

I. S. M. A.
No. 8

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

April 10, 1923.

Instructors' Summary of Military Articles
January-March, 1923

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| Digest of Selected Articles and Documents | 8 |
| Review of New Books Received in the Library..... | 11 |
| Documents Received in Instructors' File Room | 14 |
| Magazines Received in Library | 19 |
| ✓ Late Books Received in Library | 20 |
| ✓ Important Articles of Military Interest that have Appeared in Magazines .. | 23 |
| Index to Selected Magazine Articles, Documents, and Books | 29 |

DIGEST OF SELECTED ARTICLES

NOTES ON AIR SERVICE

Extract from a translation at the General Service Schools of a series of Conferences at the French *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre*. Instructors' File No. 120-J.

PREFACE

I. No paradox.

| | |
|----------------------|-------------|
| Pursuit aviation | combat |
| Bombardment aviation | bombardment |
| Observation aviation | observation |

The employment of pursuit aviation and of bombardment aviation, as well as night observation, by airplane, is only provided for at army and higher echelons.

II. The headquarters of the air service is organized. There is a commander of the air service in each one of the echelons of the:

- Infantry division.
- Army corps,
- Army,
- Group of armies.

It is to the commander and not to the units (air squadrons or balloons) that orders emanating from the generals commanding the infantry division, army corps, army, group of armies, should be addressed.

III. All orders given to the air service are founded on a tentative plan or on the execution of a plan of:

- Maneuver,
- Reconnaissance,
- Destruction.

Orders, therefore, must be precise, aiming at the verification of a particular point or at the execution of some clearly defined mission.

Never remain indefinite: orders in the form: "from such an hour to such an hour," "execute such a mission;" or "in such a zone" are insufficient.

IV. Only give such missions as can be physically carried out. Fix for these missions an order of priority in their execution.

EXTRACTS FROM REGULATIONS

Instructions of January 24, 1919, on observation aviation.

Missions: The mission of observation aviation is:

- a. The obtaining of information (*reconnaissances*).
- b. The launching, observation, and ranging of artillery fires (*firing missions*).
- c. The execution of liaison missions in combat especially in support of the infantry (*liaison missions*).

The *reconnaissances* can be executed, either directly for the command, or for:

The Infantry: (aerial *reconnaissances*, *reconnaissances* of terrains of attack, close *reconnaissances*, **battle reconnaissance in combat**);

The Artillery: (*reconnaissance* of objectives, *reconnaissances* of destruction);

Tanks: (aerial and photographic *reconnaissances* of the terrains of advance).

Firing missions without observation.

Liaison missions. The principal mission is the mission of accompanying the infantry, or the infantry mission. It consists in observing the combat of the two opposing infantries: On behalf of the headquarters and of the artillery which the airplane keeps informed especially in regard to the situation of the first line; in direct support of the infantry whose requests it transmits, and whose advance it clears up.

NOTE:—Certain terms like: "*Missions of security*," "*Missions of command*" are no longer employed to designate the missions of the observation aviation, because they do not very well apply to the designation of an accurate category of missions.

In fact, numerous missions (the majority of *reconnaissances*) cooperate for the security of the large units, even the different missions are executed for the benefit of the higher command.

Principles of employment. In battle the number of missions is considerable, consequently, observation aviation forces are

not sufficient to execute the missions which are required of same unless the headquarters:

a. Fixes the order of priority and concentrates every effort to obtain the essential results.

b. Breaks away from routine when it is not justified.

c. Demands of the aviation only what observation posts and balloons cannot do under the same conditions.

d. Distributes the task and does not double the work of some units by giving them the work of others.

Freedom of action. It is influenced by:

a. Atmospheric conditions.

b. The enemy anti-aircraft defense.

Enemy aviation. Missions offering few chances of combat are executed by single planes. Missions offering considerable chances of encounter are executed in groups. A relative zone of security is assured:

a. By the anti-aircraft defense fires which not only protect, but give notice of approach of enemy aircraft.

b. By the action of the offensive aviation which diminishes the aggressiveness of the enemy pursuit aviation by causing losses and by bringing the combat to the interior of the enemy lines.

c. By the action of the security patrols from defensive combat aviation.

Their protection is all the more effective in that observation aviation groups its missions within the time and space, in such a manner as only to require protection in zones and especially at designated hours; permitting at those hours and on those points the action of pursuit aviation. The necessary coordination of the work of observation aviation and pursuit aviation, employed in the protection of aerial observation, devolves upon the air service commander of the army.

Flying fields. The active landing field is the field where the air service commander remains and where his information service functions. It is the command post of the air service.

The airdrome is the place where airplanes spend the night and consequently where almost the entire technical personnel is located. If the active landing field is not also the airdrome, it is called the *advanced landing field*. It is not always possible for the airdrome and the active landing field to be together.

However, it is desirable, because the separation of an air squadron on two fields entails additional work on the personnel and materiel, and renders difficult for the squadron leader the exercise of his tactical and technical command.

The use of advanced landing fields is justified:

a. When the progress of our troops leads to a more rapid advance of airdromes than it is possible to displace airplane hangars;

b. When liaison difficulties necessitate the placing of an active landing field near the front lines, in a zone where the airdrome would be threatened;

c. When we propose to concentrate on a narrow front the activity of numerous squadrons without attracting the attention of the enemy by the premature setting up of supplementary hangars.

An Auxiliary landing field is a field which can be used for landing and which through its proximity to a command post or to a battery enables officers to establish liaison by airplane. The difficulty of finding at the appointed time landing fields, not necessitating considerable preparation work, prevents us from counting on their frequent employment. In principle, there is no air service personnel permanently detached.

Liaison by officers. The number of liaison officers is controlled by the distance from the airdrome to the command posts, batteries, etc. . . . and the means of communication. For the assignment of missions, for the establishment of firing programs, in a word for the reception of orders, air service commanders or their representatives frequently go to the command posts of large units or of their artillery commander; also to the infantry command posts (infantry division, battalions, regiments), to the artillery command posts (groupments, groups, batteries), or to tanks guns, to receive directly the missions.

These liaisons, useful for the easy execution of the work in common, are not *indispensable* for the execution of the missions. Aviation information and especially photographs are transmitted to advantage by the aviation officers during the course of their liaisons.

Reciprocal liaison among the air service commander, the chief of the 2d Bureau, the officer in charge of the artillery information service, the chief of the topographic section of the

army corps, is particularly important. It is often well to give it the form of a daily meeting at the command post of the unit or in the air service sector. At this meeting the information is made known.

Liaisons between flying airplanes and the ground.

The methods employed are:

a. To communicate from the airplane to the ground:

Wireless, essential method of communication utilized for the firing and liaison missions;

Rockets to make simple signals to the infantry, and in certain cases, to the artillery;

Dropped messages which have the advantage of permitting the sending of accurate, complete and signed information, and of sketches.

b. To communicate from the ground to the airplane.

| | | |
|----------|---|--|
| Panels | { | <i>Identification panels</i> of the command posts, infantry, and artillery. They must remain exposed until all the command posts are well known by the squadron. |
| | | <i>Location panels</i> (infantry). |
| | | <i>Signalling panel</i> of the infantry and artillery command posts enabling them to make simple signals to the airplane. |
| Wireless | { | seldom used. |

Reconnaissance.

Orders for reconnaissance given to the air service may, in combat, be unexpected; but wherever possible they should:

a. Form part of a plan always kept up to date, but established as long ahead as possible;

b. Involve the periodical repetition of the exploration of the same points.

The air service commander makes the reconnaissance requested of him the basis of a certain number of missions, each one having a definite aim.

The principal information which the airplane can furnish concerns:

a. *The form of the terrain.* The detailed study of the terrain in advance of our troops is very useful previous to the engagement of the infantry and tanks. It allows the completion and verification of the information furnished by maps, and the determination of covered approaches, routes, and the preparation of displacements in advance of the artillery.

b. *The organization of the terrain.*

(1) *Organization of the first lines.* They are the works or batteries located in the zone of reconnaissance of the army corps air service.

(2) *Organization of the rear.* The reconnaissance of the rear area is executed, in principle, by squadrons from the army or from the group.

c. *Results obtained by our fires.* We must discern:

(1) The determination of the points of fall, which allows us to decide whether the shots were good or bad. If the objectives are well known and the calibers appropriate we can generally ascertain absolutely if the result sought has been obtained or not.

(2) The exact evaluation of the degree of destruction. This information is more difficult to obtain.

d. *Observation of the enemy troops.*

Observation in combat of the enemy troops in first line is included in the infantry missions. The seeking of local reserves is the mission of army corps reconnaissances. In order to be profitable, those reconnaissances must consist not in a flight carried out along the lines, but on one or more successive flights pushed to the interior of the enemy lines to verify precise points. In order to do that, it is necessary to foresee, depending upon the situation, how the enemy's possible reserve will reach the battlefield (arrival of reinforcement or withdrawal) and verify those points. The hypothesis made is only valuable in that it serves to orient reconnaissance missions; it should not influence the judgment reached by the observer on what he sees.

e. *Troops marching or in convoys.* Generally they are only visible in daytime in important formations in battle. Locating

them is of capital importance because it permits the determination of where the enemy is rushing its reserve divisions; or else by observing the rearward movement of trains or artillery to know where the enemy is going to yield.

The seeking of troops in march falls to the lot of squadrons from the army or groups of armies. Like army corps reconnaissances, they must be oriented, in accordance with a tactical plan, on predetermined points or routes.

f. Movements on railroads.

Railroad reconnaissances are of value only:

(1) If the same reconnaissance or successive reconnaissances can observe trains on the same line to give sufficient idea of the density of the traffic on this line;

(2) If the observation of the same railroads is carried on with system and continuity to obtain an idea of the variations of density of traffic.

The distance to which those reconnaissances should be pushed forward makes it hard to assure the necessary continuity for very great efficiency.

g. Troops in cantonment:

Troops in cantonment are very hard to discover. The best plan is to take photographs on a large scale, which usually disclose the location of parks of vehicles.

Bivouacs when they are established specially in open terrain are very easy to see. When they are in woods, at night it is nearly always possible to see a few lights; at daybreak it is possible to notice smoke from campfires or from kitchens.

With regard to camps, it is the study of the trails which allows us to determine if they are occupied.

h. Activity of the artillery.

In combat, observation of the enemy artillery fires on our first firing lines enters in the cadre of the mission of accompaniment of the infantry. This is one of the elements which enable the infantry airplane to inform the command with regard to the general character of the combat.

On larger fronts than division fronts (army, several armies, or army corps fronts) the sending of reconnaissance (during the day or at night) as soon as an important enemy

a. *The form of the terrain.* The detailed study of the terrain in advance of our troops is very useful previous to the engagement of the infantry and tanks. It allows the completion and verification of the information furnished by maps, and the determination of covered approaches, routes, and the preparation of displacements in advance of the artillery.

b. *The organization of the terrain.*

(1) *Organization of the first lines.* They are the works or batteries located in the zone of reconnaissance of the army corps air service.

(2) *Organization of the rear.* The reconnaissance of the rear area is executed, in principle, by squadrons from the army or from the group.

c. *Results obtained by our fires.* We must discern:

(1) The determination of the points of fall, which allows us to decide whether the shots were good or bad. If the objectives are well known and the calibers appropriate we can generally ascertain absolutely if the result sought has been obtained or not.

(2) The exact evaluation of the degree of destruction. This information is more difficult to obtain.

d. *Observation of the enemy troops.*

Observation in combat of the enemy troops in first line is included in the infantry missions. The seeking of local reserves is the mission of army corps reconnaissances. In order to be profitable, those reconnaissances must consist not in a flight carried out along the lines, but on one or more successive flights pushed to the interior of the enemy lines to verify precise points. In order to do that, it is necessary to foresee, depending upon the situation, how the enemy's possible reserve will reach the battlefield (arrival of reinforcement or withdrawal) and verify those points. The hypothesis made is only valuable in that it serves to orient reconnaissance missions; it should not influence the judgment reached by the observer on what he sees.

e. *Troops marching or in convoys.* Generally they are only visible in daytime in important formations in battle. Locating

them is of capital importance because it permits the determination of where the enemy is rushing its reserve divisions; or else by observing the rearward movement of trains or artillery to know where the enemy is going to yield.

The seeking of troops in march falls to the lot of squadrons from the army or groups of armies. Like army corps reconnaissances, they must be oriented, in accordance with a tactical plan, on predetermined points or routes.

f. Movements on railroads.

Railroad reconnaissances are of value only:

(1) If the same reconnaissance or successive reconnaissances can observe trains on the same line to give sufficient idea of the density of the traffic on this line;

(2) If the observation of the same railroads is carried on with system and continuity to obtain an idea of the variations of density of traffic.

The distance to which those reconnaissances should be pushed forward makes it hard to assure the necessary continuity for very great efficiency.

g. Troops in cantonment:

Troops in cantonment are very hard to discover. The best plan is to take photographs on a large scale, which usually disclose the location of parks of vehicles.

Bivouacs when they are established specially in open terrain are very easy to see. When they are in woods, at night it is nearly always possible to see a few lights; at daybreak it is possible to notice smoke from campfires or from kitchens.

With regard to camps, it is the study of the trails which allows us to determine if they are occupied.

h. Activity of the artillery.

In combat, observation of the enemy artillery fires on our first firing lines enters in the cadre of the mission of accompaniment of the infantry. This is one of the elements which enable the infantry airplane to inform the command with regard to the general character of the combat.

On larger fronts than division fronts, (army, several armies, or army corps fronts) the sending of reconnaissance (during the day or at night) as soon as an important enemy

bombardment commences is in general the most rapid means of securing information as to the sectors in which there is artillery preparation.

The seeking of batteries by the flashes of their guns is carried out by airplanes assigned observation missions and detailed to assist the artillery charged with counter battery missions. This is also the object of special reconnaissances known as "flash reconnaissances."

Reconnaisances effected in our lines.

Their principal aims are:

- a. Establishing and keeping maps up to date.
- b. Control and progress of our works.
- c. Control of movements prescribed for our troops.
- d. Control of measures taken to avoid enemy aerial observation.

Firing missions.

Advantages. The airplane has the advantage of permitting a rapid, accurate, and vertical observation as required. It enables us to establish the value of the deviation of the shots with regard to the objective and to determine the average point of fall of several shots fired simultaneously or very rapidly.

Disadvantages. The number of airplanes that can range simultaneously is limited; it is a question of strength and technical dependence on wireless. The duration of observation is limited (duration of flight, fatigue of the crew, incidents due to the enemy or to the atmosphere).

Conclusion. Whence the necessity of making short rangings:

- In order to make several rangings;
- In order to make successful rangings.

Conditions of execution.

(a) To execute in advance everything that does not necessitate the cooperation of an airplane.

(b) To operate by series of shots fired under the same conditions as quickly as the materiel will permit.

(c) The number of shots (12 for calibers smaller than 155's, 8 for 155's and larger) enables us to determine the corresponding average point of fall on the terrain and under firing conditions on an angle to the level employed.

(d) The shots should be fired at the moment when the observer expects them, that is to say at his command.

There are two kinds of firing missions:

a. *Ranging.* The airplane has received before departure the indication of the objective and the battery that is to fire.

b. *Surveillance.* The airplane starts with the mission to operate with the artillery (whose position it may ignore) on objectives which it will discover (normal case) or which the artillery will indicate (exceptional case) during the course of its flight.

Liaison missions.

Infantry mission.

a. *Role of the airplane.*

(1) To observe and point out the first line position of the infantry and tanks, the fluctuations of this line, all incidents of combat.

(2) To observe and point out the location of the command posts (battalion, regiment, division) and to transmit the requests made by signals to those command posts.

(3) To play the part of aerial scout for the infantry (to point out the enemy first line, points of resistance, massing of troops, tanks).

NOTE.—The airplane seizes every opportunity to intervene in the combat with its machine gun.

The airplane works to assist the: Commander of the infantry division, artillery of direct support, engaged infantry.

b. *Role of the infantry.*

The infantry should display panels:

(1) On its own initiative after an advance or withdrawal movement.

(2) On the request of the airplane when it is *absolutely* necessary to clear up the situation. The display of panels on the request of the airplane is obligatory upon the infantry.

1. THE FORCES ENGAGED

Between resolute powers the seal of victory is the occupation of territory and no application of science seems likely to change this aspect of war.

Occupation requires land forces; these, in our case at least, need sea power to permit of their concentration and supply. Armies and fleets must each have their proportion of aircraft to enable them to fulfil their own functions, and we need an air force to strike in conjunction with the land forces and the Navy. In short, we cannot beat our enemy without an army, and we cannot employ an army without sea and air power. Sea and air power are, moreover, essential to secure the ocean transport by which we live, and to protect our own land from air attacks.

For all that applied science may do, we shall probably need, for as far as we can see into the future, a Navy, Army, and air force in due balance and proportion. What the proportion will be we cannot say, but certainly the threat of European war would secure for the air force a much greater relative strength and importance than it enjoys under the present political conditions.

2. SURPRISE

The sailor, soldier, and airman charged with the defense of their country in war, face the simple fact that it can only be secured by destroying or disarming her enemies. They survey their new armory, and the advantages promised by surprise—always the most formidable of weapons—stand out as never before. In the past a nation, caught by surprise and staggering under the disasters that follow it, might yet pull herself together and restore the balance of a campaign. The attacker has generally been unable to maintain unrelaxed the merciless pressure of his first onset, and the defense has usually been granted a breathing space. The question whether a nation surprised and unready, can hope for such a respite in future is worth examination.

Complete surprise gives complete victory, but by land and sea the powers in the past have watched one another too jealously for surprise to be more than partial; no nation has been able to fall, fully mobilized, on an unsuspecting rival.

The difficulty of concealing preparations for war by land and sea will not diminish; but the air presents a new problem—a problem that touches us nearly, because our sea frontiers offer no protection against attack by air.

Complete surprise on the great scale, however, will probably be as difficult to achieve by air as it is by land or sea. An unexpected air raid might be comparatively easy, but it would in itself throw away all chance of surprise in a subsequent decisive attack. For such an attack on any great country the aeroplanes necessary would be numbered in thousands, and such a fleet cannot be prepared and mobilized in secret. It is a popular idea that commercial aircraft can be diverted at will to war purposes. This is incorrect, and it becomes more so every year as the aircraft designed for battle and those designed for commerce diverge in type. This divergence has its parallel in the evolution of the battleship and the liner of today.

But the rewards of an initial surprise, if it can be achieved, will be greater in the future than in the past. The increased destroying power of scientific weapons alone would secure this; they would be comparatively unopposed while the surprise lasted, and could do irreparable damage before any counter measure could take effect. But there is, in addition, the new factor that the blow may fall, not only on the fighting men of the nation, whose discipline and training arm them against panic, but on the susceptible mass of the people.

As air power will be the chief agent of initial surprise in the future, so the first insurance against it lies in a strong air force, ready to act immediately.

3. THE OPENING MOVES

We are told by some, who should be well informed, that the next war will open by mutual air attacks on the belligerents' capitals, and that whichever side succeeds first in destroying the other's capital will win.* This is founded on a false

*Sir William Joynson-Hicks, M. P., in a series of articles published by the *Daily Telegraph* at the end of August and beginning of September, 1922, writes: "We cannot reiterate too frequently that the next Continental war will undoubtedly be fought and won almost entirely in the air. The Navy and Army will almost certainly be impotent spectators of an air battle or series of battles which will determine the issue by the destruction of the enemy capital before even the older services can get into operation."

conception of strategy. The next war will certainly start in the air, but the main object of each side will be to seek out and destroy the enemy's air squadrons, wherever they are found—on the ground for preference. If, aided by surprise, by superior morale, or by overwhelming numbers, one side can do this, its enemy's fleets and armies will fight blindfolded and the war will be more than half won. The capital may receive attention, but not more than can be spared without prejudice to the success of the main effort against the enemy's air power. If a nation is lured by this apparent short cut to victory, and neglects the true strategic objective in favor of bombing cities, it must leave its enemy's air force comparatively unmolested. These will be free to attend to the attacker's air bases and bombing squadrons.

The sudden and complete destruction of a nation's capital would, it is true, leave its fighting services paralyzed for the time being, though intact; and such a nation might possibly be cowed into submission, without striking a blow. But complete destruction of even a small area needs concentration of effort in a sustained air offensive; it cannot be achieved at a blow. In the time required for this the defender's air forces can concentrate on their true business of destroying the attacker. Moreover, any damage to the capital would undoubtedly exasperate the nation attacked, and stiffen its moral. With whatever false conceptions a war might be begun, the unchanging law which demands battle as the price of victory, and allows no short cuts, would before long assert itself.

Air defenses, comprising aircraft, guns, searchlights, balloon nets, locating devices and a most complete system of intercommunication, absorb great resources, and can therefore only be provided for the most vital areas.

4. BATTLE

(a) Infantry, tanks and cavalry.

The supreme act of battle on land is the assault, in which the attacker closes with his enemy to destroy him. It is the culminating effort of violence to which all else tends. Every activity of every arm is directed to its preparation, delivery, repulse or exploitation, and the arm that delivers it is supreme on the battlefield, demanding the services of all the others.

In the past, this arm has been infantry; in the future, it will be infantry with tanks. There is the root of the matter, and it is this new factor that will most affect the conduct of battles.

It is necessary, then, to examine more closely the powers and limitations of the tank. These are summarized below:

(i) The present fighting tank (as issued, not as designed) is proof against rifle and machine gun fire and shrapnel bullets, and can be made gas-proof; it can maintain a speed of from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 miles an hour across country, and carries an armament of 6-pdr. or .303 Hotchkiss guns. In short, in addition to the protection which it provides, it combines the attributes of fire and movement to a very high degree. It can be used, in addition, to emit a smoke-cloud.

(ii) It presents an easy artillery target when stationary, and even when moving it falls an easy victim to guns at short range over open sights. It is stopped by certain kinds of country. Tanks cannot turn Infantry out of underground shelters or the upper floors of houses. They cannot, in an enemy's country, obtain information as cavalry can, nor lie perdu to avoid detection; their track is unmistakable.

They cannot continue long in action, nor go to ground like infantry at the close of any phase of a battle. They cannot stand still on the battlefield without great risk of destruction, nor move with infantry, taking cover as they go. Their movements must be timed to bring them into battle at the right moment, and to take them out of battle, when they have struck their blow, to rest and refit, and to escape the immediate menace of artillery and aircraft.

(iii) Many of these drawbacks are inherent in the nature of the tank, but in the near future some of them will disappear. In particular their speed and endurance will increase.

(iv) Regarding mechanized transport, we may say that it can carry loads up to three tons across country at what may now be taken as five miles an hour. These powers will no doubt greatly increase.

Some deny the right of the tank to be called a weapon at all; they would acknowledge it only as a method of transport for the older arms. This point may be settled by a reference to the Field Service Regulations, which state with characteristic restraint that the tank can destroy hostile personnel and weapons by passing over them. We know what our enemies thought of them; and if we may draw a parallel from the past, Hannibal's elephants were never dismissed by the Romans as a mere means of transport for bowmen.

At present, an attack on a position by tanks without infantry would fail before the close-range fire of anti-tank guns; and the training manuals of today clearly indicate the methods of cooperation between the two arms. In the future, the increased speed of tanks will put them in a better position, but it does not seem likely that tanks can ever dispense entirely with the cooperation of an ubiquitous and thrusting infantry to

deal with the carefully sited gun. Whatever the respective roles of the two arms in the assault, ground won can only be occupied and consolidated by infantry, and that arm alone is able to protect tanks at rest.

The present tank, attacking in cooperation with infantry, moves with the leading companies. The faster tank of the future will not sacrifice its mobility in order actually to accompany the infantry with which it cooperates, but will make full use of its speed to outflank and defilade centers of opposition, and to offer as difficult a target as possible to artillery and aircraft.

If either side possesses a marked superiority in tanks its infantry will fight at a great and perhaps a decisive advantage. Hence it is probable that a general engagement will witness in its early stages a tank versus tank struggle for supremacy. This may be sought deliberately, or brought about by the tanks of one side, bent on some mission of destruction, being countered by tanks of the enemy. Imagination leads inevitably to pictures of outflanking movements by bodies of fast tanks with aerial escorts, to be met by tanks, air squadrons and anti-tank guns. Then, it will be asked, "Why not put your anti-tank guns themselves inside special tanks?" So by steps, each unassailably logical, the tank enthusiasts lead us to a vast mechanical battle of maneuver at high speed, where the sole duty of the infantry and cavalry is to keep out of the way; and artillery is only suffered because its greater range enables it to fight from a distance. Thus the doom of infantry and cavalry in open warfare is sometimes foretold!

But when the battle is over, who has won? The side that holds the position fought for. And how can it be held? Not by tanks, which must rally and refit after action, but by infantry and anti-tank guns, with due artillery support. "Infantry is still the only arm which can complete a victory and consolidate and hold the ground won."

It is worth while to recall the great losses among tanks in the late war, which more than once made it necessary for infantry alone to carry out attacks that had been planned for

infantry and tanks in cooperation.* These casualties were due to artillery fire, difficult going and mechanical defects; in the future increased speed and better design will reduce these sources of loss, but the greatest enemy of all, the hostile tank, was not in being in 1918, and it will have to be allowed for in the next war. We must remember also that it will be no more possible to bring overwhelming tank superiority against all parts of a front than it is with artillery. In each case force must be concentrated where a decision is aimed at and economized elsewhere.

We are thus led to picture an encounter battle with infantry†, supported by artillery and cooperating with aircraft, fighting to advance over the whole front until the time comes for the tanks to strike.

These have been moved by bounds from concentration to assembly, and from assembly to deployment areas; and at the right moment, deployed in depth against the chosen objective, they will pass at speed through or round the struggling line, and endeavor to get among the enemy's infantry, probably to be met in turn by his tanks.

Whatever evolution tactics may undergo to meet changing conditions, there will be occasions when fast enemy tanks will get among infantry, temporarily unsupported by their own tanks. This demands the development of an anti-tank gun as an infantry weapon. The requirements are that it should be small enough to be easily hidden, powerful enough to pierce tank armor, mechanically propelled at infantry pace across country, and able to carry ammunition for immediate needs. While tank attacks in force could be met only by tanks, such a gun would enable infantry alone to repel minor tank attacks. The battalion must have with them some defense against these attacks; failing a special gun, this defense can only be

*"The Story of the Fourth Army," by Sir Archibald Montgomery, is full of examples of heavy tank casualties. The 27th American Division, when in that Army, had 39 tanks allotted to them for their attack north of Bellicourt on September 29th, 1918. Out of these, 12 were knocked out by direct hits, 7 were ditched, and only one succeeded finally in crossing the Bellicourt tunnel.

†Whether "infantry" in the future will include a definite proportion of tanks permanently distributed among the units depends on the evolution of the anti-tank gun discussed in a subsequent paragraph.

provided by distributing a great proportion of the available tanks permanently among the infantry, instead of concentrating them for the decisive attack.

We have spoken of fast tanks cooperating with infantry; it is clear that the more mobile the infantry the more effective the cooperation can be. It is hard to exaggerate the difference in fighting value between a fresh man carrying only his weapons and the laden infantryman who has been on his feet many hours. Infantry units destined to cooperate with tanks in the assault will probably have all impedimenta, except their actual arms, carried for them in tanks. Vehicles and pack animals of all battalions will no doubt be replaced in time by small carrier tanks, which can accompany the men at all times and reach them under fire. We may expect to see also before long a tank allotted to carry the battalion commander in action.

Our present tanks are but embryos, and none can say what forms the monstrous brook may take. The first of their kind were essentially man-killers, but their possession by both sides in the future will lead to tank actions of increasing importance. These struggles will give birth to the tank of the line, heavily gunned and armored, designed, above all, for battle with its peers. Lighter and faster forms will develop for other purposes, such as participation in protective duties, infantry attacks and exploitation. Science has reduced warfare to a grim and dreadful business about which the world retains few illusions of romance and glamor; but she may yet restore to battle something of its lost Homeric savor in the tank combats of the future.

An army moving to meet its enemy must guard against surprise. The most effective measures have been found to line in a screen of protective mobile troops covering the whole front of advance, with a local advanced guard for the immediate protection of each of the marching columns. No application of science appears to threaten this principle. Up to the present, the protective screen has consisted almost wholly, and the advanced guards partly, of cavalry. The screen covering the German advance into Belgium in 1914 was most effectively strengthened by the addition of armored cars, cyclists,

machine guns, and infantry moved in lorries.* These, through their added fire power, preserved the mobility of their own cavalry by sparing them the necessity for dismounted action, and checked all attempts at penetration by the French patrols.

This is the clue to the future. Cavalry, by their ubiquity; and individual initiative, can gain local information better than any machine-borne groups of men; but mounted patrols will be checked by the fire of mechanical arms unless themselves supported by similar arms. When the endurance of tanks has improved sufficiently to enable them to accompany protective cavalry, there is little doubt that they will be employed to give the horsemen fire support in an ideal form.

When protective troops have done their work and the armies meet in battle, a commander needs a weapon of opportunity, with which to take immediate advantage of any openings that may offer themselves. In the past this has been the work of cavalry with horse artillery; in 1918 the tank took part in this exploitation, and the faster tank of the future will take a greater part. But what will happen to the cavalry?

The campaigns of 1918 in Palestine and Mesopotamia show that cavalry, as good as our own, are not stopped by rifle and machine gun fire, provided that there is no wire. In Flanders, particularly east of Arras in the offensive of April, 1917, we had examples of the desperate situation of squadrons held up by wire under machine gun fire. In the future they must meet a new enemy, the tank, and fast tanks among unprotected cavalry would be as wolves among sheep. Mounted men, moreover, have not the facilities of infantry for local anti-aircraft defense; and apart from the actual casualties, no amount of schooling would break horses to bombing. These difficulties are great; but the value of cavalry at the right place and right time, and their effect on shaken infantry, do not diminish. No commander will ever have as many tanks as he wants, and if cavalry can be protected from the dangers of wire, tanks and bombing, there will still be work for them in battle. Wire is easiest cleared by tanks, and the latter, in conjunction with anti-tank guns, will be the best antidote against enemy tanks. The development of a cavalry anti-

*See "Forty Days in 1914" by Sir Frederick Maurice.

tank gun, to accompany the squadrons, seems essential. The best protection against aircraft will be found in the open formations evolved in the attacks on entrenched infantry in Palestine, combined with Lewis guns in the accompanying tanks. Probably all these methods will be tried in the next European war. If successful, no commander will consent to be without cavalry; if ultimately the machine prevails over the horse, it will not prevail over the rider, and the same bold spirit will find its outlet in the same act of swift and decisive exploitation, whatever the agency employed.

(b) Artillery and gas.

Science applied to gunnery will increase the newly-found power of opening sudden and accurate fire on a target, without the warning that is given by previous registration. The cross-country tractor will make medium and heavy pieces more mobile. This will render it more easy to give continuous support to advancing infantry and tanks, a support which was hampered in the past by delays in moving forward the guns.

But it is gas that will, if used at all, add most to the power of artillery fire.* Only a small percentage of gas casualties was fatal in the last war; but the chemists promise to change all that, and we are assured that it will be merely a question of putting down a lethal or a non-lethal concentration at will. Although a concentration, to be lethal, must be of some intensity, yet a very slight taint of some gasses is enough to disable. We can picture the effect of gas-proof tanks, operating in a part of the enemy's position that has been so drenched with gas that its occupants are either totally incapacitated, or partially so, through having to fight in masks. The only effective reply would be the tanks of the defense.

A wood or valley filled with gas can be denied to the enemy for a period that will depend on the persistency of the gas used. Masks may protect, and will improve in effectiveness as gas grows in deadliness, but all the tendencies of the future make for a war of movement and maneuver; and in such conditions a man wearing a mask loses half his fighting value. Discipline and training can reduce this disablement; but it must always

*The use of gas is banned between those nations that subscribed to the Washington Convention; but see the section on Restriction Conventions above.

be great. We may expect, then, that artillery fire with non-lethal concentrations will be applied to direct the enemy's movements into certain definite channels, which will come under high explosive, shrapnel, or lethal gas shell. Such surprises as that successfully effected by the 9th Division at Meteren on July 19th, 1918, will be common. In the words of Sir Douglas Haig's despatch, "For some time prior to this attack gas was discharged, in conjunction with a smoke and high explosive shell bombardment. When at 7:55 AM on the 19th of July our infantry advanced behind a barrage of smoke and high explosive the enemy was expecting only a gas discharge, and had in many cases put on gas masks."

A short reference must be made to smoke, of which such extensive use was made in 1918. Its chief function is to conceal movement and to neutralize air attacks, and its extended use will be one of the many factors which will make for a war of movement rather than of fixed opposing trench lines, in the future.

Although tanks, in clearing wire and affording close support to infantry, carry out what was formerly the role of artillery alone, yet they need artillery support themselves to enable them to advance in face of the enemy's guns; their use will render unnecessary the long-drawn-out destructive bombardments that had to precede the attacks of 1916 and 1917, but it will not reduce the number of guns required for the attack itself. This is made clear in Sir Douglas Haig's final despatch, in which he says that, in spite of the 456* tanks available on August 8th, the *expenditure of ammunition was greater than in any previous battle.*

(c) Aircraft.

The fortunes of the armies in battle will depend more even than in 1918 on the success of their aircraft, scouting, observing, engaging troops on the ground, and driving down enemy machines engaged on the same work. If he is supreme in the air, a commander will be armed with that greatest weapon of all—surprise. He will be able to move troops, particularly tanks, unseen, while the enemy's movements are under observation. The tasks of aircraft working directly with the army will

*This figure is taken from Sir Archibald Montgomery's "Story of the Fourth Army."

resemble those of 1918, with the exception that the engagement of all troops on the ground will be on a much greater scale. The army will see and appreciate the work of the aircraft allotted to it, but the success of this work itself is deeply influenced by the unceasing struggle for supremacy sustained by the main air force, from the first hour of the war, against the enemy's air power. Of this struggle the soldiers will see little, though if it is successful the army will benefit immeasurably in the growing weakness of the opposing aircraft, and the moral effect on the enemy of air reverses at home.

(d) Mechanical transport, engineers, and signal communications.

With the perfection of the cross-country track vehicle, mechanical transport will become less dependent on metalled roads, though these will always be of great importance. The movement of armies in a country where roads have been destroyed or never existed is limited by the rate at which the troops can be supplied, and in the past this has been ruled largely by the difficulty of making or repairing roads. With cross-country transport instances of a victorious army robbed of the fruit of success by outrunning its supplies are less likely to occur. The new feature will facilitate maneuver in every respect; transport will be able to move across country, closed up on its front in parallel columns; and the problems of congested roads, crossing columns and movements to a flank will lose half their terrors. For work on the lines of communication, however, the great carrying capacity of railways will make them as indispensable in the future, for large forces, as they are today.

In most cases where the horse still holds his own, such as with light artillery, mechanical transport will probably take over the work when it is sufficiently developed. The reason lies chiefly in the greater ease of supply, since horses consume a greater weight in forage than the equivalent machines do in petrol, and horses, it must be remembered, must be fed whether working or idle. The great quantity of forage absorbs precious transport and is a direct drain on the nation's food supply. In addition, mechanical transport employs at the front fewer men than are needed for the number of horses required for the same work.

The growth of applied science in war will make ever greater demands on the field engineers, and three problems in particular will come to the front. In the first place, the mobility of cross-country mechanical transport will be wasted if the columns, moving abreast over the land, must check and concentrate on existing road bridges when they come to a river. The first problem for the engineers will be the rapid construction of bridges for tanks and track vehicles. In the second place the construction of some form of tank obstacle will be required to oppose tanks in the same way that wire now opposes infantry—that is, by shepherding them into previously prepared zones of fire. The third task, and perhaps the greatest of all, will be the concealment of troops and works from air observation.

As war becomes more elaborate, commanders become more dependent on signal communications. Between 1914 and 1918 there grew up behind the lines in France and Flanders a vast telephone system, which commanders and staff came to regard as indispensable until they had to leave it behind in the advance of 1918. No army is likely to enjoy such a system in future; their own movements and the enemy's bombs will combine to prevent its growth.

A commander must be in communication with both his chiefs and his subordinates; this has kept him to the neighborhood of telegraph and telephone routes, and the number of these that can be made available in moving warfare is limited. In future the need for communications will not be less; but commanders who are in other respects more free to maneuver than they have been in the past will not be content to be tied to a wire. Something more flexible will be demanded, and wireless communication at once suggests itself. The dangers of overhearing by the enemy and of mutual interference between wireless stations have still to be overcome.

A.M.

MILITARY TRAINING TODAY

By Captain H. Meredith Logan. The Royal Canadian Regiment. 19 pages.—*The Army Quarterly* (British), April, 1923, p. 58.

In the complete article, the author advances the views that national interests should be guarded by professional

soldiers; and that " there is a natural tendency in every age to consider the lessons of the past as out of date, taking the most recent experience as the only guide to follow, without pausing to weigh the special conditions which may have exercised an influence. . . . Every war has its special local conditions; and deductions hurriedly drawn, without due allowance for these conditions, are generally exaggerated, if not altogether wrong."

As regards military training, the author states that the importance of the officer in the training of his men has become more apparent. The best results today are obtained only where the officer takes a full share in, and complete supervision of, the training of the men whom he will lead in war. In proportion to the knowledge of the military profession which an officer demonstrates as an instructor, will be the confidence which his men have in him. For the officer who is unable, successfully, to accomplish his mission of instruction, a modern army can find no justifiable place. Training must be up to date, and this implies continued study by the instructor. The officer whose keenness flags is asleep at his post, and, normally, is just as guilty as a sentry in that condition. An officer who neglects his work, who fails in the duty of training his men, where pleasure takes first place, whose other interests supersede his work with his command, is a swindle on the public and a living disgrace to the uniform. There must be fidelity to duty as much in peace as in war, for it is during the days of peace that the only real preparation for battle can take place.

The training of, and the knowledge to be possessed by, the noncommissioned officer is just as important.

The training of a unit should not be undertaken by specialists. They train the trainer, and that should be the extent of their task. Specialists not only unbalance the instruction, but they tend to produce the evils which prevailed during the days of long service.

In conducting training, special attention should be paid to psychological principles. The development of those properties of mind and spirit essential to military training are more important by far, than the production of Herculean physical strength and endurance. The greatest attention

should be directed towards the mind of the recruit for, while physical development becomes a routine, mental expansion is a study peculiar to each individual concerned.

Although the primary object of the educational training of a soldier is the preparation for war, when he is returned to civil life he is far better trained for his new tasks than ever before. His mind will be developed, his physique improved, his initiative strengthened, and with his self-discipline he will be a vast asset in the national life.

In conclusion, the author states that "the profession of arms must not stand apart from the stream of current thought and every day life. The soldier should not be divorced from the civilian. The soldier should not be a foreigner to any of the general interests of the State. The soldier and the civilian have the same interests at stake. Both are of one soil; to both the flag is the symbol of home."

A.M.

EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARMY CORPS

Extracted from a French article by Colonel Nuyton.—*Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, February, 1923, p. 137. Translated at the General Service Schools. Instructor's File No. 1200CC.

The author undertakes to illustrate how the instructions laid down by Napoleon for the employment of army corps should form the basis to define the role of a Belgian army corps.

Historical examples from the World War and from the Napoleonic wars are quoted to show where the violation of certain well known Napoleonic principles has led to disaster. Emphasis is laid on the principle that division commanders should not undertake semi-independent operations that are not in consonance with the mission of the army corps, of which they are a part.

The principle of keeping concentrated the divisions of a corps requires that any division of the corps be supported within one or two hours, depending upon whether or not the division has an offensive or defensive mission. The author comes to the following conclusions:

a. When first line divisions are moved for a decisive attack, an army corps commander should have one or more second line divisions at approximately five kilometers (three

miles) in rear of the main bodies of the first line divisions, ready to be engaged.

b. As soon as contact is probable, the divisions of an army corps should be so disposed that they can support after two hours the leading security elements.

c. An army corps of three divisions (one division being held in second line) should not occupy a greater front than ten kilometers (six miles). For decisive attack, this frontage should be reduced to six kilometers (3.6 miles).

d. The principle of concentration of the units of an army corps is observed if they are distributed to a depth of approximately twenty kilometers (twelve miles).

The commander of a detached army corps is responsible not only for the execution of an operation, as in the case of a commander of a corps, which is part of an army, but also for the conception of the operation.

The essential strategical problem to be solved by such a commander consists in determining the value of the hostile forces and to come to a decision as to the line of action to be observed, bearing in mind that the means at his disposal are limited.

(Digester's Note:—In this study, the strength of the army corps is approximately 30,000 men).

A.M

FEBRUARY, 1923. AN INFANTRY DIVISION AS PART OF A CORPS IN DEFENSE

Map problem.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, February, 1923, p. 280.

The first of a series of tactical problems to be published in the *Revue d'Infanterie*. This problem deals with an infantry division in a defensive situation in which an active defense by the army of which it forms a part is contemplated, but in which the division itself, apparently, has a passive defense mission.

The problem is divided into a general and a special situation as is customary in our problems. One point to be noticed in regard to the general situation is its brevity and simplicity. No attempt is made to picture any involved operation.

The special situation is presented in considerable detail as far as the 100th Division is concerned, but the information

of the enemy is much less detailed than that usually given in our problems.

The disposition of the artillery, in this situation where the division is advancing with a prospect of meeting the enemy in a short time, is interesting as it differs radically from our ideas. Each of the leading infantry regiments is supported by a group of 75's, comprising 12 guns. The artillery marches with the infantry. The remainder of the artillery, that is, two battalions of 75's and two battalions of 155 howitzers moves by bounds ready to go into action in the minimum of time.

The I Corps order, on which the action of the 100th Division is to be based, gives the general line to be reached and occupied by the first line divisions, and gives definitely the intentions of the army commander: "To wait the attack of the enemy on this line, check him, and then assume the offensive toward the northeast."

This expression of the army commander's intentions is undoubtedly an extract from the army order and serves to inform the corps commander not only of the location of the area to be defended, but answers for him the question "How will the defense be conducted?" the answer to which is "As an active defense, ready to assume the offensive when conditions warrant."

The corps order also gives more definite locations for the battle and outpost positions.

The requirements call for the orders issued by the commander of the 100th Division to carry out the orders of the I Corps.

The first order, issued verbally at 9:30 AM, is one for the concentration of the division in the vicinity of the position to be organized. The order for the organization and occupation of the position is not issued until 2:00 PM.

The principal points to be noted with regard to the first order are the missions assigned the cavalry and the advance guard, and the handling of the artillery, which in this case, also, is different from our practice.

The advance guard is placed in a position from which it can cover the occupation of the battle position by the main body of the division. This position later is occupied by the outposts. The squadron of cavalry is still farther to the front,

observing the enemy and covering the occupation of the position.

The order provides for the concentration of the main body in concealed positions in rear of the battle position and for artillery support for the advance guards.

The next action of the division commander is to make a rapid reconnaissance of the position selected. He then issues the order for the occupation, organization and defense of the position. This order, which provides for what we would call a shallow zone defense, is similar to our defensive orders.

The division prescribes in some detail the location of the outpost lines of observation and resistance, the location of the main line of resistance, but does not, as is the case in our orders, fix the location of the regimental reserve line.

The instructions for the conduct of the defense of the outpost are given in considerable detail. It will be noted that the outpost is ordered to retire in case of a general attack except at one point, Rouvres, which is ordered held to the last and is organized with that object in view.

This action is taken because of the fact that Rouvres covers a likely line of approach for the enemy attacking the battle position.

The front held by the division is approximately 5,000 meters, two infantry regiments and a battalion of the third regiment or a total of seven battalions are assigned to the outpost and battle positions. Comparing this with our table of frontages for the division, it is seen that the frontage held by the 100th Division is about the same as that for a division holding a shallow zone in passive defense.

E.A.M.

REVIEW OF NEW BOOKS

A HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

By John Buchan, 4 volumes. (Houghton, Mifflin Co., New York.)
Library No. 940.9.

This work covers the whole period of the war from 1914 to 1918. It includes a complete discussion of the political, economic, and military conditions of the principal European

observing the enemy and covering the occupation of the position.

The order provides for the concentration of the main body in concealed positions in rear of the battle position and for artillery support for the advance guards.

The next action of the division commander is to make a rapid reconnaissance of the position selected. He then issues the order for the occupation, organization and defense of the position. This order, which provides for what we would call a shallow zone defense, is similar to our defensive orders.

The division prescribes in some detail the location of the outpost lines of observation and resistance, the location of the main line of resistance, but does not, as is the case in our orders, fix the location of the regimental reserve line.

The instructions for the conduct of the defense of the outpost are given in considerable detail. It will be noted that the outpost is ordered to retire in case of a general attack except at one point, Rouvres, which is ordered held to the last and is organized with that object in view.

This action is taken because of the fact that Rouvres covers a likely line of approach for the enemy attacking the battle position.

The front held by the division is approximately 5,000 meters, two infantry regiments and a battalion of the third regiment or a total of seven battalions are assigned to the outpost and battle positions. Comparing this with our table of frontages for the division, it is seen that the frontage held by the 100th Division is about the same as that for a division holding a shallow zone in passive defense.

E.A.M.

REVIEW OF NEW BOOKS

A HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

By John Buchan, 4 volumes. (Houghton, Mifflin Co., New York.)
Library No. 940.9.

This work covers the whole period of the war from 1914 to 1918. It includes a complete discussion of the political, economic, and military conditions of the principal European

nations during the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war and a discussion of the causes immediate and remote which led to the conflict.

A work covering so long a period in a comparatively small space must of necessity treat the subject in a general way only: It cannot be considered as a critical history of the events of which it treats.

Its value consists in the fact that it is a narrative in which the causes which brought about the principal operations and the political and economic conditions at various periods during the war are fully discussed.

The style is pleasing which helps to make the book suitable for general reading.

As in most histories, the maps are not of any great value. They contain numerous errors due probably to the process of reproduction.

E.A.M.

HISTORY OF A RAID BY A CAVALRY DIVISION (FRENCH) DURING THE WORLD WAR.

By Count Doria. 154 pages, French Text.—(*Librairie Plon*, Paris, 1922.) Library No. 940.9.

An account of the operations of the raid of the 5th French Cavalry Division which was detached from Sordet's Cavalry Corps. The division was composed of three incomplete cavalry brigades, approximate strength 1,600 men, 3 batteries of artillery, and one cyclist group. Only the combat trains accompanied the command. From September 8 to 10, 1914, it covered 60 kilometers, about 25 kilometers in rear of the German lines. During this period, it fought several engagements; detachments attacked German convoys; and the retreating German right wing of von Kluck's Army was threatened. The narrative is amplified by extracts from German reports and articles written since the close of the war, and by statements from persons who were in the theater of war during the operations.

The movements of the division and of some of the raiding detachments can be followed on a map accompanying the book.

A.M.

THE I ARMY CORPS (FRENCH) DURING THE WAR 1914-1918

Compiled by the Corps Staff. French Text, 338 pages. Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1922. Library No. 940.9.

A diary of the movements and operations of the I Army Corps from the date of its mobilization, 2 August 1914, until 22 December 1918, when it became a part of the French Army of Occupation in the Rhine.

A reading of the different chapters shows that the I Corps took a prominent part in the following operations: battle of Charleroi; first battle of the Marne; battles of Champagne; battle of Verdun; battle of the Somme; second battle of the Aisne; second battle of Flanders; second battle of the Marne; and the advance toward the Hindenburg Line. On October 4, the corps was transferred to the Vosges sector, where it had as one of its elements the 6th U. S. Division.

There is appended an interesting tabular statement showing: dates of changes in the composition of the corps; infantry divisions assigned to it; army under which it operated; and operations in which the corps participated.

A.M.

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED IN INSTRUCTORS' FILE ROOM

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE

COMMAND COURSE

Instructors' File No.

- The Art of Command.* Lectures delivered at the A.W.C. by Maj. Gen. E. F. McGlachlin, Jr. Command Course No. 19 P.H. 138-B-19
- Problem No. 3, Blue.* Directions for the Concentration—General distribution of the forces in the Theater of Operations. Command Course No. 13 P.H. 138-B-13
- Problem No. 3, Blue.* Appendix A, Blue. Order of Battle of the French Armies in Aug., 1914. Order of Battle of the Belgian Army in Aug., 1914. French Supply in 1914. Command Course No. 14 P.H. 138-B-14
- Problem No. 3, Red.* The German Plan—Concentration Schedule of Forces. Command Course No. 15 P.H. 138-B-15
- Problem No. 3, Red.* Appendix B, Red. Order of Battle of the German Armies. German Supply, 1914. Command Course No. 16 P.H. 138-B-16

April-June, 1923

- Ludendorff's Strategy.* By LeCompte (Cont'd). (Translation at G. S. S. of an article in the *Revue Militaire Suisse*, April, 1923, pp. 145-152) 1800-E
- Employment of an Army Corps.* By Col. P. Nuyten. (Translation at the G. S. S. of an article in the *Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Feb., 1923, pp. 137-154) 1200-CC
- Light Tanks (IV).* By Col. A. E. M. Poulin. Operation of Tanks after their Detrainment. (Regulation of March 11, 1920.) (Translation at the G. S. S. of an article in the *Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, March, 1923, pp. 275-283.) 1320-S

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED IN THE LIBRARY

THE ART OF WAR 23 CENTURIES AGO

By General Boucher. 216 pages, French Text. (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1923.) Library No. 940.9.

BRIEF DRAWING

By R. C. Ringwalt, A. B. LL. B. 214 pages. (Logmans, Green & Co., New York.) Library No. 340.

NAVAL OPERATIONS (TO THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS)

By Sir Julian S. Corbett. 2 Volumes (Text and Maps). 882 pages. (Logmans, Green & Co., London.) Library No. 940.9.

WAR AND ARMAMENT EXPENDITURES OF JAPAN

By Giichi Ono. 307 pages. (Oxford University Press.) Library No. 952.

MILITARY INDUSTRIES OF JAPAN

By Ushisaburo Kobayashi. 262 pages. (Oxford University Press.) Library No. 952.

HAND BOOK FOR THE MINENWERFER

By Lieut. Bierman. 112 pages. (Berlin, 1922.) Library No. 358.

NIGHT FIGHTING AND NIGHT FIRING

By Balck. 296 pages. (Berlin, 1910.) Library No. 355.62.

MY PERIOD OF SERVICE FROM 1906 TO 1918

By Field Marshal Conrad. 675 pages. (Rikola Verlag, Berlin, 1921.) Library No. 293.

MODERN HOLLAND

By Jhr. Jan Feith. 280 pages. (Nijgh & Van Ditmar's Pub. Co., Rotterdam.) Library No. 949.2.

THE I ARMY CORPS (FRENCH) DURING THE WAR 1914-1918

French Text, 339 pages. (Berger-Levrault, Paris.) Library No. 940.9.

HISTORY OF A RAID BY A CAVALRY DIVISION DURING THE WORLD WAR

By A. Doria, 154 pages. (Plon-Nourrit & Co., Paris.) Library No. 940.9.

MAGAZINES RECEIVED IN THE LIBRARY

NOTE:—The following is a list of periodicals received currently in the Library:

Weeklies:

Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette (English).
Army and Navy Journal.
Army and Navy Register.
Engineering News-Record.
Literary Digest.
L'Illustration (French).
London Illustrated News (English).
Militar Wochenblatt (German).
Outlook.
Saturday Evening Post.

Semi-Monthlies:

Arms and The Man.
Canadian Military Gazette.
Revue de Paris (French).
Revue des Deux Mondes (French).

Monthlies:

Archives de la Grande Guerre (French).
Bulletin of the Pan-American Union.
Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires (French).
Coast Artillery Journal.
Chemical Warfare.
Current History.
Geographical Review.
Infantry Journal.
International Book Review.
Memorial de Infanteria (Spanish).
Memorial de Artilleria (Spanish).
Military Surgeon.
Monthly Information Bulletin, Naval Intelligence.
National Geographic.

MODERN HOLLAND

By Jhr. Jan Feith. 280 pages. (Nijgh & Van Ditmar's Pub. Co., Rotterdam.) Library No. 949.2.

THE I ARMY CORPS (FRENCH) DURING THE WAR 1914-1918

French Text, 339 pages. (Berger-Levrault, Paris.) Library No. 940.9.

HISTORY OF A RAID BY A CAVALRY DIVISION DURING THE WORLD WAR

By A. Doria, 154 pages. (Plon-Nourrit & Co., Paris.) Library No. 940.9.

MAGAZINES RECEIVED IN THE LIBRARY

NOTE:—The following is a list of periodicals received currently in the Library:

Weeklies:

Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette (English).
Army and Navy Journal.
Army and Navy Register.
Engineering News-Record.
Literary Digest.
L'Illustration (French).
London Illustrated News (English).
Militar Wochenblatt (German).
Outlook.
Saturday Evening Post.

Semi-Monthlies:

Arms and The Man.
Canadian Military Gazette.
Revue de Paris (French).
Revue des Deux Mondes (French).

Monthlies:

Archives de la Grande Guerre (French).
Bulletin of the Pan-American Union.
Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires (French).
Coast Artillery Journal.
Chemical Warfare.
Current History.
Geographical Review.
Infantry Journal.
International Book Review.
Memorial de Infanteria (Spanish).
Memorial de Artilleria (Spanish).
Military Surgeon.
Monthly Information Bulletin, Naval Intelligence.
National Geographic.

North American Review.
Review of Reviews.
Revue d'Infanterie (French).
Revue d'Artillerie (French).
Revue Militaire Generale (French).
Revue Militaire Francaise (French).
Revue Militaire Suisse (French).
Royal Artillery Journal (English).
Scientific American.
Tank Corps Journal (English).
The Bookman.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
World's Work.
Boletin del Ejercito (Spanish).

Bi-Monthlies:

Army Ordnance.
Field Artillery Journal.
Military Engineer.
Revue de Cavalerie (French).
Quartermaster Review.

Quarterlies:

American Journal of International Law.
American Historical Review.
Army Quarterly (English).
Cavalry Journal (U.S.).
Cavalry Journal (English).
Journal of American History.
Marine Corps Journal.
Royal Engineers Journal (English).
Royal United Service Institute (English).
Yale Review.

IMPORTANT ARTICLES OF MILITARY INTEREST
THAT HAVE APPEARED IN MAGAZINES

UNITED STATES

Army Ordnance. May-June, 1923: A Review of Small Arms Development; The U. S. Aircraft Machine Gun.

Cavalry Journal. April, 1923: Modern Cavalry and Fast Moving Composite Units; The Experiences of the First American Troop of Cavalry to get into Action in the World War; How Cavalry Exploits a Victory; With the German Cavalry Advance in 1914; The Fourth Austrian Cavalry Division in the Fight at Volchkovtsy,

North American Review.
Review of Reviews.
Revue d'Infanterie (French).
Revue d'Artillerie (French).
Revue Militaire Generale (French).
Revue Militaire Francaise (French).
Revue Militaire Suisse (French).
Royal Artillery Journal (English).
Scientific American.
Tank Corps Journal (English).
The Bookman.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
World's Work.
Boletin del Ejercito (Spanish).

Bi-Monthlies:

Army Ordnance.
Field Artillery Journal.
Military Engineer.
Revue de Cavalerie (French).
Quartermaster Review.

Quarterlies:

American Journal of International Law.
American Historical Review.
Army Quarterly (English).
Cavalry Journal (U.S.).
Cavalry Journal (English).
Journal of American History.
Marine Corps Journal.
Royal Engineers Journal (English).
Royal United Service Institute (English).
Yale Review.

IMPORTANT ARTICLES OF MILITARY INTEREST THAT HAVE APPEARED IN MAGAZINES

UNITED STATES

Army Ordnance. May-June, 1923: A Review of Small Arms Development; The U. S. Aircraft Machine Gun.

Cavalry Journal. April, 1923: Modern Cavalry and Fast Moving Composite Units; The Experiences of the First American Troop of Cavalry to get into Action in the World War; How Cavalry Exploits a Victory; With the German Cavalry Advance in 1914; The Fourth Austrian Cavalry Division in the Fight at Volchkovtsy,

August 21, 1914; Training of National Guard Cavalry; The Employment of Chemical Agents and the Cavalry Service.

Coast Artillery Journal. April, 1923: Doctrine and Command; Our Military Policy Regarding the Training of Citizens.

May, 1923: Military Reasons for Paying for Supplies in the Enemy's Country; The Tactical Employment of Anti-Aircraft Machine Guns; Recent Developments in Anti-Aircraft Materiel; Notes on Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun Fire.

June, 1923: Heavy Tractor Artillery in its Relation to Coast Defenses; The Dardanellès Expedition (War College Study).

Field Artillery Journal. March-April, 1923: The Influence of Radio Communications on Conduct of Fire; A Field Artillery Group in the General Advance; The German Ammunition Problem in 1914; The Comparative Study of Military Organization; Thoughts on Artillery Tactics in Future Wars; The Infantry Battery and its Development.

Infantry Journal. April, 1923: The Principles of War (concluded).

May, 1923: Efficiency Reports; The Army in Alaska; Junior Citizenship Training; Allied Reaction to German Drive of March 21, 1918.

June, 1923: Classification of Officers; The Nivelles Attack.

Information Bulletin, Naval Intelligence. May, 1923: Military situation in China.

June, 1923: Japan, a survey of the General Situation; China, Japanese Activities; The Balkans, the Present Situation.

Marine Corps Gazette. March, 1923: Athletics as Publicity; A brief History of the U. S. Marine Corps.

Quartermaster Review. March-April, 1923: The "One-Army" idea; Moving Mounted troops.

May-June, 1923: Factors in National Strength; The Quartermaster Supply Officer of a General Intermediate Depot.

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. May, 1923: Japan: A Sequel to the Washington Conference.

June, 1923: Lessons from Naval Maneuvers off Panama Canal.

BELGIUM

Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires. March, 1923: Operations of the Belgian Army during the War of 1914-1918 (Oct. 2) (continuation); Notes on the Employment of Artillery during Combat; Strategical and Tactical Considerations of a War (to be continued); German Plan of Campaign—French Plan of Campaign.

April, 1923: Operations of the Belgian Army during the War of 1914-1918 (Oct. 3) (to be continued); Strategical and Tactical Considerations of a War (concluded); Cavalry during the World War; Light Tanks; Artillery Liaison Detachments.

ENGLAND

Army Quarterly. January, 1923: The Battle of Warsaw, August, 1920; The British Campaign in the West, August-November, 1918; An Administrative Side Show; The Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

April, 1923: A German Account of the British Offensive of August, 1918; An Aspect of Anti-Aircraft Defense; The British Campaign in the West, August-November, 1918 (concluded); Military Training Today; Tank Minor Tactics.

Cavalry Journal. April, 1923: The Advance on Mosul, October, 1918; Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (continuation).

Journal of the Royal Artillery. April, 1923: The French Plan of Concentration and the Collapse of August, 1914.

May, 1923: The French Plan of Concentration and the Collapse of August, 1914 (concluded); Early Base Work in France; German Military Training.

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. May, 1923: The Strategy of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918; Policy and Strategy; Battles of the Yser; Orders (Operation).

Tank Corps Journal. February, 1923: Cairo to Bagdad—Armoured Car (continued from December, 1922 number).
March, 1923: Cairo to Bagdad—Armoured Car (to be continued); Tanks—Changes in Tactics due to Advent of Fast Light Tanks.

FRANCE

Revue d'Artillerie. March, 1923: Employment of Divisional Artillery (Historical Example, 1914) (continued in April number).

April, 1923: Employment of Divisional Artillery (Historical Example, 1914) (to be continued).

Revue de Cavalerie. March-April, 1923: General and Special Situations of Maneuvers in France of Cavalry Corps and Cavalry Divisions (to be continued); 1st Cavalry Corps (French) during the German Offensive of May, 1918; Cavalry Operation on the Eastern Front during 1920.

May-June, 1923: Cavalry and Aviation; A Mobilized Cavalry Division and Lessons from the World War.

Revue d'Infanterie. March, 1923: Cooperation between Infantry and Artillery during Offensive Combat; Italian Infantry Drill Regulations; Attack of the 48th Division (French) in Champagne; Offensive Situation (Illustrative Problem).

April, 1923: Infantry Combat (Infantry, Cavalry and Air Service); Cooperation between Infantry and Artillery during Offensive Combat (concluded); Italian Infantry Regulations (concluded).

May, 1923: Organization of the Ground (Evolution during the World War) (to be continued); The Defense (According to the new German Regulations) (to be continued); Tanks—Historical Examples of their Employment during the World War.

Revue Militaire Francaise. April, 1923: Raids—Historical Example during the World War; Role and Employment of Railroad Artillery (concluded); High Command during the Crimean War (concluded); Second Bureau, Sixth (French) Army in Active Operations. ■

May, 1923: The Initial Operations of the Russian Army in 1914; Second Bureau, Sixth (French) Army in Active Operations; Defense of a Modern Fort (Fort Vaux, 1916); Day Bombardment (Aviation).

June, 1923: Initial Operations of the Russian Army in 1914 (concluded); Defense of a Modern Fort (Fort Vaux, 1916) (concluded); Attack and Defense of a Coast; Supply, Transportation, and Circulation; Technical Services of Military Aviation.

Revue Militaire Generale. March, 1923: Role of the French High Command from the Economic Viewpoint during the World War (continued from the September, 1922, number).

April, 1923: Role of the French High Command from the Economic Viewpoint during the World War (to be continued); Rupture of the Bulgarian (Dobro-Pole) Front; Strategy and Allied Operations during the World War (Northern Sector) (continued from January, 1923, number).

May, 1923: Role of the French High Command from the Economic Viewpoint during the World War (concluded); Strategy and Allied Operations during the World War (Northern Sector).

Revue de Paris. May 1, 1923: Discipline.

GERMANY

Militar-Wochenblatt. March 1, 1923: Artillery Firing with or without Observation; Mass Attacks of Russian Cavalry against German Infantry.

March 15, 1923: German Tanks in the World War.

SPAIN

Memorial de Artilleria. March, 1923: Some Gases used during the World War.

SWITZERLAND

Revue Militaire Suisse: March, 1923: The Strategy of Ludendorff.

April, 1923: The Strategy of Ludendorff (concluded); Liaison between Infantry and Artillery.

May, 1923: Operations of Sordert's Cavalry Corps in Belgium, August 6 to 15, 1914; Aviation and Chemical Warfare; Infantry Battalion Intelligence Service.

MISCELLANEOUS

- American Journal of International Law.* April, 1923: Russia in the Far East.
- Current History.* May, 1923: The Size of the Confederate Army; Oversea Britons' New Place in Empire's Councils; China, Ill-Governed and Bankrupt, yet Prosperous; Japan's Civilizing Mission in Manchuria.
- Literary Digest.* May 12, 1923: Claspings Hands with Mexico; A Mexican Authority on Mexico; Were Half Our Soldiers Killed Unnecessarily in the World War?; Sudden Death in the Army Air Service.
- North American Review.* June, 1923: The United States and the New Turkey.
- The Outlook.* May 23, 1923: Can we Expect a Stable Government for all China?
- The Annals.* May, 1923: Social and Economic Conditions in the Dominion of Canada.

INDEX TO SELECTED MAGAZINE ARTICLES,
DOCUMENTS AND BOOKS

AIR SERVICE

See also under *Infantry (Tactics and Technique)*; *Aviation*.

SUDDEN DEATH IN THE ARMY AIR SERVICE. 4½ cols.—*Literary Digest*, May 12, 1923, p. 67.

Coast Defense

OFFICIAL REPORT ON JOINT AIR AND COAST ARTILLERY DEFENSE. 2 cols.—*A. & N. Jour.*, May 5, 1923, p. 861.

Tactics

AIR SERVICE. Dept. of Tactics. The Cavalry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-42.

May, 1923: Operations of Sordert's Cavalry Corps in Belgium, August 6 to 15, 1914; Aviation and Chemical Warfare; Infantry Battalion Intelligence Service.

MISCELLANEOUS

American Journal of International Law. April, 1923: Russia in the Far East.

Current History. May, 1923: The Size of the Confederate Army; Oversea Britons' New Place in Empire's Councils; China, Ill-Governed and Bankrupt, yet Prosperous; Japan's Civilizing Mission in Manchuria.

Literary Digest. May 12, 1923: Claspings Hands with Mexico; A Mexican Authority on Mexico; Were Half Our Soldiers Killed Unnecessarily in the World War?; Sudden Death in the Army Air Service.

North American Review. June, 1923: The United States and the New Turkey.

The Outlook. May 23, 1923: Can we Expect a Stable Government for all China?

The Annals. May, 1923: Social and Economic Conditions in the Dominion of Canada.

INDEX TO SELECTED MAGAZINE ARTICLES,
DOCUMENTS AND BOOKS

AIR SERVICE

See also under *Infantry (Tactics and Technique)*; *Aviation*.

SUDDEN DEATH IN THE ARMY AIR SERVICE. 4½ cols.—*Literary Digest*, May 12, 1923, p. 67.

Coast Defense

OFFICIAL REPORT ON JOINT AIR AND COAST ARTILLERY DEFENSE. 2 cols.—*A. & N. Jour.*, May 5, 1923, p. 861.

Tactics

AIR SERVICE. Dept. of Tactics. The Cavalry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-42.

ALASKA

See also under *Regular Army (Alaska)*.

AMMUNITION

See also under *World War (Ammunition)*.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT

See also under *Machine Guns (Anti-Aircraft)*.

AN ASPECT OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE. 9 pages.—*Army & N. Jour.*, 1923, p. 27.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-AIRCRAFT MATERIEL. 29 pages. By Capt. A. Bradshaw, Jr., C.A.C.—*Coast Arty. Jour.*, May, 1923, p. 424.

APPLIED TACTICS

OFFENSIVE SITUATION (ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM). French Text, 11 pages.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, Mar., 1923, p. 429.

ARMORED CARS

CAIRO TO BAGDAD (Being a record of the experiences of an Armored Car Section). By Lieut. H. M. E. Bradshaw, M.C.—*Tank Corps Jour.* (British), Dec., 1922, p. 212, Feb., 1923, p. 273, and Mar., 1923, p. 301 (to be continued).

ARMY OFFICERS

See also under *Efficiency Reports*.

ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF RATING ARMY OFFICERS. 5 cols.—*A. & N. Jour.*, May 19, 1923, p. 909, and May 26, 1923, p. 934.

EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR ARMY OFFICERS. 2 cols.—*A. & N. Reg.*, Apr. 21, 1923, p. 363, and *A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 21, 1923, p. 821.

Classification

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFICERS. 8 pages. By Lieut. Col. Ralph McCoy. —*Inf. Jour.*, June, 1923, p. 627.

ARMY OF THE U. S.

See also under *Regular Army*.

DEVELOPING THE ONE-ARMY IDEA. 1 col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, May 5, 1923, p. 872.

THE "ONE-ARMY" IDEA. 3 pages. By Brig. Gen. J. McA. Palmer.—*Q. M. Review*, Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 11.

ART OF WAR

THE ART OF WAR 23 CENTURIES AGO. By General Boucher. 216 pages. French Text. (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1923.) Library No. 940.9.

ARTILLERY

HEAVY TRACTOR ARTILLERY IN ITS RELATION TO COAST DEFENSES. 9 pages. By G. R. Meyer.—*Coast Arty. Jour.*, June, 1923, p. 524.

ARTILLERY FIRING WITH OR WITHOUT OBSERVATION. 2 cols. German Text.—*Militar-Wochenblatt*, Mar. 1, 1923, p. 561. (See also Jan. 15, 1923 number.)

Tactics

- SERVICE FIRING—BATTALION 75-MM. GUNS IN ADVANCE GUARD OF DIVISION.—Field Exercise No. 1. Dept. of Tactics, F.A. School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 142-31.
- SERVICE FIRING—BATTALION OF 155-MM. HOWITZERS AS PART OF A REGIMENT ATTACHED TO A DIVISION OPERATING ON THE OFFENSIVE. Field Exercise No. 3. Dept. of Tactics, F.A. School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 142-33.
- SERVICE FIRING—BATTALION OF 75'S IN A REAR GUARD ACTION. Field Exercise No. 5. Dept. of Tactics, F.A. School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 142-34.
- SERVICE FIRING—BATTALION OF 75-MM. GUNS IN ADVANCE GUARD OF DIVISION. Field Exercise No. 7. Dept. of Tactics, F.A. School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 142-35.
- ARTILLERY TACTICS IN FUTURE WARS. (Translation of an article from *Militar-Wochenblatt*, Oct. 1, 1922.)—*Field Art. Jour.*, Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 161; also *Jour. Royal Arty.*, Dec., 1922, p. 440.

World War

- A FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP IN THE GENERAL ADVANCE. 50 pages. By Col. W. H. F. Weber, C.M.G., D.S.O.—*Field Art. Jour.*, Jan.-Feb., 1923, p. 41, and Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 99; also *Jour. Royal Arty.*, Oct.-Nov., 1922.
- EMPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY (HISTORICAL EXAMPLE, 1914). French Text, 30 pages. By Col. Verguin.—*Revue d'Artillerie*, Mar., 1923, p. 217, and Apr., 1923, p. 362 (to be continued).

ARTILLERY, RAILROAD

- ROLE AND EMPLOYMENT OF RAILROAD ARTILLERY. 14 pages. By Maj. Maurin.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, Apr., 1923, p. 37.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR

- FINAL REPORT OF RETIRING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR. 2 cols.—*A. & N. Reg.*, Mar., 17, 1923, p. 241

ATHLETICS

- ATHLETICS AS PUBLICITY. 3½ pages. By Maj. J. C. Fegan, U.S.M.C.—*Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar., 1923, p. 14.

AVIATION

See also under *Air Service*.

- AVIATION AND CHEMICAL WARFARE. French Text, 11 pages.—*Revue Militaire Suisse*, May, 1923, p. 209.
- DAY BOMBARDMENT. French Text, 22 pages. By Morlais.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, May, 1923, p. 235.
- TECHNICAL SERVICES OF MILITARY AVIATION. French Text, 22 pages. By Maj. Jauneaud.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, June, 1923, p. 397.

AVIATION

See *Cavalry and Aviation*.

BALKANS

- THE PRESENT SITUATION. 4 pages.—*Naval Intelligence Monthly Bulletin*, June, 1923, p. 40.

BATTLES

Amiens

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 314.

Arras, 1918

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 324.

Beaurevoir Line

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 329.

Canal du Nord

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 326.

Hindenburg Line

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 325.

Somme, 1918

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 318.

St. Quentin Canal

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 328.

Ypres, 1918

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 329.

BATTLES OF THE YPRES. 7 pages.—*Jour. of the Royal Service Inst.*, May, 1923, p. 321.

Warsaw

THE BATTLE OF WARSAW, AUGUST, 1920. 12 pages (with maps).
By Lieut. G. R. Johnston, R.F.A.—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 235.

BOARDS OF TRADE

MILITARY COMMITTEES IN BOARDS OF TRADE. ½ col. *A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 28, 1923, p. 843.

BRIDGES

MILITARY BRIDGES. Dept. of General Instructions. The Cavalry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-49.

CAMOUFLAGE

CAMOUFLAGE—PRINCIPLES OF CAMOUFLAGE, ETC. Conference. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 149-8.

CAMPAIGNS

See also under Plans of Campaign.

I. S. M. A. No. 9

HISTORY OF CAVALRY DURING WORLD WAR. Dept. of General Instruction. The Cavalry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-50.

CAVALRY DURING THE WORLD WAR. French Text, 15 pages. By Maj. Petiaux.—*Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Apr., 1923, p. 379.

HISTORY OF A RAID BY A CAVALRY DIVISION DURING THE WORLD WAR. By A. Doria. 154 pages. (Plon-Nourrit & Co., Paris.) Library No. 940.9.

HOW CAVALRY EXPLOITS A VICTORY. 7 pages. By Capt. J. R. H. Cruikshank, British Army.—(*U. S.*) *Cav. Jour.*, Apr., 1923, p. 163.

OPERATIONS OF THE MOUNTED TROOPS OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. (Continuation.) By Lt. Col. Rex Osborne.—(*British*) *Cav. Jour.*, Apr., 1923, p. 138.

1ST CAVALRY CORPS (FRENCH) DURING THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY, 1918. French Text, 18 pages. By Maj. Dejean.—*Revue de Cavalerie*, Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 212.

THE EXPERIENCES OF THE FIRST AMERICAN TROOP OF CAVALRY TO GET INTO ACTION IN THE WORLD WAR. 7 pages. By Capt. S. H. Sherrill.—(*U. S.*) *Cav. Jour.*, Apr., 1923, p. 153.

CAVALRY OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONT (June, 1920). French Text, 20 pages. By Lt. Col. Kleeberg.—*Revue de Cavalerie*, Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 230, May-June, 1923, p. 353.

CAVALRY CORPS

See also under *Cavalry (Maneuvers)*, *Cavalry (World War)*.

CAVALRY DIVISIONS

See also under *Cavalry (Maneuvers)*.

CAVALRY AND AVIATION

FRENCH TEXT. 13 pages. By Captain Daubert.—*Revue de Cavalerie*, May-June, 1923, p. 340.

CHEMICAL AGENTS

See also under *Cavalry (Chemical Agents)*.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

AVIATION AND CHEMICAL WARFARE. French Text, 11 pages.—*Revue Militaire Suisse*, May, 1923, p. 209.

GASES USED IN WARFARE A PROTECTION AGAINST DISEASE. 1 col.—*A. & N. Reg.*, May 26, 1923, p. 497.

Gas Mask

NEW MASK FOR DEFENSE AGAINST POISON GAS. $\frac{1}{4}$ col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 7, 1923, p. 772.

Tactics

CHEMICAL WARFARE. Dept. of Tactics. The Cavalry' School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-48.

World War

SOME GASES USED DURING THE WORLD WAR. Spanish Text, 23 pages. By Fernandez Landreda.—*Memorial de Artilleria*, March, 1923, p. 245.

CHINA

JAPANESE ACTIVITIES—GENERAL CONDITIONS.—*Naval Intelligence Monthly Bulletin*, June, 1923, p. 60.

CITIZENS' MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS

See also under Summer Training; Training Camps; National Defense.

CITIZENS' TRAINING

See also under Military Policy (Citizens' Training).

R. O. T. C.

JUNIOR CITIZENSHIP TRAINING. 9 pages. By Col. J. B. Barnes, U.S.A., Ret.—*Inf. Jour.*, May, 1923, p. 555.

CIVIL WAR

Confederate Army

THE SIZE OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. 2½ pages. By C. B. Hite.—*Current History*, May, 1923, p. 251.

COAST DEFENSE

*See Artillery (Heavy Tractor).
See also under Artillery, Coast (Coast Defense).*

COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL

See also under Doctrine (Coast Artillery School)

COMMAND

See also under Doctrine (Coast Artillery School); High Command.

COMMAND COURSE

Army War College

THE ART OF COMMAND. Lectures by Maj. Gen. E. F. McGlachlin, Jr. Command Course No. 19, Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-19.

PROBLEM NO. 3, BLUE—APPENDIX A, BLUE—ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FRENCH ARMIES IN 1914.—ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE BELGIAN ARMY IN AUGUST, 1914.—FRENCH SUPPLY IN 1914. Command Course No. 14.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-14.

PROBLEM NO. 3, BLUE.—DIRECTIONS FOR THE CONCENTRATION—GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCES IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS. Command Course No. 13.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-13.

PROBLEM NO. 3, RED.—THE GERMAN PLAN—CONCENTRATION SCHEDULE OF FORCES. Command Course No. 15.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-15.

PROBLEM NO. 3, RED.—APPENDIX B, RED—ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES.—GERMAN SUPPLY, 1914. Command Course No. 16.—Instructor's File No. P.H. 138-B-16.

MEMORANDUM FOR UMPIRES, RE WAR GAME. Command Course No. 17.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-17.

COMMAND AND STAFF ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE WAR GAME COMMENCING MARCH 30, 1923. Command Course No. 18.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-18.

THE CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN WAR ILLUSTRATED BY HANNIBAL'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY. Lecture by Lt. Col. Walter Krueger, G.S. Command Course No. 20.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-20. (Copies of this lecture may be obtained from the A.W.C.)

DATA FOR UMPIRES IN WAR GAME BEGINNING MARCH 30, 1923. By Col. E. L. King. Command Course No. 22.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-22.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMAND RECONNAISSANCE, JUNE, 1923.—GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. Command Course No. 24.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-B-24.

I. S. M. A. No. 9

CONFEDERATE ARMY

See under Civil War.

CONVOYS

Tactics and Technique

CONVOYS—ATTACK—DEFENSE, ETC. Conference. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 149-5.

COVERING FORCES

ACTION OF COVERING FORCES—FLANK GUARDS. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 149-10.

DARDANELLES

DARDANELLES EXPEDITION. 35 pages. By Lt. Col. W. H. Johnson, Infantry. (War College Study.)—*Coast Arty. Jour.*, June, 1923, p. 489.

DISCIPLINE

DISCIPLINE. French Text, 10 pages. By General Mangin.—*Revue de Paris*, May 1, 1923, p. 27.

DOCTRINE

Coast Artillery School

DOCTRINE AND COMMAND. 12 pages. By Brig. Gen. R. P. Davis, Comd't, The Coast Artillery School.—*Coast Arty. Jour.*, Apr., 1923, p. 285.

ECONOMICS

See also under High Command (World War).

EFFICIENCY REPORTS

EFFICIENCY REPORTS. 7 pages. By Col. Geo. B. Pritchard, U.S.A., Ret.—*Inf. Jour.*, May, 1923, p. 495.

ENGINEER DEPOT

THE PURCHASE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL ENGINEER DEPOT. By Capt. H. M. Yost. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. 143-18.

CONSTRUCTION, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE U. S. ENGINEER DEPOT, KEARNEY, N. J. By Maj. W. C. Lemen. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 143-19.

ENGINEERS

See also under Roads; Engineer Depot.

MOVEMENT OF AN ENGINEER REGIMENT BY TRUCK—BY RAILROAD. Conferences prepared by Maj. P. C. Bullard. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File Nos. P.H. 143-7, and P.H. 143-8.

Supply

ENGINEER SUPPLY. Lecture by Maj. C. E. Perry. Basic and Co. Officers' Course. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 143-11.

ENGINEER SUPPLY OF A DIVISION IN A RAPID ADVANCE AND IN A WITHDRAWAL. Conference prepared by Maj. P. C. Bullard. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 143-10.

April-June, 1923

SUPPLY OF AN ENGINEER REGIMENT IN ATTACK.—IN ADVANCE. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File Nos. P.H. 143-15, and P.H. 143-17.

ENGINEER SUPPLY OF A DIVISION IN ATTACK. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 143-16.

EVACUATION

See also under G4 Course (Army War College).

FAR EAST

Russia

RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST. 32 pages. By Baron S. A. Korff.—*Amer. Jour. Intern'l. Law*, Apr., 1923, p. 252.

FORTIFICATIONS

World War

PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS DURING THE WAR—HISTORY, DEFENSE, ETC. (Translation of French Document, from MID, G2, W.D.)—Instructors File No. 500-A.

Field

REVIEW QUESTIONS ON FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. Dept. of General Instruction. The Cavalry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-45.

FLANDERS, 1918

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 17 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 323.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES

See also under Canada

China

CAN WE EXPECT A STABLE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL CHINA? 2½ pages. By K. S. Latourette.—*The Outlook*, May, 23 1923, p. 15.

MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA. 4 pages.—*Information Bulletin, Naval Intelligence*, May, 1923, p. 34.

CHINA, ILL-GOVERNED AND BANKRUPT, YET PROSPEROUS. 6 pages. By G. L. Harding.—*Current History*, May, 1923, p. 320.

Great Britain

OVERSEA BRITON'S NEW PLACE IN EMPIRE'S COUNCILS. 9 pages. By Robert A. Mackay.—*Current History*, May, 1923, p. 266.

Holland

MODERN HOLLAND. 230 pages. By Jhr. Jan Feith. (Nijgh & Van Ditmar's Pub. Co., Rotterdam.) Library No. 949.2.

Japan

JAPAN: A SEQUEL TO THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. 15 pages. By H. C. Bywater.—*U. S. Naval Inst. Proc.*, May, 1923, p. 811.

MILITARY INDUSTRIES OF JAPAN. 262 pages. By Ushisaburo Kobayashi. (Oxford University Press.) Library No. 952.

WAR AND ARMAMENT EXPENDITURES OF JAPAN. 307 pages. By Giichi Ono. (Oxford University Press.) Library No. 952.

Japan-Manchuria

JAPAN'S CIVILIZING MISSION IN MANCHURIA. 7 pages. By K. K. Kawakami.—*Current History*, May, 1923, p. 327.

Mexico

A MEXICAN AUTHORITY ON MEXICO. 1½ pages.—*Literary Digest*, May 12, 1923, p. 19.

CLASPING HANDS WITH MEXICO. 1½ pages.—*Literary Digest*, May 12, 1923, p. 13.

Russia

RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST. 32 pages. By Baron S. A. Korff.—*Amer. Jour. Intern'l. Law*, Apr., 1923, p. 252.

Turkey

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW TURKEY. 11 pages. By A. L. P. Dennis.—*North Amer. Review*, June, 1923, p. 721.

FORT VAUX

See under World War (Fort Vaux).

G2 COURSE

Army War College

CONDITIONS IN GERMANY. Lecture by Comdr. W. P. Beehler, U.S.N.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-C-41. (Copies of lecture may be obtained from A.W.C.)

PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT. GERMAN SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT, 1914. Lecture by Lt. Col. G. R. Spalding, C.E. G4 Course No. 27.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 139-G-27.

SOURCE MATERIAL ON GERMAN SUPPLY, 1914. (Extracted from German General Staff Officers' Handbook, 1914.) G4 Course No. 26.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 139-G-26.

SOURCE MATERIAL ON GERMAN SUPPLY, 1914-1918.—1ST ARMY IN ADVANCE TO MARNE. By Von Bergman, 5th Army in 1918. By Singrun. G4 Course No. 28.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 139-G-28.

PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION. Lecture by Maj. A. P. Clark, M.C. G4 Course No. 25.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 139-G-25.

GENERAL INTERMEDIATE DEPOTS

See also under Q. M. Supply Officers.

GEOGRAPHICAL OBJECTIVES

GEOGRAPHICAL OBJECTIVES IN MODERN WAR. By Maj. Lucien. (Translation of an article in the *Revue Militaire Francaise*, Jan., 1923.)—Instructors' File No. 600-B.

GROUND ORGANIZATION

World War

ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND (EVOLUTION DURING THE WORLD WAR). French Text, 13 pages. By Col. Henry.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, May, 1923, p. 665 (to be continued).

G2

French (World War)

SECOND BUREAU, VI (FRENCH) ARMY IN ACTIVE OPERATIONS. French Text, 43 pages. By Maj. Paquet.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, Apr., 1923, p. 83, and May, 1923, p. 179.

HIGH COMMAND

See also under Strategy (World War).

Crimean War

HIGH COMMAND DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR. (Continuation.) 31 pages. By Lt. Col. Rivot.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, Apr., 1923, p. 51 (concluded).

Navy

TRAINING FOR HIGHER COMMAND. 1 col.—*A. & N. Reg.*, Mar. 17, 1923, p. 254.

World War

ROLE OF THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND FROM THE ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT DURING THE WORLD WAR. By Pierre Bruneau.—*Revue Militaire Generale*, Mar., 1923, p. 201, and Apr., 1923, p. 279 (continuation from Sept., 1922 number).

HISTORICAL

See also under *Marine Corps*.

INFANTRY

See also under *Liaison; World War (Mass Attacks)*.

Artillery Support

See also under *Artillery, Field (Infantry Battery)*.

COOPERATION BETWEEN INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY DURING OFFENSIVE COMBAT. French Text, 50 pages. By Lt. Col. Abadie.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, Mar., 1923, p. 237, and Apr., 1923, p. 536.

Infantry Battery

See under *Artillery, Field (Infantry Battery)*.

Intelligence Service

BATTALION INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. French Text, 18 pages. By Lieut. Pellissier.—*Revue Militaire Suisse*, May, 1923, p. 218.

Regulations

ITALIAN INFANTRY DRILL REGULATIONS. French Text, 30 pages.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, Mar., 1923, p. 360, and Apr., 1923, p. 563.

Tactics

REGIMENT IN ATTACK WITH ACCOMPANYING BATTERY AND TANKS.—GENERAL—REINFORCED REGIMENT IN ATTACK. Conference. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. 1370-C.

Tactics and Technique

VIEWPOINTS FOR COMBAT TRAINING OF THE INFANTRY ON ATTACK AND DEFENSE BASED ON EXPERIENCES IN THE WAR. (Translation of a German Document by Capt. W. Pfeifer.) From MID, Office of A. C. of S.—Instructors' File No. 1370-C.

INFANTRY COMBAT. (INFANTRY, CAVALRY, AND AIR SERVICE.) French Text, 15 pages. By Col. Lemoine.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, Apr., 1923, p. 505.

JAPAN

A SURVEY OF THE GENERAL SITUATION. 7 pages.—*Naval Intelligence Monthly Bulletin*, June, 1923, p. 18.

LIAISON

See also under *Artillery, Field (Liaison)*.

MILITARY ENGINEERING

See also under Engineers; Roads.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION. 15 pages.
By Col. O. L. Spaulding, Jr.—*Field Arty. Jour.*, Mar.-Apr.,
1923, p. 141.

MILITARY SCHOOLS

See also under arm of service concerned; Military Academy.

MILITARY POLICY

Citizens' Training

OUR MILITARY POLICY REGARDING THE TRAINING OF CITIZENS. 24
pages. By Maj. E. W. Thompson, O.R.C.—*Coast Arty. Jour.*,
Apr., 1923, p. 319.

MILITARY TRAINING

*See also under Summer Training; Training Camps; Marine Corps (Training);
Artillery, Coast (Training).*

MILITARY TRAINING TODAY. 19 pages. By Capt. H. M. Logan,
Royal Canadian Reg't.—*Army Quarterly*, April, 1923, p. 58.

Citizens' Components

OUR MILITARY POLICY REGARDING THE TRAINING OF CITIZENS. 24
pages. By Maj. E. W. Thompson, O.R.C.—*Coast Arty. Jour.*,
Apr., 1923, p. 319

Germany

GERMAN MILITARY TRAINING. 3 pages. By Brig. Gen. W. Evans.—
Jour. Royal Arty., May, 1923, p. 83.

MINENWERFER

HAND BOOK FOR THE MINENWERFER. 112 pages. By Lieut. Bierman.
(Berlin, 1922.) Library No. 358.

MISCELLANEOUS

BRIEF DRAWING. 214 pages. By R. C. Ringwalt, A.B., LL. B.
(Longmans, Green & Co., New York.) Library No. 340.

MY PERIOD OF SERVICE FROM 1906 TO 1918 (Field Marshal Conrad).
German Text, 675 pages. (Rikola Verlag, Berlin, 1921.) Library
No. 923.

MOSUL

See also under World War (Mosul).

MOTOR TRANSPORT

MOTOR TRANSPORT—BEFORE 1916—PUNITIVE EXPEDITION—PERIOD
OF THE WORLD WAR. Lecture by Major G. R. Young. The
Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 143-6.

MOTOR VEHICLES

CARE AND OPERATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES. Materiel Document No.
3, F.A. School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 142-36.

I. S. M. A. No. 9

NATIONAL DEFENSE

See also under Army of the U. S.

COST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 2 cols.—*A. & N. Reg.*, April 7, 1923, p. 313.

FACTORS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE. 3 pages. By Hon. John W. Weeks, Sec'y of War.—*Q. M. Review*, May-June, 1923, p. 3.

NATIONAL GURAD

See also under Summer Training; Cavalry (National Guard); Training Camps; National Defense.

Appropriations—Schools

NATIONAL GUARD APPROPRIATIONS FOR SCHOOLS, 1923 AND 1924. $\frac{1}{4}$ col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, April 7, 1923, p. 772.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

See also under World War (Naval Operations).

NAVY

See also under Panama Canal.

Maneuvers

LESSONS OF FLEET MANEUVERS OFF PANAMA. 1 col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 14, 1923, p. 793.

San Francisco Base

SAN FRANCISCO NAVAL BASE. 2 cols.—*A. & N. Reg.*, June, 9, 1923, p. 549.

NIGHT OPERATIONS

NIGHT FIGHTING AND NIGHT FIRING. By Balck. 296 pages. (Berlin, 1910.) Library No. 355.62.

NIVELLE ATTACK

See under World War (Nivelle Attack).

ORDERS

OPERATION ORDERS. 5 pages.—*Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May, 1923, p. 305.

ORGANIZATION

See also under Military Organization; Ground Organization.

ORGANIZED RESERVES

See also under Summer Training; National Defense, Training Camps

OPERATIONS

See also under World War.

OUTPOSTS

OUTPOSTS—STRENGTH, COMPOSITION AND DUTIES. Conference. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 149-7.

PALMER, BRIG. GEN. J. MCA.

THE "ONE-ARMY" IDEA. 3 pages. By Brig. Gen. J. McA. Palmer.—*Q. M. Review*, Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 11.

PANAMA CANAL

LESSONS FROM NAVAL MANEUVERS. 7 pages.—*U. S. Naval Inst. Proc.*, June, 1923, p. 1021.

"WELL-DEFINED WEAKNESSES" OF PANAMA CANAL. 1½ cols.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 21, 1923, p. 817.

PASSAGE OF LINES

PASSAGE OF LINES.—COMPARISON WITH A RELIEF AND A REINFORCEMENT, ETC., Conference. Special Refresher Course. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 149-11.

PERSHING, GEN. JOHN J.

GENERAL PERSHING IN RELIGIOUS AND MORAL TRAINING FOR SOLDIERS. 1 col.—*A. & N. Reg.*, June, 9, 1923, p. 530.

PHOTOGRAPHY

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY. Dept. of General Instruction. The Cavalry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-47.

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN: FRENCH PLAN BY CAMPAIGN. French Text, 11 pages. By Maj. Jobe.—*Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Mar., 1923, p. 263.

PLANS OF CONCENTRATION

See also under World War (French Concentration).

POLICY AND STRATEGY

By Field Marshal Robertson. 11 pages.—*Journal of the United Service Institution*, May, 1923, p. 270.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. (Concluded.) By Col. Wm. K. Naylo, G.S.—*Inf. Jour.*, Apr., 1923, p. 416.

PRISONERS OF WAR

Repatriation

AN ADMINISTRATIVE SIDE-SHOW: THE REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR. 12 pages.—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 356.

Q. M. SUPPLY OFFICERS

THE QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY OFFICERS OF A GENERAL INTERMEDIATE DEPOT. 4 pages. By Brig. Gen. John T. Knight.—*Q. M. Review*, May-June, 1923, p. 7.

RAIDS

World War

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE DURING THE WORLD WAR. French Text, 11 pages. By General Huguenot.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, Apr., 1923, p. 5.

RADIO

See also under Artillery, Field (Radio Communications).

I. S. M. A. No. 9

REGULAR ARMY

Alaska

THE ARMY IN ALASKA. 11 pages. By Col. W. P. Richardson, U.S.A.,
Ret.—*Inf. Jour.*, May, 1923, p. 605.

REGULATIONS

See also under arm of service concerned.

RELIGIOUS TRAINING

See also under Pershing, Gen. John J.

REPORTS

*See also under Assistant Secretary of War; Efficiency Reports, Air Service
(Coast Defense).*

RESERVE OFFICERS

See also under Training Camps.

RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS

*See also under Summer Training; Military Training (Citizens' Components);
Military Policy (Citizens' Training); Citizens' Training (R. O. T. C.).*

ROADS

MILITARY ROAD BUILDING NOT A SCIENCE ONLY A JOB. By Col.
Ernest Graves. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No.
P.H. 143-12.

ROAD WORK IN MEXICO WITH THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION. By Capt.
J. A. O'Connor. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No.
P.H. 143-13.

ROADS IN SUPPLY AND ATTACK. By Col. W. G. Caples. The
Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 143-14.

SECRETARY OF WAR

SPEECH OF SECRETARY OF WAR AT LEAVENWORTH. 1 col.—*A. & N.
Reg.*, June 9, 1923, p. 531.

SMALL ARMS

A REVIEW OF SMALL ARMS DEVELOPMENT. 9 pages. By Lee O. Wright.
—*Army Ordnance*, May-June, 1923, p. 309.

STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF A WAR. French Text,
14 pages. By Maj. Fastrex.—*Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*,
Mar., 1923, p. 249, and Apr., 1923, p. 363.

STRATEGY

Ludendorff

THE STRATEGY OF LUDENDORFF. French Text, 18 pages. By Col.
Lecombe.—*Revue Militaire Suisse*, Mar., 1923, p. 97, and Apr.,
1923, p. 145. For translation see Instructors' File No. 1800-D,
and 1800-E.

World War

ROLE OF THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND FROM THE ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT
DURING THE WORLD WAR. By Pierre Bruneau.—*Revue Militaire
Generale*, Mar., 1923, p. 358.

STRATEGY AND ALLIED OPERATIONS DURING THE WORLD WAR (NORTH-
ERN SECTOR). French Text, By Capt. Kuntz.—*Revue Militaire
Generale*, Apr., 1923, p. 300, and May, 1923, p. 374.

THE STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-18. 17 pages. By Major R. Evans.—*Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May, 1923, p. 254.

POLICY AND STRATEGY. By Field Marshal Robertson. 11 pages.—*Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May, 1923, p. 270.

SUMMER CAMPS

See also under *Training Camps; Summer Training.*

SUMMER TRAINING, 1923

ALLOTMENTS FOR SUMMER TRAINING. 1½ cols.—*A. & N. Jour.*, May 17, 1923, p. 700. Also *A. & N. Reg.*, May 17, 1923, p. 248 and page 251.

SUPPLY

See also under *Engineers (Supply).*

SUPPLIES IN ENEMY COUNTRY

MILITARY REASONS FOR PAYING FOR SUPPLIES IN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY. 10 pages. By Col. S. C. Vestal, C.A.C.—*Coast Arty. Jour.*, May, 1923, p. 395.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

See also under *Strategical Considerations.*

TACTICAL PRINCIPLES

Army Corps

THE ROLE OF AN ARMY CORPS. By Col. P. Nuyten. (Translation of an article in the *Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Feb., 1923.)—Instructors' File No. 1200-CC.

TACTICS

See also under *arm of service concerned; Applied Tactics.*

ATTACKS AND DEFENSE OF A COAST. French Text, 17 pages. By Capt. Thomazi.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, June, 1923, p. 325.

GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE OFFENSIVE. Lecture by Maj. R. S. Thomas. Co. Officers' Course. The Engineer School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 143-9.

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

Defense

THE DEFENSE (ACCORDING TO THE NEW GERMAN REGULATIONS). French Text, 11 pages. By Maj. Mabile.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, May, 1923, p. 678.

Infantry Division

A DEFENSIVE SITUATION—AN INFANTRY DIVISION AS PART OF A CORPS. Translation of an article in the *Revue d'Infanterie*, Feb., 1923.—Instructors' File No. 660-F.

TANKS

LIGHT TANKS—ANTI-TANKS DEFENSE AND PROTECTION. (Translation of an article in the *Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Feb., 1923.)—Instructors' File No. 1320-R.

LIGHT TANKS (IV). By Col. A. E. M. Poulin. Operation of the Tanks after their Detrainment. (Regulations of Mar. 11, 1920.) Translation of an article in the *Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Mar., 1923, p. 275.

LIGHT TANKS. French Text, 8 pages. By Maj. Dekempeneer.—*Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Apr., 1923, p. 395.

Tactics

CHANGES IN TACTICS DUE TO ADVENT OF FAST LIGHT TANK. 2 pages. By Lieut. W. T. Sargeant.—*Tank Corps Jour. (British)*, Mar., 1923, p. 296.

TANK MINOR TACTICS. 9 pages. By Bvt. Lt. Col. W. D. Croft.—*Army Quarterly*, Apr., 1923, p. 90.

World War

GERMAN TANKS IN THE WORLD WAR. German Text, 1 col.—*Militar-Wochenblatt*, Mar., 15, 1923, p. 592.

TANKS—HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT DURING THE WORLD WAR. French Text, 37 pages. By Maj. Fiorella.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, May, 1923, p. 691.

TRAINING CAMPS

See also under *Summer Training; Organized Reserves (Training Camps)*.

TRAINING CAMPS, 1923

SUMMER TRAINING CAMPS. (Gen. Pershing invites Senators and Congressmen to visit camps.)—*A. & N. Reg.*, Apr. 21, 1923, p. 359.
See also *A. & N. Jour.*, April 21, 1923, p. 822.

TRAINING CAMPS

2d Corps Area

NATIONAL GUARD IN SECOND CORPS AREA CAMPS (1923). 1 col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, May 5, 1923, p. 870.

3d Corps Area

THIRD CORPS AREA SUMMER CAMPS SCHEDULE (1923).—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 28, 1923, p. 846.

4th Corps Area

SUMMER CAMPS 4TH CORPS AREA (1923). 1½ cols.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 7, 1923, p. 774.

5th Corps Area

SCHEDULE 5TH CORPS AREA SUMMER TRAINING CAMPS (1923).—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 28, 1923, p. 846.

6th Corps Area

SIXTH CORPS AREA SUMMER CAMPS (1923). 1 col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 24, 1923, p. 798.

7th Corps Area

SCHEDULE SEVENTH CORPS AREA TRAINING CAMPS (1923). 1 col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 14, 1923, p. 798.

8th Corps Area

EIGHT CORPS AREA SUMMER CAMPS (1923). ½ col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 21, 1923, p. 882.

9th Corps Area

SUMMER CAMPS, 9TH CORPS AREA (1923). 1½ cols.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Mar. 24, 1923, p. 727.

CAMP OF INSTRUCTION FOR RESERVE OFFICERS, 9TH CORPS AREA (1923).—*A. & N. Jour.*, May 5, 1923, p. 867.

Regular Troops

REGULAR TROOPS FOR SUMMER TRAINING CAMPS (1923). ½ col.—*A. & N. Jour.*, Mar. 31, 1923, p. 749.

TRAINING SCHEDULE

Army Officers

EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR ARMY OFFICERS. 2 cols.—*A. & N. Reg.*, Apr. 21, 1923, p. 363, and *A. & N. Jour.*, Apr. 21, 1923, p. 821.

TRENCHES

TRENCHES—PROFILES AND TRACES.—DEFINITIONS, ETC. Conference. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 149-6.

TROOP MOVEMENTS

MOVING MOUNTED TROOPS. 5½ pages. By Lt. Col. G. W. Winterburn, Q.M.C.—*Q. M. Review*, Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 23.

WAR PLANS COURSE

Army War College

BASIC WAR PLAN (ORANGE). By Committee No. 14, W.P.D. Course No. 20.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 139-D-20.

BASIC WAR PLAN (RED AND ORANGE). By Committee No. 19, W.P.D. Course No. 31. (Secret Document.)—Instructors' File No. P.H. 139-D-21.

COMMENTS ON WAR PLANS DIVISION COURSE, 1922-1923. By Lt. Col. Upton Birnie, Jr., W.P.D. Course No. 22. (Secret Document.)—Instructors' File No. P.H. 139-D-22.

OUTLINE OF DEVELOPMENT OF WAR PLANS COURSE.—DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART I—ASSIGNMENTS TO COMMITTEES. By Col. G. S. Simonds.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-H.

DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART II.—DEVELOPMENT OF WAR PLANS COURSE.—WAR PLANS—ORANGE.—WAR PLAN—RED AND ORANGE.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-H.

REMARKS ON DEVELOPMENT OF WAR PLANS. By Col. G. S. Simonds. Development of War Plans Course No. 1.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 138-H-L.

WARS

See also under Strategic Considerations.

WARSAW

See under Battles.

WASHINGTON ARMS CONFERENCE

See also under Foreign Countries (Japan).

WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS. Conference. The Infantry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 149-12.

WORLD WAR

See also under *Artillery, Field (World War); Battles; Cavalry (World War); Raids (World War); G-2 (French); Strategy (World War); Tanks (World War); Fortifications (World War).*

THE FIRST ARMY CORPS (FRENCH) DURING THE WAR, 1914-1918. French Text, 339 pages. (Berger-Levrault, Paris.) Library No. 940.9.

American Casualties

WERE HALF OUR SOLDIERS KILLED UNNECESSARILY IN THE WORLD WAR? 2 cols.—*Literary Digest*, May 12, 1923, p. 56.

Ammunition

THE GERMAN AMMUNITION PROBLEM IN 1914. 3 pages. By C. H. Morgan.—*Field Arty. Jour.*, Mar.-Apr., 1923, p. 130.

EARLY BASE WORK IN FRANCE. 12 pages. By Maj. Gen. Sir W. E. Ironside.—*Jour. Royal Arty.*, May, 1923, p. 61.

Battles

See also under *Battles.*

Belgian Army

See under *Western Front.*

British Campaign (Western Front)

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST—AUGUST-NOVEMBER, 1918. 31 pages (with map).—*Army Quarterly*, Jan., 1923, p. 314, and Apr., 1923, p. 44.

British Offensive, 1918

A GERMAN ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE OF AUGUST, 1918 (with map). (From *Die Schlachten in Sommer, 1918*, by Gen. von Zwehl.) 6 pages.—*Army Quarterly*, Apr., 1923, p. 11.

Bulgarian Front

RUPTURE OF THE BULGARIAN (DURBO-POLE) FRONT. French Text, 22 pages. By Maj. Casson.—*Revue Militaire Generale*, Apr., 1923, p. 241.

Champagne

ATTACK OF THE 48TH DIVISION (FRENCH) IN CHAMPAGNE. French Text, 21 pages. By Maj. Janet.—*Revue d'Infanterie*, Mar., 1923, p. 377.

Dardanelles

DARDANELLES. EXPEDITION. 35 pages. By Lt. Col. W. H. Johnson, Inf. (War College Study).—*Coast Arty. Jour.*, June, 1923, p. 489.

Eastern Front

See also under *Cavalry (World War).*

Egypt

See also under *Cavalry (World War).*

Fort Vaux

DEFENSE OF A MODERN FORT (FORT VAUX, 1916). French Text, 16 pages. By Lt. Col. Tournes.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, May 1923, p. 202, and June, 1923, p. 306.

French Concentration

THE FRENCH PLAN OF CONCENTRATION AND THE COLLAPSE OF AUGUST, 1914. 32 pages. By Col. W. A. Machean.—*Jour. Royal Arty.*, Apr., 1923, p. 1, and May, 1923, p. 43.

Mass Attacks

MASS ATTACKS OF RUSSIAN CAVALRY AGAINST GERMAN INFANTRY.
German Text, 2 cols.—*Militar-Wochenblatt*, Mar. 1, 1923, p. 565.

Mosul

THE ADVANCE ON MOSUL, OCTOBER, 1918. 8 pages. By Capt. A. Hammond.—(*British Cav. Jour.*, Apr., 1923, p. 121.

Naval Operations

NAVAL OPERATIONS (TO THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS). 2 Volumes (Text and Maps). 882 pages. By Sir Julian S. Corbett. (Longmans, Green & Co., London.) Library No. 940.9.

Nivelle Attack

THE NIVELLE ATTACK. 16 pages. By Maj. C. L. Fenton.—*Inf. Jour.*, June, 1923, p. 729.

Russian Army

THE INITIAL OPERATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN 1914. French Text, 22 pages. By General Daniloff.—*Revue Militaire Francaise*, May, 1923, p. 145, and June, 1923, p. 289.

Palestine

THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN. Dept. of General Instructions. The Cavalry School.—Instructors' File No. P.H. 140-46.

Western Front

ALLIED REACTION TO GERMAN DRIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918. 8 pages.—*Inf. Jour.*, May, 1923, p. 616.

OPERATIONS OF THE BELGIAN ARMY DURING THE WAR OF 1914-1918. (Continuation.) French Text. By Lt. Gen. Greind.—*Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, Mar., 1923, p. 337, and Apr., 1923, p. 349.

Ypres

BATTLES OF THE YPRES. (French assistance.) 7 pages.—*Jour. of the Royal United Service Institution*, May, 1923, p. 321.