Gettysburg “needlessly and unwisely.”

While Gramm’s Gettysburg battlefield descriptions are lucid and sharply focused, his grim social commentary and lofty moral comparisons of yesterday and today are somewhat muddled, rambling and a little “loopy.” His conclusions reflect strongly held and passionate opinions, but his sarcasm, wordiness and spooky references to mystics and Adolf Hitler dilute the soundness of his message. Basically, Gramm concludes that today’s society is empty of courage and responsibility, that we have no men of character to emulate, and we have never understood the legacy of honor, honesty and virtue left to us by the men who fought at Gettysburg. Unlike during the Civil War era, “We now have a society increasingly uncivilized and more pervasively without conscience.”

Gramm also takes some odd, but strikingly critical pot shots at pollution, tourism, religion and television. With clear antivar salient, he also asserts that incompetent and ignorant political leadership is responsible for all our past and present wars and that, as a result, our national guilt is great but not yet great enough for us to do anything about it. Finally, he lambastes politicians, especially Republicans, for their venality and greed, for causing problems and not solving them, warning us to beware of the politicians because they are not patriots.

Despite his self-indulgent, poetic delivery and sketchy linkage to Gettysburg, it is hard to argue with his moral conclusions. Many would agree that today “in America we have enshrined not confession, but confection.” As a battle study of Gettysburg, Gramm hits the mark. However, as a social commentary, this book rates a pass.

COL William D. Bushnell, USMC
Retired, Sebascodegan Island, Maine


The New Asia-Pacific Order, edited by Chan Heng Chee, is a compilation of papers by intellectuals from academia, government, business and the media. These papers were commissioned for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Conference hosted in Singapore, 25 to 27 May 1995. The conference dealt with five key areas: the sustainability of economic dynamism in the Asia-Pacific; the shape of regional groupings in the next decade; the relative shifts in the balance among the major powers; establishing new security architecture; and globalization, particularism, democratization and human rights. The contributing authors, as with most intellectuals, did not agree on how to approach issues that will affect the region’s future.

From the conference came three themes of note. First is the region’s ongoing shift of importance from military power to economic power. The World Bank predicts that in the year 2020, four of the world’s five largest economies will be in Asia (China, Japan, Indonesia and India). The recent economic crisis might be a setback, but only a setback; this will still occur in time. This fact supports contributor Muthiah Alagappa’s statement that “security is no longer the overriding concern. Political and economic values have taken on equal importance.” In fact, Byung-Joon Ahn says tough economic sanctions might be as effective as threat of military pressures. What has caused this shift and how can we adjust?

90
July-August 1999• MILITARY REVIEW
According to Edward K.Y. Chen, East Asian economic success is primarily due to the region’s adoption of an export-oriented industrialization strategy. This type of economy leads to a greater regional independence than previously existed. He further reasons that this type of economy in its initial stages of development might require more government involvement than Western-style economies. This might account for some of the current problems, as noted by Stuart Harris, that the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other European/North American-focused economic organizations have when dealing with the region. These organizations typically see government involvement with the free market as a negative, while many East Asian countries see it as a necessity. These world organizations must not discount Asian economies as second class and adjust their policies accordingly.

The second prevalent theme is the importance of present-day as well as future China to regional and world security. According to Juwono Sudarsono, China is potentially the preeminent power in Asia and the Pacific. This is obviously a serious concern for China’s neighbors and the West. The reason is China’s rise in economic power. In fact, if China maintains its current economic growth rate, it will become the world’s largest economy by 2010. This is important to world security because as Sudarsono predicts, as China changes from coal to oil it will have to seek new energy sources. A likely location would be the South China Sea, which would cause conflict with a number of Pacific nations also claiming rights in the area. In fact, Sudarsono goes so far as to state that the next war might conceivably involve select Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries against China.

This leads to the third prevalent theme of the essays: What should the United States do in the region? The general consensus is that the United States must remain engaged within the Pacific. All essayists feel US interest has declined and US policies are not properly focused. Alan states that the US position “has a lot of rhetoric, but the policy waffles and lacks coherence.” Harris believes US policy is a carryover from the Cold War and “reflects inertia and a lack of alternatives.” They are most likely correct, but even if they are wrong, the mere perception that the United States is not lending the area sufficient focus seriously erodes US influence in the area.

The authors issue a number of recommendations. If the United States is ready to share the burden of security, it must be ready to share the power. They also shared their views on the need for US engagement in Pacific nations. Alan tells Japan straight out that it must “resist the temptation to remove most of the American troops.” Harris addresses the importance of US presence to Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore. Few would state that the United States should withdraw from the Pacific region, and it is refreshing to read accounts where the authors tell not only the United States to stay engaged but for smaller nations to ask the United States to stay.

This compilation of essays provides knowledgeable insights into the opinion of Pacific-Rim states. I recommend this book for anyone interested in the region’s future.

MAJ Daniel A. Godfrey, USA, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In his book Israeli Strategy After Desert Storm, author Aharon Levan examines the changes Israel discovered it needed in its defense strategy during Operation Desert Storm. The book’s unifying theme is Israel’s need to rethink its deterrence strategy based on three key challenges: the increased surface-to-surface missile (SSM) threat, the potential of information technology and precision weapons and the need for accurate and timely intelligence on a potential threat.

Levan identifies the SSM threat (especially missiles armed with chemical or biological systems) as both a psychological weapon and one that reduces Israel’s strategic depth. For Israel to regain the initiative over potential enemies, it must either extend its offensive capability to eliminate such threats or develop the necessary active defense, including theater-missile defense, measures to defeat such threats. While the former option is still viable, it is increasingly constrained by world political opinion and the need to expand an exponential amount of resources to keep up with the ever-increasing SSM ranges. The latter option also faces many technical difficulties and requires Israel, with the United States, to invest a significant proportion of its declining defense budget to develop an SSM defense system capable of meeting its operational needs.

The success of the allied air campaign using a combination of advanced information technology and precision targeting during Desert Storm is further validation of Israel’s investment in technology to overcome its inherent manpower and resource constraints. But the success of such weaponry also creates greater awareness and desire in Israel’s potential enemies to also acquire such technologies. Hence, Israel’s challenge to maintain qualitative military superiority has become more acute. This invites a larger question. Can the strategy of the continuous introduction of more advanced weaponry into the region ever promote peace and allow the development of a military balance acceptable to all, or does it merely enmesh the potential adversaries in a vicious circle of arms escalation?

Although Israel has a well-established intelligence service and modern imagery technologies, it faces the challenge of accurately assessing its potential threat’s intention. This intelligence system is arguably Israel’s first line of defense, without
which its strategic depth would be eroded even further. Levan acknowledges the limitations of technology and reiterates the necessity for experienced judgment in interpreting raw data.

While Levan clearly identifies the need to review Israel’s deterrence defense strategy in the light of Desert Storm developments, he does not go beyond examining the need for an alternative to Israel’s current deterrence cum forward-defense strategy. The need to do a more fundamental “rethink” is especially important in a time when the effectiveness of the current strategy is increasingly being eroded by potential enemies’ acquisitions and constrained by resource availability.

Undoubtedly, Israel’s superior technology and training will continue to put the Israel Defense Force in good stead to defeat any potential threat in the immediate future, but it is unclear if such a high-cost strategy would best ensure Israel’s survival in the long term.

Levan expresses little hope for an alternative to the current strategy given the hostility of Israel’s neighbors and the need for Israel to exercise its right to conduct a “war of choice” to defeat any potential threat. The case of US participation in a war to protect its vital interests was cited as evidence to support this assertion. However, the Second Gulf War also highlighted the world’s abhorrence of the use of force to settle disputes and the need to muster world opinion before using force. As such, Levan’s conclusion on Israel’s continuing need is incomplete without recognizing the changing world opinion.

The other paradox of a deterrence strategy is the need to balance secrecy with deterrence. To ensure maximum operational advantage, the threat must remain unaware of one’s capabilities and not be alerted to the need for countermeasures. Yet to achieve deterrence, the threat must at least have some inkling of one’s capabilities. The challenge is to strike the right balance.

The book provides a valuable contribution to readers who seek to better understand the impact of the

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**Pass in Review**


This excellent book continues the current trend of exploring the individual soldier’s experiences in World War II. Kelly, a WWII veteran, relates the stories of 12 of his fellow Kentuckians who served in the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Forces, both commissioned and enlisted. They participated in major battles from Pearl Harbor to the Battle of the Bulge and Ivo Jima. Their stories are based on extensive personal interviews. This book provides a candid, enlightening and well-written reading experience for the general reader or the WWII specialist.—**LTC John A. Hardaway, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**


J.H. Johnson offers a concise, competent sequel to his earlier book *Stalemate: The Great Trench Warfare Battles of 1915-1917*. The current book is an Anglo-centric military history of the last months of World War I on the Western Front. Germans, French and Americans appear only as supporting actors. Johnson’s chief point, along with highlighting the role of the British Expeditionary Forces in winning the war, is to show that, as late as the autumn of 1918, only a handful of key Allied leaders, chiefly Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch and Field Marshal Douglas Haig, saw that the Germans could be beaten before 1919. Johnson bases the book on the best available archival documents and secondary sources, supplemented with a thin leavening of diaries. Though longer on narrative than analysis, the book is recommended as a readable introduction to an important topic.—**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Historian and political scientist Henry Barbera has produced an excellent analysis of the nature and causes of transitions in social organizations from feudal to nation states—provincial to political societies in his terms. He considers the catalysts, such as great migrations, exceptional leaders and natural disasters, that force radical social changes. None approach total war or equally grave threats to a society as a change agent in breaking down ethnic, fraternal, guild or village loyalties in favor of territorial nationalism. Few have taken less than 200 years. Barbera’s case studies—Attica from 750 to 500 BCE, Sicily from 1061 to 1250, Prussia from 1648 to 1850—span enough time, cultural diversity and geography to identify similarities and patterns. Readers will recognize this transition process underway from Kosovo to Chechnya in the exploitation and manipulation of traditional society’s losers by a strong, driven ruling elite.—**COL John W. Messer, USAR, Retired, Ludington, Michigan**
Second Gulf War on Middle East politics and defense strategies. It also provides food for thought for those who want to reflect on the impact of new technologies on warfare and defense strategy.

MAJ Chun Sing Chan, USA, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FACE OFF: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization by John W. Garver. 286 pages. University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA. 1997. $18.95. Face Off is one of the first books to study the significance of the March 1996 confrontation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. The book provides a compelling behind-the-scenes account of China’s domestic politics and foreign policy decisions leading up to the crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

John W. Garver has studied China for over 30 years. He spent five months in Beijing in 1995 and was in Taiwan during the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) 1996 exercises intended to influence Taiwan’s presidential elections. Throughout his well-written analysis, Garver interweaves the message that Taiwan’s democratization has increased the pressure on the precarious balance of East Asia’s stability and raised the stakes in the developing relationship between China and the United States. Amplifying this concern is the ongoing tug of war in the United States between its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, support for “One China” and hopes for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

Garver supports his thesis by examining Beijing’s pattern of growing impatience with Taiwan, the historical basis of US support for Taiwan and misperceptions within the PRC and United States during the crisis. He also provides ample details of Taiwan’s internal political process and its impact on cross-Strait relations.

What is most striking about this book is its insight into the power politics influencing PLA and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. As China struggles to come to terms with its move toward a market-based economy, Taiwan’s determination to


This is the tenth publication in the Engineer Memoirs series of career interviews with major figures in recent US Army Corps history. As with previous memoirs, the publication provides an in-depth study and review of the interviewees’ lives and careers. LTG Ernest Graves’ military career included almost every element an engineer officer could possibly envision. He was successful as a commander at every level—as a staff officer and as an engineer/scientist—providing an outstanding example for upcoming army engineers. LTC James P. Hartman, USA, Retired, Aiken, South Carolina

The Cold War dominated the world’s political, economic and military activities for almost half of the 20th century. Although the conflict was mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union, it also involved members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Soviet Union’s allies were in the Warsaw Pact. The Chronology of the Cold War at Sea, 1945-1991, details the many US and Allied maritime operations during the period, including the Korean War (1950-1953), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and the Vietnam War (1964-1975). Other naval crises and confrontations were the Falkland Islands (1982) and the Suez Campaign (1956). This important and comprehensive reference work provides a useful chronological outline of Cold War developments at sea and the events as they related to the US and Soviet naval forces and their allies. —Bud Feuer, Roanoke, Virginia

Gary Hart, former Colorado senator and founder of the Military Reform Caucus in the early 1980s, has written a highly readable and important book—The Minuteman. The book’s central thesis is that the US “should have its twenty-first-century defenses in an army of the people supported by a nucleus of full-time professionals.” Hart says: “This is not a book about the military so much as it is a book about citizenship, the proper workings and structure of the American Republic and the role of the military in it.” In the last chapter, Hart continues: “It is not unreasonable to envision a US military force structure... focused on the concept of tiered readiness and... comprised of a professional core of a half-million active duty, permanent military personnel supported by a million or more highly trained, fully equipped citizen reservists.” All military professionals and citizens who care about the current and future state of America’s defense should read this book. As Hart emphasizes: “The national defense should be the preoccupation of every citizen” and “patriotism is owned by no ideology.”—COL A.G. Vitters, USA, Retired, Jacksonville, Florida
maintain its freedom and economic power serves as a lightning rod for debate between the PLA and the CCP. On one side are the PLA’s growing culture of nationalism and its fundamental desire for Taiwan’s recovery. On the other side are the CCP’s primary focus on domestic reform and its more pragmatic approach to relations with the United States in regard to the reunification issue. How the United States influences Taiwan’s future actions and China’s perceptions of Taiwan’s ambitions will form the crux of Sino-US relations in the long term. Hence the importance to the United States of having well-defined and consistent interests relative to Taiwan.

Without a clear understanding of US policy among Taiwan and PRC leaders, as well as within the US government, similar circumstances might bring another showdown with China and, perhaps, escalate into war. In 1996, firmness in action was required by both sides. Perceiving Taiwan’s democratization as a challenge to sovereignty and regarding the issue as an internal affair, China discounted possible US intervention and reacted with a display of force. The United States, which has nurtured Taiwan’s democracy since the beginning of nationalist rule, could show no weakness in responding to the threat. A misunderstanding of US interests in the future might again predispose a response, whereas greater flexibility facilitated by transparency in US-PRC-Taiwan relations might mean a confrontation avoided.

_Face Off_ presents a clear picture of the strategic and political decisions shaping an event that awakened perceptions of China as a threat. It is recommended for those interested in the implications of the emerging power of China and the potential for Taiwan to be the most significant challenge to peace in Asia.

**LCDR Steven C. Cade, USN, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE GRIM REAPER:** Machine Guns and Machine-Gunners in Action

This well-written, easily read book takes the reader on a tour of the past 130 or so years of warfare as it succinctly describes the invention, development and employment of the automatic firing weapon. Beginning with the Gatling gun’s use in the American Civil War, the author describes “manual machine-guns,” including the mitrailleuse, conceived by Belgium Captain T.H.J. Fafschamps in 1851. This weapon was not a machinegun as we now define the weapon; rather, it was a volley gun, which possessed 27 independent barrels that fired simultaneously. The author highlights the development of truly automatic weapons through an evolutionary process, which ironically comes full circle with the development of the six-barreled antiaircraft Vulcan. In addition, an excellent description of the development of the machine pistol or submachinegun is included in the text.

The major contributors to the design and development of this type weapon are given credit for their creative work. Names such as Gatling, Nordenfelt, Maxim, Hotchkiss, Vickers and Browning are among those whose inventions and innovations forever changed the nature of war on land, in the air and at sea. It is unlikely that these men could have realized that their brainchildren would rank with the English long bow, the tank, the airplane, the submarine and the atom bomb in the realm of military weaponry.

It is axiomatic that one innovation on the battlefield generates a need for others. Materiel requirements and changes in tactics were driven by the machinegun’s success. The armored vehicle was developed as a countermeasure to the gun, and a requirement arose for a more easily portable weapon system. Thus began the development of the submachine gun.

Roger Ford provides an excellent synopsis of automatic weapons’ history and development. He also provides anecdotal information. For the reader who has an interest in military firearms, this book is an excellent primer.

**COL Robert A. Gimbert, USA. Retired, Georgetown, Texas**

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**DEFENDING CYBERSPACE AND OTHER METAPHORS**

What is cyberspace? Can it be defined and identified clearly enough to be defended? If we can define what it is, then whom shall we defend it for, and from whom shall we defend it? If we can clarify who the players are on this cyber battlefield, we can then ask if it is even defensible and, if so, at what cost. These are but a few of the questions that occupy the forefront of the information-age debate.

Martin C. Libicki attempts to address these questions using metaphor as a tool of explanation. Metaphor, he explains, is “how new things are framed so they can be discussed in terms of the familiar.” In this case, the new thing to be understood is information warfare. His six essays explore various aspects of the US National Information Infrastructure (NI), the threat to it, the means to defend it and how we use it for our own information warfare.

Much has recently been written in an effort to define this new and seemingly amorphous aspect of warfare. Lest we begin a futile chase after some illusive specter, Libicki concludes, “ultimately we need to transition to an understanding of what Information Warfare is, and not what it is like.”

Information warfare can be several things—an attack on the fidelity of someone’s information; the disruption of the ability to process information; or the use of information to influence a potential adversary, such as President Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” program. I believe Libicki’s central thesis is that although the United States is increas-
ingly dependent on its information infrastructure, this dependence does not necessarily translate to an increased threat from so-called information warfare to national security.

Is there really an information-warfare equivalent to a nuclear attack or the loss of geostategic access to key minerals or oil reserves? That is not to say that nothing should or can be done. However, Libicki suggests that the solution must come from those entities most threatened and the defense tailored to the potential damage posed by potential assaults. Moreover, he suggests that a centralized government “defense,” while possible, would likely require the compromise of much of the autonomy and freedom that makes the NII so valuable. In short, the cure might be worse than the actual threat. In addition, the most vital US systems are almost all closed systems and not really as susceptible as we might believe.

Assuming that if even some NII elements, such as control systems for power grids, are so vital and vulnerable to warrant serious defensive action, what is the appropriate defense? Is there or can there be a deterrent or a retaliation? What is the appropriate response against an individual, an organization or a state that attacks part or all of the NII? Do you attack his NII? What if he does not have one? Do you then attack his home, his camp, his capital? With what do you respond? Something “cyber” or conventional or nuclear? One additional notion Libicki wishes us to consider is that if there is no discernible victory, no political gain, no terrain held, what value is the attack or the counterattack? Beyond a temporary disruption in some system or service, what is really gained or lost? In this respect, terrorism and counterterrorism share similar dilemmas.

Libicki appropriately reminds us of Arthur C. Clarke’s “Third Law.” “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Although technology appears to be magic to most of us, Libicki is in his element. However, if his target audience is defense leaders, he might have missed the mark. The NII’s complicated networks and architecture challenge a lay person’s comprehension. Most of us are satisfied that it seems to work and grateful that there are those who seem to understand it.

In fairness to Libicki, most of his “metaphors” are interesting and worth consideration by those trying to define the cyber battlefield. However, some of his examples are too hard to follow. For example, his attempted comparison of the network of information warfare with the immune system, while intriguing, lost me.

Shortcomings aside, Libicki’s message is sound. We need to find out what defending cyberspace really is before we can do anything about it. However, although those who are less technically impaired than I am might find Defending Cyberspace enlightening, I believe the question and challenge the author initially posed still remain unanswered.

MAJ Bradford K. Nelson, USA, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


To explain the American military failures in the Pacific in 1941 and 1942, most accounts scrutinize the months immediately before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In Guardian of Empire, however, historian Brian McAllister Linn takes a broader perspective as he effectively traces the Army’s experiences in the Philippines and Hawaii from 1902 to 1940. The result is an intriguing look at strategic thinking and tactical planning in the decades before World War II. Without hesitation, I recommend this superb study as both a first-rate history and as an insightful discussion of peacetime contingency planning.

The scope of Linn’s study is impressive, ranging from the highest Army planning circles in Washington, DC, to a soldiers’ boxing tournament in Hawaii. Linn outlines the creation and development of the distinct Pacific Army that was to guard America’s newfound empire. While an integral part of the US Army, this army was separate, having its own customs and internal dynamics. Similarly, the soldiers of the Hawaiian “Pineapple Army” and the Philippine “Carabao Army” were part of their local societies yet remained discrete entities. Careful to keep them within the context of their own time, Linn describes how the soldiers lived and interacted with local communities. Allowing for the Army’s ethnocentric bias, he nevertheless concludes that, in many practical ways, the army improved Hawaiians’ and Filipinos’ lives.

The crux of the book, however, remains Linn’s analysis of the evolution of strategic and tactical plans to defend America’s Pacific possessions. Linn skillfully examines how, from 1907 to the 1940s, those plans changed, ending with the final versions of War Plan Orange on the eve of World War II.

Much of the strategic debate revolved around basic disagreements—within and outside the Army—of if and how the Philippines should be defended. At the local level, Army commanders continually developed plans and conducted exercises to counter the ever-changing tactical threats. Unhappily, these local plans were often at odds with the broader strategic ones, creating tension between Washington and the commanders in the field. One of the most significant differences lay in the desire of many local commanders to use the native population as a source of military manpower.

Linn’s examination of the Pacific Army challenges the popular belief that the US Army simply ignored or belittled the threat posed by Japan. Instead, Linn contends that both
Washington planners and local Pacific commanders were painfully aware of the threat and energetically and, for the most part, competently searched for ways to solve their defensive dilemmas. He concludes that “in policy studies, military exercises and war games, [Army] officers foresaw the events of 1941 with uncanny accuracy.” Unfortunately, inadequate resources, financial constraints, service competition, public indifference and institutional inertia crippled the development of adequate defenses.

Guardians of Empire is an excellent history. Linn crafts his exhaustive research and cogent analysis into a well-written narrative. Moreover, the book offers timely insights into the frustrations of military planning when political and economic realities rarely meet with military necessity. It also highlights how the military can generate seemingly well-thought-out plans, yet still not answer the central question: Can it accomplish its missions without adequate available resources and proven weaponry? In Guardians of Empire, the military reader will gain a broader perspective on why the United States suffered the 1941-1942 defeats in the Pacific, as well as a greater appreciation for the dilemmas of contingency planning.

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Certainly the North was shocked by the death of President Abraham Lincoln. But how did Southerners react to the assassination? This is the question Carolyn L. Harrell’s study answers. She dissects the question geographically, chronologically and demographically. Harrell’s work is well researched, drawing heavily on primary sources of manuscripts stored at leading universities throughout the South and newspaper archives from New York to Little Rock.

The book’s basic thesis is that Southerners knew very little of Lincoln before the 1860 election and dismissed, out of hand, the possibility that he could govern a united country. Although many feared he would be elected by Northern votes, few took any real interest in him as an individual or as a politician. As the Civil War continued, this disdain grew; he was considered the primary villain in destroying their way of life.

The end of the war presented a dilemma to the defeated—deal with the devil they knew, Lincoln, or deal with someone equally despised, such as Andrew Johnson, who had “defected” to join the Union.

The immediate and longer-term reactions of Southerners to the death of Lincoln make interesting reading. Of particular note is the way sentiment changed rather quickly and somewhat universally. From time to time some genuine regret was expressed—and not just by the defeated region’s Unionists.

This book should appeal to three groups of readers: serious students of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Lincoln buffs and readers who enjoy well-documented, tightly written prose.