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A New Army Emphasis on Leadership:
Be, Know, Do . . . see page 62



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
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The Soviet operational formation is the subject of considerable discussion these days. In this article, the author reviews the past and concludes that contemporary Soviet practices are not revolutionary but have, in fact, evolved through the years and been updated in light of current requirements.

Soviet Operational Formation for Battle: A Perspective

Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz, US Army

A CENTRAL feature of combat at the operational and tactical level is the manner in which forces are organized and deployed for battle—specifically their operational formation and combat formation. The operational formation and the manner in which it functions is the vehicle which expresses the operational theory of a nation's military force and converts that theory into practice. If theories are correct and well-executed, the operational formation will successfully project combat power forward and prevail. Anyone who wishes to understand how and why the Soviet army will operate in war must begin by investigating the central issue of Soviet operational formation. More importantly, he must investigate operational formation in its proper context.

The Soviets define operational formation (*operativnoe postroenie*) as "the grouping of the forces and means of operational units (front, armies) created for the conduct of operations."¹ At the tactical level, the Soviets define combat formation (*boevoi poriadok*) as "the disposition of bat-

talions, regiments, and divisions with their means of reinforcements for the conduct of battle."² Since the early 1930s, there has been a remarkable consistency in the evolution of Soviet theoretical operational formation, an evolution responsive to the changing conditions and context of war.

At times, this consistency has been distorted by the difficulty of converting theory into practice and by events that have forced the Soviets to temporarily depart from theory. Such was the case in the period immediately prior to World War II and during the opening months of the war in the east (1941) when realities overcame theory and forced marked aberrations in Soviet military practices.

Lacking a knowledge of this evolution of Soviet military theory, it would be easy to approach contemporary Soviet practices in a vacuum and to treat those practices out of context, attributing to them a new and revolutionary nature. Such a lack of historical perspective inevitably results in misunderstanding and faulty interpreta-



tion of the nature and meaning of current Soviet military practices.

The fact is that Soviet operational formations (and combat formations) are derived from the past and conditioned by the present. As intense students of military history and the practice of war, the Soviets have studied operational formations of the past. And, at every period in the present, they have adjusted these formations to capitalize on the wisdom of past successes, taking care to consider the realities of the present.

Soviet operational and tactical military theory in the 1920s and 1930s owed a clear debt to the experiences of the Russian Civil War (1918-21). The concept of mobile operations on a broad front in great depth, the rapid redeployment of forces over wide expanses of territory, the use of shock groups for creating penetrations and the widespread use of cavalry forces as "mobile groups" exploiting offensive success were all legacies of the civil war.³ These legacies were reinforced by the ideology of revolution which stressed the

offensive and emphasized radical and unorthodox military techniques. The climate of the post-civil war years was conducive to Soviet acceptance of new concepts such as mechanized warfare and the offensive uses of the tank.

The major problem facing the Soviets during the 1920s was that of building an industrial base sufficient to equip such a mobile mechanized force. Until such a base was present, little could be done to implement their latent offensive theory. By 1929, the intent of Soviet offensive military theory became clearer. The field regulations of 1929 (*Ustav*) established the aim of conducting "deep battle" (*gluboku boi*) to secure success to the tactical depth of enemy defenses by the simultaneous use of infantry support tanks and long-range action tanks with infantry, artillery and aviation support.⁴ This prescription for combined arms battle involved creation at front and army level of an operational formation consisting of shock groups and holding groups supported by artillery groups and a reserve.

The shock group (two-thirds of the force) would deploy in one or two echelons on the main attack axis while holding groups (one-third of the force) deployed in a single echelon on the secondary axis. The shock group would conduct the penetration (or envelopment) in close coordination with tanks, artillery and aviation, while mobile units of cavalry, tanks and motorized infantry conducted the exploitation and pursuit.

This statement of intent was followed shortly by the forced industrialization and collectivization of Soviet industry and agriculture. These programs were designed, in part, to create conditions conducive to the implementing of those theories expressed in the *Ustav* of 1929.

From 1929 to 1935, military theory matured in tandem with the technical

reconstruction of military forces. By 1935, the theory of deep battle to operational depths (50 to 100 kilometers) was perfected. In March 1935, the Worker's and Peasant's Red Army issued "Instructions on Deep Battle" declaring:

*Deep battle is battle with the massive use of new mobile and shock forces for the simultaneous attack of the enemy to the entire depth of his combat formation with the aim of fully encircling and destroying him. . . The new means and tactics of deep battle increase the importance of surprise.*⁵

The *Ustav* of 1936, produced by Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky and his close associates, clearly defined the nature of deep battle as a:

*Simultaneous assault on enemy defenses by aviation and artillery to the depths of the defense, penetration of the tactical zone of the defense by attacking units with widespread use of tank forces and violent development of tactical success into operational success with the aim of complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy. The main role is performed by the infantry and the mutual support of all types of forces are organized in its interests*⁶

To implement deep battle, the operational formation included shock and holding groups of two or three echelons. The shock group of rifle divisions formed in two or three echelons with regiments abreast operating on the main axis of the offensive while holding groups conducted supporting attacks. Tank battalions supported the infantry

Strategic tank groups (mobile groups) were assigned to commanders of armies, corps or divisions to penetrate to the rear of the hostile defense, crush hostile reserves and headquarters, destroy main enemy artillery groups and cut off enemy retreat. According to theory, rifle corps and rifle divisions acted as shock and holding groups, and tank (mechanized) bri-



Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, early 1920

gades and tank (mechanized) corps, created in the 1930s, served as mobile groups to exploit offensive success to tactical and operational depths.

The concepts enunciated by Tukhachevsky in 1936 underwent little change and, in fact, provided a base for subsequent theoretical development during World War II and the postwar years. However, while theory remained consistent, the experiences of the late 1930s distorted theory and created a gap between theory and practice.

The purges of 1937-38 which liquidated Tukhachevsky and his generation of innovative officers also cast a shadow on his theories. Those officers who remained at the top of the military hierarchy were generally conservative and reluctant, for political reasons, to embrace Tukhachevsky's ideas. In addition, the experiences of Soviet tank specialists in the Spanish Civil War cast doubt on the feasibility of using large tank units in combat because of the difficulty of controlling them and their vulnerability to artillery fire.

The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September 1939 also pointed out the difficulties involved in employing large mechanized forces.⁸ Consequently, in November 1939, the large tank corps (four in number) were abolished, to be replaced in the future by smaller motorized divisions.⁹ In essence, faith in deep battle waned a bit, only to be rekindled by events occurring in France in 1940.

After viewing the French debacle of May 1940, the Soviets hastily attempted to create a force structure capable of implementing Tukhachevsky's concept of deep battle. The Soviets formed large mechanized corps (29 in number) consisting of tank and motorized divisions and numbering, on paper, 1,031 tanks each.¹⁰ However, none of the corps was fully

trained or equipped. Good leadership was scarce, production of new, modern T34 and KV tanks lagged and the corps were poorly integrated into the force structure.

The German invasion of June 1941 smashed the large and elaborate but poorly led Soviet force structure. Therefore, the Soviets abolished rifle corps and mechanized corps and truncated the size of armies and rifle divisions.¹¹ The evident lack of experienced leadership and the wholesale loss of units, manpower and equipment during the initial battles of June and July 1941 forced the Soviets to temporarily abandon hopes for conducting deep battle. Yet prewar views on combat, in general, and operational formation, in particular, emphasized offense to the almost total exclusion of defense.

The harsh education of the Soviets by the Germans in the art of defense caused massive losses and rendered the Soviets incapable of putting together forces necessary to carry out Tukhachevsky's offensive concepts. Faced with the German advance, Soviet commanders counterattacked in classic two-echelon configuration without concentrating their scarce forces and limited firepower. The futility of the counterattack at Smolensk in July, the wholesale expenditure of the mechanized corps of the South-West Front in July and other counterattacks vividly demonstrated the need for radical temporary changes in offensive operational formation for battle.¹² Those changes occurred in late 1941 and in 1942.

Stavka Directive Number 3, issued on 10 January 1942, amplified an earlier order of the Western Front and directed that commanders use shock groups (mobile groups) in offensive combat to concentrate forces and create operational densities required for achieving success.¹³ Such groups were used in the Soviet counteroffensive around Moscow in November

and December 1941. The general paucity of armor limited the effectiveness of these shock groups. Consequently, the *Stavka* ordered that those tank forces that did exist be used in a concentrated fashion to support infantry formations.¹⁴

During the winter offensive of 1942, Soviet commanders used makeshift combinations of tank brigades, cavalry corps and divisions, rifle divisions, and even ski battalions and brigades as mobile groups in an attempt to create forces that could penetrate into German rear areas.

In 1942, the quantities of tanks in the Soviet force structure grew as did the knowledge of how to use them. Larger tank and mechanized forces slowly emerged which were capable of developing battle to the depth of the enemy defense. Increased production of artillery also permitted the formation of artillery and anti-tank groups which continued to grow in size and sophistication at every level of command during the remainder of the war. In the spring of 1942, the Soviets created new tank "corps" of division size, including almost 200 tanks each.¹⁵

During the Kharkov operation (May 1942), the South-West Front used two of the new tank corps in an abortive attempt to achieve offensive success. Faulty intelligence, the limited offensive power of the new tank corps and a major attack by large German panzer formations spelled doom for the Soviet offensive.

To further improve the offensive punch of their forces, the Soviets, in the summer of 1942, created large tank armies of ad hoc composition (tank corps, rifle divisions and cavalry divisions) which they used in an attempt to halt the German drive toward Stalingrad. Again, the Soviets found these large formations unwieldy and of limited effectiveness against the Germans. To further improve the offensive power of infantry formations, the

Stavka issued Order Number 306 in October 1942.¹⁶

This order mandated a practice already used in some units. Specifically, divisions, regiments, battalions and companies were required to deploy in single echelons to ensure the bulk of their firepower was employed forward. This practice persisted well into 1943 until the depth of German defenses required deeper Soviet echelonment.

In the Stalingrad counteroffensive in November 1942, the Soviets formed their three *fronts*, each in single echelons of armies, with armies in two echelons of divisions. Tank corps and the newly formed mechanized corps, acting in conjunction with cavalry corps, served as the mobile groups of armies and carried out the successful encirclement of the German 6th Army. Yet the Soviets still lacked a mobile formation of sufficient size to operate as the mobile group of a *front*.

Throughout the winter of 1942-43, the Soviets continued to commit tank and mechanized corps to deep operations against the overextended Germans. Although the Germans parried these thrusts and achieved tactical successes against most of the Soviet mobile groups, the cumulative pressure of the Soviet offensive forced the Germans back to the Kharkov area. During these operations, the Soviets tested the concept of grouping tank corps and mechanized corps in full-fledged tank armies. The tests proved successful, and the Soviets began creating fully mobile tank armies made up of two tank corps and one mechanized corps.¹⁷

These new tank armies (ultimately six were formed), comprising up to 800 tanks each, would function as the mobile group of the *front* while separate tank and mechanized corps would perform the same functions at the army level. By mid-1943, the complexity of combined arms forces

increased as the rifle corps link was re-established in combined arms armies. With this development, Soviet armies usually adopted a single-echelon operational formation (of rifle corps abreast) with rifle divisions in army reserve. Rifle corps formed in two echelons of rifle divisions.

At Kursk in July 1943, the Soviets, for the first time, tested their new *front* mobile groups. The 1st Tank Army participated in the Voronezh Front defense against the German 4th Panzer Army, while the 5th Guards Tank Army won fame in its successful counterattack against German panzers at Prokhorovka on 12 July. In the Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov offensives of July and August 1943, the Soviets unleashed tank armies and tank and mechanized corps as mobile groups of *fronts* and armies respectively.

Committed on the first day of combat, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army completed penetration of German defenses to the operational depth and, by the fifth day of the operation, pushed 120 kilometers into the German rear area. In contrast to their earlier experiences against Soviet mobile groups, in 1943, the Germans could temporarily halt the groups but could not drive them back. Until the end of the war, tank armies and separate tank and mechanized corps performed the role of mobile groups, usually attacking from the second echelon to complete the penetration, exploit the penetration or pursue German forces. By 1945, mobile groups often consisted of multiple tank armies at *front* and combinations of tank and mechanized corps at army level.

As mobile groups grew in number and size, the Soviets forced the Germans to relearn the art of defense just as the Soviets had learned it in 1941. As German defenses became deeper and more sophisticated, the Soviets had to echelon their forces more deeply to overcome the

defenses. *Fronts* and armies usually deployed in two echelons. The first echelon penetrated enemy division and corps defenses, while the second echelon penetrated army defenses from the march and added to the strength of mobile groups. To further bolster the power of the offense, artillery groups at corps and army, anti-tank and anti-aircraft groups, tank reserves, engineer reserves and mobile obstacle groups became a standard element of Soviet operational formation.

However, the use of two-echelon *front* and army formations did not preclude use of single (or triple) echelons if the configuration of the defense warranted it. Most of the operations on the right bank of the Ukraine in early 1944 were by *fronts*, armies and rifle corps in single echelons. During the Korsun-Shevchenkovski operation (24 January-17 February), the 6th Tank Army attacked from the *front's* first echelon. In the Belorussian operation (June-August 1944), *fronts* formed in a single echelon of armies with tank armies as *front* mobile groups. The Soviet strategic offensive in August 1945, against the Japanese in Manchuria, found two of the three *fronts* organized in single echelons.

In addition to the common elements found in Soviet operational formations during the war years (echelons, mobile groups, artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and engineer groups), other functional groupings evolved. The Soviets created operational groups as temporary units operating on separate operational axes (such as cavalry-mechanized groups) or as temporary command staffs to manage forces fulfilling a particular sub-mission of a large unit (regrouping of forces or concentration in a separate sector).¹²

One of the most important functional groupings to emerge was the forward detachment. These were mobile units of varying size (ranging from reinforced

tank brigade to tank corps) whose missions were to penetrate into the depth of the defense to capture important objectives, thus facilitating the advance of main force units.

The Soviets used forward detachments throughout the war, and, as time passed, the number, size and scope of the missions of these detachments increased. Eventually, the Soviets used forward detachments to lead the advance of divisions, corps and armies. In August 1945, in the Manchurian operation, reinforced tank brigades led virtually every first-echelon division and corps advance; a tank division led an army; and, in effect, a tank army led the advance of a *front*. While forward detachments were usually used during pursuit and meeting engagements, by war's end, they also initiated offensive action. In essence, by war's end, forward detachments performed operational as well as tactical missions.

In the immediate postwar years (1946-54), Soviet operational formations reflected the experiences of the recent war. *Fronts* and armies on the offensive included echelons, a mobile group; aviation, air assault (airborne and air-landing) and anti-aircraft groups, as well as a mobile obstacle detachment. Combined arms armies and rifle corps of the *front* and army first echelon created penetrations, while mechanized armies (modified 1945 tank armies) and mechanized divisions (former mechanized corps) served as the mobile group for the *front* and army respectively to exploit success to the operational depth.¹³ Support groups and forward detachments were assigned the same functions that they had performed during the war years.

With the full mechanization of ground forces and the appearance of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, some basic changes occurred in operational forma-

tions The military reorganization of 1954-57, by Georgi K. Zhukov, abolished mechanized armies, mechanized divisions and rifle divisions. The reorganization created tank armies and motorized rifle divisions, thus signaling the full motorization and mechanization of Soviet forces.⁴⁶ This process rendered irrelevant the unique position of the mobile group in operational formations because now all units were mobile. But, while the distinct mobile group disappeared, its function of exploitation remained a valid task. Tank or motorized rifle units in second echelons (or occasionally in first echelons) now performed the exploitation function

The appearance of nuclear weapons increased the vulnerability of conventional ground forces, required their dispersal on the battlefield (negating the old definition of mass) and increased the importance of maneuver by mobile, self-contained operational and tactical units. Concentration of forces to conduct the classic frontal penetration operation, "gnawing through" the defense, became folly, and set-piece battle in carefully patterned arrays was discarded.⁴⁷

The comparative invulnerability of armor to nuclear strikes, the speed of armored units and the growing importance of speedy success in initial offensive operations resulted in greater emphasis on the use of tank units in first echelons. Thus, the classic function of the exploitation forces (the mobile group) blurred a bit. Exploitation could now occur initially in any operation after nuclear strikes by use of reinforced tank units in first or second echelons.

Forward detachments increased in importance as a means for rapid initial exploitation of nuclear strikes. Forward detachments were to quickly penetrate fragmented enemy defenses and destroy enemy nuclear delivery means, command



Georgi K. Zhukov

posts, air defense units and other objectives in the rear. They could also perform the more classic mission of disrupting the enemy defense and forestalling movement of enemy reserves.⁴⁸ Larger tank units of division and army size would perform the classic deep exploitation function at army and *front* level

While the Soviets maintained that a variety of echelons could be used, the two-echelon configuration seemed to offer better dispersal on the battlefield and lessened the risk associated with nuclear attack. This picture of Soviet operational formation conditioned by the "revolution in military affairs" is apparent in the writings of Vasili D. Sokolovsky, A. A. Sidorenko, V. Ye Savkin and V. G. Reznichenko.⁴⁹ Yet, even in the works of the latter three theorists, the seeds of change are evident.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets began to think more about conven-

tional combat. Their discussions of conventional combat techniques (albeit in a nuclear context) grew, and the degree to which they investigated wartime operational and tactical experiences also increased. In particular, authors focused on the role and function of the mobile group and forward detachments as well as on the more basic questions of echeloning at all levels of command. By the mid-1970s, these studies began dropping the obligatory nuclear context and devoted more attention to basic conventional operations.

Soviet theoreticians and military historians analyzed conventional combat in a "nuclear scared" posture, in part reflecting a desire and belief that combat in the future could be kept conventional. At the same time, they looked intensely at the nature of "the beginning period of war" to ascertain what nations have done to stave off defeat if attacked or to ensure rapid victory if on the offensive. Inherent in that investigation was the tendency to look for operational and tactical techniques that could assist in preventing nuclear combat while guaranteeing rapid success on the battlefield. The French experience of 1940, the Soviet experience of 1941 and the Soviet war with Japan in 1945 served as the most important subjects for study of this beginning period of war.

Analysis of successful combat in the beginning period of war, along with study of the nature of contemporary defense, led the Soviets to several conclusions.⁴ First, those nations succeed that quickly bring overwhelming force to bear on the enemy. The effectiveness of such a force is magnified if the enemy is not given time to fully prepare its defenses. Maximum force can best be projected if applied simultaneously across a broad front (single echelon at theater, *front* and army level). The results of the application of such a force can gener-

ate rapid penetration to the depths of the defense and possibly result in a reduced capability or willingness of an enemy to respond with nuclear weapons.

In addition, a single-echelon (with a reserve) configuration reduces vulnerability of classic second-echelon forces to conventional (or nuclear) fires. The Soviets have concluded that the most effective way to initiate such an operation is by use at every command level of tank-heavy, task-organized forward detachments of reinforced battalion or regiment size committed to battle on several axes prior to or simultaneous with the commitment of main force units. Forward detachments can begin the exploitation as well if they achieve success in penetrating defenses to a tactical depth.⁵ Tank-heavy, task-organized operational groups of regiment, division or army size, operating from the first echelon or reserve, can initiate or continue the exploitation on the heels of the forward detachments.

In essence, the forward detachments perform both tactical and operational missions, while the operational groups perform the function historically accorded to the mobile group (exploitation). On the surface, it appears the operational group differs from the older mobile groups in the timing of its commitment (early) and in its initial location at the time of commitment (well forward). Even that distinction breaks down with a close look at the past. There are numerous instances in 1943-45 where Soviet *front* and army commanders committed mobile groups early in the operation from positions close to the front.⁶

In other words, the older functions of the forward detachment and mobile groups have almost merged. Together, the contemporary forward detachment and operational group create the conditions for exploitation to the depth of a defense and

conduct the actual exploitation. The forward detachments are the forward elements of the exploitation forces, and the operational groups are the main body which completes the process of exploitation. This entire operational formation reflects a desire of the Soviets to commit forces to combat on a carefully timed basis to facilitate rapid penetration and steady buildup in the power of the offensive thrust (*narashchivania*) sufficient to carry it successfully to operational depths.

Supplementing the actions of ground forward detachments and operational groups are two new dimensions on the battlefield: an air assault dimension and a diversionary dimension tailored to support the timed application of ground combat power. The helicopter-delivered air assault battalion (at army or division level) will operate in coordination with ground forward detachments, as will a helicopter-borne air assault brigade at front level. Similarly, aircraft-delivered airborne forces in regimental strength will conduct operations in support of the operational groups of army or front.

A third dimension is a direct outgrowth of the Soviet World War II partisan experience. It will involve the use of numerous

small diversionary units deep in the enemy rear to disrupt command, control and communications and engage point targets which were formerly included in the mission of forward detachments (and to a degree are still included). The most important of these targets is enemy nuclear delivery means. Thus, current Soviet operational formation is a comprehensive approach to the problem of contemporary battle molded by the experiences of the past and modified by the realities of the present.

What is significant in this portrayal of the evolution of Soviet operational formation is not what type of formation the Soviets will use today. What is important is that the current Soviet operational formation is not a unique revolutionary creation. It is a reflection of a long tradition of structuring and deploying for battle. In a sense, it represents a full maturation of the concepts Tukhachevsky espoused when he defined deep battle in 1936. It represents years of study, contemplation, experimentation and practice. Soviet operational formation viewed in a vacuum is subject to wholesale misinterpretation. It should be studied, assessed and understood only in the context of its past.

NOTES

1 M M Kuran, *Operativnoe postroenie* (Operational Formation): *Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia) Volume 6, Voennaya, Moscow, USSR 1978 pp 58-60. (Hereafter cited as S V E.)

2 *Boevoe poriadok* (Combat Order), S V E, Volume 1, Voennaya, Moscow, USSR 1976 p 530.

3 For a thorough view of civil war military theory and practice see G V Kuz'min, *Grazhdanskaya voyna i voennaya interventsiya V SSSR* (The Civil War and Military Intervention in the USSR), Voennaya, Moscow, USSR 1958. For a short summary see *Stana vojn i voennogo skusstva* (A History of War and Military Art), edited by I Kh Bagramyan et al., Voennaya, Moscow, USSR 1970 pp 78-80.

4 V Matsulenko, *Pravnie fakti nastupatel'noy boya* (The Development of Tactics of Offensive Battle), *Voennno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Military History Journal), February 1968 pp 28-29 and M Zakharov, *O teorii gubokoy operatsii* (About the Theory of Deep Operations), *Voennno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Military History Journal), October 1970 pp 10-13. (Hereafter cited as VIZH.)

5 I Korotkov, *Voprosy obshchei taktiki v sovetskoy voennoy istorii* (1918-1941 gg.) (Questions of General Tactics in Soviet Military

History), 1918-1941), VIZH, December 1977 p 89.

6 V Danes, *Pravnie fakti obshchevoennoy nastupatel'noy boya v 1929-1941 gg.* (The Development of the Tactics of Combined Arms Offensive Battle in 1929-1941), VIZH, October 1968 p 95. Tukhachevsky was a leading Soviet military leader and theoretician from 1918-38. He commanded the Soviet Western Front in the Russo-Polish War of 1920-21 and was chief of staff of the Red Army from 1925 through 1928, an assistant in the People's Commissariat of Defense after 1934 and in 1937 commander of the Pre-Volga Military District. He contributed to the modernization of Soviet armament and army force structure in the 1920s and 1930s and was instrumental in the creation of aviation, mechanized and airborne forces. As a theoretician he was a driving force behind Soviet development of the theory of deep operations. Accused of treason and shot during the military purges of 1937-38, Tukhachevsky was rehabilitated in the 1960s. For a frank treatment of the affair see Lev N. Kulik, *Tukhachevskiy biograficheskiy ocherk* (Voennnoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow, USSR 1964, pp 189-97).

7 The Soviets created the first tank brigade consisting of 60 tanks and 32 tankettes in May 1930. By 1932 the first mechanized corps consisting of two mechanized tank brigades and a rifle machine-gun brigade with 490

tanks was established in 1936. Soviet mechanized forces numbered four mechanized corps, six mechanized brigades, six separate tank regiments, 15 mechanized regiments in cavalry divisions, and 83 tank battalions or companies in rifle divisions.

8 For comments on Soviet performance in eastern Poland, see F. E. Mango, *The Audacious Beginning* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1966), pp. 13-16.

9 The plan was to form eight motorized divisions in 1943 and seven in the first half of 1941. The tank corps were disbanded on 15 January, 1941. For details of the decision, see A. Hlyzhavov, *A vopros o stroitel'stve brniraniyevskikh voisk krasnoy armii G. G. Gody*, "On the Question of the Construction of Armored Forces of the Red Army," in *The 1930s*, V. IZH, August 1968, pp. 109-11.

10 The mechanized corps tables of organization and equipment consisted of two tank divisions, one motorized division, a motorcycle regiment, a signal battalion, a motorized engineer battalion, and an aviation troop (b7 p. 110). The average materiel strength of the corps in June 1941 was 53 percent, consisting primarily of obsolete T26 and BT5 tanks. Just over 1,450 tanks in the inventory were new T34 or KV tanks. S. P. Ivanov, *Nachalnyi period voyny, The Beginning Period of War*, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1974, pp. 260-62.

11 The theoretical prewar army consisted of four to six rifle corps of 14 to 18 rifle divisions, 19 to 12 artillery regiments, six to eight tank brigades and two to three aviation divisions with a mechanized corps as the mobile group. The rifle division contained three rifle regiments, two artillery regiments, and antitank anti-aircraft, sapper, signal, and reconnaissance battalions with an optional tank company. The rifle division's strength was 14,483 men with 254 guns and mortars. In June 1941, most Soviet armies included two to three rifle corps of six to 18 rifle divisions. By December 1941, armies consisted of five to six rifle divisions or brigades, one to two cavalry divisions, one to two separate tank brigades or battalions, and reduced support units. The rifle division decreased to 11,628 men and lost one of its artillery regiments as well as part of its antitank capability. Rifle brigades of 4,400 men were formed to supplement rifle divisions. Tank brigades of three battalions, then two battalions, provided armory support for 150-193 tanks but, by December 1941, 45 tanks each.

12 For details on the defeat of Soviet mechanized corps in the western Ukraine, see A. Vlodimirov, *Nekotorye voprosy pravopriemnosti kontingentov voiskami, ugo zabaeno gozima 23 iunna 1941 goda*, "Some Questions on the Conduct of the Counteroffensive in Forces of the South West Front 23 June to 2 July 1941," VIZH, July 1961, pp. 21-28.

13 *Istoriya voyny, voennogo iskusstva i teorii voyny, Military Art*, edited by A. A. Strokov, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1965, p. 410; and A. Radnevsky, *Prinyatiye obratnoy penodnoy voyny*, "Penetration of a Defense in the First Period of War," VIZH, March 1972, pp. 17-18.

14 Order Number 325, 16 October 1942, *Svoite slova, besedy o merenye sovetskikh tankovykh voisk v gody velikoy otkrytivykh voyny, The Construction and Combat Use of Soviet Tank Forces in the Years of the Great Patriotic War*, edited by C. A. Licsk et al., Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1979, pp. 100-102, and *Prkaz NKo #325 of 16 October 1942*, "Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #325 of 16 October 1942," VIZH, October 1974, pp. 68-73.

15 The tank corps consisted of two later three tank brigades, one motorized rifle brigade, and support units. Originally, its strength was 100 tanks but, by July, its number fell to 168 tanks and by 1945, 228 tanks.

16 *Istoriya voyny, voennogo iskusstva i teorii voyny, Military Art*, Bagramian et al., op. cit., p. 194. For the text of Order Number 306, see *Prkaz NKo #306 of 8 oktobra 1942*, "Order of the People's Com-

missar of Defense #306 of 8 October 1942," VIZH, September 1974, pp. 62-66.

17 The January 1943 tank army consisted of two tank corps, one mechanized corps (optional), a motorcycle regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment, an infantry regiment, a howitzer artillery regiment, a gas and mortar regiment, multiple rocket launchers, a signal regiment, an aviation communications regiment, a transport regiment, an engineer battalion, and two repair and reconstruction battalions. Changes in tank army structure are best covered in A. Radnevsky, *Tankovy udar, Tank Blow*, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1977.

18 See N. D. Saltykov, *Operativnaya grubica, The Operational Group*, S. V. E. Volume 6, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1978, p. 62, and M. M. Khokhlov, *Uzlyta sozdaniya i ispolneniya operativnykh grupp v kude voyny*, "From the Experience of Creating and Using Operational Groups in Warfare," VIZH, June 1977, pp. 23-29.

19 The mechanized army consisted of two tank divisions, two mechanized divisions and support units with a total of about 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. The mechanized division consisted of three mechanized regiments, a medium tank regiment, a heavy tank self-propelled gun regiment, and support units. It numbered 19 tanks and 63 self-propelled guns.

20 The tank army consisted of four tank divisions and support units numbering 450 to 500 tanks. The motorized division comprised three motorized regiments, a medium tank regiment, and support units totaling 210 tanks and 10 self-propelled guns.

21 For a good description of such combat, see *Istoriya voennogo iskusstva, History of Military Art*, Shchekov, op. cit., p. 608-16.

22 For a good discussion of the utility of forward detachments, see I. Vorobiev, *Forward Detachments in Offense Operations and Battles*, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, Apr. 1965, translated, FDO 957, 6 April 1966.

23 V. D. Sokolovsky, *Voenna strategiya, Military Strategy*, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, Three Editions, 1962, 1963, and 1968. A. A. Sidorenko, *Nastupeniye (The Offensive)*, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1970. V. E. Savin, *Osnovnye printsipy operativnogo iskusstva, tankov*, "The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics," Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1972, and V. G. Reznichenko, *Tankovye Turci*, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1966.

24 For a discussion of the beginning period of war, see Ivanov, op. cit., Bakashev, *Osobennosti nachalnogo perioda voyny*, "On the Characteristics of the Beginning Period of War," VIZH, February 1966, pp. 29-34, and "Big Army," *Prkaz NKo #325 of 16 October 1942, nachev period voyny*, "The Character and Parameters of the Beginning Period of War," VIZH, October 1981, pp. 20-27.

25 For the role of forward detachments in modern combat, see *Pure dovozhay, The Forward Detachment*, S. V. E. Volume 6, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1978, p. 282. N. Kiselev, *Primeneniye tankovykh podrazdeleniy v nastupeniye obratnoy penodnoy voyny*, "The Use of Tank Subunits and Units During the Penetration of an Enemy Defense," VIZH, May 1970, pp. 36-40, and M. M. Khokhlov, *Armatskiy i sputatel'naya obratnoy voyny*, "An Army Offense Operation," S. V. E. Volume 1, Voenizdat, Moscow, USSR, 1976, pp. 239-44.

26 In the Belgrade air attack operation in August 1943, the Soviets committed the 1st Tank Army and the 4th Guards Tank Army to combat on the 1st day of the offensive, about 500 tanks after the offensive commenced. Other offensives in which more than 500 tanks entered combat on the 1st day were the Kursk, Shchekovskiy, Operation 24 January, 1943, the Belorussian Offense of June 1944, the Lassy, Kishinev, Offense of August 1944, the Vistula Operation of January, 1945, and the Berlin Operation of April, 1945.

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The US Army's combat doctrine has been the subject of much debate over the years. This article addresses the continuing dialogue on maneuver warfare and reviews the "military reformer's" criticism of the 1976 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. It highlights maneuver warfare as described in the new FM 100-5 and points out steps that the author thinks the Army must take to ensure understanding of this new doctrine, especially at the operational level.

Maneuver

**and the
Operational**

Level of War

Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. DeVries, US Army


THE attack had come after a period of considerable tension between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As predicted by the NATO intelligence agencies, the main effort was made in the North German Plain, while a strong supporting attack took place through the Fulda Gap and Hessian Corridor. The US V Corps was hit very hard and grudgingly gave ground. The commander, Central Army Group, Central Europe (COMCENTAG), made a bold decision. He ordered the VII Corps commander to move one of his divisions north into the V Corps area to conduct a counterattack against the pact thrust which was advancing along a high-speed avenue of approach (Figure 1).

The division was to be under the operational control of V Corps for the operation, and the commanding general (CG), V Corps, would be responsible for coordination of its employment. VII Corps was ordered to conduct economy-of-force operations to contain possible enemy advances in that sector. COMCENTAG also directed that a cover and deception operation be undertaken to convince the enemy that the US division was not only in its original location but also was preparing for a counterattack in the VII Corps sector. The US division was ordered to move north along predesignated routes under strict radio listening silence. The division CG flew north, ahead of his unit, to be briefed by the CG, V Corps, regarding his mission.

At the corps command post, the corps commander emphasized the importance of this attack to the integrity of the V Corps defense and, for that matter, to the entire CENTAG defense. He also reiterated to the division commander that his objective was the destruction of

the enemy's first echelon. Also, if this operation were concluded successfully, he should be prepared for a rapid return to VII Corps depending on how the situation in that corps area fared.

The attack was launched at 0600 on D + 6 (Figure 2). The US division fell on the left flank of the first echelon of the attacking Combined Arms Army. Using attack helicopters and US Air Force close air support, the leading elements of the division brushed the Soviet flank guard aside and struck a tank division in the flank. Progress was rapid as the enemy attempted to reorient on the new threat from the south.



The combination of the attack helicopters and the concentrations of US armor proved devastating. The counterattack was progressing so well that COMCENTAG offered the CG, V Corps, his

reserve to attempt to annihilate the Soviet force.

Subsequently, the first echelon of the Combined Arms Army was cut off from its second echelon and became encir-

Warsaw Pact Thrust Into V Corps




Figure 1

US Counterattack




Figure 2

cluded. The second echelon already had suffered heavy casualties and now requested permission to withdraw. By

0800 on D + 7, the first echelon's encirclement had been completed, and many units had begun to surrender. The

Soviet commander at this point made a serious blunder by reinforcing failure. More and more enemy units attacked into the chaos and were destroyed piecemeal. Pressure all along the CENTAG front began to temporarily diminish, and COMCENTAG ordered his units to reorganize and prepare for further pact attacks.

The US division executing the successful counterattack was ordered north to the German I Corps for operations in Northern Army Group. Former World War II German Generals Hermann Balck and Friedrich von Mellenthin, commenting on a similar action, held that small forces skillfully led can win battles against larger forces if the small force is synchronized and the larger force is disorganized. They made it clear that this is the essence of successful operations. Their experience told them that it was not difficult to create such opportunities—that the Soviets were peculiarly susceptible to disorganization when confronted with new and unexpected situations.¹

The previous description is intended to focus this article on a question which has been discussed since the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, in July 1976. US Army doctrine has been accused of being firepower-attrition oriented rather than maneuver oriented. Theoretically, both doctrines employ the same elements—fire and maneuver—but firepower-attrition doctrine uses maneuver primarily as a way to transport and position firepower so that firepower can physically destroy the enemy by attrition.

The object of military action here is physical destruction of the enemy. This is not necessarily the object of maneuver doctrine where firepower is used only when necessary to create opportunities for

maneuver. Maneuver doctrine's object is to break the spirit and will of the enemy command by creating surprising and dangerous operations or strategic situations.²

The US Army has come under strong criticism from a group of civilians who consider themselves "military reformers."³ These reformers include some members of Congress as well as members of academia. Also, while not considered reformers themselves, several officers have examined Army doctrine from within and found it unable to sustain the challenge "to fight outnumbered and win!"

Edward N. Luttwak, a Georgetown University professor, espousing the need for a maneuver doctrine, points out that:

It must always be the human factor that is most important, for war after all is decided to a far greater extent by the moral and intangible factors than material.⁴

William S. Lind, legislative aide to Senator Gary Hart (Democrat—Colorado) a staunch advocate of maneuver doctrine, emphasizes that:

The goal is destruction of the enemy's vital cohesion—disruption—not piece-by-piece physical destruction. The objective is the enemy's mind not his body. The principal tool is moving forces into unexpected places at surprisingly high speeds. Firepower is a servant of maneuver, used to create openings in enemy defenses and, when necessary, to annihilate the remnants of his forces after their cohesion has been shattered.⁵

Steven Canby, defense analyst, cautions that:

In armored warfare major attacks are not made across the front in the manner of the Western Allies in World War II; instead the bulk of the front is held by deploying secondary, economy of force units to deceive and to pin down opposing forces while the main attack is concentrated in one or more narrow sectors, to achieve a deep penetra-

tion and subsequent exploitation in the defense rear areas.⁶

Colonel Wayne A. Downing, a brigade commander in the 1st Armored Division, stated:

A maneuver-oriented doctrine is a war-winning strategy for the US Army. Such doctrine acknowledges the realities of the 1980s and beyond and capitalizes on inherent American strengths of flexibility, adaptability and originality.

Brigadier General Robert E. Wagner, a former commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, made the key point that:

The debate over these two styles of warfare is critical because doctrine must be translated through training into an ability to win battles. If the tenets on which our training is based are wrong, then we face the dismal prospect of having prepared improperly for a future conflict. Training can hardly be changed in the midst of a fast paced fire-fight after we have found that the doctrinal foundations of our training are not sound.

Before proceeding we must define maneuver. The new FM 100-5, dated 20 August 1982, defines maneuver as placing "the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power." It goes on to explain that maneuver is the dynamic element of combat power: "It contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and to reducing vulnerability." The object of maneuver is to concentrate forces in a manner designed to gain the advantages of surprise, position and momentum which enable small forces to defeat larger ones. It is the means for:

... achieving results that would otherwise be more costly in men and materiel. At all levels, successful application of this principle requires not only fire and move-

ment, but also flexibility of thought, plans and operations, and the considered application of the principles of mass and economy of force.

The origin of maneuver doctrine is not recent. It was the basis for the successes of both Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan. It was first described in the writings of 18th-century author-generals Marshal Saxe, Wilhelm Boursset and Jacques de Guibert. It has been expanded since by military writers such as J. F. C. Fuller, Heinz Guderian and, more recently, in the unpublished works of Colonel John R. Boyd, US Air Force, Retired, father of the energy management approach to air combat tactics. Its theory is equally applicable to regular or guerrilla warfare, to tactics or to strategy and to air-to-air or ground conflict.¹⁰

Has the US Army officially espoused a firepower-attrition doctrine? If so, is this the correct doctrine for the US Army? In the next several pages, we shall examine doctrine in theory and in practice.

The US Army has always officially maintained a doctrine of fire and maneuver in modern mechanized warfare. An examination of FM 100-5, from 1941 until the present, confirms that fire and maneuver have always been included as doctrine. However, it is significant to note that whereas maneuver was listed as "an essential ingredient of combat power" in the 1968 edition of FM 100-5, it was only mentioned in passing in the 1976 edition. Also, the principles of war, included in every edition of the manual since 1949, were excluded from the 1976 edition.

While not stated explicitly, it appears that the authors of the 1976 edition felt that the lethality of the modern battlefield may preclude effective maneuver in modern warfare, especially in Europe. This is particularly ironic as much of the data utilized in the 1976 edition was taken

from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War where maneuver provided the Israelis with decisive results. So, while maneuver was not officially taken out of the US Army tactical doctrine, it can be said that it just was not emphasized.

This becomes understandable in light of our recent combat experience in Vietnam where we possessed a clear superiority in firepower over the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong forces. Also, it is key to recall here that, because of strategic and political considerations, the ground strategy remained that of a gigantic mobile defense¹¹ where the initiative was usually with the enemy, and any maneuver was carried out as a reaction to his maneuver. The enemy's tactics attempted to compensate for his relatively weaker firepower. Maneuver was key to all of his operations. He rarely accepted battle in unfavorable situations and only accepted decisive combat under exceptional circumstances.¹²

A classic illustration of the enemy's maneuver at the operational level was the Tet offensive of 1968 (Figure 3). Without warning, NVA and Vietcong battalions infiltrated in and around all South Vietnamese major cities for an attack which was timed to take place on 31 January 1968, the Vietnamese New Year's Day. Although initially achieving tactical and strategic surprise, the enemy forces were defeated because of the superior US battlefield mobility which facilitated rapid counterattacks. Nevertheless, more than a month after the Tet offensive, US and South Vietnamese forces were still mopping up pockets of enemy resistance.

Although initially outmaneuvering the US forces, the NVA and Vietcong forces suffered serious losses because of the superiority of US firepower and mobility. It is also significant to point out that, at the operational level—for example, corps,

army and army group front—the NVA habitually outmaneuvered US forces. This was not always the case at the tactical level. Also, this may not have been the case if US forces had been allowed to move into Cambodia and Laos without restrictions.

This discussion of maneuver and mobility also brings out the requirement to emphasize that they are not the same. Mobility is the means by which we execute maneuver. Only when mobility is applied with the aim of inflicting paralysis on the enemy command is it translated into maneuver. Furthermore, a key to understanding maneuver war is to realize that not all movement is maneuver. Maneuver is not a matter of simply moving and acting consistently more rapidly than your opponent.¹³ It is not a way of moving but a way of thinking.¹⁴

Therefore, the idea of fighting outnumbered and winning seems ludicrous without a heavy reliance on maneuver. We cannot match firepower with the Soviets, so we must be smarter to establish combat ratios favorable to us at decisive points. Proper positioning of forces in relation to the enemy frequently can achieve results which otherwise could be achieved only at a heavy cost in men and materiel.¹⁵

Modern US Army doctrine has identified certain factors which increase combat capabilities. These are referred to as combat multipliers. It is the opinion of this writer that maneuver is the greatest of the combat multipliers.

The Battle of Cannae, in 216 B.C., illustrates this superbly. The Carthaginian army, 50,000 strong, under Hannibal, faced a Roman army of 72,000, commanded on alternate days by Consul Gaius T. Varro or Consul Lucius A. Paulus. Hannibal chose to engage the Romans in battle when Varro was in command. Since Varro was the more aggres-

The Operational Level of War of the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong




Figure 3

sive of the Roman commanders, he was more suitable to Hannibal's plan. This plan first sought to deprive the Romans of cavalry protection on their flanks and then to maneuver them into a position favorable to the Carthaginians. Hannibal then planned to destroy the Romans by attacking with all his forces (Figure 4).

Hannibal divided his forces into an advanced weak center and strong flanks, with the latter resting on obstacles. The cavalry was posted on both flanks, with the larger force under Hasdrubal on the left flank. The Carthaginian center was to withdraw slowly and deliberately before the Roman onslaught. The wings of the Carthaginian formation were to remain in position. Hasdrubal was to destroy the Roman cavalry on the right flank, then circle the formation and destroy the Roman cavalry on the left flank which was opposed by a weak Carthaginian cavalry force (Figure 5).

The plan succeeded. Hasdrubal destroyed or put to flight the Roman cavalry of both flanks. The Carthaginian center withdrew slowly and in good order, drawing after it the mass of the Roman army, ever increasing in density as Varro rushed reinforcements to the center in an attempt to exploit the Carthaginian weakness he perceived there. With the outcome of the battle focused on this decisive point, Hannibal ordered his withdrawing center to attack. At the same time, the two Carthaginian wings wheeled in on the Roman flanks, and Hasdrubal's cavalry struck at the Roman rear.

The result was chaotic. Massed so closely, the Romans could scarcely use their weapons and thus were easily slaughtered by the Carthaginians. Some 60,000 Romans perished, with a loss of only 6,000 Carthaginians.¹ By careful planning, maneuver was used to destroy a superior force. Cannae offers many classic

military lessons. But its example of how maneuver becomes a combat multiplier is without peer. At Cannae, Hannibal fought outnumbered—and won! This battle also points out that maneuver is a function of the skill of the commander and intelligence. Hannibal was a skillful commander, and he had excellent intelligence concerning the Romans and their commanders, Paulus and Varro.

A superior understanding of maneuver at all levels was the factor which allowed the Germans to always be stronger at the decisive point (*Schwerpunkt*). A classic example of this was the German invasion of France on 10 May 1940 (Figure 6).

After having fixed a large portion of the French army behind the Maginot line defenses, Germany massed seven-tenths of its total armored strength opposite the Ardennes Forest where there was deployed only a frail screen of the French army's weakest divisions. The German invasion of Belgium and Holland drew the British and French mobile reserves northeast into Belgium. Then, to the amazement of the Allied High Command, the powerful German thrust came through the hitherto thought to be impenetrable Ardennes. It brushed aside the covering troops, roared to the Meuse River, crossed and sped on to the English Channel.

By 21 May, the German armor had cut all communications between the Allied forces in Belgium and those to the south. Allied counterattacks proved ineffective. Allied forces in the north withdrew to the Dunkirk area and were evacuated beginning on 29 May. On 28 May, the Belgian army had surrendered. The decisive thrust of the German armor had split the Allied forces and trapped those in the north. The withdrawal of the surviving Allied forces from Dunkirk freed the German army to concentrate against the French army to the south.

Ancient Operational Level of War




Figure 4

The Classic Battle of Annihilation




Figure 5

The Ardennes Schwerpunkt—Strength Against Weakness




Figure 6

From a military point of view, the German campaign in the west is a masterpiece of modern mobile warfare.¹⁶ Boyd, in his discussion in "Patterns of Conflict," points out that:

The idea was not only to understand

their adversary's strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions, but also to shake them and to cause them to do the wrong thing. The idea of initial surprise. If they have done all these things, they are going to get it. They not only want to get that initial

surprise but to keep that pace going very rapidly through fluidity of action . . . so they can generate that surprise over and over again. The idea being to slam that strength against weakness, start generating that initial doubt and uncertainty, very quickly transforming it into pain and chaos, the big prisoner of war bag.¹⁸

During the summer of 1950, while the Eighth US Army and Republic of Korea forces were fighting for their existence in the Pusan Perimeter, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was preparing a bold stroke (Figure 7). On 15 September, the US X Corps conducted an amphibious landing at Inchon. Simultaneously, forces inside the Pusan Perimeter attacked to link up with the amphibious force. On 26 September, the converging forces met just south of Seoul, and effective North Korean People's Army (NKPA) resistance collapsed.

All or part of eight NKPA divisions were cut off by this advance, and most of the other divisions had to abandon the greater part of their tanks, heavy weapons and supplies as they attempted to escape. The NKPA had ceased to exist as an effective fighting force. Apparently, its commanders had never considered the possibility of defeat and consequently had made no plans for a withdrawal. When one became necessary, it quickly degenerated into a rout and a flight for survival.¹⁹

This operational maneuver required great risk by MacArthur. Forces inside the Pusan Perimeter initially had to conduct economy-of-force operations to free other forces for the landing. Subsequently, a superior combat ratio was established by Eighth Army forces at the decisive point to effect the breakout to the northwest. The overall effect on the North Koreans was to destroy their center of gravity and cause the coherence of their entire operation to crumble.

The 1976 version of FM 100-5 states that "the skillful commander substitutes firepower for manpower wherever he can do so."²¹ It also states that "Firepower saves manpower and thus saves lives."²² Furthermore, it seems to beget the question: Does maneuver warfare cost more casualties? Casualty figures for the 1940 German campaign in the west were 500,000 Allies killed and three million captured. German losses were 156,000, of which 35,000 were killed.²³ These were phenomenal results by anyone's standards.

In the first three weeks of combat for the Third US Army, from 1-21 August 1944, it had traveled faster and farther than any US Army in history. It liberated Brittany and almost sealed the German forces inside the Falaise pocket before it was halted by General Omar N. Bradley.²⁴ US casualties for this period amounted to 1,713 killed, 7,928 wounded, 1,702 missing and 4,286 nonbattle for a total of 15,629. Estimated German casualties inflicted by the Third Army during the same period were 11,000 killed, 49,000 prisoners and 48,000 wounded for a total of 108,000.²⁵

During the initial phases of Operation *Barbarossa*, 22 June-1 September 1941, German General Fedor von Bock, commanding Army Group Center, captured vast numbers of Russians in two giant double envelopments (Figure 8). In the battle of the Minsk pocket, Army Group Center accounted for 300,000 prisoners, 2,500 tanks and 1,400 guns and, in the process, destroyed four Soviet armies.

Subsequently, 310,000 prisoners, 3,200 tanks and 3,100 guns were accounted for in the battle of the Smolensk pocket. By 8 July, the German Headquarters had reckoned that they had destroyed 89 of the 164 existing Russian divisions.²⁶ Of note is that the Germans and their Allies were

The Inchon Landing and the Breakout From the Pusan Perimeter




Figure 7

Battles of the Minsk and Smolensk Pockets— The Big Prisoner-of-War Bag




Figure 8

outnumbered by the Russians 164 divisions to 113.⁴⁷ However, what remains critical is the number of divisions which were committed by both sides at the decisive point (*Schwerpunkt*). This is what decided

the outcome of the battle, not the opponent's total inventory of divisions.

The new FM 100-5 restores doctrinal emphasis on maneuver. In addition, the FM emphasizes tactical flexibility,

speed, mission orders, the initiative of subordinates and the spirit of the offense.²⁸

FM 100-5 goes on to point out that opposing forces on the next battlefield.

*... will rarely fight across orderly, distinct lines. ... Massive troop concentrations or forces which are immensely destructive will make some penetrations by both combatants nearly inevitable [and] linear warfare will most often be a temporary condition at best.*²⁹

Points of decision or decisive points (*Schwerpunkt*) are seen as those places where combat power must be concentrated. Additionally, the new manual concludes that synchronization of operations is necessary to achieve maximum combat power at the point of decision. The FM states that "Synchronized, violent execution is the essence of decisive combat." It is the result of an all-pervading unity of effort throughout the force. "Every action of every element must flow from an understanding of the higher commander's concept."

In another sense, synchronization applies to combined arms which are synchronized in time and space to achieve complementary and reinforcing efforts to greatly magnify their potential individual impacts on the enemy. Operations are conceived with a follow-through firmly in mind. Specific provisions are made in advance for the resolute exploitation of opportunities that will be created by tactical success.³¹ The manual goes on to address how superior combat power is generated under the section entitled "The Dynamics of Battle." Here, the commander's skillful combination of the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection and intelligent leadership in a sound operational plan is emphasized.³¹

FM 100-5 calls maneuver:

... the dynamic element of combat, the means of concentrating forces in critical

*areas to gain ... the advantages of surprise, psychological shock, position and momentum which enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. [Its effective use] demands battlefield mobility, knowledge of the enemy and terrain, ... effective command and control, flexible operational practices, sound organization, ... reliable logistical support [and much more.] It requires imagination, bold, competent and independent leaders*³¹.

Also needed are discipline, coordination, speed, a high state of training and logistical readiness in units. FM 100-5 also states that:

*Effective maneuver protects the force and keeps the enemy off balance ... continually poses new problems for him, renders his reaction ineffective and eventually leads to his collapse.*³¹

Effective maneuver maintains or restores the initiative. It is the means of positioning forces on the enemy flanks and rear over indirect approaches which avoids his greatest strength, exposes his critical forces to destruction and strikes him where he is least prepared. Maneuver forces the enemy to react and restricts his freedom of action. FM 100-5 continues, stating:

*Since great numerical advantages are rare in war, the attacker will normally economize in large areas in order to develop local superiority at the point of his main effort. The attacker concentrates quickly and strikes hard at an unexpected place or time to throw the defender off balance. Once the attack is underway, he must move fast, press every advantage aggressively and capitalize on every opportunity to destroy the enemy's forces or the overall coherence of his defense.*³⁴

An example of this occurred in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Figure 9) where the Israelis, after defeating the Syrians, conducted economy-of-force operations in the

Risk—The Israelis Conduct Economy-of-Force Operations Against Syria and Jordan




Figure 9

Golan Heights area and concentrated their combat power against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Desert. The Israeli forces in the Golan area shelled Damascus with long-range artillery to give the impression that they were preparing to seize that city while sizable Israeli forces moved south. Also, while hostilities did not break out between Israel and Jordan, Israel maintained light forces in an economy-of-force role on the Jordanian border throughout the conflict with Syria and Egypt.

It should be pointed out here that it is far easier to employ maneuver at the tactical level than at the operational level. The larger the unit, the greater the risk. Thus, in our hypothetical NATO example, COMCENTAG took an enormous risk by ordering a VII Corps division to the V Corps area. However, he took the necessary steps to conduct economy-of-force operations to minimize this risk.

At both the operational and tactical levels, the object of maneuver is to concentrate strength against enemy weakness and thus facilitate the destruction of his forces. At the operational level, maneuver is characterized by the employment of corps and divisions to envelop, turn, penetrate or block enemy forces. After concentrating against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai, Israeli forces hurled their strength at an Egyptian weakness—the boundary between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. Here, the Israelis forced a crossing of the Suez Canal which subsequently led to the encirclement of the Third Army and the threat of its destruction (Figure 10).

The US Army has reaffirmed its belief in maneuver in the latest edition of FM 100-5. Publication of this new profession of doctrine should put an end to the arguments of the reformers both inside and outside of the Army. Nevertheless, the question of whether the US Army has had

a firepower-attrition doctrine will continue to be discussed.

Some would say that all warfare is firepower-attrition oriented. Realistically, it must be accepted that, when an army is outnumbered, maneuver becomes absolutely essential to success in battle. Some skeptics believe that, because of the amount of firepower available on the modern battlefield, maneuver is impossible.³⁵ Others hold that it is too complicated to maneuver large units on the modern battlefield and that current levels of training prohibit it.³⁶

Presently, the US Army is fielding many new weapons systems. The presence of these new systems on the battlefield demands that we train our soldiers to employ them skillfully. We must optimize our tactics for these new weapons. The experience of the past three decades amply demonstrates that we cannot simply erect a new doctrine, organize new formations and procure new equipment without an intense effort to redirect the thinking of individuals in the Army. There is more to the problem of instilling the idea of maneuver in the leadership of the Army than General William E. DePuy wrote in his reply to the critics of the 1976 version of FM 100-5:

*Accustomed to open flanks, to operating on the basis of ambiguous intelligence, seeking the enemy and not the terrain, concentrating rapidly, and adapting constantly to the flow of events—these leaders have maneuver in their bones.*³⁷

Clearly, this comment is directed at the US Army's experience in Vietnam. It may be true for some, but it hardly can be accepted as true for all. In order to ensure that a doctrine permeates a military organization, it must be taught throughout the organization's school system. This must be done at officer basic courses through senior service colleges at the officer level and

Israelis Concentrate Force at the Decisive Point to Achieve Success




Figure 10

at primary noncommissioned officer (NCO) courses through the Sergeants Major Academy at the NCO level. A former commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, has stated that:

The [Army's] schools and training centers must do more than provide general instruction. They must teach officers and NCOs how to train tactically and to maneuver their units over the battlefield.³⁹

In retrospect, it is possible to accept that DePuy's analysis may hold true for the tactical level. But what about the operational level? At present, there is no instruction given in the operational level of war or what some authors have called grand tactics⁴⁰ either at the USACGSC or at the US Army War College (USAWC). The significance of this is that, for the last decade, the Army education system has not provided its leadership the basic schooling in the employment of corps and larger units. It appears the Army leadership has assumed, as DePuy apparently did, that knowledge in the employment of a division will also suffice for a corps, army or army group.

The outstanding performance of the US Army professional general officers during World War II has been attributed to the very thorough and extensive (two-year) military education they underwent at Fort Leavenworth in the 1930s. Of course, whether or not there is a formal course of instruction, there will always be those few exceptional officers (the Douglas MacArthurs, Dwight D. Eisenhowers, George S. Pattons, and so on) who will take the time to learn and become proficient in military art on their own. As perhaps the most influential figure on the faculty of the then US Army Command and General Staff School in the early 1930s, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Edward L. "Schnitz"

Gruber, said, "There are few Napoleons."⁴¹

Additionally, with the increasing costs of defense, it is highly unlikely that we shall ever again see exercises of the magnitude of the Louisiana and Tennessee maneuvers of 1941 or the Carolina maneuvers in the early 1960s. Therefore, our service schools must use simulation, classroom problems and the study of historical examples to gain a feel for the operational level of war. To conduct successful maneuver at this level requires greater expertise than at the tactical level. But to acquire this expertise is easier said than done. It will require tremendous risk to maneuver a large force on the modern battlefield.

History is replete with examples of generals who did not measure up to successfully taking this risk when required. It follows also that, in order for a general to be successful, he must have able, knowledgeable subordinates who understand his overall scheme of maneuver and possess the requisite skills to carry it out. General John W. Vessey Jr., while vice chief of staff of the Army, expressed concern that the Army was not preparing its leaders and commanders for the inevitable chaos of battle.⁴²

This chaos of battle and the fear that accompanies it are not present in the classroom. Therefore, it becomes essential that the Army leadership be trained and conditioned to sort out the complexities of future battlefields so that they will make the correct decisions in the presence of fear. Noted military historian, Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, US Army, Retired, has said that:

Nothing can be more obscure than future war and how it will differ from past wars. To reduce obscurity we need a base of certainty to which we apply the new uncertainties.⁴³

This base of certainty must be developed at the USAWC. It is this institution which, in addition to turning out the soldier-

statesman, must also provide the soldier-warrior with the tools he requires to visualize, plan and execute maneuver at the operational level. Richardson, in his "Training for Maneuver Warfare," wrote:

If the colonels and generals are not competent in tactics, and if they do not display their knowledge in teaching their subordinates on a daily basis, they have abdicated both their authority and responsibility. The Army cannot win in a battle without competent and confident senior tactical leaders.⁴⁴

The essence and spirit of maneuver must be taught at Army service schools up through the USAWC level. With the implementation of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³), there are now courses of instruction which include tactics up through division level and which can teach the principles of tactical maneuver. To complete and round out an officer's military education, there should be instruction provided on maneuver warfare at the operational level. This should become part of the curriculum at the USAWC. The victories and defeats of the past, as well as the hypothetical battles of the future, must be analyzed in detail. The Army must prepare its future leaders to conduct corps envelopments or teach them the mechanics of conducting a penetration with a division to create an opportunity for such an envelopment.

Moreover, the USAWC student should be schooled in seeking out and recognizing the decisive point on the battlefield. He should become a past master in the techniques of establishing a favorable combat ratio at the decisive point so that his forces truly can fight outnumbered and win. The Army's reaffirmation of maneuver doctrine guarantees neither its implementation nor its understanding. The USAWC should take the lead in instructing its students in maneuver at the operational level.

Colonel Wilson B. Burt, then assistant commandant of the Command and General Staff School, described the need for the study of operational maneuver when he wrote on 10 September 1935 in the foreword to *Maneuver in War*:

In the academic sequence of instruction at the Command and General Staff School, there is a period of transition from the reinforced brigade and division to the Corps and Army. It is in the nature of things that this transition is abrupt. . . .

Considering that the average student has rarely commanded more than a battalion, the intelligent manipulation, even on paper, of the masses represented by the Corps and Army, called for a strategic imagination of a high order; in the absence of practical experience, such an operative skill can only be acquired through a careful study of great campaigns. . . .⁴⁵

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Naval History Proposals Wanted. The History Department of the US Naval Academy will sponsor its sixth Naval History Symposium 29 through 30 September 1983. The symposium is seeking papers on all topics relating to naval and maritime history. Proposals should be sent to Mr. Daniel M. Masterson, Assistant Professor, History Department, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21402. The deadline for submitting proposals is 1 April 1983.


Every commander faces numerous, often conflicting, demands upon his unit. He has resources such as people, equipment and funds available for accomplishing his mission. However, many times quantities of these elements fall short of requirements. Time is an additional resource that is more readily available and which can become the commander's ally or enemy depending upon how it is used. This article presents a method for making the best use of time in training personnel of a roundout division.

Training Management for Roundout Divisions

Major George P. Coan Jr., US Army

Introduction

THE Army chief of staff has stated his goal to produce a force that is combat ready to fight and defeat any adversary.¹ A well-trained force is the key to accomplishing that goal. Hence, train-



ing must be foremost in the minds of commanders at all levels if they are to enhance force readiness. To train effectively, commanders must use the resources of people, equipment, money and time to maximum advantage.²

The availability of these resources varies depending upon the relative importance of defense to the American people at a given time. Sometimes, constraints are few—for example, during the Vietnam War years. At other times, they are severe such as in the pre-World War II years. The present decade finds the US Army constrained in the availability of people, equipment and money but not time. Time, if properly used, will pay dividends in developing overall force readiness. It is the resource that commanders can best manipulate to their advantage.

Division commanders ensure that their units train in individual and collective tasks to produce an effective fighting team. They have the capability and responsibility to manage time within the division.³ Effective manipulation of time at that level permits quality training of subordinate units throughout the division.

The purpose of this article is to present a method of effectively and efficiently managing time at the division level to allow quality training of maximum numbers of personnel. Rather than focusing on a three-brigade division such as the 82d Airborne Division, this article addresses a US Army roundout division such as the 5th, 7th, 24th or 25th Infantry Division. This type of division has two active duty brigades plus a proportional slice of a normal division base. The third brigade and the remainder of the division base are National Guard affiliates which, most of the time, train independently of the division itself. This type of division continues to fulfill normal operational requirements

and conduct training as does its counterpart, the three-brigade division, but with fewer personnel.

Can a roundout division such as this meet all operational and support requirements yet still train effectively to be combat ready to fight and win? The answer is yes, provided commanders and staffs at all levels skillfully apply sound management principles.

Training Management Principles

Retired Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins writes, "Training is a difficult program to manage. But it is manageable if enough thought is given to it."⁴ Too often the tendency in units is to react to events rather than conduct activities according to a well-conceived plan. General Edward C. Meyer, Army chief of staff, states, "We must learn to make and follow good training plans." But what is a good training plan?

Before I propose such a plan, let me define two terms which are frequently abused in discussing training management: effectiveness and efficiency. Simply stated, effectiveness is doing the right thing, efficiency is doing it right.⁵ The unit may be able to conduct its activities very efficiently but chooses the wrong type of activity. Hence, the goal of combat readiness is not met.

Good training management combines effectiveness and efficiency. The division commander accurately communicates his guidance concerning which types of programs are effective; he gives priority to what he feels is important. To meet the efficiency standard, we must consider how we can best conduct the required programs.

Performance is the criterion. The Army

uses performance-oriented training as the means to develop efficient units. The small-unit leader performs assigned tasks under stated conditions to prescribed standards. Soldiers' Manuals (SMs) provide individual tasks, conditions and standards for most soldiers' military occupational specialties. Each soldier has access to his respective SM and trains to the prescribed standards. Skill qualification tests evaluate his ability to perform the required tasks under stated conditions. The Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) provide the collective tasks, conditions and standards for the unit as a whole (squad, platoon, company, battalion). The small-unit leader uses the ARTEP's stated tasks to develop and conduct his training. Higher headquarters (or the small-unit leader himself) uses the ARTEP to evaluate the unit's ability to accomplish the tasks.

Failure of either the individual or the unit to accomplish individual or collective tasks requires time to repeat the tasks until standards are met. How is this brought about? It is arranged by higher

headquarters stripping away distractors from training and giving subordinate leaders the time needed to use their people, equipment and financial resources to their best advantage. Combining effectiveness and efficiency is the essence of successful training management.

The concept of using resources as efficiently as possible is not new. The draft of Field Manual 25-2, *How to Manage Training*, states that the manual is "a composite of training and management methods that over the years successful field commanders have found work best in Army units." Successful commanders have employed principles gained either through experience or background study to maximize their resources. These principles provide the foundation for my proposal. Although they are not new, their application to a two-brigade division is unique. My proposal would apply the following principles to training management in a roundout division:

- *Centralize planning; decentralize execution.* Provide continuous, long-range planning which seeks to preoccupy units

Members of the 7th Division set up a camouflaged TOW position in Spain



National Guard

for extended periods of time to enhance skill retention. Present comprehensive, ordered guidance that steers the division toward accomplishment of goals. The guidance must be well-articulated, understood at all levels and periodically updated. Ascertain that sufficient resources are available to permit compliance by subordinates and delegate responsibility for execution to small-unit commanders. For example, the division commander should publish a guidance document which states his long-range training goals and objectives and which presents an 18 to 24-month plan, as a minimum, of the training program. As Harry Rogers stated in 1961.

Without guidance or serious thought toward long-range training objectives, the U.S. tactical unit is inclined to live on a day-to-day basis. Short-term objectives are acceptable in lieu of long-term objectives.

Aim for the long term

- *Establish prime time training periods*

This principle is very simple. Ensure that all assigned personnel are available for training during designated prime time periods.¹⁰ Eliminate or redirect activities (distractors) which draw soldiers away from training with their units¹¹ such as post support requirements, military and civilian schooling, routine medical and dental appointments, and demonstrations for visitors

- *Pool support requirements.* Every large organization, such as a division, has unique post support requirements that divert attention from training. They include interior guard, post police, range clearance, higher headquarters' details, burials, school support, National Guard/ Reserve component support, and retirement and ceremonial support. Pool these requirements and execute them on a centralized basis rather than fragmenting them to all units.

- *Coordinate resource management.* Funneling resources to the wrong customers negates their use. Match available equipment, money and administrative support with the personnel actually training. Match support units with the combat units they support.¹² For example, within the maintenance battalion, the maintenance company that habitually supports a particular brigade should train with and support that brigade continually.

- *Require commitment at all levels.* Failure of any level within the command to support the methodology can cause the entire system to collapse. Vertically, within the command, if a brigade commander modifies the blocks of time dedicated by the division commander for training, the small-unit leaders must contend with competing or conflicting interests at their level. Horizontally, if a support command or division artillery operations officer alters the type of support furnished to a particular brigade, small-unit leaders again will suffer

- *Be consistent.* Time is perishable. Once consumed, it cannot be regenerated. Frequent shifts in priorities at any level cause inefficiency at the small-unit level. Careful, deliberate determination of priorities at the outset eliminates confusion in the end. Make change an extreme exception rather than the rule. Should it become necessary, limit change, wherever possible, to one unit to avoid disrupting several training programs. Properly planned, no one should change prime time training except a commander

The impetus needed to implement these training management principles rests with commanders at all levels. Unit commanders are the key operators.¹³ Their innovative use of these fundamentals will enhance the combat readiness of units in spite of resource constraints. Misuse of the principles, however, can be disastrous.

Available Resources

As mentioned earlier, the roundout division has only two active duty brigades. These brigades have various combinations of infantry and armored battalions tailored to accomplish assigned missions. I am assuming here that each brigade has three combat battalions. The division base, however, has significant reductions in its configuration, with the exception of the command and control element.

The reconnaissance and security element (notably the cavalry squadron) has one National Guard and four active duty troops. Each of the combat support battalions of engineer, signal and aviation has one National Guard company, replacing one active duty company, while division artillery has one National Guard and three active duty battalions. The other elements within combat support units have smaller elements belonging to the National Guard. The combat service support (CSS) medical and maintenance battalions each have one National Guard company. The other CSS units have smaller elements belonging to the National Guard.

Thus, the resources available to the division include two active duty brigades complete with their normal attachments (that is, artillery, engineer, cavalry, air defense, and so forth), together with a division base reduced by one battalion-size element, five company-size units and various smaller (platoon/squad) elements. The National Guard units, although directly available in wartime, are not available for use by the division in fulfilling any post and support requirements.

Analyzing the numbers and types of units in the roundout division, and the normal operational requirements and

training needed to make them combat ready, can this division accomplish the goal of combat readiness? Emphatically, yes!

Proposed Method

Every division, regardless of composition, performs the following three basic functions:

- Trains as a collective team.
- Meets operational requirements for possible deployment.
- Supports local installation activities.

The three-brigade division assets easily correlate to each function. For example, the 1st Brigade is the training brigade which trains exclusively for the entire period without interference. It receives most of the resources available to the division and trains to prescribed standards.

The 2d Brigade conducts small-arms qualification, drivers training, emergency deployment readiness exercises and other activities to meet contingency plans. The division determines priorities for repair parts and other combat service support functions to ensure deployment readiness.

The 3d Brigade receives all post support requirements and other distractors. The three maneuver battalions are normally sufficient to meet these requirements. The division assigns overflow requirements to those combat support units that habitually support the 3d Brigade. The 3d Brigade receives the fewest resources from division because it is lowest in priority.

Simply stated, the division matches one brigade with each function and ensures that standards are met. Table 1 depicts the correlation.

How should the three functions described in Table 1 be distributed in a two-brigade to ensure combat readiness?

Correlation of Functions to Brigades Within a Three-Brigade Division

Function	BRIGADE		
	1st	2d	3d
Train	X		
Contingency		X	
Post Support			X

Table 1

The method proposed to answer this question is not new but requires strict compliance with the principles of training management discussed earlier. The margin for error is slight; the results of error are monumental as seen by the small-unit leader trying to juggle conflicting requirements. The method, simple in concept, is as follows:

The division assigns one brigade a block of time (normally six weeks) devoted totally to training as a collective team. The brigade receives all of its normal attachments (that is, artillery battalion, engineer company, *Redeye* and *Vulcan* support, maintenance support, military police, and so forth) from combat support, combat service support and reconnaissance elements. These attachments train with the brigade throughout the period.

With the brigade under his operational control, the brigade commander concentrates on a building block approach designed to operate efficiently at the lowest level before proceeding to larger operations. The brigade receives little interference from the division. The division commander has already established his guidance and diverts all other nontraining requirements away from that brigade. The brigade commander has analyzed his strengths and weaknesses from previous training periods and allocates resources to his subordinate commanders to strengthen their known weaknesses.

Each commander within the brigade aggressively demands maximum attend-

ance at every training session. Commanders eliminate distractors to the goal or forward those distractors to the division for resolution. (If planned well, the brigade commander can tell the division commander when he cannot handle tasks far enough (six months) in advance to eliminate the need for resolution.) Nothing stands in the way of that brigade conducting training exclusively during each day or night of the period.

The remaining brigade receives the mission to accomplish the other two functions (contingency requirements and post support). However, the division uses every available divisional asset (with some exceptions) to augment that brigade in its mission performance. This brigade also

A member of the 24th Division
training with the *Redeye*



receives its normal attachments from the combat support and combat service support elements. Let us look at this situation in detail. The brigade commander subdivides his total forces into two categories—readiness and post support. He carefully manages the post support requirement to set aside battalions, if possible, to perform readiness missions.

For example, assuming that there are three combat battalions, the brigade commander designates one battalion and its attachments as the quick-reaction force capable of deploying in accordance with required contingency plans. That battalion tailors its activities to preparing for the particular contingency (that is, weapons qualifications, load-out plans, and so forth). He designates a second battalion for post support. That unit meets all requirements until depleted. The third battalion (and its attachments) is the "swing" battalion. It meets the next priority in adhering to the contingency schedule and, at the same time, meets the overflow requirement for post support. The third battalion commander personally manages requirements because his situation is highly complex.

Table 2 depicts the correlation of functions to brigades. The brigade depicted in the table can still conduct training despite the primary focus on contingency requirements and post support. The noncommissioned officer can use the irregular periods of time to train his soldiers on SM tasks, promote team-building and squad integrity, and sharpen professional development.

How do other units and the division staff assist this brigade? Any combat support or combat service support commander understands the cycle of the brigade to which his elements are attached and is included in their planning process. Ideally, a continuing dialogue exists between the supported

**Correlation of Functions to Brigades
Within a Two-Brigade Division**

BRIGADE		
Function	1st	2d
Train	X	
Contingency		1st Battalion
		-----3d Battalion-----(swing)
Post Support		2d Battalion

Table 2

and supporting commander to ease the communications problem. If his attached units are supporting the highest readiness contingency posture, the supporting commander ensures that his soldiers and equipment have met the same standards as the supported unit. This relationship is critical as time is of the essence for deployments.

Supporting commanders understand that some of their units will receive overflow post support requirements and will have arranged their units accordingly. For example, the division artillery commander can expect to receive post support requirements. He has a general support battalion, target acquisition battery, and headquarters and headquarters battery as available assets for his use.

The division has an important role in supporting the overall concept. Each division staff officer should understand the following:

- What cycle each brigade is in.
- Who is attached to that brigade.
- Within the nontraining brigade, what the subdivisions are.

Failure to understand these relationships will cause extreme conflict within the units of the division. The division staff allocates resources and assigns tasks by matching the brigade with its cycle. For example, the resource manager for military schools allocates quotas to the brigade involved in operational and post support. The resource manager for training

areas assigns priority for training areas to the brigade in the training cycle. For most resources, the brigade conducting training receives priority. Taskings are directed away from the brigade in the training cycle and to the brigade involved in operational and post support.

However, tight control of taskings from the outset will eliminate unnecessary requirements and permit more soldiers to train. To achieve this control, the division commander should assign an O6 or O7 to personally validate taskings received from higher headquarters. He returns without action all external taskings received after the established suspense date (that is, 60 to 90 days prior to the required support) or, on a case-by-case basis, accepts critical ones. Periodic reviews of all taskings can eliminate needless diversion of manpower. When required to task the post support brigade, the division should follow these guidelines:

- Use a single point of contact for all taskings.
- Adhere to unit integrity in meeting a requirement.
- Use combat support units selectively to assist in meeting requirements.
- Refrain from tasking key low-density combat service support elements to avoid loss of repair capability.

Finally, the division must avoid or severely reduce programs requiring special duty personnel.

Implementation

Several key facets of the proposal discussed herein warrant additional emphasis. No plan is perfect, and certain circumstances can prevent implementation of the best of plans. In order for this particular

plan to be effective, commanders at all levels must seek consistency in their actions. Deliberate, well-conceived, long-range planning will alleviate unnecessary tampering with established priorities. Meaningful, frank discussion of priorities at the start of training will enable subordinate commanders to focus their attention on the efficient use of available resources.

Judicious selection of the length of the training cycle will reinforce stability. (I recommend at least a six-week period.) Stability permits the small-unit leader the flexibility to repeat tasks until the standards are met. Communication between the division G3 and the brigade and battalion commanders is paramount. The division G3 is the spokesman for the plan.⁴ His efforts to keep distractors away from the prime time training brigade are critical. The brigade commander ensures that the relationship between tasks and resources is accurate. The battalion commander (through his company commanders) ensures that soldiers are present for training and train to standard.

Implementation of this plan requires a close and continuous dialogue among key players to quickly overcome any obstacles posed by the dynamics of the process. Failure to overcome obstacles in real time will cause a degradation of efficiency in the units and a reduction in overall combat readiness. The reduced number of personnel in a roundout division necessitates skilled, aggressive management of time to accomplish the three basic functions of training, operational readiness and post support.

The global threat currently facing this nation causes its leadership to demand a military force that is well-trained and ready to fight. Training is the cornerstone to meeting that demand. Resources such as people, equipment and money are absolutely essential but fall short of stated

requirements. Another resource—time—has the capability to become our ally or our enemy depending upon how we use it. The commander of a US Army division has both the capability and the responsibility to effectively and efficiently manage time to his best advantage.

This article presents a method of using time as a resource at the division level of a roundout division to provide maximum personnel for training. Sound management principles exist which, if properly applied, will enable the roundout division to train efficiently using the most effective programs to enhance combat readiness. The resources are fewer, so the margin for error is slight.

Ill use of time as a resource at division level will cause severe conflict at the small-unit level. Failure to provide large enough blocks of time to units for training

while concurrently removing distractors and obstacles will degrade overall combat readiness. Failure to conduct adequate long-range planning will diminish the possibility of priorities remaining constant. Changing the priorities in a roundout division will destroy the ability of subordinate leaders to skillfully use their limited numbers of personnel. Failure to match available resources with the proper brigade will squander the already limited supply. Finally, failure to continually communicate at division and brigade level will exact a terrible price of the brigade trying to perform two functions.

The point to be emphasized is that all of the requirements normally placed on a three-brigade division can be met with only a two-brigade division. Skillful management, coupled with open communications channels, is the key.

NOTES

1 White Paper, *Army-wide Standardization Program (Phase 1)*, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 10 June 1980, p. 1.

2 Arthur S. Collins, *Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders*, Presidio Press, Novato, Cal., 1978, p. 35.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 213.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

5 White Paper, *Army-wide Standardization Program (Phase 1)*, op. cit.

6 Personal interview, Lieutenant Colonel David Cunningham, 2 September 1981.

7 Draft Field Manual (FM) 25-2, *How to Manage Training*, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., September 1980, p. 12.

8 Collins, op. cit., p. 42.

9 Harry L. Rogers III, *Spill Cycle Concept*, *Armer*, January-February 1961, p. 40.

10 Reference Book 100.5, *Selected Readings: Training for Commanders*, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., August 1975, p. 16. 11 *Ibid.*, Collins, op. cit., p. 41.

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
12 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart Circular 1-2, FY 82 83 24th Infantry Division "Mechanized" and Fort Stewart Priority Training Support Cycle Circular and Calendar, Fort Stewart, Ga., 18 June 1981, p. 1.

13 Draft FM 25-2, *How to Manage Training*, op. cit., cover page.

14 Personal interview, Lieutenant Colonel David Cunningham, op. cit.



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MOSCOW'S
VIEW
OF THE
“NEW
**”**
THREAT”

David B. Rivkin

Many of us study Soviet actions and try to determine what the future will bring. But few contemplate how our acts are seen by the Soviets. In this article, the author details what the Soviets perceive to be emerging changes in US foreign and military policies and discusses the implications of such perceptions for Soviet defense policy.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency. Editor

FROM the Soviet perspective, an effective military policy requires a clear, comprehensive and realistic appraisal of the existing political situation and of the nature of present and future threats to Soviet security. Also required is an examination of Soviet resources necessary to meet hostile challenges. The Soviets stress that, contrary to Western practice, they do not engage in intellectually sterile and mechanistic analyses of purely military and technological factors to determine Soviet defense requirements. Instead, they proceed from the assumption that the danger of confrontation between the USSR and its capitalist antagonists is rooted in the fundamental clash of vital political interests.

This clash, present as long as the two opposing social camps (capitalist and socialist) exist, nevertheless varies in intensity from time to time and thus either increases or decreases the danger of armed confrontation. Subsequently, the formulation of Soviet military policy begins with an analysis of the present international situation. The Soviets stress that any attempt to examine any question of defense in isolation from this political framework is "unscientific" and likely to engender significant errors.

Despite the seeming diversity of Soviet

pronouncements, certain persistent traits in the Soviet analysis of the international situation can be discerned. This consistent Soviet approach stems from a unique blend of a peculiar Russian tradition, Marxist ideology and ruthless imperialist realpolitik.

It is hard to assign a relative weight to each individual factor responsible for shaping the Soviet mind-set. Yet the genesis of Soviet perceptions, while an intellectually challenging question, has little operational significance. What matters is that a peculiar Soviet world view exists and provides an analytical framework within which the Soviet leaders make their respective military decisions.

Thus, it is impossible to understand past Soviet military decisions or predict their future actions without analyzing the general world view which all Soviet leaders share. It constitutes an important aspect in their political socialization and provides their one and only framework of reference. This Soviet world view establishes essential parameters for Soviet politico-military thinking which determines the scope and character of the overall Soviet defense effort.

Conceptual Framework of Soviet Politico-Military Analysis

The Soviets are not Marxist dogmatists. Undoubtedly, they are aware of the pano-

ply of geopolitical changes occurring and the growth of a more diverse, complex international environment. Yet, to the Soviets, complex international problems do not defy rational analysis. Instead, all occurrences in the international arena are perceived and evaluated through the prism of the "correlation of forces."

Basically, the "correlation of world forces," which describes the power relationship between capitalism and socialism, is the aggregate balance of the political, economic, military, social and scientific-technical capabilities of the two camps. Contrary to the more narrow "balance of power" concept, which the Soviets claim is derived ultimately from an evaluation of military strength, the correlation of forces concept is characterized as an estimate of class forces:

In contrast with the concepts of bourgeois political analysts, Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the fact that the category of the correlation of forces in the world arena cannot and should not be reduced to the correlation of the military potential of the states and that in the last analysis the correlation is none other than the correlation of class forces on the scale of the worldwide system of international relations.²

Soviet spokesmen state that the correlation of world forces is continually shifting in favor of the socialist states led by the USSR. This dynamic world view is based on the Marxist conviction that mankind moves through progressively higher historical stages, culminating in the inevitable victory of socialism. At the same time, the Soviets maintain that imperialist forces continue their strenuous opposition to this legitimate process of historical change.

Even though the Soviets assert that the global correlation of forces favors the socialist camp, they also proclaim that relations between the USSR and its

chief capitalist antagonist—the United States—must be conducted on the basis of "equal security" and the renunciation of "unilateral advantages." To Soviet leaders, these two fundamental principles of US-Soviet relations are predicated on the overall strategic equilibrium which exists between the two powers.

In this context, the Soviets use the term strategic in a broad sense without necessarily equating it with intercontinental capabilities. In short, the Soviets claim that both sides possess approximately equal aggregates of military capabilities wherein various asymmetries in specific types of military power mutually balance each other.³

Moscow attaches great importance to the existence of this approximate balance:

The realities of the contemporary world cannot be perceived without global military strategic parity. In the course of the last decade this balance became the essential component of an overall structure of international relations. The approximate parity in the military sphere between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO became the most important cause of strengthening international stability, deepening detente and developing relations based on peaceful co-existence among states with different social structures. The evolved parity laid a basis for limitation of armaments, decrease in the level of military confrontation and for a movement towards realistic disarmament.⁴

The Soviets allege that military factors, while not constituting the totality of the overall correlation of forces, nevertheless play a unique role. This role of military factors is twofold. On the one hand, military factors coupled with other instruments provide the means for shifting the correlation of forces in the Soviet favor. On the other hand, Soviet military power provides an effective deterrent against impe-


rialist opposition and safeguards the continuously growing margin of Soviet global advantage.

In praising the established strategic "parity," the Soviets implicitly acknowledge the unsatisfactory character of the previously existing balance. They posit that, following World War II, the United States heavily relied on atomic weapons as instruments of coercion designed to intimidate the USSR. They allege that, in addition, some voices in the United States were heard advocating the direct recourse to such weapons as a way of resolving confrontation with socialism. The Soviets assert that the:

Realization of such aggressive designs met serious obstacles. . . . Nevertheless aggressive imperialist policy was constantly inflaming the international situation, strengthening tension and whipping up arms race. Despite the growth of forces of peace, there existed a realistic threat of a new world war in which imperialism would have been able to resort to the weapons of mass destruction. The decisive objective precondition of weakening of a threat of world nuclear war under these conditions became the further accelerated shift of correlation of forces in Socialism's favor.

This new strategic environment which can reliably and effectively safeguard Soviet interests is based on a strategic nuclear parity:

Shifts in correlation of military forces . . . determined a fundamentally new strategic situation. Its main feature is the impossibility of unanswered nuclear-rocket strike. Under any scenarios of war initiation, an aggressor cannot escape a crushing, retaliatory strike. Even under the most unfavorable conditions, the other side is capable of inflicting heavy, irreparable damage on the initiator of conflict with the help of remaining survivable forces, which



Marx

denies it an opportunity to emerge victorious from a war."

Thus, while the shift in the correlation of forces constrains imperialist options and limits its freedom of actions, it is specifically *Soviet military might which restrains the capitalist adversary from retaliating.* This consideration affords an overall rationale for the development of Soviet military power and constitutes the most challenging role for the Soviet armed forces. Herewith is also hidden an unacknowledged paradox which the Soviets have never been able to resolve successfully.

The shift in the correlation of forces enhances Soviet security by providing the Soviet Union with greater global influence and reach. Yet this positive contribution is balanced by the possible increase in capitalist opposition which is intensified as the capitalists constantly witness

their global position eroding. Leonid I. Brezhnev characterized this trend in one of his speeches by saying that:


... the more imperialism's potential for dominating other countries and people is reduced, the more violently its most aggressive and short-sighted representatives will respond.

The Soviets have not sought to define any specific margin of military superiority as their conscious goal. Yet the maintenance and the continuation of trends favorable to Soviet global interests naturally require the continuous strengthening of the Soviet military power. In fact, the more extensive Soviet interests are, the more military power is required to safeguard them.

From the Soviet perspective, however, such a process does not refute the premise of an approximate equality between the Soviet and US military establishments. Given the Soviet mind-set, they do not mechanistically compare Soviet and US war machines. Rather, they relate both to respective political interests they are supposed to safeguard. It follows that a power with more extensive interests has more expansive security requirements which call for a more powerful military force.

While Soviet writings do not spell out these conclusions explicitly, the implications of the requirement to maintain the shift in the correlation of forces are clear to Soviet decisionmakers. *The Soviet armed forces must be constantly strengthened to the greatest possible extent. This conclusion holds true even if the extent of imperialist opposition is constant.* However, Soviet military policy is further taxed by what the Soviets view as the intensification of imperialist aggressiveness—that is, Western willingness to oppose the "legitimate" process of historical change.

In essence, Soviet concerns center on the future possibility that the United States



Brezhnev

and its capitalist allies might "irrationally" resort to armed force in response to some legitimate Soviet action which is perceived to be inimical to US interests. This threat of imperialist "first strike" always hangs like a sword of Damocles as long as imperialism exists.

Despite their genuine concern with this danger, the Soviets are obviously not prepared to renounce their pursuit of the ultimate global victory of world socialism. As Brezhnev asserted at the 24th Party Congress in 1971:

Recognizing its international duty, the CPSU will continue to pursue a line in international affairs toward promoting the further strengthening of the combat unity of all its participants. The total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable, and for this triumph, for the happiness of working people, we will fight, unsparing of our strength.

This Soviet refusal to renounce its "revolutionary" long-range goals is based not only on its conviction in the inevitability of communist victory, but also on the belief that capitalist hostility toward the socialist camp is *objective* in nature. That is, imperialist powers perceive the very fact of Soviet existence as a threat. Hence, even if the Soviets were to curtail their foreign policy activism, the imperialists would still strive to pose a threat to Soviet security.

The "objective" nature of the imperialist threat implies that the only way to safeguard Soviet security reliably and assuredly is through the effective "neutralization" of all its imperialist enemies. While imperialism exists, it will continue to posit a real threat to Soviet existence. The acuteness of such a threat depends upon the degree of coordination of various capitalist adversaries, their capabilities and the degree of aggressiveness of ruling imperialist circles rather than upon the exact composition of Soviet foreign policy.

**Soviet Assessment of the
Emerging Overall Imperialist Threat**

The Soviets have always dreaded the possibility of a union among their major adversaries spurred by renewed vigorous opposition on the part of their main enemy—the United States. The Soviets contend that precisely such an event is occurring. Since the United States has recovered from its Vietnam debacle, it allegedly again seeks to re-establish the position of global supremacy:

The message and the speech (Carter's 1980 State of the Union Address), permeated with a cold war spirit, openly stated the U.S. claim to a 'leading role' in the world. What 'leading role' means is Wash-

ington's intention to dictate its systems in any region and state and, when the U.S. administration deems it expedient, to use any means, including weapons, to oppose national-liberation revolutionary and all progressive movements. Thus, what we see here is a new American claim to world supremacy.¹⁰

The Soviets are further alarmed by what they perceive to be a US effort to organize a de facto anti-Soviet alliance with China which has apparently met enthusiastic Chinese endorsement:

Beijing has added the USA to the list of its potential allies. . . . This is evidenced by establishment of direct military ties between China and the USA, which are acquiring the distinct earmarks of an alliance, to which Japan is also stubbornly being invited. . . . rejecting the former balanced approach, in its relations with China and the Soviet Union. The USA is openly counting on imparting a 'strategic character' to its ties with Beijing. This is expressing itself in two ways. First, Washington has lifted many restrictions on supplying arms and technology with military applications to China. . . . Second, as was noted in the American President's 'State of the Union' message, the USA 'had broadened new relations with the Chinese Peoples' Republic to insure that wherever our interests are compatible, the actions we undertake independently of one another would be mutually complementary.'¹¹

The Soviets have always manifested concern about the development of US-Chinese ties and have persistently warned about the danger of US-Chinese entente. Yet, in the last year, Soviet pronouncements on this subject have highlighted new important themes. It now appears that the Soviets recognize that, for all effective purposes, the formation of an informal US-Chinese alliance has taken place. The Soviets continue to express

hope that such an alliance would prove to be short-lived and ineffective, for both partners do not truly possess common interests and, instead, merely seek to use each other:

... having come to an agreement on the grounds of bellicose anti-communism and anti-sovietism the policy makers in the USA and China are by no means united in their global claims. Each side strives to involve the other, to link the other more closely to its policies, while at the same time keeping a free hand.¹¹

However, Soviet pronouncements are hardly optimistic and represent a significant retreat from their earlier stance which was designed to forestall the establishment of close US-Chinese ties. That is, Moscow used to admonish the United States as to the unreliability of China as a partner and stress the threat posed by Chinese aggressiveness and irrationality.

Whereas the same themes are not entirely absent in the present Soviet statements on China, the overall thrust of the Soviet effort appears to be much more modest. Confronted with a growing synchronization of US and Chinese foreign policies, the Soviets seek to thwart at least US-Chinese military cooperation:

On the whole, the result of Haig's negotiations with the Peking leadership should be regarded as an escalation of a reckless policy. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the new dangerous turn in Sino-American relations, in particular to the plans for supplying China with modern American arms, military equipment and technology. These actions by Washington and Peking cannot be taken as anything other than hostile to our country.

The ruling circles in the USA and China must realize that a Sino-American rapprochement based on anti-sovietism will be taken into consideration correspondingly in the USSR within the general context of

Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union will take such measures as dictated by the situation which is arising.¹²

The Soviets, concerned as they are, realize that, given the current state of US-Soviet relations, there is little they can do that would seriously affect the development of US-Chinese relations. The dramatic effect of such realization upon Soviet perceptions and likely future behavior is difficult to overestimate. In fact, Soviet writings on the "Chinese problem" do not adequately portray to the Western reader the true extent of Soviet concern.

As stated in the recent US Information Agency survey of Soviet elite perceptions:

Most interesting, the publicly stated reasons for Soviet fears appear almost insignificant when Soviets begin to reveal their true feelings about the Chinese. There is apparently a significant 'disconnect' between the rational and reasoned assessments of the Chinese threat and the more emotional or visceral attitudes. . . . Even among Soviets who scoff at Chinese capabilities there is an abiding dislike and distrust of the Chinese. These attitudes are formed from a combination of racial/ethnic hatred, slighted pride, and irrational fantasies. . . . Realistically, informed Soviets acknowledge that the Chinese are not a major danger to the Soviet regime at this time. Soviet military superiority, especially in strategic weapons, is obvious. Again, realistically, these same Soviets admit that the greater worry they have is of the next 20 years or so, during which time the Chinese may develop a credible military counterforce.¹³

Given the subconscious and semirational nature of the Soviet perceptions of China, the lack of detailed descriptions of the Chinese military threat, à la NATO, in Soviet writings is not surprising. Most sig-

nificantly, it in no way attests to the Soviet indifference to the Chinese military buildup or to their acceptance of a US-Chinese military alliance.

The Soviets also appear to be rather cautious in their assessment of future US-European relations and the extent of a European contribution to the implied imperialist threat. Numerous Soviet statements have been made asserting that West Europeans desire the continuation of detente and resent US efforts to drag them into a confrontational course vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Privately, however, Soviet leaders probably have grave doubts that the Europeans can resist US pressure:

When, during J. Carter's presidency, certain Western European leaders complained that it was much harder for them to talk to the United States than it was for the Soviet Union, they were not far from the truth. Now, under R. Reagan, when a U.S. course of confrontation, a headlong arms race and crude military force are being accompanied by unceremoniousness, effrontery and shamelessness, it is not the Soviet Union—presumably the primary target of all this, but the Western Europeans who have been terrorized.¹⁵

In essence, it implies that, whatever misgiving the Europeans might have about US policies, they are likely to yield eventually to American pressure. Thus, the Soviet leaders believe that they are confronted with a specter of a newly active United States bent on posing challenges to Soviet security and supported in this endeavor by other Western countries and China. This picture hardly looks reassuring. The Soviet "objective" analysis is not focused on the current existing aggregate capabilities of their adversaries but, rather, on the kind of combined resources they possess and the threat level the Soviets will have to confront if such resources are put to good use.

Soviet Analysis of the Cause of the Enduring Imperialist Threat

Soviet acknowledgment of the worsening international situation presents Moscow with a challenging intellectual dilemma of how to reconcile its current gloomy outlook with the previously oft-voiced assertions of consistent improvement in the Soviet global posture. To resolve this seeming contradiction, Moscow has resorted to the dialectical method which states that each phenomenon contains within itself the struggle of two opposing forces. Brezhnev, in his speech at the 26th Party Congress, expanded upon this notion:

It (the period from 1976-1981) was marked above all by the intensive struggle of two trends in world politics. On the one hand, the course toward curbing the arms race, strengthening peace and detente and the defense of the sovereign rights and freedom of peoples. On the other hand, the course toward undermining detente, boosting the arms race, the policy of threats and interference in other people's affairs and the suppression of the liberation struggle. They were years of further growth in the might, activity and prestige of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. . . . The aggressiveness of the policy of imperialism, and above all American [imperialism] sharply increased.¹⁶

Presumably, the Soviets believe that these two trends in world politics have always been present. However, what is subject to change is their relative alignment. During certain periods, a more "realistic" policy of accepting the inevitability of Soviet gains prevailed. At other times, the inherently aggressive nature of imperialism reasserted itself in unmiti-

gated hostility toward the USSR

The Soviets have a broad conception of what their armed forces are supposed to protect. Clearly, the primary function of its national military establishment is to safeguard the security of the homeland. In addition, Soviet forces are tasked with the protection of those dynamic social processes which favor Soviet interests by deterring the United States and other capitalist states from the use of force.

As long as the sober-minded politicians determined the direction of Western policies, the Soviets were convinced that this "extended deterrence" mission was being accomplished successfully. Numerous Soviet pronouncements revealed that the Soviet armed forces were fulfilling their "internationalist" duty. In 1974, the late Marshal Andrey A. Grechko, then minister of defense, writing in the authoritative party journal, stated:

At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.¹⁷

In 1970, Brezhnev himself asserted that: "No questions of any importance in the world can be solved without Soviet participation, without taking into account our economic and military might."¹⁸

In fact, the USSR believed that not only was it legitimately entitled to "equal security" vis-à-vis the United States, but that the latter, recognizing the futility of obstinate opposition, had explicitly agreed to grant it to the Soviet Union. For example, Soviet commentators have referred to the agreement on the basic principles of US-

Soviet relations, signed in 1972, and to other related documents.

Significantly, the Soviets began to assert that the shift to the "second," more aggressive course in the imperialist policy coincided with the renunciation of previous obligations vis-a-vis the USSR assumed by the United States. Despite Soviet unhappiness with President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy, the theme of the United States being a treacherous and unreliable partner renegeing on its prior commitments did not appear as a major theme in the Soviet press until the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent withdrawal of SALT II from the Senate.

The Soviets interpreted this gesture as a formal abandonment of the "equal security" principle by the United States. Subsequently, Brezhnev himself took the occasion to announce this new Soviet assessment of the United States on 13 January 1980 in his interview with a *Pravda* correspondent. He stated that:

Growing more distinct is the view of the United States as a completely unreliable partner in intergovernmental ties; as a state whose leaders, prompted by any whim, caprice or emotional outburst, or even by reason of narrowly perceived immediate advantage, are at any moment capable of violating their obligations and renouncing their signed treaties and agreements. It is necessary to explain what a dangerous, destabilizing effect this exerts on the whole international situation—more so than acting in such a manner as the leaders of a major influential power, from whom the peoples might expect measured and responsible policies."

The same theme has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions and applied to the actions of the Reagan administration:

... blind class hatred of socialism has captured the minds of the U.S. leaders to such an extent that they, having voided all

treaties and agreements signed by their predecessors which dealt with limiting the arms race and establishing normal relations with the socialist countries on the principle of equality and equal security, are returning straight to the unpleasant memories of the policies of a 'cold' if not 'hot' war. That was true in regards to the Carter Administration. It is all the more true today in regards to the Reagan Administration.²¹

Thus, the Soviets appear to believe that the imperialist world, led by the United States, is making a dangerous transition from a former restrained course, which prevailed in the 1970s, to a course of openly challenging the shift in the correlation of forces and attacking "legitimate" Soviet interests. What kind of explanation do the Soviets provide for this change? It is true that they have previously maintained that the two contradictory courses were always present in imperialist policies vis-à-vis the USSR. Yet this assertion by itself does not provide an explanation of why a second course seems to prevail now.

The Soviets maintain that the current imperialist backlash is caused exclusively by the United States and that the rest of the capitalist states merely joined the US anti-Soviet course. Thus, their answer stems from an assessment of the US role. While the Soviets have rarely differed in their assessment of the United States as the prime adversary, they, nevertheless, have often disagreed on how best to achieve their goals vis-à-vis the United States.

Out of a multitude of Soviet opinions on this subject, two major views can be identified. One group contended that the USSR could maintain good relations with the United States as the latter seemed to be governed by sober-minded politicians who could be prompted to acquiesce to the gradual diminution of the United States'

worldwide role. The second group doubted these contentions. Rather, it asserted that the United States was naturally belligerent to the Soviet Union and that its period of good relations with the USSR was an aberration and not a harbinger of things to come.

When the Soviet Union embarked on a path of detente with the United States in the early 1970s, the ensuing debate between those two groups was not clearly resolved. Yet the Soviets believed that, at the time, the moderate and realistic group in the United States was firmly at the helm and was subsequently ready to pursue a "realistic" policy vis-à-vis the USSR. This group, however, accepted this "realistic" policy as a necessity virtually dictated by the increased might of the USSR.

As a leading commentator for *Izvestia* put it:

I do not believe that the people who determine the foreign course of the United States suddenly became imbued with sympathy for the Soviet Union. . . . Imperialism remains imperialism. But times are changing and politics are changing. The leaders of world capitalism realize that it is now impossible either to intimidate or to 'roll back' the Soviet Union.²²

The same commentator once described detente as a means of "painless transition to a new international system" and expressed confidence that the United States would have to accept this transition.²³ Simultaneously, despite their optimism, the Soviets were convinced that the more hawkish elements of the US political spectrum were not eliminated and continued to possess significant influence:

The attitude of the USA's leaders toward relations with the USSR has been marked for a long period of time by two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, there exists sober consideration of the power of the Soviet Union and other countries of the

socialist commonwealth. Hence, there is a tendency to prevent excessive aggravation in relations with the USSR and to understand that the solution of present international problems cannot be achieved without appropriate contacts and discussions with the Soviet Union. . . . On the other hand, there is a tendency to subvert the position of world socialism by all means to counter the growing influence of the USSR and other socialist countries, to create in various regions of the world critical situations pregnant with military conflicts, and to suppress the national-liberation movement. The latter tendency is always present . . . Thus, the nature of Soviet-American relations depends on which of these two tendencies dominates the foreign policy of the USA in a given period of time."

Thus, the Soviets have always fundamentally admitted that, while the realistic and somber course vis-à-vis the USSR was likely to prevail, there was always the possibility of a reversal. As we have indicated above, the Soviets believe that such a reversal has indeed taken place and that its capitalist adversaries have adopted a confrontational course initiated by the United States. The United States presumably began to pursue such a course as a result of an accession to power by the hostile, "unrealistic" and anti-Soviet group which has been temporarily restrained throughout the 1970s.

Having acknowledged these unpleasant facts, the Soviet leaders are ready to face the implications. The absorption of the unfavorable impact of the imperialist transformation is eased by the oft-voiced Marx's conviction that history, while generally moving in a progressive direction, is by no means an uninterrupted string of victories of "good" over "evil." As Nikolay N. Inozemtsev once noted:

It would be inexact, as the founders of

Marxism always stressed, to imagine history as a completely harmonious, uninterrupted, and unimpeded forward movement. No real life is more complex."

Lest the unwary thought that this general statement had no operational implications for the Soviet policymakers, a notable Soviet commentator specifically invoked Vladimir I. Lenin's authority, stating that

V. I. Lenin stressed more than once that history develops unevenly and that its development could slow down or even change course in some particular aspects and for a limited period of time owing to the influence of actions undertaken by reactionary forces. This is why V. I. Lenin frequently warned against a dogmatic approach to the analysis of situations against the substitution of ready-made formulas, for the facts of living reality, and against the expectation that events and phenomena would everywhere and always follow some kind of timetable like that of railroad trains."

The Soviet leaders are ready to accept philosophically the difficult conditions prevalent in the current international situation. At the same time, they resolutely deny that this shift has been caused by any particular Soviet action. Instead, they attribute it to a well-calculated Western effort to regain lost world supremacy:

The desire of imperialism to alter the ratio of world forces in its favor and take revenge for defeats in the social battles of the 20th century is seen most clearly in the activities of the ruling circles of the United States. The current administration in Washington is following a policy of undermining detente and aggravating the international situation. It attempts to impose its will not only on its NATO allies but on every country in the world. Evidence of this is seen in the program to build up NATO military efforts which was adopted



Lenin

under U.S. pressure, *the decision to deploy new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the flagrant intervention in the affairs of Iran and Afghanistan, and the attempt to put economic and other pressure on the Soviet Union, going so far as to boycott the Moscow Olympics*."

The Soviets further assert that, once the US imperialists settled on an anti-Soviet course, they began looking for a suitable way, "public relations wise," to justify their policies. Subsequently, "artificial pretexts were created, based on distortions and lies concerning legitimate Soviet actions." Thus, the Soviets believe that American anger and protests over particular Soviet actions, far from being the true cause of an anti-Soviet shift in US policy, merely served as a convenient rationale for a course already decided upon. This Soviet view is characteristic of Moscow's tendency to "mirror-image" in assessing its adversary.

From the Soviet perspective, a policy is decided upon based on "objective" factors;

hence, the same must be true about the United States. To change one's policy based on whim or a particular action taken by another side, which is not to one's liking, would be the height of folly. Moreover, the Soviets argue that, in the past, they have provided ample evidence of the kind of policy they intend to pursue and did not attempt to deceive the United States. Subsequently, events like Afghanistan, "objectively" speaking, could not have surprised the United States.

Brezhnev himself stated at the 25th Party Congress that he did not perceive any contradiction between Soviet support of its interests in the Third World and good relations with the United States. Explaining it in ideological terms, he asserted:

Some bourgeois politicians affect amazement and raise a houl over the solidarity of Soviet communists and the Soviet people with the struggle of other people for freedom and progress. This is either naivete or, more likely, deliberate obfuscation. After all, it could not be clearer that detente and peaceful co-existence refer to relations between states. This means above all that disputes and conflicts between countries must not be settled by means of war or by means of the use of force or the threat of force. Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and it cannot abolish or alter the laws of the class struggle. We don't conceal that we see in detente a way to the creating of more advantageous conditions for peaceful socialist construction."

Thus, the Soviets maintain that the hostile US reaction to events in Afghanistan was merely a smoke screen for an already decided upon aggressive US policy:

The American administration is constantly looking for or creating artificial pretexts to substantiate its hegemonic actions and incite chauvinism. . . . because conflicts break out from time to time everywhere in the world, there will always be

leading figures in the U.S. government who will emphasize the global repercussions of these conflicts and the potential danger which they create for U.S. security. Militant journalists and Congressmen will always take up the subject and try to persuade the President to participate in these conflicts. When he wants, the President can quickly inflate the significance of any of these conflicts, at least by using the crisis rhetoric to which the White House can always resort. It only remains to add that this was exactly the way things went with the actions of the Washington administration in relation to Afghanistan, where revolutionary changes supposedly involved the 'global interests' of the United States.²⁸

By implication, the Soviets maintain that, once the "hawkish" group within the imperialist elite prevails, the shift to anti-Soviet policy becomes inevitable no matter how benign the Soviet foreign and defense policies might have been.

Soviet Perception of the "New US Military Strategy"

Soviet analysts assume that the US attempt to shift the correlation of forces would engender new military requirements for US armed forces. They contend that the new US search for world domination is supported by programs of unprecedented military buildup, accompanied by destabilizing revisions in US military thought. They further assert that the major US objective is to achieve broad military supremacy over the USSR.²⁹

The Soviets believe that, in building up an overall margin of military advantage, the United States intends to pay particular attention to the creation of strategic nuclear superiority:

The nuclear equilibrium had left the new

version of the American 'from a position of strength' policy 'without a roof,' so to speak. For this reason, together with the plans to create a 'rapid deployment force' made up of general-purpose forces of the United States, the search has been stepped up for ways to insure the greater military political applicability of the American nuclear potential also. While proclaiming the devotion to the concepts of 'restraint' and a 'retaliatory strike' in words, Washington is in practice unwilling to abandon a search for the possibility of a preventive nuclear attack in some form or another.³⁰

Simultaneously with a nuclear arms buildup, the United States allegedly pursued with new vigor its erstwhile effort to impose "advantageous" rules on nuclear combat on the USSR while downplaying the danger of a nuclear war.³¹ This policy, the Soviets maintain, enhances the political usability of US nuclear weapons and provides an overall umbrella under which US conventional armed forces can be used more safely. The United States is also alleged to pursue the path legitimatizing limited nuclear war, which can be fought and won on US terms, while simultaneously presenting an ever-growing threat of a first strike against the USSR:

At the root of the rise of the role of the military factor in U.S. foreign policy is the yearning to turn back the irreversible course of the historical process and an attempt to recapture the position of 'World Leader' which the U.S. lost. This tendency, whose highest prophets are the foreign policy ideologues of a coalition of 'neo conservatives' and the 'new right', is becoming predominant at the present time. There are enough clear signals available indicating that the idea of this coalition actively exert an influence on the formation of the political course of the Washington administrations, first and foremost on the list of Soviet-American relations

One of the most dangerous postulates of the 'neo-conservative' and new right ideas lies in their disregard for the nuclear factor, or in any event, their considerable diminution of the scope of its danger in the present epoch. *But this signifies a direct threat to the cause of peace and international security, since it excites the sentiments in certain American circles in favor of a military solution to disputes and conflicts, charges the atmosphere with tension and uncertainty, destabilizes the 'permitted bounds' which evoked on the basis of international experience, and urges the use of nuclear arms.*³²

A number of Western analysts dismiss the possibility of the real Soviet fear of a US first strike. After all, they contend, anybody familiar with US history and national psyche would understand that it has always eschewed the first-strike concept. Moreover, the United States did not resort to a surprise attack against the USSR in the early and middle 1960s when it enjoyed something very close to a "splendid first-strike" capability.

However, both arguments are not very reassuring to the Kremlin leaders. Since they are convinced of the fundamentally hostile nature of imperialism, they are likely to dismiss the argument about American national character as irrelevant. Moreover, the Soviets actually can produce proof that the United States prepared contingency plans featuring a first nuclear strike against the USSR. Soviet writers are fond of quoting the declassified version of the US plan "Dropshot" circa 1950 which envisioned an atomic attack against the USSR.

It is true that, in the early 1960s, the United States had an impressive disarming capability vis-à-vis the USSR that it chose not to utilize. However, the Soviets do not consider the state of strategic balance per se as the most important cause of

war. At the time, despite the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, the level of confrontation between the United States and the USSR was not very high. Since the United States enjoyed a margin of strategic superiority, it could exert desirable concessions from the Soviets without resorting to war. Most importantly, at the time, the USSR was not a global power and did not pose a significant challenge to US global interests.

Thus, the political antagonism between the two powers, while "subjectively" high—witness all the rhetoric in numerous Berlin crises—was "objectively" tolerable. The Soviets consider the present situation to be fundamentally different. It is precisely the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power whose worldwide interests challenge those of the United States and the US determination to regain its lost global supremacy that make the present situation so explosive, making the threat of war so much more acute. As a recent article put it:

*War was not likely between 1950 and 1975 because each super power had primary influence in the areas of the world most important to it and had no real desire to detach part of the other's sphere of influence or control. This is no longer the case.*³³

Statements about the alleged US military-political "master plan" have been made by very authoritative Soviet spokesmen, including former Premier Brezhnev, Dmitri Ustinov and Nikolay V. Ogarkov. A recent article by Marshal Ogarkov, chief of the general staff and the likely future minister of defense, lucidly presents the Soviet perception of Washington's emerging anti-Soviet strategy:

It is known what serious harm the Carter Administration did to the cause of disarmament. But a still more dangerous and reactionary course was taken from the very first days the new American Administra-

tion was in power. In the meantime, several trends in its military political plans have already come to light with sufficient clarity.³⁴

The Soviets state that the first element of Washington's "aggressive" design is the factual renunciation of all previous agreements limiting the arms race and effective refusal to pursue meaningful arms control in the future.

The second feature of the US master plan, according to Ogarkov, is the powerful pressure which the United States is exerting on its allies to adopt similar anti-Soviet policies. In essence, the US allies are expected not only verbally to support the US anti-Soviet policy, but also to provide a tangible contribution to the US military posture.

Third, Soviet apprehension over the US strategic nuclear buildup is enhanced by its perception of a similar US move in other military areas. Thus, the USSR does not regard intermediate-range theater nuclear forces deployment and strategic modernization to be isolated developments. Rather, Ogarkov speculates that the United States is developing a comprehensive, well-balanced military posture, particularly emphasizing the Navy as well as projection and mobility forces. Clearly, the Soviets envision a period of new US military assertiveness under the "secure umbrella" of American nuclear superiority.

All of these actions, according to Kremlin leaders, make a significant departure from the previous "realistic" course pursued by the United States. *Moreover, they contend that present American actions are not accidental but, rather, represent a carefully orchestrated master plan to attain military superiority and geopolitical dominance and ultimately to destroy the socialist camp:*

The various actions and diversions pres-



Ustinov

ently conducted by the imperialist circles against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth and against the progressive forces of peace have a coordinated nature bound by a common plan and have as their goal the gradual, consistent weakening and undermining of socialism as a system and in the end, the establishment of the world supremacy of American imperialism.³⁵

This profoundly changes the international environment in which the Soviet Union has to operate and has significant repercussions for Soviet military policy.

Policy Implications

The Soviets are clearly committed to do whatever is necessary to frustrate the alleged US attempt to alter the existing

strategic equilibrium. This Soviet commitment stems from two fundamental considerations:

- Shore up deterrence. The Soviets realize that the quality of one's deterrence is not exclusively based on the relative state of the strategic balance. In fact, deterrence is not a derivative of one's operational capability but is, to a great extent, dependent upon the state of existing international environment, the state of mind of one's adversary, and so forth. The Soviets have always been convinced that, barring major adverse shifts in the strategic balance, minor strategic asymmetries per se do not appreciably influence the quality of nuclear deterrence.

Moreover, the Soviets also believe that their ability to influence the outcome of the internal American debate on US-Soviet relations is quite limited. Nevertheless, Moscow contends that, while strategic asymmetries should not be inevitably destabilizing, given the existing American mind-set, any perceived tilt of the strategic balance in the United States' favor would further embolden the already reckless imperialists. The Soviets are committed to prevent this from happening at any cost

- The Soviet conviction that nuclear war remains possible has ensured their interest in creating a credible war-fighting posture. The perennial Western debate as to whether the Soviets believe in the winnability of a nuclear war is quite irrelevant in understanding Soviet behavior. Based on available Soviet sources, there appears to be varying Soviet estimates as to how costly a victory in a nuclear war would be. In fact, one may find some Soviet sources, especially those contributed to by certain Soviet civilian writers, which almost seem to imply that any victory in a nuclear war is likely to be a Pyrrhic one.



Gorkov

Moreover, the Soviets have recently released several publications which most emphatically and explicitly proclaim that they do not believe in the winnability of a nuclear war.³⁰ The same themes, in a somewhat more muted form, have been consistently proclaimed in statements by all major Soviet political leaders throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Undoubtedly, there are differences of opinion among individual Soviet leaders on how achievable a nuclear victory is. Most of them seem to doubt that such a victory is even feasible.

Nevertheless, the operational implications of this "debate" are irrelevant. However optimistic or pessimistic Soviet decisionmakers are about the possible outcome of a nuclear war, they intend to do all possible to avoid it or, if it comes, to win it. Thus, the Soviet quest for victory is not affected by their lack of certainty that such a victory is possible.

In essence, this provides the major rationale for strengthening maximally the Soviet strategic posture. The unlikelihood of an assured victory in wartime in no way affects Soviet operational planning which concentrates on maximizing Soviet chances for a favorable outcome. The emerging Soviet conviction that the deterioration of the international situation makes war more likely further reinforces the Soviet proclivity to accumulate as much strategic "surplus" as possible.

Given the existing structure of the Soviet economy and the fact that the Soviets already devote an overwhelming percentage of their gross national product to defense, substantial net growth in Soviet defense expenditures is unlikely.

A report was recently issued by the French Center for Future Studies and International Information. It indicated that, in order to sustain the present tempo of military modernization and satisfy consumer demands, the Soviets have had to

curtail almost to zero the size of their net investment.¹ Thus, the most likely Soviet response to the new strategic situation is the reallocation of currently available military resources. Given the undisputable priority which the Soviets attach to the maintenance of a favorable strategic balance, it is conceivable that the overall spending for strategic missions will increase, while the amount of resources allocated for other military tasks will decline.²

The emerging picture of the Soviet defense policy in the 1980s is obviously tentative and incomplete. Numerous internal factors which we cannot adequately account for affect the ultimate structure of the Soviet force posture. Nevertheless, given the Soviet mind-set, an appraisal of the existing political situation, and of the nature of present and future alleged threats to Soviet security, undoubtedly influences the direction of the Soviet defense policy.

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Joint STARS Formed. The *Pave Mover* Office at the Electronic Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command is now the Joint STARS (Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) Program Office. The Air Force/Army Joint Program Office will manage the development of an airborne radar which, besides detecting enemy armor on and behind the battlefield, will also help direct attacks against it.

Both Air Force and Army personnel will staff the office, with the Air Force acting as lead agent. The office will work closely with the US Army Missile Command which is developing munitions to be used with the airborne radar. Tests are currently under way at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, of two advanced development radars built by Hughes Aircraft Company and Grumman/Norden under contract to the Rome Air Development Center. The tests include direction of mock attacks on moving vehicles. The Joint STARS will use the test results to design an operational radar.

**A
New Army
Emphasis on
Leadership:
Be,
Know,
Do**

Lieutenant Colonel Boyd M. Harris, US Army



Renewed emphasis is being placed on the quality of leadership in the US Army. This article provides a historical example of the results that can be attained through the imaginative use of leadership techniques and discusses the philosophy contained in the new Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, which will soon be sent to the field for comments.


A CASE STUDY: THE BATTLE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP

COLONEL Strong Vincent, the brigade commander, positioned Joshua L. Chamberlain's regiment, the 20th Maine. "You are the left of the Union line. You understand? You must hold this ground at all costs!"

They did not know it at the time, but the 358 soldiers of the 20th Maine Regiment were about to come under a violent attack by fierce, battle-hardened soldiers of two Alabama regiments, the 15th and the 47th. They were to fight one of the greatest small-unit actions in history, a fight that would influence the fate of the Civil War and the nation.

The time was about 1630, 2 July 1863. The place was Little Round Top, a rocky hill near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Chamberlain gathered his company commanders and explained the seriousness of the situation. He ordered his regiment into line. Minutes later, it was subjected to a violent assault all along the front by the 47th Alabama Regiment—tough, seasoned veterans. While the 20th Maine was repulsing this assault, an officer rushed up to Chamberlain and informed him that a large enemy force was moving to attack their exposed left flank. Chamberlain had to exercise the quick, creative thinking that characterized him throughout the war.

There was no tactical drill to counter this situation. Chamberlain had to create a new tactic. Pointing to a boulder at the



extreme left of the line, he ordered a new defensive line to begin there, at right angles to the existing line. The entire regiment was to shift to the left and back, keeping a continuous fire to the front so the enemy would not suspect a move.

Amazingly, with voice control impossible because of the clamor of battle, the regiment accomplished this difficult new move in a matter of minutes. It was as if the entire regiment had seen the maneuver diagramed and had rehearsed it several times. Minutes after forming the new line, the 20th Maine was assaulted by the 15th Alabama Regiment.

From this point on, no participants in the battle were ever able to remember or describe exactly what happened. For the soldiers involved, the battle took on a dreamlike quality. The devastation of the rifle fire and the resulting carnage were severe. The 20th Maine fired 20,000 rounds. A much larger number of rounds came in to its position. One tree was sheared off at knee height by rifle fire.

The 20th Maine suffered 30-percent dead and wounded. The ground was strewn with gray and blue bodies. Chamberlain, wounded in the foot by a shell fragment, was bleeding. His right thigh was severely bruised where a musket ball had struck his scabbard. Soldiers were down—wounded, dying and moaning—all over the battlefield. Squads of charging Confederates bayoneted their way through, only to be thrown back by the Maine men.

Later, Chamberlain said that there were several times when he had more Confederate soldiers around him than his own men. At one point, he was aghast to see only two men defending the entire center of the line—the colorbearer and a comrade. He plugged the line with his brother and an orderly. The 20th Maine miraculously withstood six charges by forces out-

numbering them 3-to-1. After six charges and an hour of violent fighting, there came a lull.

Chamberlain quickly gathered his company commanders to assess the situation. They informed him that only one or two rounds of ammunition per man were left. As they were talking, word came that less than 30 yards away the Confederates were forming for another charge. Chamberlain considered his possible courses of action, searching for something that might work. He knew that he was out of ammunition and that his regiment simply could not withstand another assault. They would be overwhelmed by superior numbers and firepower. He could not withdraw since that would mean giving up the key terrain, the battle and maybe the war.

Even though Chamberlain was wounded and under great stress, his mind worked clearly. He settled on a course of action. They would fix bayonets and charge—not for heroics but because that was their only chance to wrest the initiative from the enemy and gain the psychological advantage. To the astonishment of his company commanders, he ordered a bayonet charge. He pointed out that they would be attacking downhill and thus would have an advantage.

Even with the charge, Chamberlain had a tactical problem which was not covered in the manuals. His regiment was in two halves—an unorthodox formation. If split, mutual support would be lost. Again, Chamberlain came up with a solution. He directed the left half of the regiment to charge first. When those soldiers were abreast of the right half, the entire regiment would charge down and to the right like a great swinging door—firmly hinged to the left flank of the 83d Pennsylvania. The company commanders immediately ordered their men to fix bayonets and be prepared to charge. With the enemy begin-



Joshua L. Chamberlain

ning another fierce assault from only 30 yards away, Chamberlain ordered the charge. Young Lieutenant Melcher, a company commander, leaped in front of his company, saber flashing in the sun. The left half of the regiment charged, driving the stunned Confederates before them. When the left half of the regiment came abreast of the right half, Chamberlain again gave the order to charge and strode forward leading his regiment in the assault.

The regiment was at the enemy's throat with bayonets before the Confederates knew what had happened. At point-blank range, a Confederate officer fired his pistol at Chamberlain. He missed and handed his sword to Chamberlain in surrender as Chamberlain's saber was at the Confederate officer's throat.

The Alabama men, stunned, began to fall back to the positions of the 4th and 5th Texas Regiments where the 20th Main charge might have failed except for a stroke of surprise. Before the battle had begun, Chamberlain had sent his B Company out to his left flank as a screen. He

told Captain Morrill, the company commander, to act according to his own judgment and the dictates of the situation. Morrill had done just that. He had not seen fit to enter the battle until that moment.

As the Confederates were falling back, they came into the sights of Morrill's company and 14 US sharpshooters who had joined him. Morrill's company poured effective fire into the flank and rear of the Alabama regiments. Colonel William Oates, commander of both Alabama regiments, began to receive reports that he was being attacked in the rear and flank by an enemy division or regiment, that a large Union cavalry force was in his rear and that he was surrounded. In reality, no Union cavalry was in the battle. The charge of the 20th Maine and the rear and flanking fire sowed the seeds of panic in the Alabama regiments.

Oates did not know that he outnumbered the 20th Maine 3-to-1 and that it had no ammunition. He did not know that one more push would have gained him Little Round Top and started the entire Union line falling like a house of cards. His analysis of the situation was wrong, and his identification of the problem was wrong. He ordered a breakout—every man for himself. Suddenly, his two cohesive, disciplined regiments, which had marched all night, all day and made six charges, deteriorated into panic-stricken, fleeing individuals. The panic spread, and the battle, for that day, was over.

The 20th Maine soldiers swept the front of the brigade, capturing some 400 prisoners from four different regiments. As the soldiers from the 20th Maine walked back across the body-strewn battlefield, many felt that a historic action had just been fought. They were right. Most historians agree that the Battle of Gettysburg was the turning point in the Civil War. They believe that the key to the battle on

the second day was the cohesiveness, discipline, willpower and courageous fighting of the 20th Maine soldiers and Chamberlain's leadership.

* It is ironic that the fate of a decisive battle, a war and a nation could come to rest so heavily and disproportionately on the shoulders of a relatively small number of woodsmen, farmers and fishermen from Maine. Or that they would be led by a colonel who had been a professor of writing and foreign languages at Bowdoin College only a year before the battle.

For his day on Little Round Top, Chamberlain was awarded the congressional Medal of Honor. He went on to become one of this country's most remarkable soldiers. By the end of the war, he was a major general. In the conflict, he had 14 horses shot from under him, and he was wounded six times. He fought in 24 battles. Chamberlain serves as a superb example of what a leader must be, know and do to lead soldiers successfully in battle.™

One may ask about the relevance of a Civil War battle to the modern battles that we may face in the future. One thinks that the modern battlefield of massive artillery, possible nuclear weapons, air attack and armored assaults will be far more devastating and lethal than anything in the Civil War. Certainly, we must prepare for differences. However, much of the face of battle will not change. Human nature does not change. The attributes of leadership required to develop cohesion and discipline and to inspire soldiers in battle have not changed. The payoff in battle is moral forces in soldiers—confidence, morale, courage and a will to fight.

™ The primary source for this account of Chamberlain and the 20th Maine is John J. Pullen, *Twentieth Maine Volunteer Regiment in the Civil War*, J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1957, a remarkable, fascinating book that provides many insights on leadership, cohesion and soldiers in battle. Other background sources used are Willard M. Wallace, *Soul of the Lion: A Biography of General Joshua L. Chamberlain*, Thomas Nelson Inc., N.Y., 1980, an excellent biography of Chamberlain and his own after action report, and Michael Sharrar, *The Killer Angels: A Novel About the Four Days at Gettysburg*, David McKay Co. Inc., N.Y., 1974.

As shown by the Battle of Little Round Top, physical forces (numbers of soldiers, firepower and tactics) combine with moral forces in strange ways so that one side maintains the will to fight and destroy the other's will. In the end, moral forces determine victory or defeat. Inspirational, thinking leadership, more than any other factor, influences the moral forces of soldiers in battle.

The Battle of Little Round Top provides two important, fundamental lessons that are of great relevance to modern soldiers. On the modern battlefield, we are likely to be outnumbered. There will be greater stress and worse devastation than at Little Round Top. Units, small groups of soldiers and individuals will probably be isolated. Success will require well-trained units with discipline, cohesion, endurance and a will to fight—units like the 20th Maine.

The 20th Maine had been through an excellent individual and collective training program. The soldiers were tough. They were exceptionally well-led by dedicated patriots—men of unbending character. The soldiers had confidence in themselves, each other, their leaders and their cause. We will have to have units of this caliber to win the AirLand Battles of the future. Moreover, if we are to win on the modern battlefield, we will have to have good to great leaders at all levels—leaders like Chamberlain who can think creatively under stress and develop new tactical solutions to totally unexpected, potentially disastrous, situations.

Senior leaders in the Army are placing a strong emphasis on improving the programs in Army schools and units for developing, educating and training professional leaders of character, knowledge and skill. Emphasis is also being placed on creating a command climate in all units that fosters leadership development, cohesion, morale and the will to fight. As an important part

of this effort, the US Army Command and General Staff College has proposed a new, Field Manual 22-100, *Military Leadership*, for company-level leaders. The manual is based on a concept of what a leader must *be, know and do* to lead soldiers successfully in peace and war. The Chamberlain case is used to illustrate this new approach.

A CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP

The proposed concept of leadership is broad and straightforward. It consists of three basic parts: a definition of leadership, four factors of leadership and a set of leadership *be, know and do* attributes that are required to lead soldiers successfully in peace and war.

Definition

The essence of leadership encompasses everything that a leader is, knows and does that affects mission accomplishment. That is a broad view, but it meshes with the complexities of reality. To be more precise, *leadership is a process by which a soldier applies his beliefs, values, ethics, character, knowledge and skills to influence others to accomplish the mission.* This definition is lengthy and multifaceted, but, let's face it, leadership is tough and complex. All important facets of leadership have to be in the definition. Every facet of leadership in that definition is crucial to good leadership and to the creation of cohesive, disciplined units that can withstand the stress of battle and win.

Factors of Leadership

The second part of the framework addresses the four factors or variables of

leadership. These factors are:

- *The follower* is the common denominator of leadership. One cannot be a good leader unless he has a basic understanding of human nature and a clear understanding of the particular attributes of his subordinates. The leader must understand their values, character traits, knowledge, skills, needs, fears, experience, education and goals if he is to communicate with them and influence them to accomplish missions. Chamberlain understood his troops. He knew their capabilities and their limits—their potential.

- *The leader*, like the follower, is a person who is subject to the same principles of human nature. A leader must have a clear, honest understanding of his own attributes—needs, goals, experiences, motivation, and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Chamberlain knew how to best use his own capabilities to influence unit effectiveness and the outcome of battles.

- *Communications* is vital to leadership. Everything that a leader does is through the medium of communications. When he sets the example, he communicates. To plan and to solve problems, he communicates. To give orders, supervise, evaluate and motivate, he communicates. He communicates when he teaches and counsels—two major responsibilities of a leader.

Communication is the lifeblood of a unit—the flow of accurate information. A breakdown in communications causes a unit to deteriorate just like a part of the body dies when its blood supply is cut off. Leaders must understand communications and how to achieve clear, open, candid communications between themselves and their subordinates and among their subordinates.

Effective communication is essential to build cohesion. The cohesion of a unit

depends on the bonds of trust, respect, confidence and understanding that exist between leaders and troops and among troops. If these invisible bonds are strong, the unit can withstand great stress. If they are weak, the unit will deteriorate under stress. These bonds of cohesion are built through shared experiences, tough training and clear, honest communications.

Chamberlain had superb oral and written communications skills. He knew how to talk to soldiers and how to listen. He knew how to keep an accurate flow of information in his unit—up, down and laterally.

● *The situation* includes all the forces that affect the follower, the communications, the leader and the leader's ability to influence others to accomplish the mission. These forces include such things as the weather, the terrain, the enemy, the organization of the unit, the weapons, the equipment, the informal structure of the unit, the command climate and the quality of the relationships among various leaders in the organization. No list is complete. The leader must determine which forces in the situation are productive to mission accomplishment and reinforce them. He must also determine what forces are counterproductive and take action to counter those forces. Chamberlain was skilled at accurately assessing the situation and influencing the forces in the situation.

The preceding are the four variables or factors that operate in all situations. The more a leader and his subordinates understand about each factor, the better leader he will be. These factors are generally in a state of flux. Leadership techniques that worked in one situation with one group may not work in another situation. A slight change in one factor, perhaps a change in the weather, can have a great impact on morale which, in turn, can affect the leader's plans and the way he commu-

nicates. The point is that leaders must be sensitive to the fact that all the factors interact and affect each other. Good leaders think through the factors and consider them as they face and solve leadership problems.

The Be, Know and Do Competencies or Attributes

The last part of the conceptual framework of leadership is a set of competencies which are fundamental to leading soldiers successfully in peace and war. Leaders at all levels should possess these attributes.

The first category of attributes is what a leader must *be*. The *be* is what a leader is inside—literally, his being. A leader's being—his beliefs, values, ethics and character—is his essence as a leader. A leader's beliefs, values and character determine if he is selflessly motivated to serve the nation, the Army and soldiers or if he is selfishly motivated to look good for promotion. They influence the professional and personal goals he sets. They set the direction for his leadership. They determine how he applies his knowledge and skills.

Beliefs are opinions or assumptions about people, concepts or things that one holds to be true but cannot prove. Values dictate the level of importance one places on people, concepts or things. A person's most central values are those things or ideas that he most deeply believes in or least wants to give up. It is clear that the beliefs and values of the opposing leaders and troops in the Civil War had a great effect on their plans, motivation and action.

For example, on the deepest levels of beliefs and values, the Confederate soldiers strongly believed that the Union was trying to take away their rights—the right to hold slaves and the right to secede. Most Union soldiers believed that the Confeder-

ate states did not have the right to hold slaves or to break up the country. The leaders and troops on both sides held deep patriotic beliefs in the just cause for which they were fighting. The evidence is overwhelming that those beliefs influenced their motivation and will to fight.

Additionally, Chamberlain possessed deeply ingrained beliefs in the Union and in duty, responsibility, selfless service, loyalty and honor. Robert E. Lee believed that God was on his side; that one more heroic push on the third day of Gettysburg would bring victory. Having once attacked the enemy on the first day, Lee's beliefs and values would not allow him to withdraw and look for a more advantageous battlefield. He thought it would be an act of cowardice and that it would destroy the morale of his army.

A person's ethics flow from his beliefs and values. Ethics are general rules or guidelines that professionals follow to ensure that they do their duty in accordance with professional values (loyalty to the nation and its ideals, loyalty to the Army, personal responsibility and selfless service). Ethics help ensure that soldiers do not submit to selfish human tendencies and thereby abuse the power society has given to them.

Through special training and the granting of authority to make crucial decisions, society gives professionals life-and-death power. The members of society have to trust professionals to use that power for the good of society and not toward selfish ends. Ethics guide professionals in the use of their power for the good of society. Chamberlain followed a code of ethics which ensured that he did his duty in accordance with his professional values of duty, responsibility, loyalty, selfless service and honor.

Character is the sum total of an individual's personality traits. A person of strong

character has traits that are synchronized. He knows what he wants, and he has the will, drive and energy to go after it and get it. People of strong character attract followers. They give followers a sense of confidence, direction and purpose that is motivating. A person of weak character has traits that do not click. His lack of purpose, will, drive and nerve does not attract followers.

Character can be good or bad as well as strong or weak. A person of good character cares for others and builds social values. A person of bad character destroys social values. Gang leaders are examples of people with strong but bad character. The US Army needs leaders of strong and good character. One of the reasons the Civil War was so long, bloody and tragic is that there were so many leaders and troops on both sides with deep beliefs in their cause. These soldiers had the character to fight for those beliefs regardless of the stress, danger or consequences. As shown at Little Round Top, Chamberlain and the soldiers of the 20th Maine had the character to hold the ground "at all costs," regardless of the consequences. They could have withdrawn or run. Many units in the history of war have done so under far less severe conditions.

Character is the link between our beliefs and values and our behavior. People of strong character have the willpower, drive and courage to act on their beliefs and values regardless of the situation. We say that there are certain character traits that soldiers of all ranks must have: courage, competence, candor and commitment. Then, there are traits that all leaders must have: initiative, flexibility, self-discipline, confidence and decisiveness. Finally, there are some character traits that are not essential but that contribute to good leadership: creativity, bearing and a sense of humor. Chamberlain, his subordinate

leaders and many of his troops displayed strong character.

The US Army has never had a common leadership doctrine that deals specifically with beliefs, values, ethics and character. Some have believed, in the past, that these areas are important but that the overall educational system and Army climate could be trusted to ensure that correct professional values and character traits are inculcated in soldiers and young leaders. Although this approach worked to some unmeasurable degree in the past, it cannot always be trusted to work in the present and future. In addition, there is now a clearer understanding of the intangible process by which beliefs, values and character traits are inculcated in people.

Therefore, in the proposed leadership manual, an entire chapter is devoted to explaining and illustrating beliefs, values and ethics. It explains how a leader can influence the inculcation of values and ethics in himself and in subordinates, how to identify and deal with people who have unprofessional values and will not change, and how to analyze and resolve ethical problems.

Another chapter in the manual deals with character. It explains and illustrates important character traits and how a leader can influence his own character development and the character development of most of his subordinates.

The second crucial category of leadership competencies or attributes is what a leader must *know*. The new manual contains a section on knowing one's self, job and unit. The section about knowing the job discusses the critical importance of technical and tactical knowledge and how to obtain it. The section on knowing the unit discusses cohesion, discipline and human nature. The focus is on how to develop cohesion and discipline. The section on human nature explains what one

must know about human needs, emotions, fear and panic if one is to motivate soldiers under the great stress of war.

The third critical category of leadership competencies is what a leader must *do* to apply the action skills of leadership. These action skills have been divided into three types.

- *Directing skills* set the direction for a unit or organization. They are the mental skills of leadership: thinking, planning, problem-solving and decisionmaking. The soundness of a leader's thinking skills literally sets the direction for his unit. Chamberlain's directing skills were superb—far beyond what anyone could have expected. Regular Army colonels and generals were astounded at Chamberlain's creative thinking under stress—coming up with new tactical moves to wrest victory from near defeat. The new manual devotes a chapter to explaining and illustrating the directing skills and how to develop them in one's self and one's subordinates.

- *Implementing skills* involve communicating, coordinating, supervising and evaluating. A leader can have great plans, but, if he cannot implement them, he is lost. The need for communications was mentioned earlier. As professionals, we all know the vital need for leaders at each level to evaluate both the big things and the small details. There is an art to applying these skills, and the way the leader applies them has a great impact on the leadership climate, morale, motivation and combat effectiveness. Oversupervision causes resentment, low morale and ineffectiveness.

On the other hand, undersupervision, which also causes resentment, low morale and ineffectiveness, gives the perception that the leader does not care. Chamberlain understood the art of implementing. Before, during and after the Battle of Get-

tysburg, he was always at the point of action—the crisis—guiding, communicating and seeing that necessary coordination, supervision and evaluation were accomplished. When a potential disaster occurred, he was always right there in the middle of it to help sort it out but not to add to the confusion by oversupervision. The new manual devotes an entire chapter to explaining and illustrating how to develop implementing skills in one's self and one's subordinates.

• *Motivating skills* are the third type of action skills. A leader can have great plans and valuable implementing skills, but, if his soldiers are not motivated, all is lost. Motivating skills are intangible and much more difficult to inculcate than directing and implementing skills. Also, a leader's motivating skills are influenced by that leader's values and character. As stated earlier, a person of strong character is more naturally able to motivate soldiers than a person of weak personality or character. However, the motivating skills can and must be taught and trained in Army schools and units.

A chapter in the proposed manual is devoted to motivating skills. It explains a basic view of motivation—that people are motivated to take actions that they perceive will lead to the satisfaction of needs. It also explains a number of practical principles of motivation such as taking action

to cause the needs of subordinates to coincide with the needs of the unit and rewarding behavior that leads to high standards and mission accomplishment. For each principle, a set of practical examples is provided to show how to apply that principle.

The manual explains teaching, emphasizing its crucial importance as well as its direct and long-range impact on the motivation of subordinates. Continuous teaching, coaching and counseling are major ways that leaders instill technical competence, values, character, knowledge and skills in their subordinates. Good teaching, coaching and counseling cause subordinates to have confidence—a crucial motivating force.

There is a chapter in the proposed manual devoted to programs a leader can use to develop his subordinates and his unit. Through these programs, leaders can teach leadership competence to subordinates on a day-to-day basis, in conjunction with normal activities, in peace or war. The time to develop great soldiers, units and leaders is now. A leader never knows when he may find himself on some small piece of ground, like Little Round Top, with the fate of a battle, a war and the nation depending on the character, knowledge and skill of himself and his subordinate soldiers and on their discipline, cohesion and will to fight. \mathcal{M}_R



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Remodeling Engineer Models

The juxtaposition of two opposing doctrinal articles concerning tank survivability positions, "Engineer Combat Multipliers for the Maneuver Force" by Colonel James R. Whitley, Lieutenant Colonel (P) James H. Andrews and Major Michael Difley and "On Omens and Oracles" by Colonel Gerald C. Brown (*Military Review*, September 1982), proved interesting reading. The two articles and their contrary conclusions should serve to broaden professional interest in this important topic.

I believe, however, that Brown's defense of survivability positions did not address the major weakness of the article which preceded it. Brown focuses on the concept of digging in tanks when such dedicated engineer effort upholds three tactical conditions.

- The tank positions enhance the ability to knock out more enemy tanks.
- The survivability positions (number and location) support the commander's concept.
- The construction of tank positions adheres to the commander's priorities for mobility, countermobility and survivability support.

Conversely, Whitley, Andrews and Difley have used a flawed war game model in producing their doctrinal conclusions. Thus, the need remains to comment upon their article regarding the defective network of logic applied against engineer-constructed positions.

In selecting a quantitative model, the analyst must ensure that it will provide a realistic representation of the situation it is chosen to simulate. The authors used an inadequate model, *JANUS*. Specifically, they dismissed such tank killing and delaying systems as emplaced obstacles,

remotely delivered mines (FASCAMs) (family of scatterable mines), artillery fire, air attack and battlefield obscurants. The model subsequently fails to recognize that US forces are not organized to repel major enemy tank attacks solely with armor and antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). More importantly, the *JANUS* simulation was haphazardly adapted to reflect enemy delay caused by obstacle employment. An artificial five-minute delay was introduced. The resulting tactical scenario then follows an unrealistically simple sequence:

- The enemy begins an attack.
- The enemy halts in the open for five minutes.
- Both sides exchange fire during "delay."
- The enemy continues across the entire frontage of attack.

This sequence is incapable of producing reliable conclusions on the synergistic effect of countermobility and survivability measures.

These three authors base their modeling on one other erroneous assumption. They contend that, once a tank or ATGM position is prepared, it must be occupied continuously until the system is destroyed or overrun. This is not a valid doctrinal or tactical "given." Vehicle commanders can abandon dug-in positions or "defilades of opportunity" at any time that there is an advantage in doing so.

Additionally, enemy bypass is not as fatal a proposition as the authors contend. The AirLand Battle doctrine anticipates situations in a rapid war of maneuver where units will be bypassed by design. The new Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, devotes an entire chapter to tactics of encircled forces. The *JANUS* model does not reflect implementation of this doctrine

whereby dug-in tanks and ATGMs can continue to engage bypassing units.

In summary, the *JANUS* data seem to have been manipulated in order to highlight the authors' viewpoint. A mathematical model is only a framework for crunching numbers in order to form an analytical comparison. The resulting data are neither magic nor necessarily valid. In "Engineer Combat Multipliers for the Maneuver Force," the authors have attempted a *JANUS* adaptation which neglects too many facets of doctrine and realism. Your readers should regard the delineations and conclusions accordingly.

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Women in the Army: A Different View

Major Robert L. Nabors' article, "Women in the Army: Do They Measure Up?" (*Military Review*, October 1982), abounds with the exact kind of academic rhetoric that has backed our Army into the unfortunate dilemma it now faces. The author's veneer of objectivity rapidly crumbles as he moves toward the conclusion that "women . . . are capable of filling any Army position, including those from which they are currently excluded." Can Nabors really be serious?

Indeed, he must be, as are others who espouse the same timeworn arguments that somehow always manage to evade the pragmatic, grim realities of a sexually mixed combat force. Their strategy here is to isolate and diffuse separately each of the major issues—strength, stamina, pregnancy, human sexual behavior and cultural conditioning—as if each of these factors was the only problem to be overcome in fielding male/female fighting units. No acknowledgment whatsoever is made of the synergistic and devastating consequences of these aggregated variables on battlefield effectiveness.

There are real dangers in debating social issues within the framework of a sanitized, peacetime military. The further we digress from the mud and the blood of combat, the easier it becomes to substitute collegiate poppycock for common sense. Ultimately, we start to entertain such arguments as American women are "larger than the men from many other countries."

Then, there is the push-button theory which suggests that modern weapon systems obviate the requirement for strength or stamina. This uninformed assertion simply ignores the sheer physical work required to perform the grueling chores of keeping a fighting force armed and rolling. Both of these arguments represent the kind of misplaced logic that is quickly exploited by antiregistration protagonists and women's liberationists who insist that female volunteers can perform any combat task to standard.

It is a clearly demonstrated fact that women do perform many important and demanding jobs in our military. No reasonable leader can deny that the US Army depends upon our nation's men and women. But there are many jobs that the Army's leadership should neither ask nor permit women to undertake.

Nabors' article seems to imply that there are only two categories of Army leaders: first, those farsighted individuals who acclaim the utility of female soldiers in every military occupational specialty and unit and, on the other side, obstructionists who have fallen prey to "culturally produced attitude barriers" and must be "sensitized" to the reasons for their behavior. By so arguing, Nabors neatly transforms what is really a combat effectiveness issue into what appears to be an equal opportunity issue.

There are many well-meaning persons who view this controversy as a problem of equal opportunity and who try to draw a parallel with the Army's positive experience in race relations. I disagree. The color of a soldier's skin has no practical bearing

on combat performance. But strength, stamina, pregnancy and sexual factors all do and will continue to do so despite the best efforts of some to philosophically alter the physiologically unalterable. Any serious attempt to sexually integrate the main battle area disregards the very fabric of womanhood.

The author suggests, for example, that it is simply a case of "paternalism" that might cause male commanders to "worry inordinately" about their female soldiers being captured and ravished. Is there no legitimate basis for this concern? Ironically, these arguments for women on the forward edge of the battle area show a surprising lack of concern for women in general. "They wanted suffrage so let them suffer" appears to be the underlying attitude. A case in point is Nabors' recommen-

dation that pregnant Army women choose between an abortion or administrative elimination. I see this as the sort of moral aberration that comes from trying to make men out of women.

I argue, then, for women in the Army but off the battlefield—primarily for the cause of combat effectiveness but also for the welfare of Army women. And I reject the notion that this makes me some kind of victim of my culture. How much longer must we continue to sap our Army's precious resources by playing the role of vanguard for social experimentation? Perhaps, instead, it is time to get on with the business of winning the next war

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Metric by 1990. As the United States shifts to the metric system, the Department of Defense (DOD) has set its own policy and timetable for the conversion process. The undersecretary of defense for research and engineering set 1 January 1990 as the target date for converting specifications and standards to metrics throughout DOD and in defense contracts.

This does not mean that all DOD activities will be metric by that date. But, by being able to write specifications and contracts in metrics, DOD can use metric items as they become available from private industry. In the meantime, conversion efforts are already under way. A directive providing guidelines and procedures for converting to metrics specifies that DOD is to adopt the metric system when:

- There is a specific military need for materiel to be used jointly with NATO and other allied nations.
- Military materiel has a potential for significant foreign sales or joint production programs.
- Industry has made significant progress in metric conversion and production facilities are available.
- Defense and industry military preparedness or defense production readiness may be enhanced.
- Economic, operational or other advantages accrue or no disadvantage is incurred.

The general emphasis of DOD policy is to keep pace with overall metric conversion activity, both commercial and government. When a military item has no commercial counterpart, the developing military agency is to assume leadership in developing the necessary metric specifications and standards.

A "No" to No-First-Use

By David Adamson

Foreign Service Journal, September 1982

In an article in the spring 1982 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith asserted that NATO should consider adopting an unconditional no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons (*Military Review*, August 1982, p 75). In assessing the arguments presented by these four authors, David Adamson, a foreign service officer and an adviser on political and security affairs at the US Mission to the United Nations, believes the thesis presented by Bundy et al. is "unconvincing."

The no-first-use advocates base their proposal on the premise "that any other course involves unacceptable risks to the national life that military forces exist to defend." They cite as advantages the following:

- Escape from the pressures of always feeling the need for newer nuclear capabilities since we already possess the capability to retaliate to any kind of Soviet nuclear attack.
- Reduction of the risk of conventional aggression in Europe because NATO would beef up conventional forces there.
- Would provide a "tonic" for the internal health of NATO.
- Could serve to improve relations with the Soviet Union as well as give impetus to nuclear arms reduction on both sides.

The authors of the no-first-use proposal couple their plan to an enhancement of NATO's conventional forces. As the situation now stands, the Warsaw Pact enjoys a decided advantage in conventional forces

which could easily overrun Western Europe. Herein lies Adamson's main objection to this strategy. Although he admits that such a doctrine *could* prompt a buildup of NATO's conventional forces, he adds:

The postwar record, however, provides little encouragement for that belief. Despite having economic power substantially greater than that of the Soviet Union, Western Europe has not come close to matching Soviet military capabilities.

A no-first-use policy would imply that a large-scale conventional attack by Soviet forces would not bring a nuclear response from NATO. To Adamson, this would be an open invitation to the Soviets and would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of war in Europe. He feels that this foreboding prospect would hardly be a "tonic," rather it:

... would surely generate serious concern on the part of Western European governments and peoples, unless the ability of the alliance to repel a Soviet conventional attack by conventional means were firmly established.

Adamson has a two-fold prescription for improving the situation:

First, the strengthening of NATO's conventional forces or, alternatively, significant East-West conventional arms control in Europe . . . to reduce NATO's need to rely heavily and perhaps at an early stage in any conflict on its nuclear capabilities; second, the revitalization of NATO's nuclear deterrent . . . to enhance the credibility of the alliance's nuclear threat or, alternatively, substantial cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both sides, to reduce tension and the potential for nuclear devastation.—PRD.

Women in the Israeli Defense Force

By Colonel Irving H. Breslauer,
USAF, Retired

The Retired Officer, September 1982

When thinking about women in the military, thoughts often turn to the legendary deeds of the women in the Israeli army. Many people still remember the heroic contribution these women made while serving in the Israeli army during their War of Independence in 1948 and reaffirmed in such movies as "Exodus."

But today, women or, "girls" as they prefer to be called, in the Israeli Defense Force, have an entirely different role than they did in 1948. Although their need is just as great today as it was in the past, their duties do not include combat or the training for combat. In fact, current Israeli law prohibits Israeli women from participating in combat operations.

Training for women in the Israeli Defense Force, according to the author, Colonel Irving H. Breslauer, US Air Force, Retired, who recently spent a year in Israel doing research on a book about the Middle East, reflects this prohibition. The short four weeks of training "is not particularly intense and the atmosphere in the camp is very informal, compared to basic training bases in the United States." The training, he says, "is designed mostly to get them used to the army and is not meant to be difficult."

Israeli women are drafted usually around the ages of 18 or 19 and serve for two years. Their training primarily consists of lectures, history about Israel and the region, and the structure and role of the Israeli Defense Force. They spend time learning about first aid, administration, biological and chemical warfare, and equipment. In addition, Israeli women are taught to fire the *UZI* automatic weapon. "The rest of the time," Breslauer says, "is filled with gymnastics, hikes, placement tests and interviews."

The most sought after job by women in

the Israeli Defense Force is that of special secretary. This is a unique job, not available to women in the US military. Special secretaries are assigned to a unit to:

... provide a kind of homelike feeling for the soldiers in the field. She might be asked to sew on buttons, make coffee, iron a shirt or even bake a cake. She is the mother/sister type person whose purpose is to raise the unit's morale and improve the quality of life.

These duties are close to the acronym for the women's corps, CHEN. Translated from Hebrew, CHEN means "charm."

Aside from special secretaries, women want to be teachers or in social work. Women do not want to be mechanics, telephone operators or clerks. Of the 750 job skills available in the Israeli army, 500 are open to women. They serve alongside the men in such jobs as medics, military policewomen, computer operators, drivers, mechanics, laboratory technicians, electronic operators, secretaries and receptionists.

Not all Israeli women are satisfied with their mandatory service. Some women are upset with the "easy way out" for the 50 percent of Israeli women who do not have to serve. These women "are excused for lack of aptitude, health reasons or simply because they are religious." Other women are upset because of the inequality of opportunity available to them in the military. They say, "You rarely see a boy having to serve coffee."

This inequality is defended, however, by such commanders as Lieutenant Colonel Nechama Sass, commander of the Central Command Women's Corps. She says:

Important command positions and the rank that goes with them are in the combat units. By law women can't go into combat so there is no way we can aspire to those positions.

Will Israeli women continue to be drafted to fill the manpower needs of Israel? Obviously, the answer is yes. But, unlike the conflict of 1948, these women will see no combat.—SIK.

Fear and Courage: Some Military Aspects

By Professor S. Rachman
Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps,
(United Kingdom) June 1982

Can soldiers be trained to be courageous? Although a direct correlation cannot be demonstrated, training does play an integral part in developing those attributes necessary to perform courageous acts. This is the opinion of Professor S. Rachman of the Institute of Psychiatry, University of London.

Excessive fear has long been recognized for the potentially debilitating effect it can have on military forces, but military commanders and others may have underestimated the resilience of humans. People have a remarkable ability to adapt to adverse situations, including the prolonged stresses which soldiers must endure.

Before World War II, the prevailing opinion was that "the bombing of civilian populations would result in widespread panic and intense, chronic fear reactions." That was not the case, however, as was dramatically proven by the people of London who persevered despite repeated bombing attacks.

In their research, Rachman and his associates selected for study a military unit of bomb-disposal operators who were "required to carry out skilled technical acts under conditions of extreme danger." In their study of more than 200 Royal Army Ordnance Corps bomb-disposal operators who had seen service in Northern Ireland, it was discovered that most of this large group performed extraordinarily well, perhaps even courageously, despite the fact that they were, to a large extent, unselected. Approximately 54 percent of them were not aware when they joined the service that bomb-disposal work might be involved.

Operators had to undergo stringent psychometric tests and psychiatric inter-

views, in addition to passing a series of military interviews and training tasks. Most importantly, they were required to complete a course of specialized training. In the study group, only 10 percent were rejected and only 5 percent of those were rejected on psychiatric grounds.

Specialized training seems to be a major determinant of success. Rachman, states that:

The value of the course is emphasized by the finding that after completing it, the novice expressed approximately 80% of the confidence of the experienced operators. To put it another way, the training course succeeded in taking them 80% of the way towards that desirable combination of confidence and competence that make a successful operator.

Factors which contribute greatly to the military applications of courageous performance, as cited by Rachman, are "adequate training, good and reliable equipment, high group morale and cohesion, and to some extent the presence of certain personal qualities"—PRD.

The Right Freeze and the Wrong Freeze

By Edgar Ulsamer
Air Force Magazine, October 1982

According to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:

It is an amazing phenomenon, less than two years after Afghanistan, less than four years after Cuban troops under a Soviet general appeared in Ethiopia, six years after the same thing happened in Angola and while thirty-plus Soviet divisions are constantly bringing pressure on Poland, that at this moment there should be mass demonstrations all over Europe—affirming what?—the desirability of peace and implying that it is the United States which is the obstacle.

Edgar Ulsamer says that Kissinger's statement best summarizes the irony of

the current propaganda war the USSR is conducting against the West. The Soviets, he says, have:

...succeeded in hoodwinking vocal minorities in Europe and the United States into believing that it is NATO, rather than the USSR, that engages in nuclear sabre rattling and flexing its military muscle

The Soviets, Ulsamer contends, are attempting to foster a nuclear freeze attitude in the West so that they may continue to do what they have been attempting to do for years—conduct a one-sided arms race.

The nuclear freeze rhetoric is faulty, says Ulsamer, in that it presupposes that nuclear parity currently exists between the two major superpowers and that both sides will abide by the rules of such an agreement. General Jerome F. O'Malley, the Air Force vice chief of staff, has said about such a proposal that, "aside from the fact that Soviet compliance may not be verifiable, it is not in our nation's best interest." A freeze now, he added, "would leave us with a permanently weakened deterrent posture [and continue] the very vulnerabilities which we are making great efforts to overcome."

The author, who is senior editor for policy and technology of *Air Force Magazine*, believes "The Soviet Union clearly regards arms control as a competitive process which serves both political and military objectives." The Soviets, although posing as the champion of peace, are actually attempting to "place constraints on US technological advantages while protecting their own military advantages." The current situation in

Europe is a classic example of this policy.

In the mid-1970s, the Soviets began deploying three-warhead SS20 missiles in addition to the 300 SS4 and SS5 missiles already deployed. Today, they have a 1,245 warhead intermediate-range nuclear force (INF), while NATO has no similar force in place. In December 1979, the NATO ministers agreed to the US proposal to modernize NATO's nuclear force by deploying 108 *Pershing IIs* and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles to meet this massive Soviet buildup. The United States also agreed to pursue INF negotiations with the Soviets in the hope that an agreement could be worked out to eliminate the need for this deployment.

In November 1981, the United States offered to cancel its deployment in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS20s, SS4s and SS5s. The Soviets, however, reacted by suggesting that their missiles should remain in place while eliminating NATO's modernization program as well as all US nuclear-capable aircraft from Europe. A second Soviet proposal called for a moratorium on further deployment of missiles while freezing the Soviet missile advantage in place.

Obviously, it would not be advisable to accept a nuclear freeze which perpetuates a substantial Soviet advantage. The author suggests that those in the West who argue for such a freeze and also believe in the creed "better red than dead" may find "that as former Secretary of Defense Dr. Harold Brown suggested sardonically, these may not be mutually exclusive conditions."—SIK.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more detailed accounts, readers should refer to the original articles. No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements in these items is intended or should be inferred. Editor

UNITED STATES

FISTV IN DEVELOPMENT TESTS


During engineering development tests at the US Army Proving Ground, Yuma, Arizona, the fire support team vehicle (FISTV) exceeded mission reliability specifications by a wide margin. In these tests, a mission reliability rating of .92 was demonstrated. The FISTV locates and designates targets within 40 meters circular error probable at a range of 3,000 meters.

The FISTV looks very similar to the improved TOW vehicle. Mounted on the M113 armored personnel carrier, the FISTV locates targets and provides target designation information for all indirect fire using the ground laser locator designator. Other subsystems


in the FISTV include day and night sights, a north-seeking gyroscope, a digital message device and four VHF (very high frequency) radios.

In operation, the FISTV operator acquires a target. The target's position, in earth coordinates, is automatically computed and sent to a digital message device in the FISTV for transmission to an indirect-fire unit. The FISTV is compatible with all laser-guided munitions.

Three preproduction units were used in this engineering development test. Emerson Electric is the manufacturer of the FISTV — *NATO's Fifteen Nations, All Rights Reserved*



The *Military Review*, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the News section of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements is intended — Editor



F5G TIGERSHARK UNVEILED

The *F5G Tigershark* was recently unveiled for the first time at a public showing at the Northrop Corporation's Hawthorne, California, manufacturing plant. The *F5G* was developed as a private venture of Northrop.

The *Tigershark* is a Mach 2-class fighter, equipped with state-of-the-art avionics systems, giving it round-the-clock and all-weather fighting capabilities against its most likely opponents, the Soviet *MiG21* and *MiG23* fighters which are being deployed around the world. For air-to-air missions, the *F5G* can carry as many as six *Sidewinder* missiles. As a ground attack aircraft, more than 6,500 pounds of ordnance can be deployed from its five stores stations. Two internally mounted 20mm guns are standard equipment.

On the avionics side; the aircraft uses a General Electric multimode radar, a Honeywell laser inertial navigation system, a General Electric headup display (HUD), a Bendix digital display and a Teledyne Systems mission computer. The multimode radar can track and detect targets out to 30 nautical miles "look up" and 22 nautical miles "look down." The mission computer coordinates the aircraft's weapons systems, while the HUD puts weapons, target and flight data at the pilot's eye level. The Hands-on Stick and Throttle (HOSAT), combined with the HUD, allows the pilot to navigate, find targets and deliver weapons without taking his hands off the flight controls.


F16XL MAKES DEBUT

The *F16XL Scamp* multimission aircraft recently made its debut at Fort Worth, Texas. The *Scamp* is aimed at meeting a US Air Force requirement for a new strike fighter.

The new fighter is basically a delta-winged derivative of the *F16 Fighting Falcon* fighter. The *Scamp* has more than 80 percent of the same components as the basic *F16*. The *F16XL* features a new cranked-arrow graphite composite delta wing developed by General Dynamics, the manufacturer of the new fighter. The *Scamp's* delta wing has more than twice the area of

the wing of the standard *F16*.

In addition to offering improved subsonic and supersonic flight performance and low-speed stability, the new delta wing (coupled with a 1.42-meter longer fuselage) allows the *F16XL* to carry more than 80 percent more fuel internally. This increase in fuel capacity gives the *Scamp* a greater combat radius on internal fuel with twice the payload or more than double the combat range with a payload equal to that of the standard *F16* — *Military Technology and Economics*, © 1982



DEEP-BASED WEAPONS SYSTEM STUDIED

The US Air Force has awarded a contract for a feasibility study on a proposed Deep-Based Weapons System. The Deep-Based Weapons System provides a platform or deployment mode for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Air Force proposal calls for storing the missiles in a highly survivable, deep, heavily reinforced underground base that would house the missiles and protect them from nuclear and conventional attack. The study includes the identification, analysis, preliminary design and demonstration of promising concepts to support the project. It will consider such factors as systems sur-

vivability and vulnerability, missile egress, evacuation methods, operability, maintainability, cost, and technical or schedule risk.

The prime contractor, Gilbert Commonwealth, Reading, Pennsylvania, will act as program manager and will be responsible for analysis and preliminary design of support systems. This will include power, physical security, environmental control and life support systems. Bell Aerospace Textron, Buffalo, New York, is the major subcontractor and will be responsible for studying the missile transporter/erector/launcher systems.


FLIGHT TRAINER SUCCESSFUL

Initial test results of the US Navy's *FA18* operational flight trainer have shown the simulator to be highly effective in training pilots who are transitioning to the new aircraft.

The *FA18* trainer, developed by the Sperry Division of the Sperry Corporation, was formally commissioned by the US Navy at Lemoore Naval Air Station, California. The trainer is designed to provide training for pilots in normal and emergency operations, including takeoffs, landings, navigation, weapon delivery and communications. The simulator also provides advanced instructional features such as automatic problem setup, computer-assisted evaluation of pilot performance and standard demonstrations of correct flight systems operations.

The trainer provides a buffet motion, combined with computer-generated imagery and a unique "g-seat" and "g-suit" for acceleration cues. These two motion cues provide greatly increased fidelity in presenting a pilot with realistic flight cues at significantly reduced costs.

As an example of the success of the trainer, two US Marine pilots who were being trained to fly the *FA18* were each given 48 hours of training in the simulator. Following the simulator training, the pilots were cleared to make their first flights in the actual aircraft. According to the Naval Training Equipment Center, the two pilots flew the smoothest first familiarization flight known to date for new pilots being introduced to the *FA18* aircraft.



METHANE BEING EVALUATED AS FUEL

The US Army is evaluating a system for converting aircraft to operate on liquefied methane fuel. Beech Aircraft Corporation, the contractor for this project, will equip a TH55A training helicopter at Fort Rucker, Alabama, with a Beech cryogenic system for this purpose. During a nine-month evaluation test administered by the Army Aviation Board, the performance and economy of using liquefied methane as an alternative to aviation gasoline will be assessed.

The Army operates a fleet of 144 TH55As in student pilot training at Fort Rucker. Considering only fuel expenses, a potential savings of approximately \$10,000 per year for each of these helicopters may be realized. There is also the possibility of a significant reduction in routine maintenance costs and increased engine life

because methane burns cleaner than gasoline.

The Beech fuel system will also be installed in an Army engine test stand and operated on liquefied methane to establish performance characteristics, including power output, fuel flow rates, fuel air ratios and ignition timing. Identical tests will be conducted on an engine fueled with aviation gasoline for a baseline comparison of all performance data.

Methane is the principal component of natural gas and is in abundant supply. It is also a renewable fuel resource and may be produced through on-site liquefaction from landfills, sewage plants, animal waste and coal seams. The estimated retail cost of liquefied methane is almost 70 percent less than aviation gasoline.


NEW TWIST TO THE BOOMERANG

The US Army is currently testing the *Aquila* remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). The *Aquila* is a reusable forward reconnaissance and target-designation vehicle system.

The *Aquila* can reconnoiter far beyond the forward line of troops transmitting live television images, highly accurate target data for conventional artillery, target designations for laser guided munitions and immediate damage assessment. The left photo shows the *Aquila* being launched from its

Army truck-mounted rail catapult. The right photo shows it on a return mission flying into its vertical net barrier retrieval system which is mounted on a second truck.


The *Aquila*, manufactured by Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, is derived from an earlier version tested by the Army and Lockheed in which 23 RPVs were tested in 218 flights — *Armed Forces Journal International*, c. 1982



MX EQUIPMENT TESTED

A stage erection platform (SEP) was recently proof tested at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The platform, which will be used to rotate the various stages of the MX missile (MR, Dec 1982, p 72) from a horizontal to an upright position, was tested with a Stage I simulator.

Used during the missile assembly process, the SEP prepares various stages of the MX for installation in the missile canister prior to deployment. The tests were conducted under the guidance of Martin Marietta Aerospace, the assembly, test and systems support contractor for the project. The first test flight of the missile is scheduled to take place early this year.



UNITED KINGDOM

SIMULATORS AT SEA

A contract was awarded to design, develop and produce three maritime electronic warfare simulator systems for the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence. The systems, scheduled for delivery in early 1984, will be installed in vans. The air-transportable vans will be used primarily aboard ship for NATO fleet training exercises.

Each van will have the capability to generate and broadcast simulated enemy radar signals and to jam radar and communications systems aboard NATO vessels over a significant por-

tion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Two operators will normally operate all systems via computer-controlled scenarios with a manual mode available as backup.

In addition to at-sea fleet exercises, the vans containing the simulators can also be used in port or at remote locations through the use of diesel generators. The vans can be transported by such military aircraft as the C130 and C141. The contractor for this project is the Sperry division of Sperry Corporation.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY


NEW FAMILY OF 105MM TANK GUNS


A new 105mm tank gun has been developed which can be mounted on vehicles as light as 14 tons and as heavy as 60 tons. In the past, large caliber guns could only be mounted on heavy vehicles due to the high recoil force of that size weapon. Light vehicles were restricted to guns with low muzzle velocity or to smaller caliber guns or guided missiles.

The new tank gun can be mounted on vehicles weighing from 14 tons to 60 tons by varying the recoil force over the recoil length in conjunction with a series of muzzle brakes. The new gun has been successfully tested on both light and heavy vehicles and comes in four different versions depending on the size of the vehicle.

Rheinmetall, the manufacturer of the tank gun, has developed a special turret called the Light Protected Turret System for light vehicles. It has a very low silhouette and offers protection against 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds.

The 105mm tank gun is stabilized and placed outside the combat compartment. The gun has an automatic loading system which can reload the gun in any position. The gun laying system is electrohydraulic and can be controlled by either the commander or the gunner by means of joy sticks. The 105mm gun can fire all types of conventional ammunition — *NATO's Fifteen Nations*. All Rights Reserved.





SCOTLAND

LTMR TAKES TO THE AIR

Through the use of a new mounting system, the Ferranti Laser Target Marker and Ranger (*LTMR*) can now be used directly from a hovering helicopter. Prior to this development, the *LTMR*, used by forward observers to determine the range to a target, could only be operated from a ground site (normally after being transported by helicopter). Vibration had prevented its use from a helicopter.

The new mounting system (shown in the picture) is attached to the helicopter's doorframe and all but eliminates the vibration. The *LTMR's* laser beam

is stabilized to within 2 milliroentgens—about 6 minutes of arc—a sufficiently small angle to permit accurate marking or ranging of a target while the helicopter is hovering.

Using the *LTMR* from a helicopter increases its versatility and flexibility for use in combat areas. The danger to the operator from long exposure to the enemy is decreased, speed of targeting is increased and, since the *LTMR* is a line-of-sight laser system, its capabilities in wooded or builtup areas are improved by the ability to move above obstacles.



ISRAEL

B300: ONE-MAN TANK KILLER

A new antitank rocket launcher, the B300, was recently released by Israel Armament Industries. The B300 is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, antitank weapon system with an effective range of 400 meters. The weapon can be employed against tanks, armored vehicles and fortified positions.

The rocket launcher is a smoothbore tube made of fibreglass epoxy. The launcher comes in two major sections: the launcher itself, to which a stadia sighting or starlight scope can be attached, and an expendable container in which the sealed rocket is located. After firing, the container is uncoupled and thrown away, and a new container is attached.

The B300 can fire a standard HEAT (high-explosive antitank) warhead, a

target practice round with an impact marker for day or night use and a dummy round with noise cartridge for loading and firing practice. A subcaliber device firing a special 9mm cartridge which follows the trajectory of a live round is also available for practice training.

Fired while standing, kneeling or in the prone position, the launcher is said to be able to destroy heavy tanks in one hit. Loading, sighting and firing takes less than 20 seconds, and the weapon requires minimal training for use. The gunner can carry the launcher and up to two or three rounds as well as his basic firearm.—*Military Enthusiast*, © 1982 by Eshel Dramit Ltd., Hod Hasharon, Israel.

MR BOOKS

THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT Volume 9, July 7-December 31, 1863. Edited by John Y. Simon 700 Pages Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale Ill 1982 \$40 00

THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, Volume 10: January 1-May 31, 1864. Edited by John Y. Simon 618 Pages Southern Illinois University Press Carbondale Ill 1982 \$40 00

The collecting, editing and publishing of the letters and papers of significant figures in American history is an industry of considerable scholarly proportions in the United States, with several important series currently in production. For the student of military affairs, none is more significant than the papers of Ulysses S. Grant, prepared under the auspices of the Ulysses S. Grant Association.

Entering the Civil War as a man long accustomed to failure, both in military and civilian pursuits, Grant emerged from that conflict as the pre-eminent American soldier of the age. Although his postwar career was marred by an unsuccessful presidency, his military exploits remain untarnished. He stands at the pinnacle of 19th-century American generalship, joined only by the man he vanquished at Appomattox, Robert E. Lee. Yet, no matter how brilliant a field commander, Lee was a man who harked backward to an earlier time. In contrast, Grant is seen as a general of greater vision—a strategist who could harness the North's great superiority in men and materiel into a winning combination.

The period covered by Volume 9 of *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant* begins with Grant savoring his great victory at Vicksburg and aggressively attempting to crush the remaining Confederate forces in Mississippi. Yet, as so often happened after a successful Union campaign in the area, Grant's victorious army was quickly

reduced to impotence by the need to send reinforcements to less successful generals in adjacent departments. One such commander was Major General William S. Rosecrans. He managed to be soundly defeated by Braxton Bragg at Chickamauga in September 1863 and then shut up in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Grant responded first with troops and then sent his trusted subordinate, William T. Sherman. He finally went to Chattanooga himself, having been given command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Quickly replacing Rosecrans with George H. Thomas and expediting the flow of supplies to the beleaguered federal garrison, Grant proceeded to plan the third of his four great triumphs which culminated in the smashing victory at Missionary Ridge on 25 November. By the end of the year, the Confederates had been driven from Tennessee in disarray, and Grant was being showered with honors, including unwelcome suggestions that he consider becoming a presidential candidate.

Volume 10 continues Grant's climb to the top of the Union Army's command structure. Beginning the year planning operations against Confederate forces in northern Georgia, Grant soon found himself being solicited for advice on larger questions of Union strategy. This request foreshadowed his promotion to lieutenant general and commander of all Union land forces which occurred on 10 March 1864. Grant now had to develop a coherent strategy for all departments and coordinate military operations from Louisiana to Virginia.

Given the transportation and communication difficulties of the time, Grant had to leave implementation of much of the strategy to others while he traveled with

George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac. Some subordinates failed, while others, notably Sherman, succeeded. Grant, of course, was responsible for them all, but his desire to bring victory to the heretofore unsuccessful federal forces in Virginia led him to concentrate his efforts in that theater. This volume carries him through the blood baths of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House and closes with Grant deep in central Virginia contemplating the moves that would bring him to Cold Harbor.

Like their predecessors, these volumes are models of their kind. The editorial apparatus, so ably manipulated by senior editor John Y. Simon and his assistants, is complete yet unobtrusive. Grant has long been noted for his simple yet vigorous prose, and, in these volumes, it is once more on display to good advantage. Not only can the reader follow clearly such themes as Grant's maturation as a strategist and his growing trust in Sherman, but he also gains insights into the simple humanity of Grant himself. The whole man is on view here in as complete a version as modern scholarship can supply. For that, future generations of scholars, both military and civilian, must be grateful.

William G. Robertson,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE: NATO and the Credibility of Western Defense in the 1980s by The Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent. 270 Pages. Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass. 1982. \$24.50.

This is the fourth recent study by the Atlantic Council of the security concerns of the Atlantic allies which draws from the knowledge and experience of a number of distinguished scholars and practitioners in the field of national security. The book is composed of a collection of policy papers which reviews the many problems facing

the North Atlantic Alliance—the Soviet threat, the military needs of readiness reinforcement and resupply, and burden-sharing. The most important message that is conveyed is that the NATO allies must jointly solve their collective problems by frank and open discussions.

It is suggested that, even though the task, purpose, structure and nature of the NATO Alliance have basically remained unchanged throughout the years, the problems of security which now confront the Atlantic allies are more multidimensional and troublesome than ever before. They entail difficult and complex global, political and economic implications, in addition to regional and military ones, and require relations with both nonaligned and aligned nations.

Such problems have exacerbated the differences between the allies themselves on how to meet such challenges. The Soviets seek to exploit these problems and to divide the alliance on such issues as arms control versus force modernization, detente versus linkage, Middle East policies, energy and resource policy, and trade. Accordingly, the political priority of NATO in the 1980s is alliance unity.

Strengthening Deterrence, set in nine chapters, is a very timely, well-written book which not only conveys specific recommendations for the United States but also those applicable to our NATO allies. The recommendations which are presented are sound. The point is well-taken that NATO policy issues for the future merit emphasis on both short and long-range priorities and full recognition that many defense measures—for example, doctrine, logistics, force structure and burden-sharing—are highly sensitive to political considerations.

I highly recommend this book for the policymaker, military professional and scholar. It is a valuable contribution to the development of a stronger NATO.

Col James B. Motley, USA, *International Security Policy,*
Office of the Secretary of Defense

THE POLITICS OF WAR AND PEACE. A Survey of Thought by Abbott A. Brayton and Stephana J. Landwehr. Foreword by Andrew J. Goodpaster. 294 Pages. University Press of America, Washington, D.C. 1981. \$20.50 clothbound. \$11.50 paperback.

This book provides an excellent collection of more than 60 key scholars, philosophers, theologians, warriors and statesmen who have studied the relationship between war, peace and political thought. The authors structure their work around two governmental types: the organic conception and the contractual conception. The strongest organic theories are exemplified in fascist and communist ideologies. The contractual theory is based on a social contract such as a democratic constitution. In the latter, the citizen-soldier responds to the threat to order, not out of a sense of inherent obligation, but willfully inspired by self-interest—security and survival.

In the framework of these two theoretical constructs, Abbott A. Brayton and Stephana J. Landwehr group their selections into five dominant themes: "The Causes of War," "The Just War," "Civil-Military Relations," "Achieving National Goals Through War" and "War and Society." Each selection has a brief introduction, detailing the historical context of the writer and his major thoughts. Included are selections from Thomas Hobbes, Albert Einstein, David R. Locke, Winston Churchill, Hugo Grotius, Martin Luther, Barthold G. Niebuhr, Francis Bacon, Otto von Bismarck, Napoleon Bonaparte, Immanuel Kant, Karl von Clausewitz, Henri Jomini, Karl Marx, Mao Tse-tung and 48 others.

Each selection has enough length to give the reader an excellent introduction to the author's position, whet his interest to read more and allow him to see the macrocosm of thought on war and peace. A foreword by General Andrew J. Goodpaster sets out a series of provocative questions on war and peace which will guide the reader in judging each selection.

The authors' philosophical bias is that

"peace is preferable to war," "preparedness is essential to preserve peace" and "democratic government is preferable to alternative forms." The only serious omission in their selections is the scriptures of Islam—the Koran. Nearly one-third of the world's population is directly in its influence, and a work of this type cannot ignore its impact on the politics of war and peace. Apart from this, *The Politics of War and Peace* is a valuable resource and worthy of purchase for the military officer's library.

Ch (Maj) William L. Hulham, USA,
3d Infantry Division, Kitzingen, Germany

MILITARY LIFE IN DAKOTA: The Journal of Philippe Regis de Trobriand. Translated and edited by Lucile M. Kane. 395 Pages. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln. Neb. 1982. \$24.95 clothbound. \$9.94 paperback.

Colonel Philippe Regis de Trobriand, the son of one of Napoleon's trusted officers, was the descendant of a line of soldiers that fought in every major battle of the French Republic and Empire. Well over 40 and with grown daughters, he finally joined that lineage to serve the Union Army in the Civil War.

Despite his age, de Trobriand was recalled shortly after his muster out in 1866 to command the 31st Infantry and the Dakota territories. This avid writer and artist brought these talents to his post, along with the soldierly skills of leadership, tactics and statesmanship. He blended these to create a diary that gives tremendous insight into what life was like for an Army officer in the late 19th century in our Western plains.

Lucile M. Kane has provided us the opportunity to share de Trobriand's adventures with this superb translation from the original French version. She researched de Trobriand's experiences, verifying dates, places and names where possible with official Army records, newspaper accounts and even riverboat logs.

Her work is well-rewarded with this easily readable account of Western life.

In his journal, de Trobriand recounts his journey up the Missouri River, his problems with his command and his relationships with local Indian tribes, both friendly and hostile. It becomes quickly apparent that the challenges of leadership were similar to those facing a commander today. The requirement for military commanders to serve as diplomatic representatives of "The Great White Father" causes the reader to reflect on the differing roles US Army officers have fulfilled throughout our history.

This book is intellectually stimulating, historically accurate and just plain interesting. The history student will welcome its contribution to literature from this period. The military officer will find it replete with thoughts and ideas on military duties. Both will read it with interest.

Maj Thomas W. Mastaglio, USA,
2d Battalion, 75th Field Artillery, Hanau, Germany

LEE by Richard Harwell. An abridgment of the four-volume *Robert E. Lee* by Douglas Southall Freeman. 601 Pages. Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y. 1982 \$17.50.

No single man personifies the Confederate cause more than one of the greatest field commanders in American military history—Robert E. Lee. Douglas Southall Freeman's four-volume, Pulitzer Prize-winning biography, *Robert E. Lee*, is the definitive piece on the Southern general, and now Richard Harwell has abridged this masterpiece into a single volume entitled *Lee*.

The book's first 100 pages trace Lee's decision to attend West Point (a step he took in part because of a lack of money), his assignments after graduating second in the class of 1829 and commissioning in the Corps of Engineers (he found the work challenging at times but more often frustrating); and his exploits in the Mexican War (Lee was cited for valor in several

communiqués, earning three promotions in 20 months).

But the vast bulk of *Lee* is devoted to the battles he waged for the Confederacy. After an unsuccessful campaign in western Virginia and an uneventful campaign in South Carolina in the first year of hostilities between the North and South, in April 1862, Lee was called upon to repulse a 105,000-man Union Army encamped outside of Richmond. Freeman explains how the heavily outnumbered Lee saved the Confederate capital with a victory in the Seven Days' Battle. He goes on to describe, in detail, Lee's performance in some of the greatest actions of the Civil War—Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg and the Wilderness.

Lee is a superb biography because Freeman is careful not to extrapolate too much, as he states in the introduction:

Although I have lived 20 years with General Lee . . . I am prepared to submit to you that I do not know what [he] was thinking at any particular moment unless he happened to have written it down himself.

But this logical restriction does not prevent Freeman from making some astute observations on the general's character:

[Lee] showed himself willing to go to almost any length to avoid a clash. In others this might have been a virtue; in him it was a positive weakness. . . . there was always a question whether Lee would permit his battles to be lost by it. It became necessary to ask whether his judgement as a soldier or his consideration as a gentleman dominated his acts.

Freeman's compelling narrative and vivid descriptions of Lee and his battles have deservedly made his biography of the general the standard by which all other efforts on the subject are measured. Harwell has abridged this classic to one excellent volume which retains all of the essentials of the original without sacrificing any historical flavor.

1st Lt Thomas W. Dworschak, USA,
Public Affairs Office, Fort Gordon, Georgia

THE HOUSE OF SAUD: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World by David Holden and Richard Johns 569 Pages Holt Rinehart & Winston N.Y. 1981 \$19.95

David Holden, chief correspondent for *The Sunday Times*, London, England, was mysteriously murdered in December 1977; his body was found in the outskirts of Cairo. His murder has never been solved. David's friend and colleague, Richard Johns, picked up where David left off. He completed the story of a desert family that not only consolidated a vast desert kingdom but also became one of the most wealthy states in the world.

The House of Saud is rich in detail, well-documented and presented in a clear and concise manner. The authors set the stage by recounting, rather superficially, the Islamic movement and King Abdul-Aziz ibn-Saud's struggle for power. The heart of this work centers on 20th-century Arabia. Of particular interest is the contrast between British and US diplomacy from the discovery of oil in Persia, shortly after the turn of the century, to the present.

King Faisal Abdel Aziz al Saud's rise to power following the removal of his brother, Saud (who succeeded his father, Ibn-Saud), is covered in great detail. Faisal is studiously portrayed as a great statesman who was particularly sensitive to a growing communist threat to the Middle East. Like many Arab leaders, he had developed a "love-hate" relationship with the United States. The love developed from a close US-Saudi relationship beginning with a meeting between Ibn-Saud and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the hate stems from US support of the Arab world's archenemy, Israel. For a time, however, Faisal saw President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt rather than Israel as the devil incarnate and the Egyptian leader's revolutionary creed as sinister—a carrier of Marxist plague as Zionism. During the mid-1960s, Faisal:

believed that his main Western allies,

the US and Britain, albeit well meaning, were misguided and blinded to the threat of communism. He came to see himself as a lonely bastion standing against a remorseless Marxist tide.

No story of Saudi Arabia is complete without a detailed discussion of the impact of oil on this desert kingdom. In this regard, the authors have performed yeoman service. Nobody can read this book and come away without understanding what the discovery of oil has done for and to Saudi Arabia and those proud desert people.

This work is not only a story of the Saud family but also an excellent history of US-Saudi relations from the Saudi perspective. As such, it is indispensable to any historian concerned with the diplomacy of the period.

Maj Robert R. Ulin, USA,
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

WHEN TIGERS FIGHT: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945 by Dick Wilson 269 Pages Viking Press N.Y. '982 \$16.95

There are undoubtedly a number of theaters of World War II which could be described properly by the phrase "forgotten war." Among them stands the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1937-45. To the general observer concentrating on the more highly publicized campaigns in Europe and the Pacific, the struggle in China may appear to have been a war in the shadows, perhaps even a sideshow. Reality was, however, considerably different.

For eight years, the Japanese were occupied in a bottomless morass which drained critical resources from other theaters. The scale of this drain is reflected in the fact that more than 1.25 million Japanese soldiers surrendered in China at the war's end. The official count of troops killed in action on both sides was 2.5 million. When civilians are included, estimates range as high as 10 million lives lost. This titanic

struggle has most certainly been slighted in works of popular history. An attempt to correct this oversight produced *When Tigers Fight*.

Dick Wilson has had distinguished careers in both scholarship and journalism. He has taught at several American and Asian universities and has served in reporting and editorial capacities on the Singapore *Straits Times*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *The China Quarterly*. He has three previous books on modern Chinese history to his credit.

Obviously, no author could present a comprehensive discussion of an eight-year cataclysm on the scale of the Sino-Japanese War in 269 pages. What Wilson does provide is a useful overview of a complex era of modern history. Unfortunately, his coverage tends to be episodic, with too much repetitive detail lavished on well-publicized incidents such as the rape of Nanking and too little analysis on many major aspects of the conflict. For instance, only one brief chapter is devoted to the efforts of Chinese partisans, both Nationalist and Communist.

In spite of these shortcomings, the author's lucid style makes *When Tigers Fight* an enjoyable introduction to the Chinese theater of World War II. It is recommended to those with an interest in East Asian history.

Maj David L. Watkins, USAR

DAS REICH. The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Through France by Max Hastings. 264 Pages. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. N.Y. 1981. \$16.50

This book by Max Hastings is something very different from a chronicle of an inconsequential road march. The movement of the 2d SS Panzer Division through south central France was one of the most dreadful episodes of World War II.

As this division moved forward to Normandy after the D-day invasion, members of the French Resistance and raiders from

the Allied forces sought to hamper its movement by ambushes, road blocks and disruption of gasoline supplies. The German division replied with absolute ruthlessness, and hundreds of French died, many of them as innocent bystanders. In Tulle, 99 men were hanged on the camp posts in their village and, in Oradour-sur-Glane, 642 people—many of them children from the local schools—died in a German frenzy of destruction. More than 400 women and children were burned alive or shot in the village church.

Tragically, many of the soldiers responsible for these massacres never came to justice after the war. The division commander built a prosperous engineering business and died of old age in 1971 without ever being tried. The battalion commander whose troops slaughtered hundreds of French citizens in Oradour-sur-Glane died in the war. Other senior officers of the division remain alive today and insist they did nothing for which they have cause to feel shame.

While Hastings does not defend the German atrocities, he does attempt to dilute their moral reprehensiveness by contrasting them with the unparalleled slaughter on the Eastern Front. He does this by noting that the "accepted usage of war" permitted the Germans to execute civilians on the spot and by alluding to Napoleon's savage acts against the Spanish in 1808-9. He seems to forget that comparisons of clearly illegal or immoral acts does not necessarily make one immoral act more moral than another.

Despite these reservations, the book is well worth reading. The author shows that the guerrillas did not decisively delay the division, and the reader is drawn ineluctably into the moral and ethical issues surrounding the Resistance actions and the German reprisals. Every professional soldier should periodically address or consider such issues.

Lt Col Robert A. Doughty, USA,
Department of History, USMA

TARGET BERLIN: Mission 250: 6 March 1944 by Jeffrey Ethel and Alfred Price 212 Pages Jane's Publishing Co. N.Y. 1981 \$8.95

During World War II in Europe, the Allies devoted aerial assets to the strategic bombing offensive against German industrial and urban targets. Beginning with leaflet raids in 1939, the Allies launched an extensive campaign to force an early end to the war by round-the-clock assaults on *Festung Europa*.

As that world conflict recedes in human memory, historians are re-evaluating the effectiveness of the bombing and discovering new facts about the air war. This addition to the literature of the war is a minute-by-minute account of the first major US Air Force raid on Berlin, Mission 250, launched on 6 March 1944.

With crisp and concise writing, Jeffrey Ethel and Alfred Price relate the background of the raid, reviewing the organization, tactics and equipment of the Allied and German air forces. The gripping narrative is equal to graphic scenes of such World War II bombing campaign movies as *Twelve O'Clock High* and *Command Decision*. After recounting the prolonged aerial battle, the authors review the after-action reports, the propaganda announcements and the effects of the raid.

Not content merely to report a desperate battle, the authors review the impact of the raid on the war effort. The raid was not a war-winning operation by itself, but it was the beginning of the end for the *Luftwaffe* over its own territory. The US ability to mass hundreds of heavy bombers and escort them all the way to deep targets and back to England was a sign of doom for the Germans. The *Luftwaffe* was forced to shift many fighter units from the Russian Front to the defense of the Reich.

The Allied preponderance in war production began to make its presence felt as more and more aircraft flew against a German air force unable to match US production. The bombing of Germany did not achieve its objective of obliterating Ger-

man industry or demoralizing German civilian morale. However, the aerial strikes did disrupt the Germans by causing them to disperse their industry and shift aerial resources from more important fronts.

Capt Albert J. Golly Jr., *USAR*

ALLIES Pearl Harbor to D-Day by John S. D. Eisenhower 500 Pages Doubleday & Co. N.Y. 1982 \$24.95

A person familiar with the considerable literature on the Anglo-American alliance of World War II will be hard put to find any significant original or revisionist contributions in this book by John S. D. Eisenhower. Nevertheless, it is recommended strongly to those not well versed on the subject as a solid, balanced and intensely interesting study of "the creation, nurturing, and maintenance of the Anglo-American military alliance." Subjects range from the Arcadia Conference of December 1941-January 1942 to the launching of Operation *Overlord* on 6 June 1944, with the emphasis overwhelmingly on strategic decisionmaking for the Mediterranean and European theaters.

The book is particularly rewarding in delineating the conflicts and compromises between the strong-willed men who constituted the top echelons of the American-British coalition. These ranged from the heads of state to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to theater and field commanders. The author, who became distinguished in his own right as an Army officer, ambassador and author of two other well-received books, is commendably judicious in his treatment of his father, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. His analyses of his father's relationships with Winston Churchill, George C. Marshall and Alan Brooke are especially perceptive. The war against Japan and the Russo-German conflict are deliberately neglected because he considers them to be "largely one-nation shows."

His research in manuscripts and pub-

lished works, as well as interviews and correspondence with leading participants of the era, is impressive. His style is simple, clear and at times moving. Occasionally, his organization suffers as he tries to touch upon too many important topics. For example, he parenthetically inserts the question of the State Department's posi-

tion on the Holocaust and leaves the subject hanging. He also provides details of select battles such as 'Alam Halfa that seem tangential to his thesis. All in all, however, Eisenhower provides a tale well and fairly told, even if oft told previously.

D. Clayton James, *Mississippi State University*

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MEN WANTED FOR THE U.S. ARMY: America's Experience With an All-Volunteer Army Between the World Wars by Robert K. Griffith Jr. 259 Pages Greenwood Press Westport, Conn. 1982 \$29.95

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KENTUCKY FIGHTING MEN, 1861-1945 by Richard G. Stone Jr. 126 Pages University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. 1982 \$6.95

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