"Soldiers Are Our Credentials!"
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**Tribute to General Dennis J. Reimer, Army Chief of Staff**  
"Knowledge, Speed and Power (Special Insert)"
From the Editor

This special edition of Military Review provides an in-depth look at the Army’s new capstone manual, US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership. The new FM provides a framework for all Army leaders and provides leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements under any conditions; establishes a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders—military and civilian, Active and Reserve, officer and enlisted—and provides yet another comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the 21st-century Army.

Section One explores the relationship between leadership doctrine and the fundamental principles guiding leader actions in accomplishing assigned missions and caring for soldiers. The Army leadership framework integrates many existing leadership concepts by establishing leadership dimensions and showing how they relate to each other. It also trumpets the principles Army leaders use when they apply doctrine, tactics and techniques, ensuring America’s Army is a trained and ready force prepared to fight and win the nation’s wars—now and in the future.

Section Two examines leader development and how FM 22-100 serves as the bedrock for future leadership and leader development initiatives associated with the Army Leader Development Model’s three pillars—institutional, operational and self-development. Solidly based on BE, KNOW, DO—character, competence, action—the Army leadership framework provides a comprehensive instrument for leader development, embedding the requisite skills, knowledge and behavior characteristics necessary to execute future operations.

Section Three focuses on operational leadership, providing points for Army leaders to consider when assessing and developing themselves, their people and their organizations. By “Being, Knowing, Doing,” the leader’s actions and abilities, coupled with professional competence and technical skills and the capacity to function under stress, mark the margin of effort that spells the difference between battlefield victory and defeat. The bottom line is this: “leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence by developing a force that can fight and win the nation’s wars and serve the common defense of the United States.”

MIR
Center for Army Leadership (CAL).
The Army Values Homepage, maintained by CAL’s Leader Development Office, is a website that supports the education, training and development of all soldiers on the Army’s seven core values. It provides a consolidated source of current guidance on values as outlined in field manuals, policy letters, Army regulations, pamphlets, recent updates and emerging information. The site also provides a library of training tools including lesson plans, slides, case studies and graphic training aids, to help units develop, execute and assess successful values training programs. The Army Values Homepage is linked to the Chief of Staff, Army Homepage; and can be accessed through the CAL Homepage at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cal>.

CAL also established a website containing information on counseling doctrine at <www.counseling.army.mil>. This website provides plenty of material, examples, doctrine and tips on counseling your subordinate leaders and soldiers. The site was developed primarily to provide information on the counseling doctrine addressed in the new FM 22-100, Army Leadership. The new counseling doctrine retains almost all the counseling principles addressed in FM 22-101, Leadership Counseling, but shifts the counseling focus to creating a plan of action for personal development based on a more subordinate-centered, less directive approach.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD).
The Combined Arms Center approved FM 101-5-2, US Army Report and Message Formats for publication. A printing backlog will delay hard-copy distribution until at least the first quarter of Fiscal Year 00. However, the manual is electronically available through the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate homepage at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/index.htm>. For help accessing the manual, contact Major Michael Porch at <porchm@leav-emh1.army.mil> or at DSN 552-2603/Commercial 913-684-2603.

This new FM provides current standards for US Army report and message formats and establishes doctrinal report formats for use by all field units. For the first time, this manual establishes a common set of report and message formats allowing units Armywide to exchange commonly required information without exchanging local formats.

FM 101-5-2 contains a compendium of formats commonly used by tactical units from small unit to corps level and forms the baseline for reporting and communicating as command, control and communications technology evolves. It provides a doctrinal directory on which units can build their unit standing operating procedures. To ensure Armywide application, FM 101-5-2 omits most branch-specific or technical reports and messages, which are included in field manuals published by their respective proponents.

FM 101-5-2 establishes a catalog of common reports that will provide a starting point for those developing message templates for automated systems. While many of the formats are based on US Message Text Formats, approximately one-third were developed from field input.

Society for Military History (SMH) Conference.
Fort Leavenworth was well represented at the annual meeting of the SMH, held at Pennsylvania State University 15 to 18 April 1999. Dr. Roger J. Spiller, George C. Marshall Chair of the US Army Command and General Staff College, a trustee on the society’s board, presented a paper, “Mr. Lee’s Conversion from Secession to Loyalty,” on the panel Fractured History: When History and Public Passions Collide. Dr. Robert H. Berlin, School of Advanced Military Studies, who chaired the panel Theory Confronts Experience: World War II Allied Coalition Politics and Civil-Military Relations in Europe, continues as the society’s recording secretary and SMH Gazette editor. Another representative, Retired Lieutenant Colonel Tom Morgan, is a fire support operations analyst working for Logicon/RDA with Operational Group Alfa, Battle Command Training Program and serves as the SMH Gazette photographer. Dr Jacob W. Kipp, Foreign Military Studies Office, presented a paper coauthored with General Makhmut Akhmetevich Gareev, president of the Academy of Military Science, Moscow. Titled “To Break the Back of Japan: Soviet-American Cooperation for the Manchurian Offensive of August 1945,” the Kipp-Gareev paper was presented on the panel What Did They Know and When Did They Know It: Intelligence Assessments and Assumptions Before the Invasion of Japan, chaired by D. M. Giangreco, Military Review design editor. Giangreco also spoke the following day at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, at a program marking the Berlin Airlift’s 50th anniversary.
Leadership
Doctrine

The June 1999 US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, defines leadership as “...influencing people—by providing purpose, direction and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.” The manual further defines influencing as “getting people to do what you want them to do. . . . Through your words and example, you . . . communicate purpose, direction and motivation.” Purpose, of course, gives people a reason to do things. Direction communicates a specific way to accomplish the mission. Motivation “gives subordinates the will to do everything they can to accomplish a mission,” often resulting in their taking initiative to get something done. Operating actions are then taken to accomplish the organization’s immediate mission, while improving increases the organization’s capability to accomplish current or future missions.

Doctrinal-based leadership provides a holistic base for the Army as we incorporate new ideas, technologies and organization designs. As the capstone leadership manual for America’s Army, FM 22-100 establishes the Army’s core leadership doctrine, those fundamental principles guiding leaders actions in accomplishing any assigned mission while caring for their soldiers. As the single-source reference for all Army leaders, FM 22-100 provides leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements under any conditions; establishes a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders—military and civilian, Active and Reserve, officer and enlisted—and provides a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the 21st-century Army.

Further, FM 22-100 contains the principles Army leaders use when they apply doctrine, tactics and techniques. Deeply rooted in “BE, KNOW, DO”—character, competence and action—this leadership framework brings together many existing leadership concepts, ensuring America’s Army is a trained and ready force prepared to fight and win the nation’s wars—now and in the future.
Leadership Doctrine — Turning Challenge Into Opportunity

GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER, US ARMY

HALF A WORLD from home, Private First Class (PFC) Jarred King stood outside the Bosnian Serb headquarters in Sokolac, Bosnia-Herzegovina, waiting for his major, who was inside meeting with a group of local faction leaders. A former Bosnian Serb army commander had been arrested, and when the Serbs learned of the arrest they were angry. Without warning, an agitated mob descended on King, demanding he give up his weapon. Though surrounded, King refused. Instead, he calmly slung his M-16 rifle, ignoring the taunts and threats of the crowd. After a tense standoff, the Bosnian Serbs released King and his major. When King returned to his unit, the young soldier admitted he had been scared but said he had kept faith in himself and his unit. He was confident that if something happened, help would be on the way.

King’s extraordinary display of self-composure and courage say a great deal about the kind of soldiers we have in today’s Army. It says a lot about training, values and teamwork—and about the bonds of confidence and trust between leaders and soldiers that yield effective combat units. Building soldiers like King demands quality training, skilled mentors and a strong, positive values-based command environment. These kind of soldiers truly are our credentials.

Leadership doctrine is the critical part of the equation and has always been an important part of our successes. It pulls our efforts together, providing focus, purpose and direction. Through 224 years of serving, fighting and dying for their country, American soldiers have learned that the fundamental principles of leadership are important—and that we must have leaders who truly care about their soldiers and understand Army doctrine.

Our leadership doctrine continually evolves, and in periods of transition such as that of today, we put great effort into capturing lessons learned and revising doctrine to meet current and future challenges. If you compare our newly revised doctrine—US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership—with previous versions, you will find a clear thread of continuity woven through the Army’s fundamental leadership principles. You will also find many additions that recognize our changing environment and enumerate the leadership skills, knowledge and attributes our Army will need today and tomorrow. We developed the new FM 22-100 with input from leaders at all levels throughout the Army. I am very pleased with both the development process and the product. It is already starting to draw interest from other organizations, impressed by the Army’s leadership model.

Developing leadership doctrine does not end with the distribution of the new field manual. We are already addressing the future requirements of Army leadership and the development process we will need for the Army After Next. To investigate the future, we will use the newly designated Strike Force as a leader-development laboratory. Our intent is to explore and test leadership techniques and procedures that will provide the adaptable leaders, soldiers and units we will sorely need in the information age.

Change is Leader-Intensive

Today’s tasks are tough, no question about it. When we got a good look at the post-Cold War world, it did not take us long to figure out we were going to be facing some real leadership challenges—challenges that would be with us for the foreseeable future. Over the past decade, we have learned we should not place much confidence in anyone’s ability to accurately predict the future. We cannot be 100-percent sure where America’s global leadership role will take us or what missions we
[An] ethical revolution provided the catalyst for the Army’s training revolution. You could not have combat training centers and after-action reviews without leaders and soldiers who had the assurance they could make honest mistakes and learn from them. This was not about zero defects—it was about learning our trade and taking care of soldiers. Leadership gave our soldiers the confidence to shed their blinders and not dwell on the Army’s shortfalls and concentrate on the fundamentals of realistic training and focus on facing future challenges.

will be asked to perform. The Army needs soldiers ready for war and prepared to serve many roles in peace. But most of all, we need leaders who are comfortable with the uncertainties of change and who know how to bring out the best in our soldiers—leadership turns challenges into opportunities.

The Army’s operations tempo has exceeded our wildest expectations. The rate at which we use the Army has increased more than 300 percent since the Cold War’s end. During the Cold War’s 50 years, we used land forces on 10 major operations. Since 1989, the Army has sent soldiers on 32 major operations. On Christmas Eve 1998, we had 144,313 Active and Reserve Component soldiers in 65 different countries doing everything from deterring Iraq and North Korea, to keeping the fragile peace in Bosnia and assisting civilian authorities in Central America in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. Short of war, our Army has never been so busy.

We have a readiness challenge that is unprecedented in American military history. The Army has to change—it must transform itself into a force optimized to conduct information-age military operations. We are doing this, but we must also constantly remember there are no “time-outs” to prepare for the future. In the midst of transforming itself, the Army must continually provide strategically adaptive, trained and ready forces. In short, we must be trained and ready today—and tomorrow. Meeting these requirements simultaneously is no easy task.

The pressures of service, diversity of missions, uncertainties of change and lack of time and resources to accomplish everything we want to do weigh on all of us. Some leaders are concerned about “zero defects,”—worrying that they must do more with less—and that even if they do their best and still make a mistake, their careers will never recover. Others are anxious that, in the competi-
Today’s tasks are tough, no question about it. When we got a good look at the post-Cold War world, it did not take us long to figure out we were going to be facing some real leadership challenges—challenges that would be with us for the foreseeable future. . . . We cannot be 100-percent sure where America’s global leadership role will take us or what missions we will be asked to perform. The Army needs soldiers ready for war and prepared to serve many roles in peace. But most of all, we need leaders who are comfortable with the uncertainties of change and who know how to bring out the best in our soldiers—leadership turns challenges into opportunities.

As we thought about publishing new leadership doctrine for the future, we reflected a great deal on our own past. Today’s most senior leaders served in Vietnam and came of age in the post-Vietnam Army. I can clearly remember the concerns and questions we had as young officers in the throes of that period of change. The Army was a different force then—and we had a front-row seat to observe everything that went into producing an army in crisis. We had too much obsolete, broken equipment; too many poorly educated, unmotivated and undisciplined soldiers; unrealistic training; and undermanned units. In essence, we became an Army that had lost its soul—a “hollow army.” We knew the Army faced an incredible challenge in turning the force around. At the same time, we were on the “express train” for change, transforming a draftee Army, tarred with the bitter legacy of Vietnam, into an All-Volunteer Force that could stare down Soviet power in Europe.

General Creighton W. Abrams, one of the senior leaders who helped lead the Army through that difficult period, focused our efforts by constantly reminding us “The Army is not made up of people, the Army is people.” We had many problems, from
Our leadership doctrine continually evolves, and in periods of transition such as that of today, we put great effort into capturing lessons learned and revising doctrine to meet current and future challenges.

old equipment to empty squads, but if we wanted to transform the Army through that maelstrom of change, we had to focus on the most important thing—the matter over which we had the greatest influence—how we led our people. The Army underwent an "ethical revolution," relooking how it taught, evaluated, mentored and inspired its leaders. We focused on:

- Setting and enforcing standards.
- Doing what is right—legally and morally.
- Being a values-based organization.
- Treating soldiers with dignity and respect.
- Underwriting the honest mistakes of our subordinates, viewing those mistakes as opportunities to learn rather than a mark of failure.

These ideas became the core of what every professional officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) believed. We had to have that "ethical" revolution to rebuild the trust and confidence between senior and junior leaders and between leaders and their soldiers. This ethical revolution provided the catalyst for the Army’s training revolution. You could not have combat training centers and after-action reviews without leaders and soldiers who had the assurance they could make honest mistakes and learn from them. This was not about zero defects—it was about learning our trade and taking care of soldiers.

Leadership gave our soldiers the confidence to shed their blinders and not dwell on the Army’s shortfalls by concentrating on the fundamentals of realistic training and focusing on facing future challenges. It took more than leadership to turn the Army around, but leadership was the key ingredient—as it always is. Eventually we added modernized equipment, filled the ranks with quality soldiers and rewrote our warfighting doctrine. On that solid foundation, we built the finest army in modern history.

We have not forgotten the lessons of the "hollow army." There is not a senior leader today who would stand by and let the Army become a hollow force again. Senior leaders are working hard to ensure there are adequate resources, that we enlist sufficient quality soldiers, that we take care of our people and continue to modernize the force. At the same time, we have to make sure the base remains rock-solid. The past has taught us well that you can never take leadership for granted.

Today, we are still enjoying the fruits of our post-Vietnam War transformation. The beneficiaries of that leadership renaissance are our soldiers and the nation. No force in history has matched the caliber of NCO leaders that we have today. Our officer corps has the education, experience and imagination to lead in demanding circumstances and prepare soldiers for very diverse missions. When they see honorable and competent examples, soldiers respond in kind. Young men and women—like PFC King—train for important missions, operate in dangerous environments and improve conditions wherever they go. They trust their leaders and their fellow soldiers—they trust in themselves.

The past decade speaks for itself—32 major operations executed with skill, discipline and efficiency. That is a record any force would be proud to own. Our achievements have not gone unrecognized. A recent Harris Poll found that Americans rated the military as the most respected institution in the country. There is a reason for that—the unselfish service and sacrifice of the American soldier. Retention in the Army at all ranks remains high, another clear indicator that we are a special profession. We are an Army with the right stuff. With our updated leadership doctrine, a history of tradition based upon values and leaders who truly care about their soldiers, we can turn tomorrow’s challenges into unprecedented opportunities. **MR**

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General Dennis J. Reimer is the US Army chief of staff. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.S. from Shippensburg State College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in joint and allied assignments in the Continental United States, Europe, Korea and Vietnam, including commander, US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; US Army vice chief of staff, Washington, D.C.; deputy chief of staff, Operations and Plans, US Army, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, Washington, D.C.; commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado; assistant chief of staff, C3/J3, US Combined Forces Command, and chief of staff, US Army Element, Combined Field Army, Korea; commander, III Corps Artillery, and deputy assistant commandant, US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and chief of staff, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Following a career that has spanned 37 years, he will retire this summer after four years as the chief of staff. His article “The Army and Congress” appeared in the March-April 1999 edition of Military Review.
Designing a Battalion Leadership Development Program

Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Craig, US Army

Identifying and developing the future leaders of America’s Army are commanders’ most important functions. . . . They will be faced with a constant tug-of-war between near-term readiness and leader development. . . . Faced with this tension, they must err on the side of leader development and carve out the time to talk with young leaders. . . . The greatest legacy we have is how well we’ve trained our subordinates. . . . How well we’ve done can generally be measured by the next generation of leaders and the performance of their soldiers.

—Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer

BATTALION COMMANDERS have an inherent responsibility to develop subordinate leaders. This responsibility is important to the unit’s warfighting abilities, as well as long-term individual developmental aspects. Army warfighting doctrine recognizes leadership as an essential element of combat power. Each commander’s responsibility to deliver maximum combat power to the battlefield is a compelling reason to improve the leadership abilities of all leaders within their battalions. The Army must develop effective leaders. Even if commanders do nothing to consciously shape subordinate leaders’ growth, the operational environment provides the experience for leaders to learn and adequately perform their duties. However, commanders cannot leave leadership development to chance nor individual motivation. Rather, they should deliberately plan and execute leadership development just as they plan and execute tactical and technical training or equipment maintenance.

Several key questions come to mind:

• How do commanders consciously develop leaders in their units?
• What programs should they create to improve leadership?
• Although the 1999 US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, clearly describes leader values, attributes, skills and actions, how do commanders develop those leadership qualities in their junior leaders?

This article describes a leadership development model (LDM) and explains how individual leaders can use the model to consciously guide their personal leadership growth and how supervisors can use it as a basis to shape their subordinates’ leadership. I also describe how battalion commanders can use the model’s components to craft a comprehensive unit leadership development program (LDP).

The LDM is a derivative of the best officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) development programs from various units across the Army. The model is a product of the synthesis of various units’ developmental programs, the Army’s leader development framework (LDF) and several adult learning theories.

Strategic LDF

The Army’s strategic LDF illustrated in Figure 1 consists of three pillars:

• Institutional training and education. Provide leaders with “the opportunity to acquire skills, knowledge and behaviors needed to perform duty position requirements.” During institutional training, leaders learn leadership theory and doctrine. They also acquire information, learn and use the learned knowledge through role playing, case studies, practical exercises and computer simulations.

• Operational assignments. Are key to developing leadership abilities by placing “leaders in positions to apply the skills, knowledge and behaviors acquired” during institutional education and training. Operational assignments refine “a leader’s skills, broaden his knowledge and shape his behavior and attitudes.” Additionally, operational assignments provide opportunities to master skills and demonstrate values and attributes essential to effective leaders of character and competence. Based on their performance during operational assignments,
promising leaders are selected for progressive promotions, appropriate schools and utilization assignments.

**Self-development.** Pervades the other two pillars, and should “stretch and broaden the individual beyond the job or training.” The importance of self-development increases with leaders’ seniority. As leaders rise in rank, their assignments become increasingly unique, and institutional training does not always fully prepare leaders for what lies ahead. They must also learn from experience and personal study—self-development.

The Army’s LDF defines the broad goal for operational assignments—to master leader values, skills, attributes and actions. Unfortunately, there is no Army doctrine that describes a formal process to achieve this goal. Figure 2 describes a theory for leadership development that shows the three pillars’ connectivity.

In operational assignments, “developing” leaders study leadership through discussions, observations, reading, education and their own experiences. After gathering information, leaders learn by analyzing information and identifying ways to put it to use. Leaders experience the majority of their development when they practice what they have learned during duty performance and receive feedback following that performance. This feedback can come from peers, subordinates supervisors and self-assessment. Feedback provides developing leaders with more information to study, analyze and implement.

Periodically, individuals attend formal education and training. The process described during operational assignments also occurs during institutional training. Students study information from readings, instruction and research, gaining additional information and perspectives from their peers. They learn through the analysis of information and develop practical applications. Outside a unit, students do not have the opportunity to lead; they must perform leader actions through simulation, which could be a case study, practical exercise or role playing. Instructors provide feedback to students on what they have learned and how well they applied that knowledge. Additional feedback comes from peers and through self-assessment.

Self-development is not a formal element of leader development, but an integral part of operational assignments and institutional education and training. Institutions and operational assignments are environments that provide information, practice and feedback to developing leaders. Self-development is a process during which developing
leaders study, analyze and create applications for new information. This cognitive process does not have to be a drawn-out analysis of information. Rather, it may be as simple as gaining knowledge from not executing something to standard. This cognitive process exists in all conditions—in garrison, school, field and combat. For example, a ranger student acting as a squad leader learns how to interact with exhausted soldiers after having failed a patrol because squad members fell asleep and compromised the unit’s security. The motivation and mental ability of each developing leader determines the degree of self-development that occurs during attendance at schools or in operational assignments.

Because the leadership development process occurs along the continuum of time, the process can produce a leader at any given moment. Periodically, the Army considers leaders for leadership positions, promotions and formal education and training. Department of the Army personnel managers and unit selection processes ensure leaders benefit from progressive and sequential positions and schooling based on past performance and the evidence of potential for increased responsibility.

**Personal Leadership Growth**

Individuals manage their own leader development. Leaders who understand and consciously address each LDM component can magnify their own professional growth. For example, individuals who desire to grow professionally and improve their leadership abilities should continually study and learn, find ways to practice and be open to feedback about their performance. Battalion-level and higher commanders should establish programs to create environments that allow individual growth. Supervisors implement the commanders’ programs and assist their subordinate leaders’ growth. Individual leaders, however, consider their own experiences, think about what they have seen and heard and then modify their own leadership techniques, styles and attributes. Leader motivation and ability to study and learn leadership largely determine how much they develop. Dedicated leadership students find ways to implement what they have learned and are receptive to honest, candid feedback.

**Individual study.** During operational assignments, leaders have an opportunity to observe other leaders in action. Students learn from observing good and bad leadership. They observe and assess role models’ abilities and leader actions to influence, improve and operate. The thorough analysis of other leaders provides developing leaders with new ways to lead others.

*Listening* is an important study component of leadership development. Leaders can gain a valuable understanding of subordinate perspectives by listening to soldiers’ comments, aspirations and frustrations. Understanding soldiers’ points of view can improve a leader’s ability to motivate and communicate with his subordinates. A developing leader also gains useful perspectives listening to other leaders describe their experiences, successes and failures. For example, platoon leaders benefit from listening to experienced, competent platoon sergeants.

*Readings* provide developing leaders with different perspectives, styles and techniques. Reading about leaders in war provides a combat perspective that few experience but all should study. Still, mirroring a successful leader does not create success for another. Developing leaders should analyze what values, attributes, perspectives and experiences influenced historical leaders. For example, a leader’s imitation of the flamboyant speech and dress of General George S. Patton would be foolish, but understanding why Patton spoke and dressed as he did might be educational. The same holds true for role models. Leaders learn by analyzing role models, not copying them. It is more important to understand the why, not the what.

Informal and formal *discussions* of observations provide opportunities to articulate and hone personal understanding. Examples might include conversations overheard in the motor pool, during a meal in the dining facility or at the club. Informal discussions are not social banter but rather focused dialogues about leadership-relevant issues. A supervisor or commander might facilitate more formal discussions, such as a leadership after-action review (AAR) or a leadership *appliqué* to the current AAR.

**Reflect and improve leadership.** Leaders assemble and think about what they have seen, heard, read or done. The final result of the learning process is largely an individual endeavor. Soldiers who have the conceptual skill and motivation to analyze
Listening is an important study component of leadership development. Leaders can gain a valuable understanding of subordinate perspectives by listening to soldiers’ comments, aspirations and frustrations. Understanding soldiers’ points of view can improve a leader’s ability to motivate and communicate with his subordinates. A developing leader also gains useful perspectives listening to other leaders describe their experiences, successes and failures. For example, platoon leaders benefit from listening to experienced, competent platoon sergeants.

Information and learn from experiences will continue to grow. Those who do not think about their experiences will stagnate, continue to live in their existing mental models and never fully develop their potential. Leaders should analyze both positive and negative experiences to determine why they succeeded or failed.

After analyzing information and determining what led to specific leader actions or techniques, developing leaders should determine how to use the information in their current and future leadership positions. Although there is no “play book” for leadership, leaders should think about their own experiences, consider how they could have used this additional information and file away the knowledge for future use.

Practice what is learned. The LDP’s aim is to create a successful leadership practitioner. Practice is the manifestation of the LDP. In this component of development, leaders reinforce the leadership techniques they have found to be successful. When appropriate, they apply methods modified through study and learning. Leading provides evidence of potential—one’s ability to continue to improve and be successful. Additionally, operational assignments provide opportunities to lead allowing leaders to use knowledge gained through formal training and personal study. Operational assignments provide leaders with job-skill training for their current duty positions and exposure to the skills necessary for positions of increased responsibility.

Feedback. Feedback is a critical developmental process element. Leaders’ first source of feedback is a review of their own actions. However, leaders cannot objectively evaluate their own effectiveness—good, bad or indifferent. They should consider others’ perceptions of them and attempt to reconcile the differences between others’ perceptions and their own. Only through effective feedback can a leader gain insight into these discrepancies. Unfortunately, developing leaders may receive incorrect or incomplete feedback. Leaders should
seek as much feedback as possible and analyze the information before drawing conclusions about the success or failure of a particular leadership ability. Informal feedback provides nearly immediate information to the leader and should occur frequently and in many places and consists of teaching, coaching and discussing ongoing or impending actions.

Developing leaders should seek feedback from more sources than their supervisors. Peers and subordinates may have different leader effectiveness perceptions than the supervisor’s. In the Spring 1998 Parameters, Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer asserted that “only the led know for certain the leader’s moral courage, consideration for others and commitment to unit above self.” Currently, there is no formal method for 360-degree assessment. However, a unit climate that promotes candid discussion of leadership development can provide leaders with these various perceptions. In the absence of such an atmosphere, leaders should seek feedback from others and reflect on all available feedback, using the information for continued study.

Simply by watching other leaders perform their duties, soldiers learn leadership everyday. Those who deliberately apply the process—study examples of leadership, reflect on their own experiences, apply lessons learned and seek feedback—become better leaders now and for the future.

Direct-Level Leadership Development

Because they have an explicit responsibility to develop their subordinates, leaders operating at the direct level must mentor them. To be effective, leaders must thoroughly understand their subordinates’ strengths, weaknesses and professional goals. Direct leaders coach and counsel subordinates and tailor specific actions to develop them. Supervisors use programs outlined in the organization’s LDP as well as day-to-day activities to continually enhance their subordinates’ leadership. Direct-level leaders assist their subordinates’ study, provide opportunities to practice what they have learned and ensure feedback is timely, accurate and useful. The model in Figure 3 shows the various ways a leader may influence a subordinate’s leadership development.

Study. Supervisors communicate expectations and establish standards. If available, they may guide subordinate leaders toward references such as doctrinal publications or subject-matter experts (SMEs). Within the context of organization-level programs, supervisors may direct specific readings or research that they believe to be applicable to the leader’s current job or future assignments. Supervisors may also require developing leaders to present briefings or classes, which can focus soldiers’ study and ensure they derive appropriate lessons. Leaders should initiate and facilitate discussions of relevant topics,
such as leadership, unit climate or soldier retention.

Leaders increase subordinates’ knowledge of various systems by requiring them to conduct external coordination. For example, a junior armor officer’s understanding of maintenance systems will improve as a result of coordination with the forward support battalion’s (FSB’s) maintenance company. Likewise, a squad leader will learn about casualty evacuation procedures if tasked to coordinate medical support for a live-fire range. As mentioned earlier, the learning process depends on the individual’s motivation, mental attributes and conceptual skills as he thinks about information and formulates practical applications. Although supervisors provide information for consideration, they cannot directly influence what leaders learn from it. Consequently, each subordinate may draw different conclusions from the data, thereby learning different lessons.

Practice. Leaders can assist subordinates in the “practice component” by influencing the tasks given to subordinates. Similarly, supervisors consciously provide opportunities for developing leaders to practice what they learn. Direct leaders must consider the developmental aspects of duties, tasks and assignments. They observe subordinate leaders as they execute their duties that require them to use leadership dimensions previously identified as needing improvement.

Leaders operating at the direct level execute organizational training plans. During training, developing leaders have an opportunity to use what they have learned and to gather additional information and experience to continue to develop. Supervisors are mindful of leader tasks included in training events and groom subordinates for success. Supervisors may also use tasks in to reinforce strengths or remediate weaknesses. Tasks such as instructing physical training (PT), acting as jumpmaster for an airborne operation or leading a quartering party provide opportunities to lead. Leaders may have subordinates instruct PT to improve confidence, perform as jumpmaster to reinforce technical skills or lead a quartering party to enhance initiative, problem solving or tactical skills.

Mentoring leaders measure subordinates’ leadership improvement and observe the effect of their own coaching, counseling and training. They observe and assess subordinate leadership strengths and weaknesses, coach them as necessary and formulate feedback.

Feedback. The supervisor provides the leader with coaching and feedback during and after tasks, assignments or duties. Feedback may be informal or formal, but most feedback to developing leaders is informal. Direct leaders base informal feedback on personal observation and assessment. Developmental counseling is formal feedback.

Supervisors base feedback on observation and assessment. Assessments are objective judgments of subordinate performance using known standards. Leaders use assessments to determine, from performance, the proficiency and potential of their subordinates. Assessments should be nonthreatening, unbiased and un inflated. Using observation and assessment, supervisors determine subordinate leaders’ strengths and weaknesses. Leaders communicate their assessments through informal and formal feedback.

One aspect of professional counseling provides a leader with feedback on job performance during a specific period and adjusts developmental goals previously established. However, counseling does not dwell on the past. Rather, it should be future-focused to overcome weaknesses identified during the period.

Another aspect of professional growth counseling is identifying and planning short- and long-term goals. Superiors conduct professional growth counseling to help subordinates become better leaders. During professional growth counseling, senior and subordinate leaders discuss areas of strengths and weaknesses and courses of action to either sustain or improve these areas. The supervisor guides the leader’s “studying” by recommending readings and research. He uses his authority to provide the leader with opportunities to practice lessons learned, take advantage of strengths and overcome weaknesses. The supervisor rejuvenates the developmental process by providing follow-on feedback and continued recommendations for growth.

A developmental action plan (DAP) formalizes the developmental counseling process. Lieutenants and warrant officers use the Junior Officer Development Support Form for developmental action planning. Direct leaders and subordinates list strengths and weaknesses, then create a plan to overcome identified weaknesses. Leaders will soon conduct professional growth counseling on a new developmental counseling form that the Center for Army Leadership is testing.
Supervisors who mentor their subordinates will have a profound impact on the latter's development. They provide role models and present subordinates with additional information for self-development. They provide opportunities for leaders to practice, and coach them through performance of their duties. They mentor through frequent informal feedback and timely, proactive formal counseling to regularly inspire and improve their soldiers.

**Organizational-Level Leadership Development**

Battalion commanders and other leaders operating at the organizational level create and implement a unit LDP to improve all unit leaders. Leaders at the direct level use the unit LDP to guide their actions to develop individual subordinate leaders. There are various programs that organizational-level leaders can use to address the development process—study, practice and feedback. Only by combining these individual programs into a comprehensive unit-wide LDP can commanders effectively develop their subordinate leaders.

Battalion commanders operate in two domains of leadership—direct and organizational. At the direct level, they develop their immediate subordinates, including the executive officer, company commanders and principal staff officers. At the organizational level, battalion commanders develop the programs that affect all leader’s development by designing a system that influences each LDM component shown in Figure 4.

A battalion’s command climate reflects the commander’s attitudes and priorities and must promote Army values and foster the warrior ethos encouraging learning and promoting creative performance. Likewise, commanders should create cohesive teams, recognize mistakes as opportunities to learn and reward leaders of character and competence. If commanders want to promote leader development, they should shape the climate by encouraging specific attitudes, policies and actions. Additionally, command climate surveys and externally facilitated sensing sessions are two means to assess unit climate. The aggregate effect of a battalion commander’s programs should create the desirable climate for leader development.

**Study.** Battalion commanders should develop programs that enhance the leader development study element to ensure leaders are trained for current assignments, exposed to a variety of perspectives and prepared for future positions. Most organizations have officer and NCO LDPs. However, these programs are often ineffective because leaders view them as comprehensive LDPs although they only address one component—study. There are many more programs a battalion commander may implement to amplify the LDP study portion, and they
Commanders employ various programs to accomplish goals and objectives. The LDP is an overarching document that provides the connectivity between various specific programs and other existing programs that affect leadership growth. These programs must address the LDP’s three components—study, practice and feedback.

should be mindful of LDP processes and objectives.

Rigorous leader certification or “check-ride” programs can instill pride, boost self-confidence and ensure leaders have requisite job skills. Units with the best LDPs invariably have certification programs. Through these programs, commanders can cause developing leaders to study critical leadership skills and demonstrate certain leader attributes and values. Commanders provide leadership development guidance in the Quarterly Training Guidance (QTG). The focus for leadership development should complement the QTG’s emphasized mission essential task list (METL) tasks. Direct leaders use the QTG to direct subordinate study and training.

Other programs that enhance the study component may include guest speakers, directed readings or “ride-alongs.” A guest speaker program that includes veterans and support agencies, such as the American Red Cross, Directorate of Community Activities and Directorate of Logistics, among others, provides developing leaders with the insight gained through others’ experiences and knowledge. Organizational reading programs could give subordinate leaders the perspective of leading in combat and imbue the importance of values and leadership attributes. Commanders can create “ride-along” programs to allow leaders to observe peers in tactical situations. Such a program could provide leaders with opportunities for observer/controller (O/C) “ride-alongs” at a combat training center or while acting as an O/C at home station.

Practice. The objective of any organizational-level LDP must be to produce confident, competent warfighters. The culmination of leadership development occurs within the practice component. Battalion commanders significantly impact this LDM component. Soldiers learn best by doing—leaders learn best by leading. Commanders operating at the organizational level should create the programs that provide leaders with opportunities to lead.

Commanders can use their unit training program to develop leadership by emphasizing certain leadership skills assessed as needing improvement in much the same way they plan collective training to address unit-level weaknesses. As commanders plan training, they should consider each event’s developmental potential. Unit METL training provides opportunities for developing leaders to lead and practice what they have learned. Commanders should craft programs requiring training-event AARs to discuss leadership observations and lessons learned.

A program that requires leaders to prepare and rehearse prior to a collective training event could improve unit training quality. Ultimately, leaders would be competent and confident in their own abilities and could more efficiently train their soldiers. A battalion commander could modify the unit’s training schedule to provide leaders time to prepare for training. For example, a commander may institute a policy that requires soldiers be released at 1500 so leaders could use the balance of the duty day to prepare, coordinate and rehearse the next day’s training.

Commanders should implement programs that train leaders on specific skills or attributes. For example, as part of the unit’s LDP, commanders may require all leaders to be jumpmaster-qualified, conduct monthly 20-mile road marches or be licensed/certified on specific equipment. These programs produce trained leaders with the attributes and skills necessary for success.

Battalion commanders may implement programs for the selection and assignment of leaders. Duty assignments allow developing leaders to practice what they have learned and gain additional experience. Battalion commanders select and assign leaders based upon their proven abilities and potential to continue to perform well. Assignment programs that reward individual learning and motivation will help establish a climate where leader development is important.

Feedback. To enhance the leader development feedback component, battalion commanders should establish and implement programs that encourage informal feedback and require formal developmental counseling. Commanders can cause their unit climate to encourage informal feedback. When personally operating in the direct mode, they should provide abundant informal feedback to immediate subordinates. By modeling “desired feedback” and rewarding similar action by subordinate leaders, commanders will demonstrate how to provide informal feedback to junior leaders. Operational commanders should also design programs that require formal feedback, with documented developmental counseling and supported, candid evaluations to ensure the Army selects leaders with demonstrated
competence and potential for promotion and schooling.

The LDM components and the organizational programs that address those components are elements of larger systems. For example, the LDM’s feedback component is part of the larger system that selects NCOs and officers for promotion and schooling. This particular system consists of selection, education, assignment, training, coaching, feedback, counseling and evaluation. Leaders operating at the organizational level must consider a broad systems perspective as they develop a LDP.

The LDP

Battalion commanders should describe how they intend to deliberately influence the leader development process through a comprehensive LDP. The LDP should describe the leader development focus, program goals and objectives and programs to achieve those objectives. As Figure 5 shows, commanders may achieve some objectives through study, practice or feedback. The commander then creates programs within each component to achieve the LDP goals and objectives. The aggregate impact of these programs is effective organizational leadership development.

Focus. Before developing an LDP, commanders should determine the organization’s specific developmental needs. Commanders should analyze their unit’s mission, equipment and long-term schedule to determine specific requirements. Commanders should also consider their leaders’ battalion experience and competence. Based on this assessment, each commander then develops an LDP focus. Commanders should ensure that unit leaders are capable of leading their soldiers to fight and win in combat and have demonstrated necessary leadership abilities to succeed within their career fields. For example, an FSB commander may determine that his LDP focus is to “prepare leaders in the battalion to support a maneuver force in any environment.”

Goals and objectives. In an LDP, commanders should clearly articulate their LDP goals and objectives for leadership development. They can use goals and objectives to communicate specific responsibilities for subordinate commanders and leaders operating at the direct level. The goals and objectives should address all facets of leadership, including values, attributes, skills and actions. Goals—usually not measurable—provide purpose and direction for direct-level leaders.

Goals:

- Ensure conceptual skills to manage increased data and make faster, better-informed decisions.
- Retain interpersonal skills on a dispersed battlefield.
- Ensure top physical fitness to sustain fast-moving, continuous operations.
- Objectives, which support program goal achievement, are measurable.
- All leaders:
  - Should ensure that the unit’s equipment undergoes preventive maintenance checks and services up to company level.
  - Conduct quarterly professional growth counseling.
  - Analyze combat service support requirements within a mission.
  - Are certified on communication equipment.
  - Conduct a 12-mile road march monthly.
Goals:

- Address all leadership values, attributes, skills and actions.

Objectives:

- Elements required to achieve program goals.

Focus:

- Based on unit mission, equipment schedule and individual needs.

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**Figure 5. Leadership Development Program Goals, Objectives and Programs.**

- Score a 250 or higher on the Army Physical Fitness Test.
- Run 15 miles per week.

Because these goals and objectives are not all-inclusive, commanders’ goals will require extensive knowledge of each unit leaders’ capabilities, unit equipment, long-term training plan and mission. Likewise, goals and objectives should address all leadership values, attributes and skills.

**Programs.** Commanders employ various programs to accomplish goals and objectives. The LDP is an overarching document that provides the connectivity between various specific programs and other existing programs that affect leadership growth. These programs must address the LDP’s three components—study, practice and feedback. In fact, the commander may establish a leader certification program that deliberately influences the study component of leadership development by requiring leaders to:

- Demonstrate their ability to operate and maintain appropriate equipment.
- Facilitate a class on a selected Army value.
- Conduct a 12-mile road march in 3 hours.

The same commander may influence the practice component of leadership development by using quick decision exercises in the battalion training plan to enhance field-environment decision making and interpersonal skills.

**LDP Characteristics**

The LDP should adapt to changing unit needs and the leaders being developed. The commander should assess the LDP periodically to adapt it to unit METL changes and respond to the changing needs of individual leaders. Perhaps a leadership panel composed of the battalion commander and command sergeant major (CSM), operations officer and several company commanders and first sergeants could meet quarterly to review LDP goals, objectives and programs. The review could look at goal validity, how the objectives are being met and better methods to develop leaders.

**Battle focused.** Since leadership is the most critical element of combat power, the LDP should focus on leaders’ abilities to train, deploy and lead units in combat. Commanders should also look to the future and systematically develop skills and attributes successful leaders require in follow-on assignments.

**Comprehensive.** LDPs should include more than tactical and technical competence. Although these skills are essential, a program to fully develop leadership potential should enhance conceptual and interpersonal skills, build physical, mental and emotional attributes and clarify and enrich the expected values for leaders of character. An LDP should provide information to study, opportunities to apply it and feedback to assess all leadership dimensions.

**Inclusive.** The LDP should apply to all leaders in the battalion—from the newest corporal to the battalion commander and CSM. Regardless of the level of expertise and experience, leaders must continue to develop in a climate that emphasizes continual development for all ranks and positions.

**Supportive.** The LDP should recognize and,
when possible, accommodate individual developmental goals. The chain of command should support individual goals identified in DAPs whenever possible. Leaders will more likely commit to unit goals that also satisfy their personal goals. There are several other LDP developmental factors that commanders should consider:

- New leaders assess the unit climate upon reporting to the unit. The attitude of a sponsor can quickly set the tone for the battalion’s environment. A commander should reinforce a command climate that promotes individual leader development through sponsorship, reception and integration programs.

- USMEs can assist in leadership development. When leaders show special knowledge or experience, they become more confident and their subordinates respect them more. Commanders can develop SMEs by assigning junior leaders to teach classes, take responsibility for additional duties, research and brief a topic to a peer group or support an exercise away from the parent battalion.

- Broader perspectives improve leader conceptual skills and improve interpersonal and communication skills. New jobs, professional organizations, adventure experiences, role playing and community involvement all provide unique opportunities to either practice leadership in different environments or observe other forms of leadership.

Every leader has a professional responsibility to continually develop. The commander’s obligation to maximize his battalion’s combat power is a compelling reason to deliberately develop leadership abilities throughout the unit. Commanders should plan and execute subordinate leadership development—it must transcend more urgent, but less critical day-to-day operations. Leader development has implications far beyond those weekly, monthly or yearly events.

At the individual level, all leaders should continually seek information to study, and learn new techniques from that information, practice those new techniques and seek feedback on their performance. At the direct level, leaders assist subordinates by jointly designing DAPs that provide relevant information for learning, opportunities to use what they learn and providing various forms of performance feedback. Organizational commanders’ programs to achieve developmental goals and objectives should address the LDM’s three components.

The institutional and operational assignment environments provide student leaderships with information for their respective development. The individual’s motivation and conceptual ability determine how much is actually learned. The leader’s duty performance reflects this ability to learn and indicates potential for increased responsibility. Evaluations are conducted in both environments and provide a tool for selection and assignment to progressive assignments. The development of subordinate leadership is an imperative shared by the leader, direct supervisor, commander and the Army. There is no greater or longer-lasting contribution a supervisor or commander can make to improve his unit and shape the Army’s future.

**NOTES**

1. Quote attributed to GEN Dennis J. Reimer, US Army Chief of Staff.
2. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], June 1993), 2-11, describes leadership as the most essential dynamic of combat power.
3. These various programs were gathered through extensive discussions with the Center for Army Leadership members and leadership instructors at the US Army Command and General Staff College and students of the Command and General Staff Officer Course.
6. Ibid., 6.
7. Ibid., 7.
10. Ibid., 10. Ulmer addresses senior leaders’ influence of organizational climates through their values, insights, skills and behaviors.
11. Ibid., 10. Ulmer addresses senior leaders’ influence of organizational climates through their values, insights, skills and behaviors.
12. The Army Research Institute website (www-ari.army.mil—Surveys & Data) contains unit climate survey forms and analysis tools.

**LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE**

_The LDP’s aim is to create a successful leadership practitioner. Practice is the manifestation of the LDP. In this component of development, leaders reinforce the leadership techniques they have found to be successful._

When appropriate, they apply methods modified through study and learning. Leading provides evidence of potential—one’s ability to continue to improve and be successful._

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Leadership and Doctrinal Reform

Sergeant First Class David R. Gayvert, US Army

Leadership is certainly among the most frequently uttered buzzwords in the current American lexicon. Whether discussing political, industrial or communal affairs, leadership is continually advanced as the key to solving most any problem. This tendency is even more pervasive in military literature and lore. The role leadership plays in war dominates accounts of famous battles and heroes. Young soldiers are instructed from day one that to be successful, they must exhibit “leadership potential,” and US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations, states unequivocally that “the most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership.” Yet in both military and civilian circles, leadership is often talked about like love—as a matter so universal it requires no definition, or so mysterious it defies one. When it is defined, it is generally in somewhat redundant terms, as some subset of what a leader does, or at least does well, and is applied to virtually all exercises of duty or responsibility. For those who wish to consistently foster effective leadership in their organizations, however, such vague conceptions of the process are just not good enough. For leadership to truly have the meaning its use implies—something that calls forth the best in people, leaders and followers alike—its essence must be distinguished from simply the behavior, personality or experiences of those who hold rank or position, and just as important, from processes that may indeed be desirable complements to leadership but are not leadership itself. Current Army doctrine does little to shed steady light on such distinctions, however, nor does it offer a compelling theory of “pure” leadership that either transcends the differences of popular competing views on the subject or convincingly reconciles and integrates them. Prerelase publicity for the new FM 22-100, Army Leadership, claims the revised manual will incorporate and replace current editions of several auxiliary leadership publications, include expanded sections stressing the importance of physical fitness, character and ethics to the leadership process and reflect lessons learned from operations since its 1990 predecessor was released. With a scheduled release of June 1999, it remains to be seen whether this reengineered manual will achieve what I argue should be viewed as a critically needed improvement to current doctrine: providing clear framework through which soldiers may discover and better grasp the various facets of leadership and how they differ quantitatively from those that constitute management, administration or command.

Sources of Leadership Opinion

Professor Bernard Bass observed a few years ago that leadership is the most talked-about and least understood of human phenomena. General George S. Patton Jr. succinctly confirmed this truth about leadership by once confessing, “I got it, but I’ll be damned if I can define it.” Notwithstanding such admissions, researchers and scholars have advanced scores of competing explications over the past 30 years alone, each seeking to nail down the essential essence of leadership. Dominant models have alternately explained it as a function of behavior, character traits, personal charisma or sensitivity and adaptability to different situations. The most useful of these theories, however, make clear and necessary distinctions between leadership and other authority-related relationships and activities. Among the first to identify such explicit differentiations was business professor Peter Selznick, stating in Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, that “Leadership is not equivalent to office-holding or high prestige or authority or decision-making . . . only some (and sometimes none) of the activities of decision-makers are leadership activities.” A decade later, researchers David Katz and R.L. Kahn argued that “the essence of organizational leadership [is] the influential increment over and above the mechanical compliance with routine
directives. . . . Leadership is the use of influence, and management the use of authority.” More recently, Warren Bennis and Bert Nanus have illuminated numerous areas in which managers and leaders diverge, arguing that leaders ask ‘what and why,’ while managers ask only ‘how and when;’ that leaders originate and innovate, and managers merely imitate and administer. In this view, creating and promoting shared vision within a group is a primary task of leadership, and leaders are those people who not only ‘make things happen,’ but also ‘dream dreams and then transform them into reality.’ While such arguments offer valuable insight into the differences between simply being ‘in charge’ and the exercise of real leadership, they stop short of providing a discrete, substantive definition that could serve to categorically determine whether a given activity fell within the boundaries of pure leadership.

Drawing heavily from the concept of ‘transformational leadership’ advanced by J. M. Burns in his seminal 1978 work, Leadership, Joseph Rost, professor of leadership and administration at the University of San Diego, Rost asserts that ‘Leadership is an influence relationship between leaders and followers in which real change is intended that reflects their mutual purposes.’ Rost makes clear in his explication of this definition that an active role by followers and the exercise of non-coercive influence between leaders and followers is critical to the leadership process. Leaders and followers must develop a sense of common shared vision directed at creating meaningful change, that most essential element of organizational growth. In sharp contrast to this conceptualization, he defines ‘management’ as an authority relationship between superiors and subordinates, intended to produce or sell products and services or coordinate joint activities. Substantive change, committed ‘followership and a shared vision or purpose are irrelevant, or at least nonessential to such activity. While one may quibble over some aspects of these formulations, the key elements of non-coercive influence, common purpose and intended change indeed seem to afford fairly specific measures by which leadership may be quantified and differentiated from management and other related but distinct processes. Seen through this conceptual lens, questions readily appear concerning the efficacy of some aspects of the Army’s current doctrine in the teaching and development of leadership. I offer what seem to me the most fundamental of these, then reflect on how they might be addressed.

Leadership and Army Doctrine

The 1990 FM 22-100, Military Leadership, defines leadership as “the process of influencing oth-
are presented as just as much a part of leadership as activities such as team-building and creating a shared purpose. Lumping together essentially different functions all under the mantle of “leadership” blurs the distinction between pure leadership and other leader-manager activities and may often lead to ineffective, or at least less-than-optimum, performance by those tapped to perform differing roles. These “one size fits all” lists also promote two pernicious notions—to be effective, one must master all enumerated skills—an unrealistic and counterproductive expectation for most soldiers—and perhaps even worse, the implication that if a soldier is particularly competent in one set of leadership skills, he will prove similarly able in all others. The stellar staff officer promoted because of his impressive administrative ability, who suddenly founds in a command position that calls instead for team-building and agenda-setting skills, is an obvious example of the potential problems created by this failure to fully appreciate the differences between leadership and management.

Closely related to this issue is the explicit stratification of function in current doctrine. It is made clear in both FM 22-100 and FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, that developing and enunciating the Army’s vision and instituting and guiding organizational change lie almost exclusively in the domain of senior officers. Junior “leaders” are to focus their primary efforts on carrying out the directives and intent of those above them, and on related, direct supervisory tasks—in other words, management and administration. Implicit in this formulation is some acknowledgment of differences between leadership and managerial/administrative duties, but these differences are still not recognized as fundamentally distinct types of functions, each requiring different skills, training, outlooks and perhaps even aptitudes to perform well. Rather, Army doctrine tends to present them as simply levels along the rank continuum.

Obviously, some division of function, as well as tasks and duties, is unavoidable in any large organization. In a fundamentally hierarchical one such as the Army, it is necessary and efficient in many contexts. But to provide any doctrinal basis whatsoever for the idea that junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) need not overly concern themselves with developing and exercising the same competency in building shared vision and directing change within their own sphere of influence that is expected of senior leaders, is to move the Army backward. An organization in which vision, policy and direction are largely imposed upon and complied with, rather than co-created and deeply shared by the majority of its members, is ill suited to face the challenges waiting in the century ahead.

Finally, and perhaps most important, Army doctrine makes no distinction between coercive and non-coercive influence. It is plain in the definition offered here that for real leadership to take place, there must be an element of choice involved. A potential follower may be persuaded, but not forcibly enjoined, to comply with a leader’s wishes. If a potential follower lacks real freedom not to follow, then whatever compliance is elicited from that person is not the result of leadership, but force. Giving and obeying orders is, of course, a necessary and proper part of exercising military authority and command, but the moment an order is issued as a means to accomplish a task, it is important to understand that any leadership relationship between the order giver and its recipient(s) is suspended, and other managerial and decision-making processes take over. While in no way suggesting that those with a responsibility to do so should ever hesitate to give orders when necessary, doctrine should make very clear the difference between issuing orders and achieving leadership, and provide solid means for determining when each is appropriate.

Ideas for Change

In light of the points raised above, I suggest the following positive changes aimed at producing a more comprehensive and effective Army leadership doctrine. Above all, leadership ought to be identified, taught and discussed as a function, or set of functions, different from management, administration or command. To provide the necessary conceptual framework the Army’s doctrinal definition of leadership should be modified along the lines I suggested earlier. It should be accompanied by separate definitions of administration and supervision, all of which would constitute what might be then presented as the “three pillars of mission accomplishment” and effective command. Consider the following as starting points for change:

- **Leadership** is the process of building shared purpose and direction with followers so that they commit themselves to mission accomplishment.
- **Administration** (or organization) is the development and use of systems, means and procedures.
- **Supervision** (or management) is the exercise of authority to ensure tasks are properly understood and accomplished.

Next, the important collection of principles, factors, traits and competencies now used to explain and teach leadership should be refined and reorganized into new sets that alternately detail and explain effective managerial/ supervisory, administra-
George McClellan was an able administrator with a fine strategic sense. Nevertheless, his lack of aggressiveness in combat repeatedly robbed the Union of battlefield victory. At least a portion of McClellan’s timidity can be attributed to his intelligence staff under Allen Pinkerton (standing to the left of the tent pole below) which consistently exaggerated the size and capability of Southern forces confronting him.

Lumping together essentially different functions all under the mantle of “leadership” blurs the distinction between pure leadership and other leader-manager activities and may often lead to ineffective, or at least less-than-optimum, performance by those tapped to perform differing roles . . . The stellar staff officer promoted because of his impressive administrative ability, who suddenly founders in a command position that calls instead for team-building and agenda-setting skills, is an obvious example of the potential problems created by this failure to fully appreciate the differences between leadership and management.
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Impressive gains in performance and productivity are being reported by civilian companies such as Frito Lay and Intel, which have successfully merged 360-degree and similar assessment methods into their human resource systems. Armed with such tools and an expanded accent upon critical self-evaluation, those in command or other positions of responsibility can then more accurately identify strengths and weaknesses in their own personal inventory of ‘people’ skills, as well as in the collective inventory of their staff, and make appropriate adjustments.

Finally, the importance of participative, emotionally engaged followers in the leadership process can hardly be overstated. Because all military leaders are also followers in some context, leadership doctrine must explicitly consider the characteristics of effective followers and instruct leaders how best to forge and encourage them at all levels—from the fire team on up. Creating wide parameters within which followers may exercise judgment and make decisions, exploring/aligning the personal goals and values of soldiers with those of the organization and providing meaningful, responsive incentives to excel must be stressed as critical leadership tasks. When effectively executed, these “musts” will combine to create teams with genuinely shared vision and commitment, operating via an influence connection between leaders and followers that transcends the tacitly coercive nature of military relationships. In this way, authentic leadership will underpin effective command in our Army, attracting and retaining the high-quality soldiers so vital to future operations.

Retired Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., currently chief executive officer of The Center for Creative Leadership, pointed out a dozen years ago that despite volumes of official literature and seemingly exhaustive focus on the subject, “we [in the Army] have imprecise, unstudied and randomly supervised concepts” for building and sustaining the leadership behaviors already identified. He went on to flatly assert, “If we are serious about identifying and developing leaders, we must provide a model for measuring pure leadership.” As of this writing, Ulmer’s imperative remains unfulfilled.

Almost everyone who has thought about the matter senses that there are indeed differences between what can broadly be termed management and leadership, even if exactly how those differences may be quantified remains an object of debate. I have suggested that identification and analysis of such differences in the Army’s cornerstone leadership manual would furnish needed elements a “pure leadership” model called for by Ulmer and others and provide a framework which would allow leadership-related competencies to be independently appraised, but synthetically employed. As plans for Force XXI and the Army After Next respond to the challenges wrought by the ongoing socio-technological revolution in military affairs, the development and explication of a comprehensive doctrine that integrates, yet explicitly distinguishes between leadership and other guidance-oriented responsibilities will be a vital key to ensuring and multiplying our Army’s future combat power.

NOTES

8. This does not mean, of course, that every captain and staff sergeant should be personally polled before the Army’s senior cadre effect a particular course. It does mean that senior leaders should devote considerable effort to building widespread and representative commitment among soldiers in such crucial areas as organizational values, norms and vision. Even more important, unit leaders at every echelon must do the same. Currently the Army does not do an especially good job in this regard. As a quick test of this assertion, try this short experiment: stop 10 soldiers on your installation at random and ask them to recite the Army’s Vision statement (it’s short; a couple of lines), or alternately, the seven Army values. I have performed this quiz on three separate occasions, with officers and enlisted alike, and not once received a complete answer to either query. Ask them to list five Army or unit policies that they believe are wrong, counter-productive or just plain silly, however, and the responses come much more quickly and fully.

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Competency-Based Leadership for the 21st Century

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth H. Pritchard, US Army Reserve

Army leaders need a new mix of competencies to properly shape their forces and develop their subordinates to meet 21st-century challenges. Shifting demographics, rapidly changing technology and other factors will require new patterns of leadership. US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Military Leadership, recognizes two leadership levels—junior and senior—and discusses leadership functions, tools and styles within two modes: direct and indirect leadership. Most of these and other basic features of the 1990 FM 22-100 will remain valid in the years to come because they are based on human nature. However, research from the “high-performance” workplace advocates two fundamental changes to the 1990 FM 22-100 and Army leadership itself: a new leadership continuum and a competency-based leadership system.

Empirical evidence from the United States and Europe shows four identifiable stages on the leadership continuum—first, middle, upper and top levels, all requiring direct and indirect modes of influence in proportions that vary by level. Company grade officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) typically work at the first level—the current junior level; field grade officers typically work at the middle to upper levels—the current senior level; and general officers typically work at an executive level not covered by the 1990 FM 22-100. Current Army leadership doctrine forces the allocation of leadership into two enormous categories, when four smaller categories would provide clearer focus for more appropriate leader selection, development and management. It also provides a basis for discussion of competencies needed in the decades ahead.

Our 21st-century leaders will need greater awareness of diverse factors and new sets of competencies—characteristics that lead to success on the job—to help them make relevant, correct and timely decisions in the leadership of change and leadership of people. Leadership of change encompasses the ability to design, develop and implement an environment (domain of upper to top levels) or local setting (domain of first to middle levels) of values, standards, goals, priorities and other factors that encourage adaptation, modification and true transformation balanced by continuity, moderation and common sense. The Army needs highly competent change managers at all levels of its 21st-century force, and the final version of FM 22-100, to be released in June 1999, should emphasize this through forward-looking competency profiles.

Leadership of people in the 21st century will routinely involve joint, combined, military and civilian efforts. It encompasses ability to design and implement plans, policies and practices that maximize individual potential and group cohesion and foster high professional ethics. The predominantly

Old-fashioned counseling will be a mainstay of the 21st century, but there will be modifications to session conduct and content. Emphasis will shift to two-way communication, and the effective leader will listen well and avoid overly restrictive formalities. New-era leaders at higher levels will have to build a solid foundation of honesty, integrity and trust to elicit the best efforts of subordinate leaders in fast-changing situations. Freed by a sense of comfort in downward loyalty—follower ship—they will try new approaches and take reasonable risks that can make the difference between excellence, mere success and failure.
Competency-based systems require significant investment in people, but the potential payoff in performance is worth it—more versatile, skillful leaders performing additional, varied functions better, increased individual and group productivity and a quantum leap in effectiveness and efficiency. People are the key in competency-based systems. Individuals apply competencies to produce outputs—the products of performance. These outputs yield results—the consequences of performance—within the context of their internal and external environments.

unpredictable 21st-century world contains one certainty for the first 50 years: situational, operational, locational and human diversity that will require Army leaders at all levels to perform more diversified tasks with fewer Army resources. The 1999 FM 22-100 reflects a new Army leadership system and must feature the leadership competency clusters needed for success and high performance.

Leader selection, development and management should be integrated on the basis of leadership competencies needed along the leadership continuum for satisfactory and superior performance during an Army career. Core competencies are those essential characteristics needed for on-the-job success. They can vary along the continuum. For example, skill in visioning is extraneous at the first level of leadership but mandatory at the upper and top levels. It should be developed at the middle level. A tentative list of 21st-century core competencies includes:

- Tactical, technical and technological (information/computer) proficiency.
- Cognitive skills and abilities, such as numerical comprehension, oral communication and problem solving.
- Interpersonal skills and abilities, such as skill in human relations and teamwork ability.
- Personal characteristics, such as decisiveness and tenacity.

The competence level required must correlate with the level of leadership position held. For example, officers and NCOs who lead at the first level typically need to communicate instructions, descriptions and ideas so others will understand. Leaders working at the middle and upper levels need higher-order oral and written communication skills, including skill in drawing inferences, forming hypotheses, developing logical arguments and expressing such information so that others will be convinced or persuaded. After core competencies, the Army’s new leadership system should focus on differentiating competencies that will distinguish between superior and satisfactory leadership in the 21st century. Based on demographic patterns, operational trends of the 1990s, likely changes—such as new emphasis on aspects of homeland defense—and other factors, a tentative list of differentiating competencies for high performance leadership of change and people includes:

- Continuous learning—increasing current proficiencies; rapidly understanding and using new information; and mastering new skills.
- Awareness—knowing the interrelationships of and keeping current on key military, political, economic and social issues, trends and events that affect the organization.
- Flexibility—being open to change as an opportunity and having a tolerance for ambiguity; adjusting rapidly to new situations; applying different methods to meet changing priorities. The multimission-capable forces of tomorrow must be able to rapidly transition from one type of operation to another. This capacity has profound impact on leader competencies, including continuous learning, awareness and flexibility. How successful one is in self-development, the depth and breadth of one’s awareness and the degree of one’s flexibility will help define high performance.
- Resilience—maintaining focus amid pressure; recovering quickly from setbacks; gearing up for another enemy assault. Physical and mental stamina diminishes as the speed, volume and complexity of assignments and change itself accelerate. Capacity to bounce back, no matter how intense the pressure of these factors, is essential. How quickly and fully future leaders do that will help determine high performance.
- Initiative—working without close supervision; initiating new assignments; looking for ways to improve matters.
- Creativity—providing insight; generating original ideas or innovative solutions; extending the state of the art.
- Entrepreneurship—leading with a sense of ownership; identifying and taking prudent risks. Improved information and communication systems will permit higher-level participation in lower-level operations, but conditions will often require more
decentralized execution. Accordingly, command and control in the 21st century will be more centralized in some operations or situations and more decentralized in others.3

- **Influencing others**—skill in affecting opinions, judgments or behaviors of others through persuasion, mediation, and so forth; causing people to do or refrain from doing something.
- **Partnering**—collaborating; working cross-organizationally; building coalitions. Multinational operations will remain the norm, interagency teaming will improve and increase in approaching the goal—seamless integration—and work with non-government organizations will expand.4 Ad hoc coalitions of groups will require rapid integration and true interoperability. These future environment features imply profound impact on leader competencies, including influencing others and partnering.
- **Organizational commitment**—creating and sustaining esprit de corps and organizational culture.

The Army has long recognized the important aspects of many of these competencies, including flexibility and reasonable risk taking, a subset of entrepreneurship. However, the 1990 FM 22-100 is way off target in its outmoded approach to competencies.5 Second-generation competencies provide a form uniquely geared to the high-involvement work culture the next generation will demand.6

The next step would be competency-based officer and enlisted human resource management systems. Competency-based systems require significant investment in people, but the potential payoff in performance is worth it—more versatile, skillful leaders performing additional, varied functions better, increased individual and group productivity and a quantum leap in effectiveness and efficiency. People are the key in competency-based systems. Individuals apply competencies to produce outputs—the products of performance. These outputs yield results—the consequences of performance—within the context of their internal and external environments.

Competencies are powerful enablers, not magic result producers. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that a competency-based military leadership system is one of the best ways to leverage the qualitative advantage of the American soldier in the next decade and beyond.

In an early 21st-century competency-based leadership system, the more effective mid- to executive-level leaders will fully apply key lessons from the 1990s’ revitalization of corporate America—entrepreneurial spirit, cross-functional teams, partnering and always-open, multichannel lines of communication.7 They will supplement these imperatives by personal touch, such as site visits to inspect for full-potential soldier development and to ensure “best-practices” family support. Executive and upper/middle-level leaders who fully integrate indirect influence with direct, face-to-face influence will be most successful.

First-level leadership in this new age, in contrast, will be mainly direct and personal and supported by structures erected by higher-level leaders. The effective “junior” leader in the coming decades will be sensitive to cultural diversity, race and other individual differences, have well-developed
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interpersonal skills and be able to adapt leadership style to a variety of situations. This new-era leader will be able to tackle ambiguous problems in fluid situations and a freer-form Army organization. Awareness of the big picture and long-term effects of short-term actions, in union with mature judgment, self-reliance and initiative, will enable peak performance.

To promote subordinate leader development for full-spectrum dominance, middle and upper-level leaders of tomorrow should eschew what is “politically correct” and trendy and emphasize moral courage and other time-tested leadership traits. Methods of delivery will still include teaching, coaching and counseling, but the details of presentation must change for fullest effect. There should be “just-in-time” teaching of “just-enough” information in new formats, including Internet and Intranet mixes of audio and visual information, where appropriate. Information should be short and to the point in the styles familiar to the generation addressed—a “book report feel” suits today’s up-and-coming “Generation X” Army, for example.

As befits the subject, the information provided in formal sessions should be given in short bursts, with quick-cut, energetic video that is musically driven—MTV-style presentations attract Generation X’s attention. The “Millennium Generation”—those younger than 18 today—is in the same mode as Generation X but moving faster. The younger half of this group, which will come of military age beginning in 2008, only knows “high-tech.” The perspectives and supporting skills of the Generation X executive and senior leaders who will be in charge then must keep pace.

Coaching should change, too. Good coaching in the early to middle 21st century will likely include constructive use of generational and cultural peer teams to ensure full development of a unified “team spirit” that is now a staple of leading-edge American businesses.

Similarly, old-fashioned counseling will be a mainstay of the 21st century, but there will be modifications to session conduct and content. Emphasis will shift to two-way communication, and the effective leader will listen well and avoid overly restrictive formalities. New-era leaders at higher levels will have to build a solid foundation of honesty, integrity and trust to elicit the best efforts of subordinate leaders in fast-changing situations. Freed by a sense of comfort in downward loyalty—followership—they will try new approaches and take reasonable risks that can make the difference between excellence, mere success and failure.

Today’s Army stands at the threshold of a new military era, the information-age force in the “new world disorder.” No single element is more important to full-spectrum military power development than the quality of leadership. The next two generations of Army leaders need a new leadership system, one that blends the very best of the tried-and-true with the most promising of the up-and-coming. It’s a big job, but today’s Army can do it. MR

NOTES

1. See Center for Creative Leadership Capabilities 1998 and http://www.ccl.org/leadership.htm, for key private sector findings. A web search for “competencies” will yield nearly 50,000 matches and provide links to federal, state, academic and corporate sites concerning leadership, managerial and supervisory competencies.


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For America’s Army to be prepared to face the full spectrum of operational environments looming in the 21st century, leader development must be a continuous, progressive and sequential process that embeds the skills, knowledge and behavior characteristics necessary to execute future operations. Therefore, leaders must be skilled in operational art, adjust rapidly to temporal and spatial battlespace variations and master the complexity of advanced technology today to meet tomorrow’s knowledge-based warfare challenges. Leader development must incorporate formal and informal training; progressive and sequential duty assignments; and self-assessment, counseling, coaching and feedback.

The new FM 22-100 serves as the basis for future leadership and leader development initiatives associated with the Army’s Leader Development Model’s three pillars—institutional, operational and self-development. True leader development rests on a solid foundation of training and education, setting and meeting expectations and standards, all shaped by values and ethics. This foundation supports the three leader development pillars, forging a trained and ready Army.

The driving principle behind Army leader development is that leaders must be prepared before assuming leadership positions, and they must be competent and confident in their abilities. This principle applies to all ranks and levels, to soldiers and Department of the Army civilians (DACs) alike, as well as the Active and Reserve components. Commitment to leader development will assure that the Army’s enduring legacy of competent, confident and highly skilled officers, noncommissioned officers and DACs continues well into the next century.
Developing a Leadership Philosophy

Colonel Maureen K. Leboeuf, US Army

"Leader development is a lifetime process and has three components. Our leader development programs must be a blend of education, training and experience. I will support attendance by our personnel at formal Army schooling as we will supplement the education provided by Army schools with our own vigorous in-house professional development programs. Due to the rapid pace of technology change today, learning must be a continuous process."

In writing this article, I obtained selections of leadership philosophy papers from the Philosophy of Command course for the past several years. I reviewed them to determine common themes that should be incorporated into my leadership philosophy. Virtually all future leaders agreed that vision, values, care for soldiers and families, leader development, managing change, diversity and a sense of humor were imperatives within a leadership philosophy. Although I read a host of articles, I selected the above elements as a framework for this article and suggest they should be the blueprint for every Army leader’s personal leadership philosophy.

While the primary audience for this article is mid-level to senior leaders, all supervisors will find the information presented useful in developing their own personal leadership philosophy.

Why is a Philosophy of Leadership Important?
Philosophy is “the rational investigation of the truths and principles of being, knowledge or conduct.” In his discussion of values, author Scott W. Clarke captures the significance of a personal philosophy for the military leader. He indicates that

IT IS A MEMORABLE DAY. The sun is shining, there is a gentle breeze that causes the flags and their campaign ribbons to rustle, and the soldiers are standing tall in formation. A time-honored tradition is about to take place—a change of command. The orders are read, the colors are passed and a new leader takes charge of the organization.

More often than not, however, there are no formal ceremonies when an officer takes over a new position, yet the first order of business is always the same—the discussion of a leadership philosophy, usually accompanied by a “philosophy document.” This “philosophy” ostensibly allows the supporting staff and soldiers to understand the leader’s inner thoughts, beliefs and expectations for organizational performance.

We have all been in organizations where this scenario unfolds. Many times the leadership philosophy is hastily prepared. Quite often, leaders are in demanding jobs until they assume new positions and do not have the luxury of time for genuine reflection about their personal leadership philosophy. Most write some peripheral thoughts about leadership, beliefs and personal philosophy, discuss it with immediate subordinates and send their philosophy paper to elements within the organization.

While attending the US Army War College (AWC), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, I had the opportunity to take a Philosophy of Leadership advance course, which included considerable discussion, reading and reflection on the subject. The students in the class represented a wide cross-section of the Armed Forces and included men and women, all services, minorities, combat, combat support and combat service support officers. All students in the class were assigned to follow-on brigade-level command or senior leadership staff positions. At the course conclusion, each officer was asked to write a personal leadership philosophy.
philosophy is the attainment of an integrated, comprehensive view of life, of vital importance. He further relates that “values, ethics and virtues are actually secondary . . .” to the absolute necessity to couch these attributes within a personal philosophy. In other words, your personal philosophy provides a foundation for all other issues—it is your personal foundation or belief in human nature or behavior. As an example, we refer to an interview with Lieutenant General Robert F. McDermott, US Air Force, Retired, and retired chief executive officer (CEO), United Services Automobile Association (USAA). He indicated that his overarching personal leadership philosophy was based on the “Golden Rule”—all values and ethical behavior stemmed from it. This simplistic personal philosophy served McDermott well for 25 years of military service in peace and war, and for 25 years as the head of USAA, a Fortune 500 company.

Whether you select the Golden Rule or another philosophical approach, you must establish your overarching personal philosophy before you can extrapolate from it the framework of key issues, that follow.

**Vision**

The first element to consider in developing a philosophy of leadership—vision—is the most confusing and has been described as similar to “nailing Jello to a wall.” So what is vision and what does it consist of? One of the best general descriptions of vision comes from Burt Nanus’ book *Visionary Leadership*. He contends that vision must be idealistic and a “mental model of a future state of the . . . organization.” He asserts that vision must also possess the properties of appropriateness, standards of excellence, purpose and direction. Ultimately the organizational vision must be ambitious, easily articulated and well understood. In other words, “Where there is no vision, the people perish.”

I believe that organizational vision is most similar to the Army concept of commander’s intent. US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, describes commander’s intent as the description of operational purpose and endstate. *Purpose* is what you want the organization to do—it is the single unifying focus of the operation. *Method* is generally how you intend for your subordinates to carry out their jobs. *Endstate* is what you want the final result to be. If we apply Nanus’ definition of vision to the description of commander’s intent, we could describe vision as “the mental image of what you want the organization to do in the future, how you believe it should generally accomplish this transition or journey and what the organization should look like at the end of the transition or journey.”

Whether you agree with this definition or prefer another, vision must be communicated, shared and understood by all within the organization if the organization is to succeed. In his leadership article, “Three Vital Little Words,” Oren Harari discusses the importance of sharing and communicating vision in order to inspire people’s emotion and challenge subordinates to attain organization goals for the future. Another example extracted from an AWC *Philosophy of Leadership* paper states “My organization will flounder if I don’t provide a meaningful vision. [Therefore, I must] create the vision. Keep it clear, concise, energetic, creative, relevant and achievable. [E]nsure it defines the purpose and direction of the brigade. Share it, sell it. Focus on the “buy in” of subordinate leaders; particularly junior officers and NCOs. Inspire their enthusiasm. Assess the vision; keep it alive.

Subordinates must buy into the vision, support it and act on it, or organizational success will be minimized. In this regard, I believe vision and commander’s intent are again synonymous since both must be understood by all elements within an organization.

Perhaps a good description of vision and intent is exemplified during complex Army airborne operations. Under difficult circumstances, Army paratroopers may become disoriented or separated from their leaders. However, when the commander’s intent (vision) has been communicated with subordinates, soldiers are able to continue operations because they fully understand and share the common purpose (what), methodology (how) and end state (objective) of their tasks. I believe...
“Empowerment is a powerful tool to provide every individual with a sense of pride in performance. . . . People should be given the tools to make good decisions, then allowed to demonstrate their ability. Mistakes should be tolerated to provide for growth of the individual. This should be tempered with a critical analysis of the individual’s ability.”

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that the same concepts of shared purpose, general methodology and objective can be applied to all organizations and should be included in any personal philosophy of leadership.

Finally, I firmly subscribe to the concept of “vision and revision.” This premise is discussed in John Redding and Ralph Catalanello’s book Strategic Readiness: The Making of a Learning Organization.9 The authors describe vision as similar to looking at a vista in the Rocky Mountains. The end state of the vision may not be visible because you cannot see through the mountains. In Army organizations, these intermediate mountains may be personnel and equipment changes, turbulence, improvements in doctrine and technology or other external, uncontrollable factors. The leader creates vision but only as far as he can see. Once the leader moves to an intermediate point in the journey of learning, the vision is adjusted. This process of vision and revision is essential to keep the organization viable, healthy and adaptable to change. As you undertake your voyage of organizational leadership, you should understand that the vision you describe in your leadership philosophy may only be a “way point” along your journey.

Values

In The Book of Virtues, author William Bennett remarks that “Today we speak about values and how it is important to “have them,” as if they were beads on a string or marbles in a pouch. But [we] speak to morality and virtues not as something to be possessed, but as the central theme of human nature, not as something to have but as something to be, the most important thing to be.10 Reflecting similar sentiment, the US Army is an organization whose “values are the foundation for service to the nation.”11 Although many values have been ascribed to our Army, we believe that the seven values articulated by Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer best describe those required for any organization:

Loyalty: Bear true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the Army, your unit and other soldiers.
Duty: Fulfill your obligations.
Respect: Treat people as they should be treated.
Selfless-Service: Put the welfare of the nation, the Army and your subordinates before your own.
Honor: Live up to all the Army values.
Integrity: Do what’s right, legally and morally.
Personal Courage: Face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral).12

These values serve as our moral compass to guide every soldier, from private to general, through the maze of intellectual, philosophical and emotional issues that encompass our life and Army. Every Army leader should personally ascribe to these seven values, include them as an integral part of his leadership philosophy and discuss them in detail with subordinates in terms of specific relevance and application within their organizations. Robert Haas, Levi Strauss and Company CEO, believes that a company’s values—what it stands for, and what its people believe in—are crucial to organizational success.13

I suggest that those who think values cannot be trained or changed are incorrect and would refer them to the US Marine Corps model for basic training. The Marine Corps imbues in its initial training program the core values of honor, integrity and courage. Examples of this value training include lecture and discussion in the form of value-related vignettes, reinforcement of values that are related to training events and designing experiences that test the mettle of values.14 The Marine Corps believes that values can be changed or learned through positive experiences—so should you!

Furthermore, I maintain that a lack of understanding and discussion of values within some Army organizations is the overwhelming reason for a number of events involving charges of unethical behavior that have been publicized by the media.
It is the leader’s foremost responsibility to serve as an Army values role model, discuss their particular application within the organization and apply decisive corrective action when the organization’s values become distorted or compromised. One such philosophy states “Respect is key. Trust is vital. I will set the moral and ethical standards within the brigade. I must maintain formal training programs to foster values within the organization.”

Caring for Soldiers

Lieutenant General William M. Steele, former 82d Airborne Division commander from 1993 to 1995, led many of his leader discussions by describing the division’s two imperatives—successful mission accomplishment and taking care of soldiers and their families. He indicated that although these two imperatives often appear to compete, great leaders always find a way to accomplish both.

We have all been taught the importance of caring for our soldiers, those who work for us and their families. Although the imperative of caring for people embraces a wide variety of issues, research suggests that the key issues include quality of life, proper training and equipment, safety, family support and timely recognition for a job well done. We are not discussing platitudes to be incorporated into your leadership philosophy. You must embrace these issues as your own, and live them, for they directly affect our nation’s treasure—its soldiers. This leadership attribute is described in then Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Jr.’s book, *Certain Victory: The United States in the Gulf War*. “The Army’s aggressive program to provide for soldier’s welfare served as an essential catalyst for unit bonding and coalescence. . . . Soldiers fight best when led by effective, caring leaders. Modern combat . . . requires love of soldiers and soldiering that has been a hallmark of the American Army for more than two centuries.”

Leader Development

You should include three essential leader-development components in your leadership philosophy: formal schooling, leader training within your organization and empowerment.

There are countless opportunities for formal professional military development and schooling. Enlisted soldiers can attend Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course and numerous other courses that will enhance professional development. Officers have the basic and advanced courses, Combined Arms

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ing as we will supplement the education provided by Army schools with our own vigorous in-house professional development programs. Due to the rapid pace of technology change today, learning must be a continuous process.17

The last consideration, and perhaps the best method for leader development, is empowering subordinates. One of the harder tasks for senior leaders to master, yet the mark of a great leader, is delegating. Leaders and supervisors must delegate to subordinates to encourage leadership growth within the organization. Without empowering subordinates, organizational progress and growth is significantly stifled. “Empowerment is a powerful tool to provide every individual with a sense of pride in performance. . . . People should be given the tools to make good decisions, then allowed to demonstrate their ability. Mistakes should be tolerated to provide for growth of the individual. This should be tempered with a critical analysis of the individual’s ability.”18

Managing Change

Anyone who has ever tried to initiate organizational change has probably heard, “We tried that and it didn’t work” or “We have always done it this way.” Change is not always easy for an organization’s members. However, change is inevitable. In a 1995 survey conducted with the top Fortune 100 highest-revenue companies, the number one human resource issue was managing change.19 With downsizing, frequent deployments, rapid technology and increasing operations tempo and personnel tempo, the Army has had to deal with significant change. A leader’s ability to manage change is a critical skill now and in the future.

Senior leaders can manage change by recognizing that change is inevitable and strive to master it; or sit back, resist and allow it to overtake the organization.20 If the leader chooses to sit back, then the organization will surely fail. The two keys to successful change in any organization are the leader and its members. Thus, the leader must clearly articulate the reason for the change, and how it ties into the organization’s mission and purpose. The simple act of communicating the reason for the change is not enough. People resist change and do so for a variety of reasons. “Most people are perfectly content with the status quo. . . . When a large body is in motion, it takes considerable force to alter its course. . . . Humans have an innate fear of the unknown. . . . Change threatens our self-esteem. . . . Change requires the powerful to admit they have been wrong.”21

Leaders and their subordinates must quickly mesh in their organizations. A philosophy of leadership—whether written, verbal or both—is an appropriate mechanism for the members of the organization to get to understand you as the leader. The philosophy should be from your heart and in your own words. It provides the best opportunity up front to state your priorities, goals and areas of emphasis for your organization. Ultimately, whatever leadership philosophy you select, you must live the philosophy. Remember, “There is no one recipe for success as a senior leader. . . . However. . . . my own core values . . . will form the bedrock of my . . . philosophy. . . . I have a good feeling about this! There will be a wealth of talent, ingenuity and commitment waiting for me.”

The organization’s members must “buy into” the change, so it is up to the leader to communicate the reason for the change, why it is important and how it will improve the organization. Leaders must address change in their leadership philosophy and inform the organization how change will be managed.

Diversity

One area of leadership philosophy often overlooked is the strength of leveraging diversity in our organizations. We all look alike from a distance, and the Army of necessity, encourages uniformity. However, when we get close, we recognize the distinct and marvelous differences in each soldier within our unit. Men and women, of various ethnic, racial, religious backgrounds and experiences, reflect the treasured differences that make us a unique and powerful organization. This variety provides organizational richness that gives leaders—if willing to leverage the diversity—myriad ways to tackle issues and challenges and ultimately find better solutions.

Members of your organization need to know—through your leadership philosophy—that you value and will listen to every member. In your philosophy, you should generally articulate the mechanisms that you intend to use during your leadership tenure. A few that come to mind include: open-door policy, small-group sensing sessions, getting out of the office daily and visibility within the organization. Finally, your subordinates must know that you will not tolerate those who do not value diversity in the organization.
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Maintain a Sense of Humor

Although having a sense of humor is not a theme in everyone’s philosophy of leadership, I believe it is important and extremely helpful for a positive command climate. In fact, James Thurber remarked that “Humor is a serious thing. I like to think of it as one of our great and earliest national resources which must be preserved at all costs.” You have to know how to laugh, especially at yourself. Humor can very often diffuse a potentially tense situation. For those serious-minded pragmatic leaders, Gillian Flynn’s article “Career Advancement May be a Laughing Matter” suggests that “. . . a good sense of humor helps build personal rapport and a greater spirit of cooperation.” A suggestion—when all else fails, you had better be able to laugh! Leaders and their subordinates must quickly mesh in their organizations. A philosophy of leadership—whether written, verbal or both—is an appropriate mechanism for the members of the organization to get to understand you as the leader. The philosophy should be from your heart and in your own words. It provides the best opportunity up front to state your priorities, goals and areas of emphasis for your organization. Ultimately, whatever leadership philosophy you select, you must live the philosophy. Remember, “There is no one recipe for success as a senior leader. . . . However . . . my own core values . . . will form the bedrock of my philosophy . . . I have a good feeling about this! There will be a wealth of talent, ingenuity and commitment waiting for me.”

In developing a credible leadership philosophy, follow these seven imperatives—vision, values, care of soldiers and families, leader development, change, diversity and humor. Whatever the leadership level or type of organization you lead, you owe it to those who work for you to develop a thoughtful, comprehensive and realistic leadership philosophy. No leadership philosophy can address all of the issues you will confront, but it will serve as a solid start point that will be understood by you but, more important, by those you lead.

NOTES

5. The Bible, Proverbs 29:18.
15. Extracted from AWC Philosophy of Leadership unpublished paper #8, 13.
17. Extracted from AWC Philosophy of Leadership unpublished paper #8, 11.
18. Extracted from AWC Philosophy of Leadership unpublished paper #12, 4.
20. UMI ProQuest, General Periodicals OnDisc, item 02254504.
25. Extracted from AWC Philosophy of Leadership unpublished paper #10, last page.

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Doctrine, so excellent in many respects, suffers greatly from its neglect of the human factor in war—something all leaders should still consider important. For example, the 1993 US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, defines friction in war as the accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties and confusion of battle that impede both sides.1 No gut-wrenching terror here, no cowardice, no shirking and no agonized indecision. Very little, it seems, hampers smooth operations that could not be fixed with better intelligence, planning and communications. But Carl von Clausewitz, the concept’s originator, added a fourth ingredient to friction—danger. “War is the realm of danger,” he wrote, and its presence inspires fear; fear, in turn, undermines the soldier’s desire or ability to carry out the commander’s will, thereby multiplying the sources of friction.2

Any modern army, dependent on the synchronization of so many elements for its combat power, is perhaps more vulnerable than ever to friction’s debilitating effects, yet we pay little attention to one of friction’s primary sources. War in the information age will strain the sinews of leadership in ways we can barely imagine. The conventional battlefield will be a place of physical isolation, fluidity and instantaneous destruction inflicted at an unprecedented pace. Soldiers may wield “push buttons” more often than bayonets, but metal will still tear flesh with sickening regularity—often without warning. Realistic training and unit cohesiveness can attenuate some of fear’s effects, but there is no substitute for strong battlefield leadership in steeling soldiers for the real and perceived dangers of future war.

Ardant du Picq wrote that “Man is flesh and blood; he is body and soul. And, strong as the soul often is, it cannot dominate the body to the point where there will not be a revolt of the flesh and mental perturbation in the face of destruction.”3 Keeping this in mind, fear’s debilitating effects can be divided into two general categories: preoccupation with self-preservation rather than mission accomplishment; and mental paralysis.

The instinct for self-preservation is a useful part of any soldier’s character, instilling a certain and necessary amount of prudence in dangerous environments. But the danger zone has expanded considerably in the past 20 years and will continue to grow until it virtually encompasses the entire battlefield. Moreover, the individual soldier will have less warning of danger’s presence and less ability to defend against it. Highly lethal and precise weaponry, often guided by imposable machinery, renders even the strongest defensive position unsafe. Danger penetrates the blackest night and ranges far beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Sensors can detect the slightest activity so that movement, electromagnetic emission, firing and even the simple act of warming up an engine can make the soldier a target. Further, maneuver warfare’s nature intermixes armies amid the swirl of combat so that the whole notion of “forward” and “rear” areas becomes moot. Every action, even minor routines performed miles from the enemy, becomes a calculated risk. Thus, the fear of death will not be limited to those directly confronting the enemy but will extend throughout the battlefield’s depth—a constant, nagging companion of every soldier, 24 hours a day.

Consequently, combat stress—usually associated with the maneuver arms—will affect all branches
more or less continuously. In fact, by virtue of his greater protection and lesser worth as a target, the infantryman in his foxhole will arguably be safer than the clerk in a command post. The only historical parallel to this constant nervous strain was that experienced by World War I trench-warfare veterans. Even those unfortunates had long spells of rest in rear billets away from the firing line. Modern warfare will offer few secure rear-area billets.

At the sharp end, even low-level stress will be punctuated by periodic spasms of intense violence extending well beyond the FEBA. Casualties are likely to come in massive quantities, considering the killing power of today’s weapons. For example, during the Gulf War, US ground forces killed roughly one tank or fighting vehicle per minute during armored clashes.\textsuperscript{62}

All this leads to an obvious point—the stimulus for self-preservation will be at least as great on future battlefields as it has been on recent ones. In all probability, it will be even greater. Failure to master the inclination to avoid death or dismemberment leads to behaviors ranging from passivity to outright desertion—actions or reactions—leaders must recognize. Accordingly, the traditional supports for the fearful soldier are the presence of comrades, the influence of trusted leaders and confidence in the plan. Unfortunately, the sources of danger are multiplying while the sources of support are disappearing.

Author Richard E. Simpkin remarked that “Whether they are in armoured vehicles, on their feet, or dug in, troops deployed at high density will certainly be pulverized into incapacity and probably ‘destroyed’ in a markedly more literal sense than Clausewitz intended.”\textsuperscript{150}

Battlefield dispersion is a development that has been discussed for decades. Armies today are larger than ever, yet so are the battlefields. The lethality of modern weapons forces units to disperse, causing soldiers to become more isolated than ever before. Isolated in foxholes, vans or armored vehicles, few will have direct physical contact with more than a handful of their peers. Moreover, many small groups will consist of maintenance detachments, air defense teams and engineer squads task-organized away from the parent unit to which they owe their primary loyalty. These factors weaken one of the strongest forces keeping soldiers in the fight—the fear of appearing weak before their buddies. Isolation, real or imagined, allows the fearful soldier to indulge his instinct for self-preservation without the prospect of recrimination.

S.L.A. Marshall opined that “On the field of fire, it is the touch of human nature which gives men courage and enables them to make proper use of their weapons. . . . By the same token, it is the loss of this touch which freezes men and impairs all action.”\textsuperscript{153}

Isolation also makes it harder for leaders to exert personal influence over their soldiers. Dispersal, camouflage and the tactical use of terrain render personal example a tool of limited usefulness at best. On the modern battlefield, even the most conspicuous act of bravery will rarely be seen and almost never appreciated for what it entailed. This does not mean feats of raw courage will have no place on future fields; it just implies that their ability to inspire comrades will decline, even as their cost in terms of leader casualties climbs. Other acts of leadership, such as a reassuring gesture, calming remark, inspiring speech or simple display of interest in and understanding for the fearful soldier, will become difficult to apply and likewise limited in effectiveness.

Some may argue that the digital revolution can replace a leader’s physical presence through virtual, electromagnetically transmitted reality. This may be true to some extent, because the commander can theoretically be linked to each subordinate. Few would dispute the effectiveness of a calm (or exhortatory) voice over the command network in steadying a unit. In my opinion, however, the digital link is a weak medium for exerting combat leadership for several reasons. From a practical standpoint, the digitized battlefield will severely overload the electromagnetic spectrum, leaving only a very narrow bandwidth for voice communications. Another digital reality is that leaders can neither personalize their messages nor discuss their subordi-
The digital link is a weak medium for exerting combat leadership. . . . Digital reality is that leaders can neither personalize their messages nor discuss their subordinates’ psychological problems in any depth over the air—the enemy’s electromagnetic warfare efforts will make it impossible. . . . Digital links cannot give the effective leader what he needs most—a sensing of his soldiers’ moods. No computerized icon has been developed yet to signal the leader that his troops are “freezing up,” cowering or simply needing reassurance. For that, a leader must be with his soldiers.

nates’ psychological problems in any depth over the air—the enemy’s electromagnetic warfare efforts will make it impossible. Finally, digital links cannot give the effective leader what he needs most—a sensing of his soldiers’ moods. No computerized icon has been developed yet to signal the leader that his troops are “freezing up,” cowering or simply needing reassurance. For that, a leader must be with his soldiers.

The final bulwark against fear is a soldier’s confidence that what he is doing is part of a well-conceived operations plan. Personal sacrifice is easier to bear if one believes it will contribute to success—but no one wants to die uselessly. Supposedly, the dawning of information-age warfare will make it possible to keep everyone fully informed about what is happening. Each soldier, cognizant of the commander’s intent and supplied with enough data to fight effectively as part of a fully synchronized team, will be able to operate with minimal guidance. At the stroke of a light pen and push of a button, fragmentary orders and supporting graph-
cool head, so that things may appear to him in their true proportions and as they really are.”

Danger’s final effect is mental paralysis. Combat’s violence produces impressions that can reduce the bravest soul to a state of sensory overload. Obviously, this is undesirable in any soldier, but leader paralysis on the modern battlefield is especially harmful. This has always been true, but today’s emphasis on mission-type orders and subordinate initiative make any weak links in the chain of command a serious impediment to mission accomplishment. Further, digitization promises to burden leaders with information overload, increasing the chances that soldiers may simply cease to function rationally on the battlefield.

Exacerbating this particular problem is the continuing trend of demanding more complex tactical decision making at lower levels. Battalion and company commanders no longer lead fairly homogenous forces toward relatively simple objectives. Instead, they lead combined-arms teams. Units today are dispersed over a much wider area and operate at higher tempo. Add to this leadership challenge the fact that future success will depend less on planning and more on opportunism. In short, leadership will shoulder more responsibility, receive less-specific guidance, be required to process more information and be exposed to a greater degree of danger than their predecessors. It will be little wonder if many are unable to bear combat stress, seeking refuge in passivity or indecision.

Realizing that fear may become an even more powerful source of friction on future battlefields, we must consider what can be done to reduce its effects. First, we may have to distinguish between what is technically feasible and psychologically desirable. Communication technology may enable howitzers to operate as single guns, but we may want to reconsider further isolating gun crews from their sources of moral support. Similarly, digitized information systems will allow expansion of an individual’s span of control, but will he still be able to effectively command 10 or 20 subordinates? Can we reduce a tank platoon to 12 men by introducing autoloaders and still be assured an effective combat leader is somewhere in the mix? Not likely.

Second, it may be time to try to push the level of tactical decision making higher. With rare exceptions, leaders cannot process information and exercise leadership at the same time. Remember, time is a resource that will be in exceedingly short supply in conventional warfare. Reducing the scope for leader initiative from a tactical decision-making standpoint may seem heretical, but it is both feasible and desirable. Information technology reduces the need for independent action, because higher head-quarters will be able to see the battlefield better. Conversely, lower-level commanders can spend more time exercising leadership if they are partially freed from the burden of constantly rethinking their roles in the greater maneuver scheme.

Alternatively, separating the functions of command and decision making may be in order. This is not as radical as it seems at first glance. Modern staffs were developed to free commanders from involving themselves in the minutiae of logistics, intelligence and order writing as war grew increasingly complex. Future staffs may have to evolve into agencies exercising decision-making authority, simply to allow commanders to fulfill what remains their fundamental role—leading soldiers into combat.

Finally, doctrine must pay more than lip service to battlefield morale, both in human and organizational terms. Units must be structured and employed to minimize the stress placed on the soldiers who serve in them, not just to maximize their weapons’ destructive potential. The segregation of tactics and leadership in our training publications is symptomatic of how deeply we neglect the human factor in war. Consult the tactical series of field manuals at any level. There, you will find commanders described as planners, synchronizers, tacticians and data processors—anything, in fact, but leaders who depend on flesh-and-blood soldiers to win their battles.

NOTES

4. An admittedly unscientifc guess, drawn largely from vignettes. Most helpful was retired Army COL Richard Swain’s ‘Lucky War’ Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1994).

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Counseling:  
An Ignored Tool?

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Graham, US Army

HOW MANY TIMES has a boss counseled you? That is, how many times have you had a boss sit you down and discuss your strengths and weaknesses? How many times—short of your Officer Evaluation Report (OER)—has a boss identified for you what he considers to be your strengths and weaknesses? If your boss did take time to talk with you about your strengths and weaknesses, did you both write a developmental action plan (DAP) to sustain your strengths and improve your weaknesses? Did you walk out of his office with a road map or did you just walk out and have to make one up by yourself? If your boss did design a DAP for you to follow, did he meet with you later to monitor your progress? Did he take a long-term view of your career and discuss your future?

Sadly, for an institution that focuses and depends so much on people, the answer to these questions in our Army is usually “never” or “seldom.” In our arsenal of tools to improve people and units, counseling is an often-ignored force multiplier. Publication of the 1999 US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, specifically Appendix C, “Leadership Development Review and Developmental Counseling,” is the Army’s attempt to correct this individual and collective failure to tap into the power of counseling.

Counseling is cheap—it doesn’t cost a dime—it takes less time than you think. Counseling substantially builds trust between the leader and subordinate, translating immediately to more focused leaders and more effective units. In short, counseling pays dividends.

You may remember when the Army transitioned from its old Inspector General inspections to the Command Inspection programs. The old inspections were directive and often extremely harsh. Inspectors knew what they were looking for, the checklists provided detailed instruction and inspec-

tors never deviated from the checklists. Woe be to the unit or commander who had not followed the checklist to the letter.

More recent inspection programs are friendlier, less threatening and focus on educating and developing. They are better characterized as assistance visits—the inspectors are there to help units in improving specific areas within their commands. This analogy, with the difference in focus between old and new inspections, works with developmental counseling too. Developmental counseling sounds new. People may be uncomfortable with it now, but as the Army embraces the concept, subordinates will realize that their leaders are counseling them so they can become or remain successful team members, contributing to its mission, not just “checking the block.”

The purpose of counseling is to make subordinates more effective as leaders and as members of an organization or unit—“the team.” Counseling makes those counseled more involved, more
Counseling is not communication that results in temporary changes in a subordinate’s behavior: “Sergeant Jones, make sure your squad does its precombat inspection next time.” That is merely informing a subordinate to take corrective action. True counseling results in creation of a plan of action jointly, by the leader and the subordinate, with the objective to make the subordinate better able to perform his job.

committed and more responsible for their own personal and professional development. Those properly counseled become better individual and collective team members. Counseling helps subordinates succeed because leaders can chart a focused plan for a soldier’s personal and professional growth, both near term and long range.

What effective counseling is not is what we think of when we hear a comment like, “Don’t worry, I had a little counseling session with Private Blank, and he won’t be doing that again!” Effective counseling is not directive, one-way communication. A leader preaching, pontificating or storytelling to his subordinates is not counseling—that is relating folklore. While there may be a time and place for such activity, it is not what we mean when we discuss our new leadership doctrine and developmental counseling.

Counseling is not communication that results in temporary changes in a subordinate’s behavior: “Sergeant Jones, make sure your squad does its precombat inspection (PCI) next time.” That is merely informing a subordinate to take corrective action. True counseling results in creation of a plan of action jointly, by the leader and the subordinate, with the objective to make the subordinate better able to perform his job. To continue with the example, true developmental counseling takes the next step—creating a plan of action. “Sergeant Jones, your squad had a problem with PCIs. I want to make sure you understand the importance of com-

bat checks and how a noncommissioned officer (NCO) conducts a thorough precombat inspection. Let’s take time next Wednesday to go over this together. Bring your Soldier’s Manual and we’ll walk through a good PCI.”

Developmental counseling is not negative and it should not be done only at evaluation time or after poor performance. Developmental counseling has to be periodic, regular and routine, with the end goal of improving or maintaining good performance of the soldier being counseled. True developmental counseling should be positive in tone. It should leave the soldier feeling he has a good idea of what his boss wants him to accomplish, both individually and collectively for his “team.”

Appendix C, in FM 22-100 spells out four qualities leaders must have as counselors:

- Respect for subordinates. Leaders must have faith in their subordinates’ abilities and in their capacity to develop.
- Self-awareness and cultural awareness. Leaders must be aware of their own values and aware of the similarities and differences of those of different cultural backgrounds and how these factors influence values, perspectives and actions.
- Empathy. Leaders must be understanding of and sensitive to the feelings, thoughts and experiences of their subordinates.
- Credibility. Leaders must have a straightforward style with their subordinates, fostering a mutual trust.

For more information about counseling, visit Appendix C, FM 22-100, at: www.counseling.army.mil.

Without these four qualities, leaders cannot succeed as counselors. Moreover, without these qualities, I doubt if any individual could succeed as a leader. A challenging aspect of counseling is selecting the proper approach to a specific situation. Generally, skills of successful counselors include:

- Active listening—give full attention to subordinates; listening to their words and the way they are spoken. Notice voice, tone, eye contact, facial expression and appearance. Transmit an understanding of message through responding.
- Responding appropriately—verbally and nonverbally. Use eye contact and gestures. Check understanding without talking too much; summarize, interpret and question.
- Questioning Skills—serve as a way to obtain valuable information and to get subordinates to think. The majority of questions should be open-ended and structured so that the information received relates to the session at hand. Well-posed
questions may help to verify understanding, encourage further explanation or guide the subordinate through the stages of the counseling session.

Counselors should use the four-step method below when counseling soldiers or subordinate leaders:

- Observe the behavior. See what the soldier or leader is doing. Go where he works. See firsthand what he does. Use manifestations of behavior if you cannot witness the event yourself. What are “manifestations of behavior?” They are the things you can measure or get objective feedback on if you are not there—physical training scores; inspection results; gunnery scores; preparation for overseas movement results; and training after-action reviews (AARs). There are ample possibilities specific to your unit or assignment.

- Assess the behavior. Was it above standard? Where did it not meet the standard? Of course, this implies that you as a leader know what the standards are or should be. Evaluate subordinate’s behavior as it corresponds to one of the Army’s 23 leader dimensions—the seven Army values and the 16 attributes required of leaders. Assess how what you observed either exceeded, met or needs improvement among these leader dimensions. The leader dimensions will help you be more explicit in your feedback to those you are counseling.

- Coach the individual you are counseling. Tell him from your experience, where he can make specific improvements to his skills or behaviors: “You know, Lieutenant Smith, when I was a platoon leader, we had a crew that could not do gunnery. But one day the platoon sergeant and I sat down with the whole crew and went step by step through the crew drill with them. Once that crew understood why they were performing the steps in a certain sequence, they became one of the best squads in the platoon.” Coaching is where you can provide your experience and skills to those you are counseling.

- Conduct a developmental counseling session. Solicit from the individual you are counseling what he needs to fix or do to maintain his current performance level, outlining what you both will do to either maintain the good or repair the bad. Then make a commitment on when and where to meet again to review your joint plan.

As a leader, how will you know when counseling has been effective? While you are counseling, ask the subordinate for feedback. Does he understand what you are trying to get across to him? When the soldier can tell you exactly what performance of his you judge as below standard, and when he can tell you why it missed the standard(s) and what you both are doing to fix it, then you know you got your point across. When the attitudes or actions that first led you to suspect there was a problem with the soldier start changing for the better, you know that you have been effective.

When more soldiers want to talk to you, you know that you have been effective. Developmental counseling helps leaders “build” better subordinates. Those counseled focus more clearly on their own professional growth. They can contribute more effectively to the team’s success.

Our Army embedded preventative maintenance checks and services into our collective psyche in the early 1970s. We developed our training in the 1980s by institutionalizing the AAR. We standardized our approach to risk assessment in the early 1990s. Now, on the threshold of the new century, we can take great steps forward in personnel readiness by making developmental counseling an integral part of how we manage our people. Our soldiers want it and deserve it—as leaders, we owe it to them. Let’s get started. **MR**
WITH PUBLICATION of the June 1999 US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, the Army moves a step closer to making the Total Army a reality. The name change from Military Leadership to Army Leadership signals that this latest version is different and more inclusive than its predecessors. Previous editions were narrowly focused on the uniformed portion of the Army at battalion and lower levels and pretty much excluded the rest of the Army, including a segment that today amounts to about 20 percent of the Total Army personnel structure—Department of the Army civilians (DACs). This new FM addresses all Army leaders—military and civilian.

The FM’s authors have incorporated references to DACs throughout the new manual, as well as vignettes that address situations which civilian employees are likely to encounter. The scope also extends beyond that of earlier versions and lays out three distinct levels of leadership applicable throughout the Total Army—direct, organizational and strategic.

The term Total Army has been widely used for some time now in pronouncements by the Army’s senior leaders. References to the Total Army usually extend to include Active Component, Army National Guard, US Army Reserve and DACs. The new FM 22-100 follows that format and acknowledges that the Total Army today is dependent upon its soldiers and more than 232,000 civilian employees. That has not always been true. There were times—not too long ago, in fact—when conditions were different.

The Past
Fifteen years ago, Raymond J. Sumser, then director of Civilian Personnel for the Army, reported that “Too little attention is being given to identifying civilians with potential for advancement or to systematically determine the skills . . . needed to prepare such high caliber individuals for progressively more responsible positions. . . . The Army is not
guiding the . . . development of its future civilian managers in ways which assure most effective and efficient accomplishment of the Army goals.”

Sumser’s statements were echoed in early 1986 when the Department of the Army Inspector General issued findings in a similar vein: “Army leaders are failing to provide effective leadership to the . . . Army civilians. . . . Their concern is primarily for the soldier, not the civilian member of the Army Team. . . . Commanders don’t understand the civilian personnel system; most would prefer not to deal with it; and . . . they often aren’t willing to learn.”

Similar concerns about deploying civilians to the war zone during Operation Desert Storm were reported in The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Deployment of civilians to Southwest Asia may have resulted more from the conditions facing the Army at the time than from any planning beforehand. “The Army as a whole had done little planning for the use of . . . civilians in a war zone. It soon discovered, however, that civilians were needed to fill a number of skilled positions, such as air traffic safety controllers, port safety officers, logistics management specialists, automation and computer specialists, engineers, equipment repair technicians and communications specialists. Most civilians in Southwest Asia worked at modifying and maintaining equipment. . . . At peak deployment in February [1991] 1,500 civilians were in the-
Emphasizing the need to develop civilian leaders for positions of greater responsibility, Reimer stated, “We cannot leave the development of our civilian leaders to chance. The development of civilian leaders starts with the accession and training of interns... We must hire the best and train them to meet the challenge of the 21st century... It is important that we continue the emphasis on professional development for all civilians through the executive level.”

The Present

The observations illustrated above show how far the Army has come in the past 15 years concerning civilians in the Total Army. The new FM 22-100 is the latest indicator that the Total Army must depend on all its components in performing today’s missions.

The Army is smaller today than at any time since before World War II and it continues to downsize. In less than a decade, the Army reduced its ranks by more than 630,000 people, closed more than 700 installations and changed from a forward-deployed force to a Continental United States-based, power-projection force. The number of deployments in that same period increased by 300 percent. Accordingly, missions were realigned and force structures changed.

The bottom line is that DACs have assumed responsibilities in the Total Army that were not even envisioned a couple of decades ago. The Army simply cannot mobilize, deploy or sustain itself without its civilian component. The old ways of doing business do not work anymore. The outdated paradigms that endure about DACs should be revisited. DACs’ roles, responsibilities and leader challenges are in constant flux.

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training for resources.

The Army has made considerable progress in the past 15 years in modernizing civilian personnel management. Programs such as the Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS) and the Total Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES) have eliminated many of the earlier system’s complexities, resulting in some civilian developmental programs more closely resembling those for officers and enlisted personnel.

ACTEDS provides a career progression road map for developing and training civilians from entry to senior level. The development of civilian leaders, like that of their uniformed colleagues, is a blend of institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. The Civilian Leader Development Action Plan provides similar frames of reference as plans developed for officers, warrant officers and NCOs. ACTEDS specifies training in two areas: professional technical career training and leadership training.

Leadership Training

CAL’s Civilian Leadership Training Division (CLTD) at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) was established in 1985 to provide leadership development for DACs. Three courses were developed for intern to manager levels:

- ♦ Intern Leadership Development Course (ILDC). Begun in 1986, ILDC’s target audience is new Army interns. The course objective is to ensure that interns are knowledgeable about the structure of the US Army, leadership styles, team building and group dynamics, leadership competencies and their own emerging roles as tomorrow’s leaders. Through Fiscal Year 1998 (FY 98), 11,690 interns had completed the course.

- ♦ Leadership Education and Development (LEAD) Course. Started in 1988, LEAD’s focus is the first-time, first-line supervisor. The LEAD course is designed to teach leaders how to assess their own effectiveness, assess employee and team effectiveness, motivate and influence employees, communicate effectively, conduct counseling, resolve conflicts, develop strategies to create fully functioning teams, make effective decisions and explain the effect of values on individual and team effectiveness. LEAD is conducted at home station by local command facilitators, who successfully completed the LEAD train-the-trainer course conducted by CLTD. By the end of FY 98, 38,802 supervisors had completed LEAD, while 1,260 facilitators had completed the train-the-trainer course.

- ♦ Organizational Leadership for Executives (OLE). Established in 1986, OLE provides leadership training to “supervisors of supervisors” and managers of programs, resources and policy. The OLE provides leaders with skills necessary to conduct organizational assessments, communicate influentially, establish an effective organizational climate, manage organizational change, develop organizational strategic plans, diagnose their own personal effectiveness and build high-performing teams. More than 6,900 supervisors have graduated from OLE. Gains shown on six-month follow-up surveys of OLE participants and their supervisors are depicted in the figure. These three courses have been conducted long enough now that a significant number of interns who completed ILDC in its early days are attending OLE, have progressed in their careers and are now “supervisors of supervisors.” The impact to the Army of more than 58,000 graduates as we move into the 21st century should be significant.

There are some underlying concepts that are common to all three courses. The content in each course is embedded in the Army’s leadership doctrine and values. Participants experience leadership in its purest form—experience being the operative word. Experiential learning permeates the course from the moment class begins and continues until the participants depart. CLTD courses are the only ones the Army offers that employ experiential learning. Adults learn better if they experience a situation rather than simply hearing about it from others. In experiential learning, everyone in a situation has his own personal experience. Human nature being what it is, no two experiences are exactly the same because of individual backgrounds, prior experiences, biases, values, beliefs and attitudes. Once the common experience is complete, participants examine the varied perspectives in the group and look at why those different views exist. Through discussion, participants begin to discover the factors that came together to create the behaviors others saw. They consider the lessons they can take away from the experience and then examine possible new courses...
“Army civilians . . . will become even more important to [the Army’s] readiness and success. Dedicated civilians support America’s Army superbly—at home, with overseas forces and in contingency operations. Army civilians possess skills critical to the Army’s success, make vital contributions to the nation’s defense every day, and are irreplaceable players on the Army Team.”

of action. Through this process, greater and deeper understanding develops, trust grows and teams build.

The focus is on how people work together, as contrasted to what they may be working on. Participants examine how the group made decisions and how those decisions affected members’ commitment to the final product, how conflicts were resolved, how people communicated with one another and how groups dealt with common issues or problems. In doing this, the participants learn more about themselves and others.

Many opportunities arise throughout each course for participants to discover how influential they can be with other members. They live the Army’s values and come away with a real understanding of those values—not merely slogans that are little more than “bumper stickers.” They polish influential communication skills and gain a better understanding of their individual strengths and the areas where they may want to change. Opportunities abound for those who desire to practice new behaviors and receive feedback from others in the group. They also examine the choices they have in their lives, which often yields surprises. If individuals see that they are empowered to influence their own behavior, then they can do a better job of influencing and motivating others. Leaders also learn how to diagnose the culture in their organizations, develop visions for their organizations and lead change. Class participants learn what works for them personally and do not simply take home cookie-cutter recipes for leadership.
CLTD continues to enhance its state-of-the-art leadership training by adjusting the courses based on front-end analysis of current needs and follow-up surveys completed by graduates and their supervisors. Interested individuals may obtain additional information and class schedules from the CAL web page at <http://www.egsc.army.mil/cal/cltd/cltdfr.htm>.

**The Future**

In FY 2000, CLTD will change its name to the Leadership Services Office (LSO) to more accurately reflect its current role in leader development. In addition to providing the training described here, CLTD/LSO—to the extent that manpower and time allow—performs organizational development services for units, organizations and agencies that request them and pay the associated travel and per diem costs. Assistance has been provided to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command deputy chief of staff for Base Operations Support; Office of the Dean, US Army War College; 30th Signal Battalion/Department of Information Management, Hawaii; deputy commandant, CGSC; commandant, US Disciplinary Barracks; and, most recently, a major intervention with the Civilian Human Resource Management Agency, Headquarters, US Army Europe.

The services focused on:
* Organizational assessment.
* Increasing awareness of behaviors that help or hinder personal and organizational effectiveness.
* Integrating personal and organizational goals.
* Helping the organization make better use of its human potential.
* Increasing member participation in decision making.
* Increasing trust in the organization.
* Effecting an organizational culture change to more effective ways of doing business.
* Creating organizational vision and the resulting strategic plan to realize that vision.

CLTD/LSO is most recognized for its mission—providing DAC leadership training. The rapidly changing organizational landscape dictates that progressive and future-oriented organizations keep a constant vigil on direction and the indicators of future trends. CLTD/LSO has done that in the past and will continue to do so.

A recent US Army General Counsel opinion states that CLTD/LSO training may be offered to any government agency—local, state or federal—on a cost-reimbursable basis, thereby expanding CLTD/LSO’s sphere of influence immeasurably. That opinion has created a potential training population of every government worker in the United States. This opportunity presents CLTD/LSO a tremendous responsibility to continue offering the same quality cutting-edge leadership services it has delivered since the organization’s creation. Plans are to pilot cost-reimbursable training by offering vacant seats to other organizations on a test basis in FY 2000.

The Government Performance Management Review Act also stated that organizations would create strategic plans. CLTD/LSO has the ability to guide organizations through this process. Many have used this service in the past as a foundation for Army of Excellence and Malcolm Baldrige Award nominations.

The driving force behind CLTD/LSO’s success is its members and the core ideology they embrace. CLTD/LSO is about providing quality leadership services—training and organizational assistance—to improve the leadership of America. It is much more than a program or a qualifying adjective in front of the word leadership. It is an organization of people dedicated to providing the best possible leadership training and services. Such a challenge necessitates a strategic plan that describes the future for CLTD/LSO and outlines what is needed today to achieve that future. CLTD/LSO has developed a strategic plan that takes the organization to the “next level” and thereby meet the challenges of an ever-changing environment.

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**NOTES**


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Civilian Graduate Education and the Professional Officer

Second Lieutenant Robert A. Vitas, US Army Reserve

The era since World War II has witnessed tremendous challenges to the traditional perception of military professionalism. What was once an endeavor largely isolated from society, at least in peacetime, has grown into national security. Due to its expanded roles of civic action and political involvement, the military can no longer stand apart from society. Intervention and peacekeeping (PK) roles in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia underscore that the officer-leader is now both manager and bureaucrat. Internally, there are new mechanisms to manage human and materiel resources. Externally, the military is inextricably involved with policy making at the highest national levels. Internationally, there are no military actions without political ramifications.

Professional military education—from West Point to the senior schools and war colleges—is not sufficient to develop officers cognitively able to deal with these new nonmilitary tasks without compromising military professionalism. The depth of insight and inquiry needed is best found in civilian liberal arts graduate education, in contrast to technical and scientific graduate degrees. Although traditionalists may contend that graduate school detracts from professionalism, such study enhances the profession and enables the officer to better carry out long-term military obligations.

This article may serve as a companion to the seminal volume, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Fred B. Bryant. References to Mel Sorg’s and Bryant’s analyses herein refer to this volume. I hope to convey a better understanding of the current status of the professional officer, as well as what will be expected of him as the United States enters the 21st century.

Leadership versus Management

The management of violence and successful combat leadership, which had been the hallmarks of the military profession before World War II, were no longer sufficient to characterize the totality of the profession as the United States progressed through the 1940s. The traditional functions of officers were modified in two broad ways. First, there was greater concern with international affairs and the premises and purposes of military policy. Second, military support functions became more important, encompassing supply, finance, research and development, public relations, education and personnel management. Especially in noncombat assignments, the career of the skilled military technician began to parallel that of a federal civil servant.

From an international security standpoint, author Morris Janowitz presents the concept of a constabulary force designed to promote deterrence, stability and the limited use of force because “it is increasingly essential for military commanders and their subordinate personnel . . . to be fully aware of the changing calculus of making war and making peace.” Janowitz contends that the contemporary officer must relate national policy to the military organization. This means acting with minimal force and incorporating a protective posture while...
company—and the act of violence—firing a rifle. Another author adds, “No longer is the leader always the most skilled soldier; today the technical skills of followers may well exceed those of the leader. . . . Nevertheless, followers seem to expect more from their leaders today,” alluding to personnel and resource management functions.\textsuperscript{60}

Taking these new international and organizational responsibilities into account, authors John W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway have constructed three categories of qualifications that all officers should meet:

- Professional military qualifications, which consist of military competence, the representation of the national security viewpoint in a democratic society and knowing the problems of enlisted personnel.
- General executive qualifications, which include the evaluation of people and information, effective communications and the efficient and economic conduct of affairs. Here the officer must be able to grasp large and complicated situations. Seeing military affairs “big picture” means making cognitive connections among—and balancing—its diverse components. Technical, organizational and social relationships must be discerned here. This requires some degree of socio-political sophistication. The professional military executive must adapt to political and technical situations while reviewing the service’s traditions, doctrines and missions.\textsuperscript{5} The postwar officer must be aware of the joint and international nature of military planning and operations and be free from parochialism. This openness extends from the avoidance of service bias to politico-military interchange with allies.
- Military executive qualifications of versatility, exercise of job motivation and creative service under civilian leadership. A military executive must possess a wide range of knowledge and be able to absorb new data and concepts quickly. Also, he leads his charges mainly through patience and intellectual leadership. Persuasion, not orders, is seen as the best motivational strategy. Finally, a contemporary officer obeys his civilian superiors and brings his best judgment as a military expert to bear on civilian policy decisions.

Masland and Radway end by addressing the issue of the military executive versus the combat leader. They conclude that field and headquarters situations probably grow more alike as responsibilities increase. To capitalize on this, they propose a good military education system, as well as a rotation designed to enhance an officer’s adaptability.\textsuperscript{61}

Not all observers, however, embrace the managerial ethos of the US officer corps. For instance, Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage make an
especially scathing indictment of the Army officer corps in light of its performance in Vietnam, noting that the military is qualitatively different from civilian bureaucracies, with the former being monastic and corporate, and the latter entrepreneurial: “In the final analysis, no one is seriously expected to allow his loyalty to IBM to cost him his life or to force him to bear the responsibility for the death of others.” Traditional military values and experiences center on combat. Further, they allege there are too many managers in the Army today and not enough good combat officers. Models of military organizational change must take this into account. Gabriel and Savage urge the Army to abandon the entrepreneurial ethos and return to its core values.

Some have taken this point further by noting the debilitating effects of the managerial ethos on officers’ attitudes toward their careers, referring to the new military careerism as “trained incapacity” and “professional deformation.” Especially among staff officers, personal career goals begin to outweigh military interests and objectives. Savage also recommends a move away from the managerial officer to the traditional officer more concerned with leadership than with resource management.

Others are not absolutist concerning the place of management in the military. James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves note that the postwar growth of defense spending calls for improved procedures and techniques to manage the military at all levels of command. They add that professional military schools, in addition to strictly military studies, correctly stress national security policy, international relations, personnel and fiscal management and individual skills such as writing, speaking and negotiation. These skills may be even more necessary in the climate of post-Cold War defense cuts.

Maintaining that today’s military needs both leadership and management, several authors suggest that education early in an officer’s military career emphasize leadership development, along with management skills to inculcate efficiency. Later, an officer should have executive-level leadership training for goal definition and the establishment of organizational climate, alongside management skills for resource allocation.

Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach further refine the notion of leadership versus management. Leadership emanates from the personal qualities of the officer, while management is the process of using tools and techniques to effectively and efficiently deploy resources. In the broadest sense, resources include time, information, money and people. These authors also maintain that the post-war military needs both leadership and management qualities to carry out its diverse missions and tasks.

The Postwar Professional

Former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor once characterized the Army as an institution “more like a church.” Indeed, the “military” components of military professionalism, such as honor, obedience, integrity, loyalty and service, are not typically associated with other organizations. The military is not a corporate bureaucracy, but a value-infused institution with a long history. Military life is holistic, characterized by Gabriel and Savage as a “monastery” in terms of its values, rewards and punishments by one’s peers. It is “an institution which requires deep psychic investment from its members as a prerequisite to effectiveness.”

The military’s identity and its relationship with society and state are determined by the officer corps, which strives to be more than a body of trained killers, acting as the repository of loyalty, gentlemanly conduct, corporateness, responsibility and expertise.

However, the postwar officer corps must transcend this traditional definition of professionalism. No longer is the officer just a professional soldier, but a bureaucrat as well. Leadership now includes influencing both civilian and military people, goal achievement in a political-cultural setting that mitigates exclusively military solutions, the study of interpersonal relations and group dynamics and understanding American liberal democratic values. As John W. Gardner observed, “if anything significant is to be accomplished, leaders must understand the social institutions and processes through which action is carried out.”

By 1953, two-thirds of Army general officers were already carrying out economic, scientific and political assignments. Combat operations had become—and remain—only a fraction of Armed Forces activity. Masland and Radway noted:
Externally, in the domestic political environment, both civilians and military professionals have recognized the need to have the military involved in the policy process: “With the traditions of obedience to civilian control strong within the military, with an appreciation by military leaders of the spirit of the democratic system, and with competent civilian superiors determined to exercise effective civilian control, the costs of a broadened military professionalism do not appear too high. The benefits of military advice given after a consideration of all relevant factors should contribute to more enlightened national security policy.”

“Obviously, very few officers in these [nonmilitary] positions have much to do with matters of high national policy. But each stands at the base of a pyramid that reaches up to heights on which other military officers, by conference, staff study and directive, help dispose of pressing national business.” As the 1950s progressed, completing a decade of the postwar military, officers’ roles continued to be transformed due to technical advances and the informal federalism of Western democracies. This was important not only for the sake of military administration and preparedness, but also for deterrence and peacekeeping in the nuclear context. They concluded: “If, in the future, total war means total annihilation, it follows axiomatically that any officer corps that manages to survive will do so only because war has been avoided or because it has been severely limited in purpose and scope.”

The limitation in purpose and scope includes cooperation between officers and diplomats.

Officers have become involved in psychology, civil affairs and international security policy, as well as fighting drug trafficking and, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, racism. Technology, specialization and social changes have posed moral, philosophical and ideological challenges to military traditions. This, in turn, has led to modified officer education and career patterns. While some have criticized these activities in nonmilitary fields, others contend that military involvement in social welfare, education and civic action is needed to sustain professional purpose as much as preparing for, and waging, war. The military profession cannot be limited to the management of violence, for this is not always a relevant or viable option. When an institution loses its function, it must either find a new one or disappear. The military, though slow to change, has done so. Recognizing this, Amos A. Jordan formulated a new military vocation definition: “The management and application of military resources in deterrent, peacekeeping and combat roles in the context of rapid technological, social and political change.”

Contrary to popular opinion, military officers have been involved in civic action and political matters since the founding of the Republic. Before 1815, officers managed the negotiation of treaties and US missions abroad, taught in frontier schools and, of course, ran the Army Corps of Engineers. Later, with the acquisition of overseas territories, naval officers entered the political realm. World War I saw officers involved in civilian affairs, while World War II saw officers engaged in diplomacy and civil administration during the German and Japanese occupations, including overseeing the establishment of political parties, labor unions and fledgling economic structures.

Former Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was aware of the political nature of military programs and made his immediate staff responsible for politico-military coordination. This, for example, led to officers becoming involved in fiscal management, research and development, and political analysis, and eventually saw the appointment of an assistant secretary for International Security Affairs and an assistant secretary for Economic Security in the 1990s. While General Douglas MacArthur’s speech to the graduating cadets at West Point in 1962 warned them to avoid all things political—perhaps recalling his stormy relationship with President Harry S. Truman—President John F. Kennedy told them just a year later to be aware of the political dimension of their profession. This contrast, indeed, sparked discussion and debate throughout the 1960s at West Point.

Politics is a consideration not only at the national level, but at the international level as well. The fall of communism has not eliminated the necessity of a US presence abroad, especially in terms of PK, limited warfare, counterrevolution and counterterrorism. This includes the use of the US military in advisory and support positions to supplement nation building and internal security in developing nations. Such actions, indeed, are heavily political. The battlefield commander’s every move has political ramifications. Thus, even the officer who has spent most of his career in the combat arms must be aware of the international politico-economic dimensions of military action and the fact that limited wars do not bring victory in the traditional sense.
Not only are military leaders considering nonmilitary factors in their deliberations, civilian leaders now expect military advice to be broad in scope. A survey of former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirms that this expectation was generally met during deliberations of that body. Political Scientist William Jesse, who conducted the survey, wrote that many of the military leaders he interviewed were politically sophisticated and shared the same value system with society in general. They had a knowledge of the spirit, as well as the mechanics, of American democracy. They had also had public policy-oriented “adaptive” assignments, which gave them an appreciation for the workings of the political system.  

To function effectively in the domestic and international environment, some tactful, constructive professional dissent should be allowed. Otherwise, a reliance on military orthodoxy may harm the very profession that orthodoxy is intended to protect. Responsible skepticism and inquiry are needed at the individual level so that the institution may be subject to constant self-examination.  

Reginald Brown writes of the danger of a traditional officer corps that unquestioningly refrains from self-examination and criticism. He recounts the German General Staff’s subservience to Adolf Hitler. There, traditional military virtues ultimately led to greater militarism. He sees a parallel in the US entry into Vietnam, when military leaders did not stand up to civilian decision makers. “Civilian militarism can be as reprehensible as that of military men. Traditional military professionalism is not likely to succeed in preventing the rise of militarism, civilian or military.” Brown concludes that the new military professional, a political participant, should not feel the need to blindly accept any military policy, but should be more concerned with how he relates to his country than to his service or superior. General Colin Powell’s advocacy of clearly stated objectives, overwhelming force and an exit strategy before and during the Gulf War is an example of a military leader nudging political leaders toward sensible and realistic expectations and decisions. The right to dissent and access to political institutions, specifically Congress, are more compatible with contemporary American democracy and its national security interests. Note the JCS approaching Congress in late 1998 to testify about readiness problems, lamenting defense funding shortfalls and floating a military pay raise trial balloon.  

**Education and the Molding of the Mind**  
In a study of *operant behavior*—what people do—and *respondent behavior*—what they consciously say they choose to do—David C. McClelland notes: “People carry around with them cognitive schemas that organize their feelings, attitudes, and choices in a particular area such as affiliation or achievement.” Obviously, everyone has a particular psychological makeup which, coupled with education, socialization and experience, forms attitudes and values. These, in turn, help determine behavior.  

Bengt Abrahamsson, for example, writes of three stages in an officer’s recruitment and promotion. First, there is selection and self-selection. Individuals with active, conservative and authoritarian attitudes appear to predominate among those who seek a commission. Second is the selection process in promotion. Those who conform with superiors’ expectations and attitudes obviously are at an advantage. Third come indoctrination processes to ensure homogeneity in values. This is the point at which an officer whose values do not mesh with those of his peers may leave the military. Specifically, Abrahamsson finds that professional military indoctrination leads to a pessimistic attitude regarding danger to the state. If an officer adopts this attitude, it contributes to his career success. He concludes that selection plus professional socialization ultimately lead to uniform attitudes among officers at the upper ranks.  

Some curricula lend themselves more to the treatment of values than others. Author Philip E. Jacob asserts that “values inhere and are inseparable from the teaching of social science. They are a subject of instruction. They are sometimes a specific *motivation* of instruction. They are also a consequence of instruction.” Some students, though, are not very...
Few would dispute the value of a liberal education for officers or other professionals at the undergraduate level. However, there is also a need for depth of knowledge that can be gained only through advanced, research-oriented study. This is partially provided by the war colleges, senior schools and other institutions of professional military education (PME). But such education is not fully able to prepare an officer for his responsibilities as he advances in rank.

Creative in their thought or its consequences for value formation. Jacob notes that “Some students have a set of mind so rigid, an outlook on human relations so stereotyped and a reliance on authority so compulsive that they are intellectually and emotionally incapable of understanding new ideas, and seeing, much less accepting, educational implications which run counter to their pre-conceptions… Such students quail in the presence of conflict and uncertainty. They crave ‘right answers.’ They distrust speculative thought, their own or their fellow students’. They recoil from ‘creative discussion.’”

Interestingly, Jacob concludes that student values do not change because of the formal educational process or curriculum, but because of the climate of certain institutions, sensitive teachers with value commitments and value-laden personal experiences integrated with intellectual development. Even the hard-core students described above can be affected by a well-ordered syllabus, coupled with a patient instructor who inspires the self-confidence to reason and judge independently.

Further, applied to the military, one study points out the importance of not stopping with a four-year undergraduate degree, at least for West Point officers. After graduation, they tended to be more politically conservative, more inclined to a pragmatic, situation-oriented mode of judgment and less inclined to value academic achievement. Overall, new officers emerging from West Point demonstrated a practical realism over theoretical values and had adopted values similar to those of their instructors. Cadets who failed to receive a commission took with them values similar to society in general.

If a significant number of officers have such attitudes, what can the Army do, considering that mental processes must be endlessly changed because of the flux in the professional officer’s role? The answer consists in an officer’s broad educational background at all levels. Even at the undergraduate level, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps officers from various universities bring a diversity and depth of educational background to the officer corps, as opposed to the more uniform West Point cadets. A number of observers have stressed the importance of a liberal arts education for the well-developed officer. Medal of Honor recipient Admiral James Stockdale proposes a return to the historical and philosophical classics, which would provide wisdom and perspective to tackle contemporary problems. Leaders need to possess integrity, discipline and a philosophical bent not available from the modern management literature. Socrates, Mill, Dostoyevsky and Koestler are among the authors Stockdale recommends to develop the principles of “right, good, honor, duty, freedom, necessity, law and justice” as they apply to the human predicament generally and to the role of the leader in particular.” Finally, he notes that philosophy “gives perspective to the problems of the present and drives home the point that there is really very little new under the sun.”

Samuel P. Huntington also advocates the study of liberal arts for the officer: “The fact that, like the lawyer and the physician, he is continuously dealing with human beings requires him to have the deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations and behavior which a liberal education stimulates. Just as a general education has become the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and medicine, it is now also almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional officer.”

Few would dispute the value of a liberal education for officers or other professionals at the undergraduate level. However, there is also a need for depth of knowledge that can be gained only through advanced, research-oriented study. This is partially provided by the war colleges, senior schools and other institutions of professional military education (PME). But such education is not fully able to prepare an officer for his responsibilities as he advances in rank. Some have argued that PME too rarely recognizes
individual differences among the officer-students, for it inculcates common perceptions of the profession, as well as professional solidarity. Others have found PME to be a very stimulating experience with no pressures to conform their views to others.

Theodore J. Crackel notes that the specialist ordered to a war college is forced to become a generalist, considering foreign affairs, national interests and civil-military relations. The problem at the service colleges is that frequent curriculum changes prevent a high level of sophistication in instruction or faculty. There is little opportunity for in-depth thought and development of ideas among faculty and students. The senior service schools also possess few distinguished scholars, perhaps because of a systematic discouragement of thinkers in uniform. “If Clausewitz and Jomini had served in the American military, they would have been counseled to serve no more than a single three-year teaching assignment, and to escape sooner if possible. The schools are now anything but a safe haven for the select few who should be allowed to turn gray thinking and recording profound thoughts about their profession.”

Former JCS Chairman General David Jones laments that such officers retire as lieutenant colonels and go to think tanks.

Civilian Graduate Education for Officers

The most appropriate place for such outstanding individuals is full-time civilian graduate education in the liberal arts. There are, of course, outstanding officers with bachelor’s degrees. Others pursue masters and doctorates part-time while off-duty. However, for an officer to derive full benefits from graduate study, it must be pursued full-time at a civilian university. Research-oriented civilian graduate education engenders a flexibility in thought supported by three pillars:

- The technical component teaches scientific and management skills.
- The critical component instills judgment about the priorities and trade-offs among resources and values.
- Officers are able to assess the values and attitudes that the nation wants them to hold.

This third pillar deserves special mention, for officers must go beyond purely military thoughts. Every professional—military or civilian—must have an intellectual awareness of the world outside his profession. The military professional must have the intellectual sensitivity to assess the use of force, policy outcomes and the domestic and international environment. As Masland and Radway note, “high-level command and policy-making responsibilities...

Professional military education—from West Point to the senior schools and war colleges—is not sufficient to develop officers cognitively able to deal with these new nonmilitary tasks without compromising military professionalism. The depth of insight and inquiry needed is best found in civilian liberal arts graduate education, in contrast to technical and scientific graduate degrees. Although traditionalists may contend that graduate school detracts from professionalism, such study enhances the profession and enables the officer to better carry out long-term military obligations.

are not those for which a neatly packaged bundle of requirements can be determined and assembled. They call for the broadest sort of intellectual and personal qualities.”

Certainly not all have embraced the merits of civilian liberal arts graduate education for professional officers. Antimilitary critics want to keep officers out of civilian institutions, isolating the military from society. Military traditionalists fear the loss of a sense of duty in civilian study. At best, such study is perceived as “nice to have,” but not relevant to the combat arms. This attitude, though, ignores the benefits to both soldier and service. Certainly, the military and the university have different viewpoints, purposes and professional commitments. Further, the university offers a diversity of behavior and views. But those factors are particularly useful. The officer who brings relative maturity and experience to the classroom becomes an object of examination, which can help correct misconceptions among students and faculty about the military. The university sees that officers are not warmongers but serious and thoughtful students who bring valuable insights to the classroom. Likewise, officers see that all university people are not leftists or radicals.

In such an environment, the officer is better able to evaluate the military institution—and the political system itself. Social issues, human behavior, morality and philosophy are now a part of discussion. Alternative sources of information and influence are available, resulting in a greater dynamism within the military upon the officer’s completion of graduate studies. Civilian graduate education thus becomes important for professional dimensions while also establishing closer ties with society. Indeed, the better understanding of the military profession resulting from graduate study is the best
The management of violence and successful combat leadership, which had been the hallmarks of the military profession before World War II, were no longer sufficient to characterize the totality of the profession as the United States progressed through the 1940s. The traditional functions of officers were modified in two broad ways. First, there was greater concern with international affairs and the premises and purposes of military policy. Second, military support functions became more important, encompassing supply, finance, research and development, public relations, education and personnel management. Especially in noncombat assignments, the career of the skilled military technician began to parallel that of a federal civil servant.

starting point for upgrading the profession. This would not happen at the service schools or war colleges. The profession is open to improvement because of this development of individual officers. Some find the experience rewarding, while others renew their commitment to the orderly world of military life. Some become so dissatisfied with the military and its intellectual constraints that they resign—the military can no longer fulfill their expectations. Most remain committed to change the institution for the better.272

Studies indicate that most professionals feel civilian graduate education makes them more competent, competitive and effective. They have a greater sense of satisfaction and achievement and their promotion and retention rates are enhanced. They are well prepared for the more challenging assignments required of senior officers in the international environment.

Many analysts who support civilian graduate education for professional officers maintain that such validated positions must be geared specifically to military requirements, needs of trained personnel and the demand for their subsequent services. In other words, the program should be geared to meet personnel needs, not the educational level of individual officers. Indeed, current regulations support this view. The Army’s Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) program allows officers to pursue graduate degrees in disciplines that have validated branch, functional area or specialty requirements. After obtaining a graduate degree, the officer must complete a three-year tour in a validated position under the Army Education Requirements System. On average, officers spend 18 months in school, incurring an obligation that must be repaid on a three-for-one basis—three days active duty for every day of schooling. They also incur an active duty service obligation of up to six years.282

Specifically addressing the Navy’s graduate program, Edward H. Monroe writes: “Above all, programs requested should be based upon qualifications, eligibility and background. The Navy’s goal is to provide the best possible specialists and sub-specialists to fill defined requirements; not merely to grant graduate education as a reward for past performance or as a career incentive.” Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown are not as dogmatic but still look primarily at military requirements: “Civilian graduate education should be retained as much for the integrative effects of exposure to civilian elite groups as for the academic discipline. It should be possible, however, to focus on those disciplines which are most relevant to the combat Army.” Specifically addressing the Marine Corps, particularly since Commandant P.X. Kelley’s tenure, graduate studies have not blended well with the Corps’ preparation for warfighting. It would be advantageous for the career-minded officer to focus on field performance and PME rather than nonmilitary education.292

Others, however, criticize the stipulation that civilian liberal arts graduate education be geared toward military requirements, claiming that policy overlooks the program’s long-term value. The military’s interests are served when the intellectual level of individual officers is raised. Such observers assert that civilian graduate education should be an integral part of officer education for all who academically qualify. This would help avoid “ticket punching” and eliminate the distinction between education and training. The officer returning to duty following graduate study brings with him a healthy skepticism of the norms and expectations of the military profession. This new attitude can make the military more progressive, dynamic and acceptable to the society it serves. Officers with graduate liberal arts degrees tend to be less absolutist, less likely to have a myopic view of politics, have a deeper understanding of ends-means relationships in policy issues, be more open to society’s socio-political values, have higher professional ideals and feel a greater commitment to their military careers.302

One of the most important findings of Fred Bryant’s analysis of officers is that receiving a civilian graduate education appears to alter officers’ beliefs in certain ways. Specifically, such officers give a lower national priority to activist military policies than do officers just beginning graduate
The new military professional, a political participant, should not feel the need to blindly accept any military policy, but should be more concerned with how he relates to his country than to his service or superior. General Colin Powell’s advocacy of clearly stated objectives, overwhelming force and an exit strategy before and during the Gulf War is an example of a military leader nudging political leaders toward sensible and realistic expectations and decisions. The right to dissent and access to political institutions, specifically Congress, are more compatible with contemporary American democracy and its national security interests.

school or older majors without graduate degrees. Evidently, those who seek an advanced degree are not different in these terms initially, but rather come to see counterinsurgency, military commitment abroad, increasing nuclear capability and reinstating the draft as having a lower national priority only after completing civilian graduate studies. Again addressing the Navy, specifically the Ph.D. degree, Norman E. Hoehler writes: “The line officer is the personification of the Navy’s ability to meet its national defense objectives. Does the line officer, then, need a Ph.D. degree to fulfill his role within the organization? The answer is no. Is the total organization more effective, however, as a result of the intellectual potential he represents? According to the study, yes.”31

While those who study the impact of civilian graduate education on military officers agree that it improves both individuals and the military institution, a perception persists that the program somehow diminishes military expertise and professionalism. Indeed, the question would not arise if graduate study were an accepted component of an officer’s education. The final barrier, this reaction against intellectual sophistication, has yet to be surmounted.

If the military is to function in the international and domestic socio-political environments with their diverse and complex challenges, officers must be prepared in a way that cannot be accomplished solely by PME. Civilian liberal arts study gives an officer the best perspective from which to serve his client—the nation and the society it represents: “The educated military man, skilled in his own profession, and unafraid to commit himself to higher principles, provides the best safeguard to civilian control and a democratic system.”32

The need to have a socially and politically sophisticated military has presented a challenge to the officer corps in terms of dealing with policy making, civilian perceptions of the military and vice versa. Traditionalists, in the Huntington mold, continue to call for the isolation of the military to
Military involvement in social welfare, education and civic action is needed to sustain professional purpose as much as preparing for, and waging, war. The military profession cannot be limited to the management of violence, for this is not always a relevant or viable option. When an institution loses its function, it must either find a new one or disappear. The military, though slow to change, has done so.

preserve martial purity in the unconditional service of the state. More appropriate today, however, is the military’s embrace of political understanding and expertise, a realistic and enlightened self-interest and professional perspectives enhancing “Duty, Honor, Country.” An officer without this mind-set is in trouble.

There is little doubt, whether traditionalists like it or not, that it is impossible to maintain a rigid and narrow professionalism, which has been rejected by the nation’s political and military leaders for 50 years. Internally, the military has been forced to adapt to social changes since the 1960s. The gays in the military debate of 1993 and 1994, and continuing court challenges, are just the latest chapter in this continuum. As organizational forms and social demands have grown more complex, military authority has become less arbitrary, authoritarian and direct. Informal, interactive processes have modified formal military authority structures.

Externally, in the domestic political environment, both civilians and military professionals have recognized the need to have the military involved in the policy process: “With the traditions of obedience to civilian control strong within the military, with an appreciation by military leaders of the spirit of the democratic system, and with competent civilian superiors determined to exercise effective civilian control, the costs of a broadened military professionalism do not appear too high. The benefits of military advice given after a consideration of all relevant factors should contribute to more enlightened national security policy.”

The military has been dissatisfied with its status and influence in society and has desired a voice in policies that impact it. There has been concern over carecrism, professional ethics, institutional demands and individual values. Rather than retreat back to the barracks, the military must address these problems head-on, recognizing its social and political calling in peacetime. It is possible to retain military identity while participating in civic action, peaceful uses of military force and policy making. Far from diluting professionalism, these roles enhance it.

Internationally, few military actions, even at the battlefield level, are without political consequences. The military must be involved in policy making if the state expects it to competently carry out policy directives. For that, civilian liberal arts education, the study of foreign politics and culture and involvement in politics are unavoidable. Even in postwar Germany, Army captains and majors were passed over for promotion or discharged because of deficiencies as managers and educators. The ongoing Bosnian PK operation since dramatically highlights the political, economic, social and cultural components of an officer’s role.

Of course, the military cannot be a carbon copy of society. It must stand apart to maintain professionalism, cohesion and competence. Though involved in politics and peaceful social action, the military will always be in the business of engaging the enemy. Nevertheless, a dynamic professionalism with the ability to argue positions with sophistication and maturity in the highest intellectual tradition will best position the military in the socio-political milieu. This calls for constant self-examination and debate over what constitutes legitimate political and social activity for the officer corps. There cannot be a reliance on past glories and institutional inertia—the military must develop imaginative and innovative concepts for the future. Witness the current debates on Force XXI, the Army After Next and Rapid Dominance, where the approach used in the Persian Gulf is being questioned. Mental processes are needed which cannot be added to operational orders. Because the military profession rewards orthodoxy, civilian graduate education must be a weapon in the institution’s arsenal.

The key question is whether civilian graduate education can be institutionalized in the US military system as it enters the 21st century. Except for certain West Point instructors, military intelligence, public affairs and foreign area officers, fully funded civilian liberal arts graduate study does not fit into the Army’s paradigm for success. Career patterns, for instance in the infantry, do not include graduate school, and the combat arms received no graduate school slots in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998. Exceptional officers are always in high demand and it is difficult to extricate them for full-time graduate study. Further, prevailing Army attitudes can easily resocialize returning officers, thus obviating the effect of their education. Sorg and Bryant note that officers with technical graduate degrees felt that
their studies were more relevant to the Army than social science graduates did, and the former were more likely to think that social science graduates were not useful to the Army. There are almost 5,400 positions designated for commissioned and warrant officers holding graduate degrees or who have participated in the Training With Industry program, but most of these designated positions are not for liberal arts degrees. Under ACS for FY 98, there were only 100 nontechnical graduate school slots authorized out of a total of 427 funded slots and only five funded Ph.D. slots. Combat arms officers were unsure of the relevance of civilian graduate education to their Army service. Ticket punching was another negative manifestation. Although most officers were pleased with their graduate school interlude, attitudes toward it were ambivalent.

On the other hand, Bryant identifies sets of differences that do emerge regarding career enhancement and activist military policies. Of course, officers seeking ACS are already different from their fellow officers to begin with, but certain beliefs are also affected by civilian education. Further, when considering Army policy, there seems to be a long-term trend away from the notion of graduate study for the purpose of fulfilling certain requirements for the payback tour, and some movement toward an attitude accepting the development of well-rounded officers. Indeed, when individuals who have received fully funded graduate degrees and possess the latter mind-set become general officers, the notion of individual development may truly take hold within the military. Officers do not need Ph.D.s in political science to fire pistols or perform most of their duties. They do, however, contribute more overall because of their intellectual skills. The officer corps is, after all, supposed to be the introduction of enlightened professionalism into the business of managing violence.

For Further Study

To more fully understand the link between civilian liberal arts graduate education and officers’ perceptions of military professionalism, several questions need further research to refine the military’s policy on this issue and the rightful place of advanced study in an officer’s development.

First, it may be useful to speak with the commanders of those officers returning to the military. Do these payback tour commanders feel that officers possessing master’s and doctoral degrees perform better? Are they more flexible and adaptive in their thinking? Do they enhance unit performance? Are they more broad-minded in their decision making and implementation? Are they less dogmatic? Do they take nonmilitary factors into account when assessing means-ends relationships? Is there actually a payoff during the payback?

Second, the ACS population at civilian graduate schools ranges from 800 to 1,000 officers at any given time. The utility of student detachments at civilian graduate institutions must be more fully considered. Do they negate the positive aspects of civilian study? Do they prevent meaningful integration into the civilian student milieu? Would it be wiser to send officer-students to institutions by themselves? Would that be beneficial to both the officer and the institution? Would it allow for meaningful and more permanent value changes that could withstand the return to full-time military service?

Third, a large-scale policy of civilian liberal arts graduate education immediately following commissioning should be investigated. On average, officers selected for ACS attend graduate school as branch-qualified captains between their sixth and eighth year of service and are Combined Arms and Services Staff School graduates. Is it beneficial to concentrate on young lieutenants, or does civilian graduate education after a few years of operational experience provide officers an opportunity to reflect on their past real-life experiences and impart a more sophisticated understanding of the use of their knowledge for future career experiences? Sorg’s analysis appears to indicate that a relatively brief exposure to civilian graduate education at the seven-year mark in an officer’s career does not have a profound effect on his basic attitudes. By then the military mind is well formed. Particularly resistant to change are the core values related to perceptions of military professionalism. Examining the survey results, Bryant reaches a similar conclusion that civilian graduate education does not profoundly alter the values and beliefs of captains and majors. Perhaps the solution to this problem is starting civilian graduate education earlier. Is there a long-term and
sustained difference in both values and performance as an officer? Does it detract from the development of an officer's traditional martial virtues or from military professionalism, both actual and perceived?

Fourth, the problem of resocialization constantly emerges throughout surveys and analyses. Is the overall civilian graduate experience rendered meaningless upon returning to military life? Are attitudes toward the experience changing? Will they be markedly different a decade from now? Will the experience be viewed in light of individual development or specific requirements? Will the experience be used in positive ways in an officer's policymaking and implementation activities? Is the problem of resocialization insurmountable or is it just a matter of time?

Fifth, other options and developments need to be investigated. Has PME sought to emulate civilian graduate education? How has it tackled social, political, economic and cultural issues?

These are important issues which must be addressed to gain a better understanding of the meaning of civilian graduate education for the individual officer, for the officer corps and for the military as an institution. Ironically, if the military profession does not go outside itself, martial virtues themselves may wither, resulting in diminished professionalism.

NOTES


29. The author acknowledges Jim Toce of Army Times, who reports on officer education issues for the information on current Army policies and statistics in this article.


32. Newman E. Heshler III. "The Unrestricted Line Ph.D: An Assessment," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1974), 110. Regarding the Ph.D., see also Burton L. Edelson, The Ph.D. in Uniform, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1966), inter alia 73. 77. Massland and Radway, 350, point out that one of the first postwar military officers to earn a Ph.D. in international relations, Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, was appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as White House staff secretary in 1954.


36. Since the drawdown, the Army has been more cost-conscious about ACS. The FY 1988 funding level for the program was $8.1 million. Officers must choose from a list of approved schools. Two-thirds of ACS officers attend low-cost schools—those with annual tuition less than $14,500.

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Operational leadership is the key to victory on the battlefield. In fact, US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, states unequivocally that “the most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership.” As this section’s articles suggest, leaders inspire soldiers with the will to win and provide purpose, direction and motivation in combat. FM 100-5—the Army’s keystone manual—further states that “no peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession, understanding the human dimension of leadership, becoming tactically and technically proficient and preparing for war.”

FM 22-100, Army Leadership—our capstone leadership manual—posits that the leader’s ability, knowledge, exertion, inspiration and capacity to function under stress have always inspired soldiers to perform far beyond the call of duty. As General George S. Patton Jr. so eloquently stated, “Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory.”

The Army must develop leaders who understand and can exploit our doctrine’s full potential. Our future leaders must be adaptive, creative problem solvers who can achieve decisive results in war and other operations as a joint or multinational team. We have inherited an incredible legacy from the soldiers and leaders who have gone before us. They established a reputation of professionalism, dedication and self-sacrifice that has made our Army legendary. This tradition of vigilance and ability to motivate, encourage, develop and guide others to achieve their full potential has been the key to US Army battlefield victory for the past 224 years.

As this section’s authors observe, the modern battlefield will place unprecedented demands on commanders. By “Being, Knowing, Doing,” the leader’s actions and abilities, coupled with professional competence and technical skills and the capacity to function under stress, will be the margin of effort that will make the difference between battlefield victory and defeat. We hope these articles will both instruct and inspire. Leadership is the key to battlefield victory.
I stepped over to greet the tank company commander as he approached the tactical operations center. This man was a neighbor and a friend, but he was not the same soldier I had briefed three days earlier. After 72 hours of combat, his eyes were sunken and dark. The left side of his face was stained with iodine and bandaged to cover a bullet wound received 14 hours earlier. He was distant and detached as he described an incident that had occurred just hours before. His company had engaged two Iraqi trucks moving across its front. The trucks exploded and Iraqi soldiers leapt out of them on fire. The company then finished them off with coaxial machineguns and a single sabot round that vaporized the soldier it hit. My friend was clearly shaken by the episode. This man was a warrior. Circumstances had made him a killer.

My friend wasn’t a natural killer. A natural killer is a person who has a predisposition to kill—he enjoys combat and feels little or no remorse about killing the enemy. These men have existed throughout the history of warfare, and their feats have often been hailed as heroic. They constitute less than 4 percent of the force, yet some studies show that they do almost half of the killing. These men rarely distinguish themselves before the moment arrives to pull the trigger. It is only after the smoke has cleared that the full impact of their accomplishment is seen. It is important to identify natural killers before combat, because these soldiers are both a vital asset and a potential liability—correctly positioning them in a unit can turn the tide of battle. To better understand the importance of identifying these soldiers, one should understand what makes soldiers kill, the characteristics of natural killers and their battlefield capabilities and limitations.

Thou Shall Not Kill

Most soldiers are unknowingly conscientious objectors. They try to avoid taking a human life. This is not a bad thing. Rather, it is a reflection of a strong moral upbringing. Getting most soldiers to pull the trigger on another human being requires great effort. In World War II, General S.L.A. Marshall studied infantry unit firing ratios and concluded that only 15 to 25 percent of infantrymen ever fired their weapons in combat. In general, those on specialty and crew-served weapons were firers, while the nonfirers were almost exclusively riflemen. In On Killing, David Grossman points out that there are three things that make soldiers kill: conditioning, recent experience and temperament. Soldiers can be conditioned individually and collectively to pull the trigger. Individual conditioning includes gunnery and rifle ranges where pop-up human shaped targets are rapidly engaged without thought. The trigger-pull response becomes automatic. Close supervision also affects firing rates. Men pull the trigger more frequently under supervision or in groups, hence a higher ratio of firing among key weapons. Artillery, the greatest killer on the battlefield, has always killed in teams. We indirectly condition soldiers to kill by training them as killing teams. Recognizing that men had to be conditioned to fire, the Army changed its training programs after World War II, and firing rates during the Korean War rose to 55 percent. This figure reached 95 percent during the Vietnam War. Soldiers can...
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be taught to pull the trigger, but that does not guarantee that the bullet will find the target.

Recent experiences, such as the death of a comrade, can cause soldiers to kill the enemy out of revenge or frustration. This is a temporary condition resulting from combat stress. It is based upon emotion and can subside as quickly as it occurred. In an American field hospital in Vietnam, a wounded Vietcong dragged himself out of bed and used a broken bottle to slit the throat of an Australian lying next to him. The American doctor, who had worked for hours to save the Australian’s life, grabbed a .45, shoved it in the Vietcong’s mouth and, with no regard for the Hippocratic Oath, blew his brains out. When he realized what he had done, he went insane and had to be shipped home. While we may attempt to emotionally condition soldiers through propaganda, it has little long-term effect on them on the battlefield.

A temperament for killing exists among some human beings. Marshall, in identifying the battlefield fighters, said, “the same names continued to reappear as having taken the initiative, and relatively few fresh names were added to the list on any day.”

A post-World War II study by R. L. Swank and W. E. Marchand proposed that 2 percent of soldiers were “aggressive psychopaths” who did not suffer from the normal remorse or trauma associated with killing. I use the word suffer because when the job of the soldier is to kill, those fettered by their conscience are suffering while doing their job. We tend to shun the concept of the willing killer because it offends our kinder sensibilities, but a controlled psychopath is an asset on the killing fields. Those who possess such a temperament are natural killers and many have served this country well. The problem lies in identifying these individuals and positioning them where they can be most effective.

Killers Among Us

The term psychopath conjures up images of movies such as Psycho or Silence of the Lambs. There are less inflammatory terms such as sociopath,
antisocial personality type or undercontrolled personality type that apply to the same people. The meanings of these terms have changed and interchanged over the last half-century. Psychopath is now associated almost exclusively with violent actions rather than a propensity for violence. The last three terms are still used somewhat interchangeably to denote someone who lacks social emotions and often resorts to violence, deception or manipulation as a means to get what he wants. These people constitute 3 to 4 percent of the male population and 1 percent of the female. Such people who enter the military are not monsters waiting to be released. They can be level-headed, productive soldiers, and if put into the right situation, they will kill the enemy aggressively and without remorse. If these soldiers are in our units, how can we identify them?

A predisposition to kill is the result of genetics and early childhood experience. There are common traits that are indicative of natural killers. While the collection of these traits is not absolutely deterministic of a killer, it is a good framework for identifying those who may have this propensity. In general, the natural killer found in the US Army lacks social emotions, is a later son (not first-born), got into frequent fights as a child, enjoys contact sports, is from a middle or upper class background, is an extrovert, has above-average intelligence and a caustic sense of humor.

While no specific violence gene has yet been isolated, there is ample evidence to suggest that violent tendencies are inherited. Researcher D.C. Rowe posits that some individuals have a genotype that disposes them to antisocial behavior. These individuals are characterized by a deficit of social emotions which include love, shame, guilt, empathy and remorse. They are keen predictors of other people’s behavior. Unbridled by emotions, they rely solely on actuarial data to predict outcomes, never resorting to feelings or hunches. They focus on short-term outcomes without taking into account the emotional reactions of those with whom they are dealing. Thus they may come across as cold, impersonal and manipulative.

As previously mentioned, the natural killer is most likely not a first-born son. Later sons are generally more aggressive and have less fear or anxiety in dangerous situations. An Israeli Defense Force study of its officers from 1961 to 1966 showed that “first borns” were more anxious than “later borns” and that they generally sought less dangerous positions in the military. Later borns were more likely to volunteer for combat and had a better chance of encountering terrorists on patrols. A study of Korean War fighter plane aces found that first borns engaged the enemy less and were more anxious about flying. Family position also seems to relate to assassins. Almost all American assassins have been later sons—John Wilkes Booth, Charles Giteau and Lee Harvey Oswald, to name three. Later borns, by virtue of being routinely dominated by their siblings, ultimately feel less fear during stressful situations. They also feel the need to prove their worth over their siblings and more quickly accept dangerous challenges.

A natural killer has been a fighter for much of his life. Frequent fighting as a child does not mean the individual was a bully. Rather, he chose to respond to stressful situations with aggression. Arthur J. Dollard concluded that aggression is the result of frustration and this is a normal human reaction. The sociopath, also referred to as the undercontrolled aggressive personality type, has low internal controls against violence and will resort to aggressive behavior unless constrained by rigid external controls. Such a person can be conditioned to not respond to frustration with external aggression. Thus, if frustrated by a Drill Sergeant’s control, the undercontrolled personality type will refrain from direct aggression and look for another target for his aggression. The military provides ample displacement outlets for this aggression in the form of physical training, field maneuvers and weapons ranges. It is the perfect environment for a sociopath to excel.

The natural killer is an aggressive athlete whose physical makeup allows him to excel at contact sports. Combative sports provide long-term training in aggression while acting as a short-term catharsis or safety valve for aggressive individuals. An Army-funded study of Korean War veterans discerned differences in the characteristics of fighters—those who took aggressive action in combat—versus nonfighters—those who were hysterical or nonre-
There are several considerations for the positioning of natural killers in the unit. If they are junior enlisted personnel, they should be assigned to a crew-served weapon. This will provide them with ample firepower and place them in a position to motivate others. They will naturally seek this position out anyway. If the natural killer is a noncommissioned officer or officer, assign him to a leadership position where he will supervise trigger pullers and will have a weapon system at his disposal. Here they will lead by example, killing the enemy and motivating others to do so as well.

Responsive in combat. This study, conducted by the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO), concluded that the fighters had been more active in contact sports such as football, boxing or hockey. It also concluded that fighters had a high masculinity factor or outdoors adventurousness about them. Their body types were larger; on average they were an inch taller and eight pounds heavier than the nonfighters. They were rugged individuals who had channeled their aggressions through contact sports.

Another discriminator for identifying natural killers is their socio-economic background. Natural killers usually come from a middle or upper class background. The volunteer military has had the luxury to pick and choose those who will be allowed into the service, and we exclude those with criminal records. Sociopaths follow a “cheater strategy” to obtain what they want. The lack of a social conscience allows the sociopath to cheat without remorse. Consequently, those who find themselves in the economically disadvantaged lower class will resort to crime unless placed in a highly controlled environment. In other words, a sociopath from a depressed economic background will most likely have a criminal record, and under today’s standards, he would not be able to enter the military. Thus, natural killers in the US military will most likely come from a middle or upper class background.

Sociopaths are generally extroverts. One reason for this is the inheritance of a nervous system that
is relatively insensitive to low levels of stimulation. Individuals with this physiotype tend to be extroverted. They also have lower than average levels of adrenaline and seek experiences to heighten this. Extroverts and sociopaths are less affected by threats of pain or punishment, and they have greater tolerance of actual pain or punishment. Both sociopaths and extroverts will approach a situation that most people

will avoid. These factors were confirmed by the HumRRO study conclusion that fighters were extroverted, spontaneous and relatively free from anxiety.

The natural killer has above-average intelligence. Like sociopaths with no economic resources, those without above-average intelligence end up in jail. Therefore, sociopaths in our military are usually intelligent. The HumRRO study found that the intelligence quotient (IQ) of fighters was, on average, 13 points higher than nonfighters. The study subjects were all infantrymen and the mean group IQ was only 85, 15 points below the national average of 100. This indicated that less intelligent men were sent forward to fight, but within that group, the more intelligent ones were better fighters.

Additionally, the natural killer has a caustic sense of humor that relies on sharp wit and biting sarcasm. Such hostile humor acts as a tension-discharger, a relief valve. While we normally associate humor with friendly behavior, laughter itself is a primarily aggressive behavior. Laughter is usually directed at someone and is infectious, with the unspoken agreement being “join in or not be part of the group.” With aggression as the underlying theme, the natural killer enjoys humor.

Potential natural killers can be identified through long-term observation testing. Supervisors can look for natural killer traits in their soldiers. Over time, they will develop a close enough relationship with their soldiers to be able to distinguish those who match most of the characteristics of killers. Personality-type testing may also identify natural killers. One such test already in use by the military is the Myers-Briggs personality-type test. Considering the characteristics discussed above, the natural killer would most likely be an ESTP (extroverted, sensing, thinking, perceiving) personality type on this test. ESTPs are outgoing, highly adaptive, deal in facts, sensory oriented, excel at sports, learn through life experience, prefer action to conversation and are tough in harsh situations.

Matching the ESTP personality type to intelligent, caustic, later sons will help identify potential natural killers. The ESTP personality type, coupled with the other associated traits, is not an absolute determinant of a natural killer or a sociopath, but it provides a good baseline. Personality-type testing at initial entry could identify and help place natural killers where they can best employ their talent—in infantry, armor and special operations units.

Cry Havoc

The individual soldier does make a difference on the killing fields. The natural killer is a vital asset to a unit because he is a killing machine that will turn the tide of battle when the chips are down. During World War II, 40 percent of the US Army Air Forces’ air-to-air killing was done by 1 percent of its pilots. Marshall’s work and the HumRRO study both found that a small percentage of soldiers did most of the fighting. It is not enough to rely on conditioning to produce killers—genetics and childhood environment have already molded them.

Natural killers bring some obvious advantages to a unit. They will personally kill the enemy in droves. They are natural leaders who will motivate other soldiers to kill. They are also fiercely competitive and will aggressively pursue victory. However, there are drawbacks to natural killers in a unit too. Their highly aggressive nature may act as a catalyst for violence in tenuous situations such as peacekeeping operations.

Atrocities are the result of the release of pent-up hostilities—not a characteristic of sociopaths who live for the moment. Natural killers may participate in atrocities but they will not initiate them. This same “live-for-the-moment” attitude makes the peacetime routine difficult for killers. The sociopath craves stimulation that the peacetime Army often does not provide. Marshall concluded that many of the best fighters spent significant amounts of time in the stockade—‘They could fight like hell
but they couldn’t soldier.” Consequently, many of these individuals seek out fast-paced specialty units such as Airborne, Ranger or Special Forces units. The natural killer will become bored in a regular unit and may seek the stimuli of sports, fighting or drugs. Natural killers are motivated by competition and excitement, not a sense of sacrifice—they are not the kind of soldiers who will leap on a grenade to protect others.

Another characteristic of the natural killer is to usurp authority in a crisis to turn the tide of battle. Marshall wrote of a sergeant whose actions had carried the battle and yet he had not been recommended for a decoration. When his company commander was asked why, he replied, “When the fighting started he practically took the company away from me. He was leading and the men were obeying him. You can’t decorate a man who’ll do that to you.”

There are several considerations for the positioning of natural killers in the unit. If they are junior enlisted personnel, they should be assigned to a crew-served weapon. This will provide them with ample firepower and place them in a position to motivate others. They will naturally seek this position out anyway. If the natural killer is a noncommissioned officer or officer, assign him to a leadership position where he will supervise trigger pullers and will have a weapon system at his disposal. Here they will lead by example, killing the enemy and motivating others to do so as well.

Natural killers may be spread out in the unit or concentrated, depending on the tactical situation. The typical officer cannot single-handedly lead an entire company in combat. By spreading out those who will carry the day you increase your chances for success in battle. Wherever they are placed in a unit though, they may take over command based upon the situation and the leaders around them. This may be desirable depending upon the quality and number of your other leaders. You can “backstop” leaders of unproved ability with natural killers. If there is a well-defined decisive point of the battle, the commander may choose to place natural killers at that point. They will provide that final measure of resolve in the assault or become the defense linchpin. Since natural killers are motivated by competition and excitement, they should not be placed in a reserve position, where they would have to patiently wait, then hurl themselves into the breach on command. Quick to take charge, they will move to the sound of the guns unless tightly controlled. In PK operations, keep them in positions where they will not habitually deal with potential combatants. This will minimize the risk of escalating the tension into violence. Likewise, during peacetime operations, keep them active in exercises, schools or in sports. They will seek out these activities themselves to stay stimulated.

Too often we find out about the lethality of an individual soldier after the fact, when he has saved the unit and been nominated for a valorous award. If you knew before hand who was likely to rise up and save the day, you could place these soldiers at the battle’s decisive point and enhance your chances of success. Natural killers are out there in your unit right now—find them and use them wisely.

NOTES

2. Ibid., 66-67.
5. Grossman, 35.
22. Ibid., 17.
23. Ibid., 14.
24. Watson, 49.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Elbi-Eibesfeldt, 90.
30. Watson, 245.
34. Ibid.

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MILITARY REVIEW • May-June 1999
Leadership and Combat Motivation: The Critical Task

Major John M. Spiszer, US Army

They were probably as contented a group of American soldiery as had ever existed. They were like American youth everywhere. They believed the things their society had taught them to believe. They were cool, and confident and figured that the world was no sweat. It was not their fault that no one had told them that the real function of an army is to fight and that a soldier’s destiny—which few escape—is to suffer, and if need be, to die. 1

—T.R. Fehrenbach

The study of military history and theory can yield many useful tools for the military professional. Important among these “tools” is an opportunity to gain insights on where to place limited and valuable emphasis, time and resources in the development of personal, professional and unit-leader development programs. An in-depth knowledge of military history and theory is indispensable to provide focus and utility to this task. 2

In this vein, permit me to adapt a statement by noted military writer Michael Howard: It is the mission of the military professional in an age of peace to ensure that he and his subordinates are prepared for war. 3 The trick is to figure out which tasks are the most important in today’s fast-paced, high-OPTEMPO (operations tempo) force and hope to avoid a historian’s characterization similar to this article’s opening quote.

Through studying military theory and history, I believe that the critical leader task is understanding how to motivate soldiers in combat. This encompasses both battlefield leadership and setting the proper conditions for combat during times of peace or lulls in fighting. All other tasks are of subordinate importance, and leaders should treat them so, ensuring that scarce resources, especially time and energy, are devoted to preparing soldiers to perform in combat.

Battlefield Leadership

Current leader emphasis appears headed in a somewhat different direction. The Army’s Force XXI process—with its focus on computers, digitization, precision-guided munitions, and the like—takes emphasis away from soldiers, leaders and the combat environment and places it on machines. Emerging thought emphasizes attempting to dislocate, disintegrate and paralyze an enemy through simultaneous, distributed operations that produce asymmetric effects throughout an extended battlespace.

While for many years the argument was between annihilation or exhaustion through attrition or maneuver, a third pattern has emerged—paralysis through cybershock. These patterns are all “complementary and mutually reinforcing” and lead to the disintegration of the enemy by acting simultaneously on his physical, logistic and cybernetic domains. 4

However, what seems to be lost is the recognition that at the cutting edge of conducting attrition, maneuver or cybershock is some soldier who is either firing or in a position to fire a destructive round or missile at other living people—the enemy. No matter what technology brings to the battlefield, we must not lose sight of an enduring truth: “Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war. Fighting, in turn, is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter. Naturally moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war.” 5

In short, while leaders must know, understand and be able to employ the weapons and tools of war in the physical and cybernetic domains, the moral or psychological domain is more important, for it controls the actions of men in combat. It is important to remember that “the Army’s fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation’s wars by establishing conditions for lasting peace through land force dominance.” 6 Thus, fighting, and getting soldiers to fight well, is our primary job and must be treated as such.
Combat Motivation

Military leaders must spend a large part of their time studying and discovering what motivates men in combat, what they must accomplish and what they have to do to make that happen. The individual soldier’s task is essentially the same—fire at the enemy or support those who fire at the enemy. The focus should be on the combat soldier who actually fires at the enemy—the soldier who must maneuver, wear down or bring to bear destructive power to shock, annihilate or exhaust the enemy on the battlefield.

This is not a new thought for the US Army. It was understood and believed through the World Wars, briefly forgotten going into the Korean War and has again lost currency since Vietnam. Historian S.L.A. Marshall captured the importance of this issue by noting that “What we need in battle is more and better fire.” He believed that the greater the ratio of effective fire to that of the enemy, the greater the chance of success, which still holds true today. Fire, or the ability to fire, is the ultimate arbiter of combat and is essential to all patterns of attrition, maneuver and cybershock.

To Marshall, producing this effective fire is a function of mobility and morale, with morale being the most critical and the element which needs addressing before, during and after combat. Leaders need to set the conditions prior to combat, influence their soldiers’ morale during combat and assess and adapt methods after a fight to ensure success in the next battle. Success can be defined as achieving a greater rate of fire than the enemy due to enhanced combat performance, which is a direct result of combat motivation and morale. Setting the conditions prepares men for combat by providing them the necessary mental and physical tools. Influencing soldiers during combat includes alleviating the negative impact of fear and other combat environment elements on the individual soldier so he can function effectively and, ultimately, fire at the enemy.

While the Army does not discount the importance of the relationship between leadership, morale and combat motivation, it does not do enough to stress this importance or incorporate it into the organizational fabric. A draft of the upcoming US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, proposes adding morale as a principle of war and devotes a section to the moral domain of conflict. As evidenced by studies done after both Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm “battlefield leadership at all levels is an element of combat power,” and the Army’s preferred leadership style emphasizes face-to-face contact in order to see the battlefield,
No matter what technology brings to the battlefield, we must not lose sight of an enduring truth: "Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war. Fighting, in turn, is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter. Naturally moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war."

Unit Cohesion

The key morale factor that the leader can influence before, during and after combat is unit cohesion. An important ingredient in units sticking together and performing under fire is that the individual soldier not feel he is alone. Unit cohesion is an absolutely critical and basic morale factor. In fact, the Army's senior leaders can influence this factor through personnel and assignment policies, which are deficient in today's Army with its rapid rotational policies which promote instability rather than stability in our combat and supporting units. Unit leaders influence this factor every day prior to hostilities through local assignments, training and all aspects of command presence and information. During combat, the leader influences cohesion through personal ex-
ample and by enabling and ensuring communication and the flow of information. Interpersonal communication reduces soldier isolation on the battlefield and allows him to manage his fear through the presence, reliability and reassurance of his comrades. Once your soldiers do this, they can unite and regain their cohesion, allowing them to plan and ultimately to act, which manifests itself in fire and movement directed against the enemy. Assessment of individual and leader performance after the battle and subsequent improvement of techniques prepare the unit for combat in the future. That familiar face-to-face Army leadership style is absolutely critical and should be maintained.

Mitigating the combat environment is a related issue because it includes noise, darkness, fear, weapons effects, filth, hate, moral degradation, death, horrible wounds and a host of other characteristics. The overall impact is to erode the morale factors’ positive influence on combat motivation, resulting in reduced combat performance and fire. By maintaining unit cohesion and unit esprit, leaders can mitigate the effects of the battlefield environment. Units with strong values and historical pride also retain their motivation and drive in the most trying circumstances. The US Marine Corps, with its proud traditions and unit lineages, is perhaps the best example of unit esprit’s impact in the US military.

Leaders can also mitigate this environment through proper training that counters unrealistic expectations of combat so that the soldier is not overwhelmed by the sights, sounds, smells and feelings of isolation and fear when they occur. As Fahrenbach put it, “For his own sake and for that of those around him, a man must be prepared for the awful, shrieking moment of truth when he realizes he is all alone on a hill ten thousand miles from home, and that he may be killed in the next second.” In addition, the leaders and staff officers must understand this environment as well, in order to both prepare their men for this environment and to understand what it does to them.

Furthermore, the leader needs to economize his men’s powers during and immediately prior to combat, since a tired soldier frightens more easily and vice versa. The unit leader has direct responsibility for training, physical training and soldier load issues. However, the Army’s senior leaders need to adopt policies and provide equipment that supports realistic training and lightens the soldier’s load.

Thus, unit leaders can promote combat motivation and mitigate the effects of the battlefield by:
- Supporting and promoting small-unit cohesion every day.
- Ensuring communication among individual soldiers during battle.
- Encouraging soldier communication during difficult and realistic tactical training.
- Providing information prior to, during and after battle. Making sure the chain of command works in passing information from higher to lower commands, not just lower to higher.
- Developing programs to foster unit esprit through historical material, regimental system customs and affiliation and other methods. This is especially important for a professional army facing limited operations.
- Focusing unit professional development and leadership instruction on the linkages between the leader, combat motivation and the soldiers’ performance or ability to fire at the enemy.
- Ensuring soldiers are physically and mentally tough.
- Managing soldiers loads to economize their strengths. Resource units and operations with vehicles to carry loads so soldiers do not have to carry them.
- Planning, preparing and executing demanding and realistic training. This is critical because “it is undoubtedly terrible to force men to suffer during training, or even sometimes, through accident, to kill them. But there is no other way to prepare them for the immensely greater horror of combat.”

In supporting this effort, the Army’s senior leaders should ensure policies and resource allocation efforts also focus on combat motivation issues. This can be done by:
- Developing manpower policies consistent with maintaining small-unit cohesion. Avoid replacement policies that keep soldiers isolated and do not promote cohesion.
- Providing information and historical material and enforcing policies, such as the regimental system, designed to enhance unit esprit.
- Developing equipment that enables small-unit communications down to the individual soldier level.
and lightens his load. Consider force modernization and reorganization to provide vehicles to carry loads to conserve the soldier’s physical resources.

- Promoting decentralized execution of training and operations.
- Providing the support and resources necessary for realistic training that fully incorporates all available means to replicate the battlefield environment, consistent with soldier safety requirements.
- Refocusing leadership doctrine on improving combat motivation and on leading men in combat and preparing them to fire at and kill the enemy, rather than on management practices.

While these methods and policies are not all inclusive and do not provide definitive techniques, they do provide a starting point. Each leader needs to devote time and effort to study this issue and tailor his methods to the specific unit and situation he faces.

The US Army understands the importance of combat motivation and a leader’s responsibilities pertaining to its development and maintenance. However, what is not well understood is how the two are related, other than through platitudes and definitions. The Army does not emphasize the practical aspects of combat motivation or the methods available to focus on it. Nevertheless, it is an important responsibility of every Army leader to do more than just recognize this importance, and take the next step to develop and practice methods for improving combat motivation.

Leaders must make it their business to understand the linkages between victory, fire, combat performance, combat motivation, morale factors, combat environment and leadership. This is a task of first importance and should take precedence over digitization, force modernization, quarterly training briefings, command inspections, mission-essential task lists and the other priorities in the seemingly inexhaustible list of things to do and know in today’s Army. The bottom line remains—it is the leader’s primary duty to motivate his soldiers in combat. To do that, he must know how to enhance and develop morale factors while using them and other means to mitigate the trauma of combat. There is never enough time to do everything, but this task cannot be neglected.

As Fehrenbach cautioned years ago, “A nation that does not prepare for all the forms of war should then renounce the use of war in national policy. A people that does not prepare to fight should then be morally prepared to surrender. To fail to prepare soldiers and citizens for limited bloody ground action, and then to engage in it, is folly verging on the criminal.”

NOTES

2. The lengthy notes following are not meant to overwhelm the reader with documentation but to provide a starting point for the reader to begin his task of studying military history and its interpretation as it relates to leadership and combat motivation.
3. This is an adaptation of Michael Howard’s quote: “Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.” Taken from Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (March 1974), 7.
7. Fehrenbach provides an excellent examination and analysis of this issue and how it impacted the Korean War.
9. See both of Marshall’s books on this subject, where he fully develops these ideas. In Men Against Fire, he focuses on the morale of the soldier and in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, January 1960), he focuses on the mobility of the soldier.
10. FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft) (Washington, DC: GPO, 5 August 1957), 2-10, 2-11, and 4-5.
15. Fehrenbach focuses on different morale factors for various categories of soldiers. Professional soldiers fight from discipline, pride and training. Citizen soldiers fight from motivation and ideals. Both are equally valid, but the leader must understand what type of soldier he is leading. Fehrenbach argued that World War II was fought with the citizen-soldier and the leaders got it right, while the Korean War was fought by professional soldiers and we got it wrong by treating them as citizen-soldiers. See pages 146 and 163.
17. Ambrose thoroughly examines the impact of a poor replacement policy in a combat theater on pages 275-279 and 286-287.
19. For an excellent firsthand account of the true horrors of combat, see E.B. Sledge, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
20. Ambrose describes how the German infantry in World War II communicated during battle, 192. Sledge also makes mention of this phenomenon by the Japanese throughout his book.
21. Three key factors allowed the Marines in Sledge’s book to persevere and triumph against the horrendous combat conditions they faced on Peleliu and Okinawa, pride in the Marine Corps and the unit they were in, training and unit cohesion.
23. Ambrose, 166.
25. Fehrenbach, 640.
26. Ibid., 162.
28. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see my monograph on “The Light Infantry Company and Tactical Mobility: A Step in Which Direction.” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies), 18 December 1997.
29. Fehrenbach, 657.
Peacetime Leadership: A Critical Element of Combat Power

Major Daniel S. Roper, US Army

US ARMY FIELD MANUAL (FM) 22-100, *Military Leadership*, has served the US Army well since its publication in July 1990. Its discussion of *Leadership in Principle, Leadership in Action* and *Leadership in Battle* provide the foundation for the “Be, Know and Do” required of every Army leader. Well written and easy to read, this manual helps leaders, primarily at company level and below, understand the expectations that both their seniors and subordinates have of them. It is battle-focused and provides many vignettes of successful combat leadership, mostly by junior US Army officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

Although FM 22-100 has proved its worth through the actions of its practitioners in Kuwait, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia, it has several areas that need improvement. For instance, it does not adequately describe the nature of leadership challenges in “information-age warfare;” it lacks appropriate emphasis on specificity in junior leader actions; and while it is counterintuitive—it does not sound entirely correct to say the words—a shortcoming of the US Army’s basic manual on military leadership is that it is too battle-focused. While the vignettes and discussion of combat leadership dilemmas are both interesting and thought-provoking and should be retained in any revision, they do not reflect the gamut of challenges facing today’s junior leaders.

While developing moral, ethical and successful combat leaders is, and must remain, both the purpose and the end state of Army leadership doctrine, this doctrine must thoroughly address the *peacetime* development of combat leaders as well. Leaders are not exclusively developed in combat or during major collective training events such as combat training center (CTC) rotations—they are developed in the training room, barracks, motor pool and on small-arms ranges.

Exceptional leaders, such as those cited in the 1990 FM 22-100, did not simply appear on battlefields. They developed as leaders over years of hard, unglamorous work as peacetime soldiers in preparation for a few critical moments in combat. General Sir James Glover summarized this point when he remarked, “A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war. Character is a habit. It is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed in war.” General George S. Patton Jr. also succinctly captured this concept: “Battles take years to get ready for, all one’s life can be expressed in one little decision, but that decision is the labor of uncounted years.”

What FM 22-100 needs is more emphasis on the “labor of uncounted years” in times of peace that prepares leaders for the “one little decision” that can make all the difference on future battlefields.

What is Missing?

The 1990 FM 22-100 lacks a set of guidelines and questions that junior leaders can use to assess themselves during routine, peacetime training. As doctrine, FM 22-100 should not specify every tactic, technique and procedure (TTP) that prescribe “how to lead,” yet it should be specific enough to guide its target audience beyond understanding toward *routine application* of its principles. It should not attempt to provide “flow-chart” solutions to peacetime leadership challenges which will necessarily produce outstanding combat leadership when
As a Leader, you must do, “Provide Direction,” an example of which is to set goals. A stronger example would be: Counsel with specificity—your soldiers and subordinate leaders can successfully tackle most challenges you give them if you specify what success is in PT, weapons qualification, vehicle maintenance and appearance, and so forth. 

Knowing that leaders must provide direction and set goals is necessary but not sufficient guidance for leaders, who must consistently provide purpose, direction and motivation to their soldiers. required. It should simply enable junior leaders to see if they are “leading” and preparing themselves to lead in combat or simply going through the motions. Paraphrasing the discussion of leadership— “the most essential dynamic of combat power”— in FM 100-5, Operations, the Army’s fundamental leadership manual should provide more direction to its practitioners to complement both the purpose and motivation, which it already adequately supplies. 

Peacetime development of combat leadership. FM 100-5 makes the importance of peacetime training of leaders exceptionally clear— “No peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession, understanding the human dimension of leadership, becoming tactically and techni- 

cally proficient and preparing for war.”

History has shown the wisdom of this philosophy. Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal, a 1984 study conducted by the US Military Academy Department of History found that “a pattern of being able to adapt to changing circumstances had been developed in the successful leader by the time he was tested in combat.” This study also found that “the most salient predictor of a successful combat leader was successful leadership in peacetime, particularly of a tactical unit” and that the leader “must have a well-developed and practiced ability in making decisions under pressure.” These observations reinforce the imperative to maximize leader training prior to conflict.

The challenge of specificity. How often do leaders describe their last training event as “good training”? How often do junior leaders spend their day “checking training,” how frequently are units “conducting maintenance” and described by their leader as “combat ready”? While these descriptions may indicate positive actions, they clearly lack specificity and require further explanation, frequently in the form of senior leaders playing “20 questions” with the leader who offered such general observations. Each of these descriptions has imbedded tasks, conditions and standards that must be understood by the leader making the assessment.

If junior leaders have difficulty in seeing themselves with the required degree of specificity, it follows that they will be challenged even more in determining a course of action (COA) when they encounter a challenge. If they do not have a clear and detailed picture of their unit’s capabilities and limitations, it may be difficult for them to determine a feasible, acceptable and suitable COA to reach their objective—which also should be clearly defined if possible—for a given mission or event. Simply telling leaders to “be more specific” does not solve the problem. Senior leaders must coach, teach and mentor their subordinates toward achieving the required specificity in their assessments of their units, their missions and their obstacles. A technique reinforced at the CTCs is the backbrief, which requires the subordinate to brief his superior on the mission he thinks he was told to do. It is simply a more structured method of asking yourself “so what?”—the same question leaders at all levels should frequently ask themselves.

While leaders must internalize leadership principles and values, they must act with specificity. In other words, the be and know of leadership may be somewhat general in nature, but the do must be focused on the issue at hand. An understanding and embodiment of leadership principles and the “Seven Army Values” may not provide enough focus for a
## LEADERSHIP IN ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As a Leader, You Must:</th>
<th>Examples:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Be a person of strong and honorable character | • Determination  
• Compassion  
• Self-discipline  
• Role Modeling  
• Initiative  
• Flexibility  
• Consistency |
| Be committed to the professional Army ethic | • Loyalty to the nation, the Army and the unit  
• Selfless service  
• Integrity  
• Duty |
| Be an example of individual values | • Courage  
• Candor  
• Competence  
• Commitment |
| Be able to resolve complex ethical dilemmas | • Interpret the situation  
• Analyze all the factors and forces that apply  
• Choose a course of action that seems best for the nation |
| **KNOW**               |           |
| Know the four factors of leadership and how they affect each other | • The leader  
• The situation  
• Communications |
| Know standards | • Sources of Army standards  
• How standards relate to warfighting |
| Know yourself | • Personality and performance  
• Strengths and weaknesses  
• Knowledge, skills, and attitudes |
| Know human nature | • Potential for good and bad behavior  
• How depression and sadness contribute to fear and panic, and how fear affects performance |
| Know your job | • Plan and communicate effectively  
• Supervise, teach, coach, and counsel  
• Display technical and tactical competence  
• Develop subordinates  
• Make good decisions that your soldiers accept  
• Use available systems |
| Know your unit | • Unit capabilities and unit limitations |
| **DO**                 |           |
| Provide purpose | • Explain the “why” of missions  
• Communicate your intent |
| Provide direction | • Plan  
• Maintain standards  
• Set goals  
• Make decisions and solve problems  
• Supervise, evaluate, teach, coach, and counsel  
• Train soldiers and soldier teams |
| Provide motivation | • Take care of soldiers  
• Serve as the ethical standard bearer  
• Develop cohesive soldier teams  
• Make soldiering meaningful  
• Reward performance that exceeds standards  
• Correct performance not meeting standards  
• Punish soldiers who intentionally fail to meet standards or follow orders |

Figure 1 Leadership in Action
junior leader to use in daily situations encountered without additional refined guidance. Values and principles are necessary but not always sufficient tools in the leader’s toolbox. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel highlights the need for directed action: “One of the most important factors—not only in military matters, but life as a whole—is the power of execution, the ability to direct all of one’s whole energies towards the fulfillment of a particular task.” With minor modification, FM 22-100 can guide leaders toward more focused execution of their daily duties and better prepare them to lead in combat.

Leadership in action. The Army’s leadership manual should explicitly and convincingly convey, to junior officers and NCOs in particular, that ultimately, leading is an action word—the be and the know enable the leader to do. The chart summarizing “Leadership in Action” in the 1990 FM 22-100 (see Figure 1) offers a useful framework for general discussion of leadership doctrine but lacks the specificity necessary to enable a leader to act. The “Leadership in Action” chart provides an overview of be, know, do, with examples of each. These examples may be sufficient for academic discussions at the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) or Officer Basic Course (OBC), but lack sufficient specificity for practical application—a junior officer or NCO cannot apply them directly next week at command maintenance or “Sergeant’s Time” training. This should be neither a flowchart nor a recipe to a given leadership situation or challenge. It should, however, provide enough substance and detail for a leader to use as a foundation for developing a particular COA.

The chart states that “As a Leader, you must be a person of strong and honorable character, an example of which is self-discipline.” A more forceful example would read: Be your own toughest critic; if your boss is routinely tougher on you than you are, reevaluate your standards and your commitment to attaining them. Knowing that a leader should be of good character and have self-discipline is far too broad to be of any practical utility. Likewise, the chart also states that “As a Leader, you must know standards,” examples of which are “sources of Army standards” and “how standards relate to warfighting.” While neither of these examples is wrong, they do not provide anything a leader can readily use. A better example would be: Learn the standards that apply to your unit. Get into the books and understand the standards in the mission training plan (MTP), applicable FMs, tactical standing operating procedures (TAC SOP), operator’s manuals (-10s) for assigned equipment and your command training guidance (CTG). Knowing that there are many sources of standards that relate to warfighting is too general to be useful to junior leaders.

Further, the chart states that “As a Leader, you must do, ‘provide direction,’” an example of which is to set goals. A stronger example would be: Counsel with specificity—your soldiers and subordinate leaders can successfully tackle most challenges you give them if you specify what success is in physical training (PT), weapons qualification, vehicle maintenance and appearance, and so forth. Ensure that this counseling directly supports the mission and is consistent with your CTG and quarterly training guidance (QTG). Knowing that leaders must provide direction and set goals is necessary but not sufficient guidance for leaders, who must consistently provide purpose, direction and motivation to their soldiers.

Recommended Solutions

A more usable version of the “Leadership in Action” chart is shown in Figure 2. “A Guide to Leadership in Action” helps focus on some of the action elements of leading that build “habits of leadership” which ultimately contribute to better combat leaders. The US Army ought to make it standard practice to print a “smart card” that summarizes the key points, focusing on action, of the doctrine it expects its leaders to implement daily—not as a substitute for, but as a supplement to, the basic manual. At a minimum, this should be incorporated into the Army’s bedrock FMs on leading (22-100), training (25-100/25-101), and operations (100-5). “A Guide to Leadership in Action” can serve as a performance counseling tool, a self-assessment checklist or a page in a “leader’s book.”

Evaluation and counseling tools. The Army has several available counseling and evaluation tools that articulate specific, tangible and quantitative objectives for junior leaders and are tailored toward the peacetime development of combat leaders. These tools complement the doctrinal precepts of FM 22-100, but what is required is to better
**A GUIDE TO LEADERSHIP IN ACTION**

**Influencing (communicating, decision making and motivating)**

- Do not say: “can’t,” “never” or “impossible”—if it was easy, anybody could do it.
- Understand standards—read the book (-10, MTP, FMIs, TACSOP).
- Be your own toughest critic; if your boss is routinely tougher on you than you are, reevaluate your standards and your commitment to attaining them.
- Focus more on “how” and “how well” as opposed to “what”; take things apart & put them back together (what initiatives/innovations did you take?)
- Identify problems and solutions with specificity (who, what, when, where, why, & how).
- Avoid pronouns: “they (the staff/battalion) said . . .”—eliminate “20 Questions.”
- Give “yes/no” answers to “yes/no” questions.
- Avoid superlatives unless substantiated by facts.
- Passion for job: care for soldiers/make decisions (chapters, retraining, etc) as if your son/brother/best friend depended on it—someone’s son/brother/best friend does depend on it (e.g., Would you want this soldier as your brother’s section chief in combat?) In good units, soldiers go home tired (they earn their pay daily).
- Pride starts in the motor pool: it’s where you & soldiers will spend the most time.
- Do not snivel, or permit an environment where others do so.
- Do not blame it on higher headquarters.

**Operating (planning, executing and assessing)**

- Leading is an action word.
- Do your homework: obtaining information is easy; applying knowledge is tough. Strive for excellence, but remember, if you can ensure that everyone in your unit simply meets the standard in everything, you will be a star (especially in maintenance).
- Start out each day working—get head in gear at 0600, not 0900.
- If you are simply doing what you are told to do, you aren’t leading, you’re an overpaid clerk.
- Develop & execute a PT straggler plan.
- 100% accountability (soldiers, equipment, training status), 100% of the time.
- Make training meetings and training schedules work for you.
- Be a technical expert on your assigned equipment (weapons, wheels, tracks, radios).
- Identify weekly & monthly objectives or end state for your unit.

**Improving (developing, building and learning)**

- Counseling, performance: base directly on QTG; counsel with specificity: your soldiers and subordinate leaders can successfully tackle most challenges you give them; you simply need to specify what success is in PT, weapons qualification, vehicle maintenance, etc.
- Personally check: “my chief told me” is not a substitute for your personal leader spot checks.
- Do not invent too many new solutions to old problems.
- Build strong teams—you will be judged by the successes and failures of your subordinates.
- Convey to subordinates that most everyone they deal with is a “good guy” who is also trying to do his job to the best of his ability, and even “good guys” have different viewpoints, priorities or can be plain wrong sometimes.
- Leaders cannot check everything; therefore, have systems in place to ensure that everything gets done; empower subordinates & hold them accountable for results.
- ID two or three of the worst performers and take immediate, decisive action to make them perform or get out.
- Fight to “nest” training & other events to support your long-term goals & objectives—don’t just check the block and move on to the next event.
synchronize the doctrine with the primary tools in a unit for guiding it and coaching and evaluating subordinates' progress toward achieving competence.

The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) provides a positive step toward formalizing the degree of specificity required of leaders. The OER specifies nine leader "actions" divided into three activities—
influencing, operating and improving.

- Influencing consists of communicating, decision making and motivating.
- Operating includes planning, executing and assessing.
- Improving includes developing, building and learning.

While officers are not specifically evaluated on these actions, their rater does indicate which of these actions most accurately characterize the rated officer.

The Junior Officer Developmental Support Form (JODSF) requires that the rater and rated officer jointly create a developmental action plan targeting the major performance objectives on the OER Support Form. Each of the nine leader actions must be addressed on this form, which is mandatory for lieutenants and warrant officer 1s (WO1s) and optional for all other ranks.

The NCO Evaluation Report (NCOER) requires specific bullets in the areas of: values, competence, physical fitness and military bearing, leadership, training and responsibility and accountability and offers some examples of each. The NCO Counseling Checklist/Record describes each of these areas in further detail and provides examples of standards for both "Success/Meets Standards" and "Excellence" ratings. Although somewhat lengthy, it is a good tool if the rater takes the time to read it and use it for its intended purpose.

Information-age leader challenges. As the Army publishes the 1999 FM 22-100 to establish its leadership doctrine for the 21st century, it must sensitize its leaders to an emerging challenge—potential information overload. Junior leaders, those who ultimately make things happen, need to understand that an abundance of information is not necessarily a good thing—it may actually have a negative effect. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-200-1, Battle Command, characterizes this apparent dilemma: "The challenge of the future is not the availability of information; rather it is the proper organization and delivery of the information to the commander."9

Information must be acted upon if it is to prove useful. Rommel, again, is instructive. He stressed that "Mental conception must be followed by immediate execution. This is a matter of energy and initiative... Whatever is attempted must be carried through. The young officer must understand at the outset of his training that just as much energy is required of him as mental ability."10

Leaders must attempt to maximize efficiency while ensuring effectiveness. This means keeping soldiers focused on doing the right thing while being as efficient as practicable. This will become increasingly important in information warfare. Faced with potential information overload, it is critical that leaders and their subordinates be able to rapidly distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. Leaders must build units that are able to think and act rapidly to exploit opportunities that contribute to their mission. The window of opportunity on a 21st-century, high-tech battlefield will likely be short, so leaders must be ready to act immediately. As Napoleon intoned, "In war there is but one favorable moment, the great art is to seize it."11 Leaders who can convey their vision to their soldiers will have the inherent ability to seize the favorable moment and act decisively.12

NOTES

4. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 10.
10. Rommel Papers, 518.
11. Napoleon, Maxims, LXXXII, 1631.

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Leadership in the Information Age

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony J. Russo, US Air Force

The US Army recognizes the revolution in military affairs (RMA) sparked by the technological advances in data automation and information technology (IT). Force XXI is a conscious and deliberate effort to evolve the Army’s organization, doctrine and tactics to integrate advances in technology. Since all good leaders adapt their leadership style to fit the situation, military leadership in the coming century will have to evolve as well to accommodate the changing situation.

History has shown that superior technology is not always victorious—technology is only a tool. Military leaders decide how to use the tool to accomplish their mission. Inappropriate use of war’s tools will result in military defeats, which, if significant, can lead to national disaster. Perhaps the most dramatic example of leaders who failed to grasp the impact of technological change is the fall of France in 1940. France emerged from World War I victorious and a world superpower. The French military leadership was aware of significant emerging technological developments, and their official army regulation, Provisional Instructions, specifically addressed them in 1936.1 Although the French industrial complex could manufacture state-of-the-art military equipment of any type, the problem lay in the French leaders’ lack of understanding about how these emerging technologies would fundamentally alter warfare’s nature.

The astonishingly rapid defeat of the French army in 1940 is often incorrectly attributed to inferior technology. The fact is, France was technologically superior in many ways. For example, they not only had tanks, they had bigger, more powerful tanks—and lots of them. Without even counting the British forces on French soil, the French had 3,254 tanks compared with only 2,574 for the Germans. In addition, the French Char B was probably one of the best tanks in the world in terms of firepower and armor thickness. However, the Char B was tactically inferior, even if it was not technologically inferior. The French clearly intended it to be armored artillery, parcelled out piecemeal to support the infantry. In doing so, they planned on set-piece slug-ging matches that did not require mobility. The most striking evidence of this philosophy was the open engine grille on the left side of the tank. This allowed even smaller-caliber German guns easy immobilization shots from the left flank. In addition, the Char B was slower, nearly impossible to fire outside of its forward arc and lacking in radios. In short, it was totally unsuited to combat the highly mobile German Blitzkrieg warfare.2

As Michael Howard asserted, “whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong.” However, strong leadership can rapidly adapt to new situations in time of war, provided the doctrine is not too far off track. Therefore, we need to develop leaders capable of adapting to crises in the information age, even as we conduct Force XXI exercises to evolve our organization, doctrine and tactics.
The lesson of France in 1940 is relevant to us today because we are in a similar situation. We are the victorious superpower and have the superior industrial capacity, resources and technology. Like the French military leaders, we recognize the RMA to use direct influence on lower echelons will be great, the impulse must be resisted. Tomorrow’s leaders must recognize that they are constrained by the same human limits that dictate an efficient span of control today. The senior leader’s job is to look at the larger picture and allow his subordinate leaders to address the details. Because a senior leader can have direct contact with the lowest echelon does not mean he should.

Modern communications allows for command and control of units without requiring the leader’s physical presence, thereby allowing greater dispersion and depth on the battlefield. However, the lack of a leader’s physical presence can have a number of deleterious effects on the unit’s efficiency. One example where the impact will be most obvious is in the loss of fidelity in communications. Since more than 87 percent of human communication is nonverbal, over reliance on digitization can result in a leader losing the perspective he would have had from interpretation of his subordinates’ nonverbal signals. Similarly, the leader’s ability to fully communicate his intentions to subordinates is compromised, because even with perfect receipt of the written message, the nonverbal emphasis is lost. Physical presence also plays a major role in inspiring and motivating soldiers to perform their best. Successful leaders have always led by example, and from the front. A danger facing the US Army in the next century is technology will work so well, leaders may no longer feel the need for physical presence with their soldiers.

Information overload. In the past, a leader’s main problem was the accurate and timely receipt of battlefield information. Quality information is the key to good decision making. However, the problem today, is too much information. The information age provides the leader with unprecedented information from every imaginable source and in mind-numbing detail. Unfortunately, there is a very finite limit to the amount of information the human brain can usefully process. Machines can collect data in quantities that far exceed that limit. For example, satellite reconnaissance has already collected more imagery than humans will ever be able to review, even if imaging stopped today.

The human brain, faced with more data than it can process, will automatically filter out what it considers unimportant. Only a small subset of data received will be processed as information, thereby impacting the decision making process. The challenge for leaders is to make the natural filtering process a conscious effort rather than an unconscious
Since more than 87 percent of human communication is nonverbal, over reliance on digitization can result in a leader losing the perspective he would have had from interpretation of his subordinates’ nonverbal signals. Similarly, the leader’s ability to fully communicate his intentions to subordinates is compromised, because even with perfect receipt of the written message, the nonverbal emphasis is lost. Physical presence also plays a major role in inspiring and motivating soldiers to perform their best. Successful leaders have always led by example, and from the front. A danger facing the US Army in the next century is technology will work so well, leaders may no longer feel the need for physical presence with their soldiers.

reaction. Leaders need to make hard choices in advance about what kinds of information they need and reject the trivia that now floods into the modern tactical operations center. Subordinate leaders must also be trained to be selective in what they forward to higher echelons. Knowing what and when to filter is an important leadership skill that requires training focus.

Information Warfare’s potential impact. Increasing Army reliance on data automation and digitization creates serious vulnerabilities. The United States cannot maintain undisputed IT preeminence because the commercial sector produces new generations of equipment faster than our military acquisition system can purchase them. State-of-the-art information systems are sometimes obsolete long before they are fielded. This situation, coupled with the fact that information is now considered an independent medium for combat, means that the US cannot expect to rely on the wartime use of all of its information systems like it can in peacetime.

In the future, US adversaries will try to deny, disrupt, degrade or destroy our information processes. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the tremendous military advantage of using precise navigation signals from space. The technology now pervades every US military system. However, the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal is one of the easiest to jam, and GPS receivers can be deceived. Even current commercial off-the-shelf systems can interfere with our use of that technology. However, the Department of Defense is reluctant to even conduct exercises without GPS now for safety reasons. The leadership challenge here is not to become so dependent on technology that we cannot react when that technology is disrupted. A successful leader will have to adapt to any situation, and it is virtually guaranteed that our adversaries will attack the
The information age provides the leader with unprecedented information from every imaginable source and in mind-numbing detail. Unfortunately, there is a very finite limit to the amount of information the human brain can usefully process. . . . The challenge for leaders is to make the natural filtering process a conscious effort rather than an unconscious reaction. Leaders need to make hard choices in advance about what kinds of information they need and reject the trivia that now floods into the modern tactical operations center. Subordinate leaders must also be trained to be selective in what they forward to higher echelons. Knowing what and when to filter is an important leadership skill that requires training focus.

technologies we rely on most. While we should continue to develop organization, doctrine and tactics to incorporate the best emerging technologies, we must not forget that our adversaries are thinking opponents that will adapt as well.

Increased reliance on simulation. Another Force XXI trend is the increased reliance on simulation to replace live-fire exercises and training. Cost is a major driver behind this trend—we simply do not have the resources to train as we did in the past given the downward spiral of resources. Simulations allow troops more training time. Although increasingly more realistic, simulations cannot fully substitute for actual hands-on experience. I recall a system I tested for North American Air Defense that was supposed to provide the National Command Authorities with timely indications of hostile missile launches against the United States and Canada. The developer tested the system thoroughly thousands of times with a sophisticated computer simulation, and the system worked flawlessly against the simulated threats. However, I managed to crash the multimillion dollar computer system in less than 2 minutes by using live inputs. It seems the various clocks at the radar sites were not perfectly synchronized. When the computer tried to reconcile the minor differences in the clocks, it calculated a physical impossibility and crashed. Of course, the simulation’s programmers had assumed a consistent time standard.

This example illustrates a pitfall in relying on simulations. While the above problem was easily fixed once identified, other issues may not be as easy to fix until it is too late. Training simulations, in particular, are hazardous in that they force students to “learn” unreal tactics and ignore proper tactics for a given situation. Since more and more training will be conducted on simulators, the discrepancies between the real world and the simulator become critical. Our Army’s 21st-century leaders need to ensure that there is a balanced approach to using live and simulated training devices and that all simulations are validated prior to use.

Cultural Change and the Information Warrior

One of the challenging aspects of leadership in the next century will be the changing nature of sol-
eters. Technology’s increasing complexity requires ever-greater levels of sophistication in the soldiers who operate the technology. The individual soldier’s education and training level will have to increase as the Army digitizes. For example, when F-15 cockpits became fully digitized in the US Air Force, the required training time actually quadrupled for individual pilots. A recent US Army Command and General Staff College guest speaker stated that he has already found that he had to increase the number of signal officers in an armor company to support the digitization of the modern tank, rather than decrease their numbers, as had been projected from simulations. The projected personnel savings from digitization were illusory. Instead, the Army will require a better-educated and more specialized work force to support increasingly complex and constantly evolving systems.

The US Army leadership culture will need to evolve to deal with a different type of soldier. Currently, those professionals who best understand emerging IT find a hostile climate in the services. People adept at using the new technology are ridiculed as being “nerds” or “geeks” and not true soldiers. However, 21st-century Army leaders need to recognize that moving and shooting apply to the information medium as well. When the fog and friction of combat begin to stress the information systems, a successful leader needs to be technically proficient to continue the mission with degraded systems and improvise new solutions. Joint doctrine requires that we achieve battlespace dominance to prevail in a military conflict, and every leader needs to become an “information warrior” in the sense that he appreciates the impact of friendly and hostile information systems on the mission.

Like recent advertisements for mutual funds on television, the Army understands that past performance is no guarantee for future success. The IT revolution is impossible to ignore and clearly changes the fundamental nature of warfare in ways we do not yet completely understand. However, we do know from centuries of recorded military history that the key to survival in times of turbulent change is military leadership. Successful leaders will adapt to the changes and use new technologies as tools, not solutions. Information-age technology will challenge future leaders to become adept in selectively applying these new tools. Increased communication, better simulations and greater access to information works both for and against future leaders. Reliance on IT makes us more dependent on winning the information war and requires leaders to be competent information warriors to achieve mission success.

The United States stands today as the unchallenged superpower with superior technology, but technology alone will not maintain our superpower status. Flexible military leaders must be able to rapidly adapt to problems we have not yet encountered. In the final analysis, it will be our leadership quality, not our past performance or technological advancement, that determines whether or not our nation endures.

**NOTES**


3. Ibid., 79.


5. CGSC General Officer Guest Speaker, name protected under the principles of academic freedom, November 1995.

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Battle Leadership Examples from the Field
by Major General William A. Cohen

More than 40 years ago, management guru Peter F. Drucker reiterated that the first systematic book on leadership, written 2,000 years ago by Xenophon, a Greek general, is still the best on the subject. Xenophon’s book on combat leadership describes leadership actions during a five-month campaign when he and others, although surrounded by a hostile and numerically superior foe, led 10,000 men in a retreat from Babylon to the Black Sea. If the concepts of battle leadership written 2,000 years ago are so powerful they attract the recommendations of probably the greatest management thinker of our time, I thought they might well apply to nonbattle environments also.

The fact is, a professional soldier, sailor, Marine or airman spends most of his career preparing for war or cleaning up after a war—not fighting. Moreover, modern warfare requires a supporting cast far larger than just those who actually wield weapons. So, whether assuming combat responsibilities or serving in a noncombat function as a “war supporter,” combat leadership potentially seems to have something to offer outside the confines of the battlefield.

Is Conventional Thought Wrong?

That combat leaders have anything to offer noncombat leaders flies in the face of conventional thinking. Even some military people feel that war is war and so unique as a human endeavor that nothing derived from it has any noncombat application. Yet, much technology and cures for diseases have sprang from wartime developments. No less a military thinker than B.H. Liddell Hart, writing of his concept of the indirect approach in his classic book Strategy, states: “With deepened reflection, however, I began to realize that the indirect approach had a much wider application—that it was a law of life in all spheres.”

Many military leaders who never served in battle probably apply combat leadership principles without considering what they are doing or where their ideas and leadership philosophies originated. General Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded the largest seaborne invasion in history. However, he had no actual combat leadership experience. General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold was the only airman to wear five stars, and he commanded the largest air force in history. But he never served as a combat leader either.

Some civilians believe that leadership in battle consists only of running around shouting orders. If this were true, there would not be a lot we could learn from it to apply elsewhere. In my judgment, battle leadership represents probably the greatest leadership challenge for any leader. There are significant hazards. There are poor working conditions. There is probably greater uncertainty than in any other type of human activity. It may be the only leader activity where both followers and leaders would rather be somewhere else. Further, as Drucker points out, “In no other type of leadership must the leader make decisions based on less, or less reliable, information.”

While there are true military geniuses in battle, the majority of people in the military, as in most organizations, are ordinary men and women—not military professionals. And, not all are suited to their jobs. Whether a professional or a trained amateur, all soldiers are stressed far more than those in any civilian situation or occupation. Also, leaders must not only carry out the mission, they must also be responsible for the lives of those they lead. So, battle represents a “worst-case” condition. No wonder traditional motivators such as higher pay, good benefits and job security are not much good. There is no “business as usual” on the battlefield.

Under these conditions, good leaders enable ordinary people to routinely accomplish the extraordinary. In battle, leaders help their followers reach difficult goals and complete arduous tasks. People in such an environment cannot be managed—they must be led. And under terrible conditions, successful combat leaders build and lead amazing organizations that get things done ethically, honestly and, for the most part, humanely.

Goldwater’s Suggestion

Back in 1989, Senator Barry Goldwater endorsed an earlier book of mine on leadership that described the techniques of leadership as an art. Goldwater stated that while my techniques were sound, all were founded on certain principles such as basic honesty. According to him, all leadership techniques must be derived from these basic principles or they will not work.

Assuming Goldwater was correct, while leadership techniques depend on the situation and the leader’s as well as the followers’ styles, there are basic principles from which all techniques are derived that are always true. Once these principles are uncovered, tech-
niques in any situation almost automatically follow.

Moreover, if general leadership principles from the worst-case scenario could be documented, they would have an extremely important impact on many other activities. Leaders from all organizations could use these principles to dramatically increase productivity and the likelihood of success in any project in which they were engaged.

Such principles could be likened to the law of gravity. A stone dropped from an outstretched hand will fall whether the one who drops it is a combat leader, a business leader, a coach, a teacher or any other leader. And, the stone will always fall down—not up.

Thus began my search for the source principles of leadership from the battlefield experience. I was hardly the first to do leadership studies in the military. I have heard of and examined leadership studies from combat and noncombat situations from all of the services. However, I believed this would be the first attempt to derive noncombat leadership principles from the combat experience.

Former Combat Leaders Survey

The foundation of the research was data from a survey sent to more than 200 former combat leaders. Other data were derived from conversations with hundreds of leaders from all four military services and from information gleaned from histories of wars ranging from World War II to current operations. I especially sought people who had become successful in the corporate world or in nonmilitary organizations after leaving the Armed Forces. Of the responses received in the initial phase, 62 were from generals and admirals. The survey asked these extraordinary leaders the following questions:

- What had they learned from leadership in battle?
- What tactics did they use?
- How important was their style?
- What are the most important principles a leader must follow?

How did they adapt these principles outside combat and in their civilian careers?

Not unexpectedly, the data show that successful leaders practice many different styles. Moreover, confirming Goldwater’s opinion, certain universal concepts that these successful leaders followed appeared again and again. These principles resulted in dramatically increased productivity and extraordinary success in all types of organizations. However, with so many respondents listing three or more principles, I anticipated an encyclopedic list.

Eight Basic Principles

Napoleon developed a number of ideas about warfare but published neither his memoir nor his ideas. After his death, 115 of his maxims on the conduct of war were published. If a single combat leader documented so many ideas necessary to be successful in warfare, how many hundreds of leadership principles would be uncovered after analyzing and tabulating the input from such a large number of combat leaders?

Surprisingly, 95 percent of the responses could be boiled down to only eight principles, one or more of which helped leaders achieve extraordinary results in their careers. So, I began to think of them less as principles or guides to leadership success and more as leadership “laws”—to be violated only at great peril.

A significant number of survey respondents wrote notes or letters expressing their support for my project and sending anecdotes illustrating one or more of the principles that had helped them achieve success. It was as if they had seen payment in blood for what they had learned. They knew their experiences’ value and did not want to see their hard-won knowledge wasted.

During the interviews, I talked with successful senior business leaders and reviewed dozens of corporate situations and the actions these corporations’ senior leaders took. Among those I talked with were Robert C. Wright, chief executive officer (CEO) of NBC, who served five years in the Army Reserve, and Michael Armstrong, CEO of AT&T, who never served in the military, but whose ideas of integrity were closely aligned with ideas expressed by combat leaders.

Some senior executives interviewed had combat backgrounds; some did not. Some allowed the use of their real names and companies; some preferred to remain anonymous. Some had developed their own lists of principles of leadership. While their lists differed, they invariably included the eight responses developed from the surveys. I also looked at 7,000 years of recorded history to confirm these concepts. There was an abundance of evidence to support the “laws.”

Leadership Essentials

There are hundreds of excellent techniques and rules people may follow in leading others. But the eight universal laws are essential—the soul of all leadership. The eight laws are simple, but they are not always easy to implement, and sometimes conflict with one another. However, implementing even one of these laws can make the difference between success and failure. But, if you violate these universal laws, you will probably fail, even if you are at first successful.

No one can guarantee success in any situation because there are other factors, such as available resources or policies, which might override anything a leader could do. But, there is no doubt that if a leader follows the universal laws, chances of success will increase. These laws are so powerful that the consequences of following them or not can determine success for most leaders in most situations.

The Eight Leadership Laws

Maintain absolute integrity. Although the other laws are described
in no particular order, this one is listed first for a reason. Most combat leaders say integrity is critical and the foundation of everything else because leadership is a trust. If the leader does not maintain absolute integrity, he will not be trusted regardless of his implementation of the other laws. Successful leaders indicate there is more to integrity than simply not lying. For example, “white lies” not for the benefit of the leader might be told, and this would usually not impact integrity. However, integrity means doing the right thing even when no one is looking.

In his book Taking Charge, US Air Force Major General Perry Smith writes of Mildred “Babe” Zaharias, who was an Olympic Gold Medal winner and later became a professional golfer. She once penalized herself two strokes when she inadvertently played the wrong ball, something no one else had seen. “Why did you do it?” asked a friend. “No one would have noticed.” “I would have noticed,” she answered.8 That is the kind of integrity leaders say must be maintained—the kind of leader we follow even if no one else notices.

Smith is himself a leader of integrity. As a CNN consultant, he was first hired during the Gulf War. He did such a good job CNN retained him as a consultant. Last year, CNN ran a story that US forces used gas warfare on our own troops in Vietnam. Smith knew the story was false and warned CNN before the story was released. He did everything he could to convince CNN’s CEO to retract the story. When nothing worked, he publicly resigned. This forced CNN to take notice. They turned the evidence over to an independent investigator, who confirmed Smith’s allegations and eventually forced CNN to retract the story and fire some of the individuals directly responsible.

Know your stuff. No leader can know everything, but the more you know about what you are responsible for, the better. During World War II, the US Army conducted the largest leadership study ever completed before or since. The study was conducted by some of the most prestigious universities, including Harvard, Yale and Princeton.9 The 12 million people under arms during the war provided an adequate sample size. Moreover, they surveyed some very important people—the soldiers who looked to their officers for leadership. They asked the soldiers what they wanted from leaders. Integrity was so basic it was assumed; it was not even included in the choices given. Among the choices listed in the survey, the top choice was that leaders should “know their stuff.”

As confirmation of the universality of this law, during my research, I found a speech by Captain Wolfgang Lueth, one of Germany’s leading World War II submarine aces, which clearly shows he came to the identical conclusion. He told German naval cadets: “Your crews won’t care if you are a perfect fat head, as long as you sink ships.”10

Your subordinates do not care two straws how good you are at office politics either. They do not care whether you are good at managing your career or that you get all your tickets punched correctly. They want to know if you are competent—they want to know if you know your stuff.

Declare your expectations. This law encompasses objectives, goals and vision—and getting the word out over and over in every way possible. But first, you must think through the entire process. I like to say you cannot get “there” until you know where “there” is.

Drucker spent a fair amount of time working and consulting with Japanese companies. Commenting on “Theory Z” back when it was thought this was the solution to managing American companies, Drucker maintained it was not so much “quality circles” or some other special technique used in Japanese goods. Rather, it was management experts such as W. Edwards Deming, Joseph M. Juran and others who made Japanese leaders aware of the problem.11 Japanese business leaders then declared their expectations of a renewed focus on quality. This redirected the emphasis in their companies to a subject that had previously been ignored or thought unimportant. Quality circles and other techniques that became total quality management techniques supported that effort. So this law really has two parts: establish your expectations, then declare them.

Show uncommon commitment. People will not follow you if they think your commitment is temporary or that you may quit the goal short of attainment. Why should they invest their time, money, life or fortune in something if the leader is not going to lead them there anyway? Others will only follow the leader when they are convinced he will not quit no matter how difficult the task or no matter what obstacles are encountered.

The 216 BCE Battle of Cannae was probably the most decisive battle in history. Most military students study Cannae for its lessons in strategy and a most successful employment of what has come to be known as the double envelopment. But Cannae also has an important lesson for leaders. Carthaginian commander Hannibal faced Roman forces that outnumbered his by almost four to one. Hannibal showed uncommon commitment: “We will either find a way, or make one.”12 His commitment clearly gave his men heart. Almost 80 percent of that seemingly overwhelming Roman force was left dead on the field of battle.

Fighting in the Carolinas during the American Revolution, Major General Nathanael Greene also demonstrated this kind of commitment: “We fight, get beat, rise and fight again.”13 During the Civil
War, in a note to General Henry W.
Halleck, General Ulysses S. Grant
wrote: “I propose to fight it out on
this line if it takes all summer.”

Little wonder that Grant was the
first Union general about whom
Confederate General Robert E. Lee
expressed concern.

There will always be obstacles.
Someone said, “There are no
dreams without dragons.” When
you show uncommon commitment,
followers know their investment of
time and effort will not be wasted.
They know you will not walk
away—that you will see the task
through to the end. Yes, there may
be dragons; but your commitment
gives everyone confidence that you
and they can and will slay them.

**Expect positive results.** It is true
a leader who expects positive results
might not actually get them because
of circumstances beyond his control.
It is equally true a leader who does
not expect positive results will proba-
bly not get them. Chester L.
Karrass, who said, “You don’t get
what you deserve—you get what
you negotiate,” proved that years
ago. In thousands of negotiation
experiments, Karrass found that
time after time the better the
negotiators expected to do, the better
they did. So, while expecting positive
results might not always lead to suc-
cess, failing to expect positive re-
results will almost always lead to
something less—and, maybe, to
failure.

When things were at their black-
est, with his troops surrounded by
superior forces and over 1,000 miles
from friendly support, Xenophon
told his officers, “All of these sol-
diers have their eyes on you. If they
see that you are downhearted they
will become cowards. If you are
yourselves clearly prepared to meet
the enemy, and if you call on the rest
to do their part, you can be sure that
they will follow you and try to be
like you.” Xenophon expected
positive results, and he got them.

**Take care of your people.** During
recent downsizing, CEOs who
made sacrifices for their people, in-
cluding taking salary cuts them-
selves to help avoid layoffs, were
rewarded. Their workers were more
productive, which eventually paid
off in higher profits. Those who
sacrificed others while taking ben-
efits and pay increases for them-
selves did not get the same results.
According to retired Colonel Harry
G. Summers, a commander has a
responsibility “to shield his subor-
dinate leaders from arbitrary and
capricious attack.”

To illustrate his point, Summers
tells of a combat action in Vietnam.
Brigadier General James F. Hol-
lingsworth, an assistant division
commander, flew over Summers’
battle position in a helicopter. He
called Summers’ battalion com-
mander, Lieutenant Colonel Dick
Prillaman on the radio and told him
that one of his company command-
ers was all screwed up. “I want you
to relieve him right now,” he de-
manded. Prillaman responded
instantly: “He’s doing exactly what I
want him to do. If you relieve any-
one, it should be me.”

Hollingsworth could have done
exactly that. Instead, he said, “Now
dammit Dick, don’t get your back
up. It just looked screwed up from
up here. Go down and check it
out.” By the time he retired from
the Army, Prillaman was a Lieuten-
ant General.

Good leaders who take care of
their people tend to get promoted,
but that is not guaranteed. The de-
cision we must make is whether we
are primarily interested in being a
real leader or getting promoted no
matter what. Most of the time good
leadership and promotion go to-
gether, but not always.

**Duty before self.** Duty has two
main components: the mission
and the people. Sometimes the mission
comes first; sometimes the people.
However, with a real leader, one
thing never comes first—personal
interests and well being.

All US Armed Forces have great
examples of those who put duty
before self. Howard Gilmore was
the commander of the USS Growler,
an American submarine on its fourth
war patrol in the Southwest Pacific.
Forced to surface to recharge the
submarine’s batteries on the dark
night of 7 February 1943, Gilmore
and his crew did not see the Japa-
nese gunboat until it was too late.
The gunboat closed range to ram the
surfaced submarine. By skillful
maneuvering, Gilmore moved the
Growler aside to avoid the gun-
boat’s attack. The gunboat’s crew
fired all of its guns, hoping it could
damage the Growler and delay its
escape for only a few minutes so
nearby enemy ships could finish the
sub off.

Gilmore had already ordered
those on deck to clear the bridge.
He was the only one still not inside
the sub. Before he could get below
himself and order a dive, he was
wounded by enemy fire. He was
alive but could barely move. He
knew his crew and submarine were
in danger from the gunboat and
other approaching enemy ships. He
could not get to the hatch. For his
men to climb out of the submarine
to drag him into the submarine
would result in further delay, which
could be fatal to his crew. The sub-
marine had to crash dive immedi-
ately. Gilmore gave his final order
even though he knew it meant his
own death: “Take her down.”

The Growler was seriously dam-
aged, but under control. Gilmore’s
crew brought the sub back to a safe
port. No doubt they were inspired
by the courageous fighting spirit of
their skipper, who had sacrificed his
life while putting duty before self.
Gilmore was awarded the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor posthum-
ously for his bravery. Fortunately,
noncombat situations do not require
this kind of sacrifice. But make no
mistake about it, if you put duty
before self, there will be sacrifices you
must make.

**Get out in front.** There are lead-
ers who feel they must maintain
total detachment. They believe they must coolly and carefully analyze the facts and make decisions without being influenced by outside complications. From their viewpoint, this must be done away from the action, where the noise, pressures of time and other problems distract from their ability to think calmly and clearly.

There is a place for contemplative thinking and measured analysis in leadership, but many leaders have their priorities wrong. The first priority is that the leader must get out where the action is—where those who are doing the actual work are making things happen. They cannot lead from behind a desk in an air-conditioned office.

Military historian John Keegan has written many professional books on command and strategy. In his classic treatise on the essence of military leadership, The Mask of Command, he concludes: “The first and greatest imperative of command is to be present in person.” That means getting out and seeing and being seen. That way, you can see what is going right and what is not. You can make sure your objectives, goals and vision are being conveyed the way you intend. You can make on-the-spot corrections. You can tell it like it is. You can set the example. At the same time, your people can tell you what is on their minds. You can communicate with them in a way no consultant’s survey can match. When you are out in front and “for real,” others know it and will positively respond to your leadership.

I call the eight universal laws “the stuff of heroes.” Apply them. They will work for you today, as they worked for Xenophon 2,000 years ago.

NOTES

6. Anonymous, letter to the author, 13 November 1997. Former Vietnam combat leader Brigadier General Michael L. Ferguson’s comment is typical of the responses. “I truly hope it reaches all the people out there who are students of leadership, because I am convinced that we need more and more great—no, really great—leaders who will use these laws of leadership to protect the future of our country. If not, we will be in real trouble. God bless.”
11. Drucker.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
Mentoring—A Critical Element in Leader Development
by Major General Lon E. Maggart and Colonel Jeanette S. James

The US Army is recognized around the world for its exceptional leader development programs. In fact, it has no equal. We have made great strides in counseling our subordinates to help them improve their performance. But, turbulence, budget and other policy constraints have created the need for a more personal approach to taking care of our soldiers.

The knowledge, skill and experimental requirements thrust on leaders today may well exceed our formal education system’s capacity to develop future leaders capable of dealing with the complex problems they will face. As the Army shrinks, soldiers must perform increasingly more complex tasks, often in jobs for which they have insufficient experience or training. Also, soldiers must work more efficiently and produce quality work in diverse areas without benefit of previous experience or, for that matter, specific training.

Twenty-first century leaders will have to set the conditions that give their subordinates the best possible chance for success. One of the easiest ways to do this is through mentoring. Personal mentorship between senior and junior leaders is essential in filling information gaps, and mentorship provides another avenue to help motivate, educate and guide quality people to higher levels of performance and responsibility. Leadership success in the immediate future will depend on mentoring more than any other single process.

Mentoring may be the critical missing key to help compress young leaders’ learning curve. Today, there is so much to know and so little time to learn it that mentoring might be the best way to ensure future lead-
ers’ professional development. The mentor can help subordinates sort through information to identify the things that are really important.

Mentoring also is self-perpetuating. Leaders who have been well mentored tend to become great mentors themselves. The bond of trust and confidence from a close mentoring relationship could last a lifetime. Mentoring provides a unique opportunity for young leaders to have a permanent, personal linkage with experienced senior officers and noncommissioned officers who have demonstrated professional competence, outstanding leadership and technical ability.

The best mentoring comes from personal commitment between senior and junior leaders rather than from some type of formalized assignment process. Mentoring may well occur outside normal command relationships or branches. In fact, mutual trust and confidence must exist between the mentor and those whom he mentors long before a permanent mentoring relationship unfolds. Trust is critical for the mentoring relationship to be open and honest. Mentors must be able to tell those they mentor what they need to hear even if it is not what they want to hear. However, honesty must flow in both directions. Mutual trust between the mentor and the mentored helps soften the sting often associated with honest communication.

Mentoring can take several forms and be strictly related to branch issues or a solely intellectual engagement. The subjects for discussion are unlimited, ranging from leadership to theoretical constructs. It is up to the mentor to decide which areas are ripe for exploration and for those mentored to seek information that meets their specific needs. Accordingly, mentoring can be transformational for both the mentor and those mentored. Each learns from the other as they work together. For the mentor, it is a way to influence the progress of bright young leaders. Collective wisdom gained from years of experience is passed from senior to junior leaders as a bridge between the past, present and future. The mentor gets the pleasure of watching young leaders grow and progress far beyond a level that could have been achieved otherwise. Interestingly, those who are best mentored often achieve a level of expertise far beyond that of their mentor. The mentored learn, grow and mature.

The mentor also gains access to what subordinates are thinking, and they, in turn, gain insight about the organization and the Army at large. Mentors learn what is working well and what is not and gain valuable and honest feedback from those who make the organization work. The mentor can use those who are mentored to help impart new ideas and ways of doing business throughout the organization and beyond. Mentoring provides both security and courage to those mentored. Security occurs because there is someone with whom to check signals. Courage comes from the knowledge gained.

The mentor provides focus for young leaders’ natural curiosity to learn and explore the various components of soldiering. The mentor serves as a guide to help young leaders gain the most from beneficial experience while helping them avoid potential pitfalls. The mentor can teach both the art and science of a thousand important topics and can expose young leaders to expert knowledge on the subtleties of various job skills. More important, the mentor can model the enduring values and positive spirit so important to the Army.

Mentoring brings both participants exhilaration and exhaustion. There is no greater satisfaction than teaching or learning something new and useful. However, considerable energy must be expended to challenge and teach even a small group of bright young leaders. For those mentored, there is an expectation of performance to a higher standard.

Mentoring offers unparalleled opportunities to build a better Army. If you are a senior officer or noncommissioned officer and are not mentoring several promising young leaders, you are missing an important opportunity to contribute to the Army’s future. Mentoring is the single, easiest way to develop young leaders. But to do so, the mentor must be willing to commit the time and energy necessary to do it right and to set the conditions for success so young leaders will seek him out to be their mentor.

Because mentoring is so critical for growing future leaders, it is up to every one of us to provide the guidance and inspiration to give them the tools to do in the 21st century what we did in Operation Desert Storm—overcome danger, fear and adversity with calm professionalism.

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Imperatives of Leadership: Henry at Agincourt
by Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Callahan

In Autumn 1415, outside the small village of Agincourt in northern France, England’s King Henry V arrayed his army for battle against a numerically superior French force. The English soldiers had been in France since late summer. Henry, their 27-year-old king, had led them on an invasion to reclaim the lands in northern France he felt rightly belonged to England. The English infantry had marched 200 miles in only 12 days; their numbers cut in half by disease and malnutrition.

On 25 October 1415, the feast day of Roman martyr Saint Crispian, an English force of 1,000 men-at-arms and 5,000 archers waited in the morning mist for action to begin. They were tired and wet from a fitful night’s sleep on the cold, damp ground. The temperature was probably between 40 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit. They were exhausted from their forced march, and many suffered with diarrhea. Across the freshly plowed field, five times their number of French knights, including 1,000 on horseback, waited to crush them.

What could Henry, still a young man by current military standards, have said or done to motivate these exhausted soldiers to attack the French and, in fact, eventually route them? One possible answer is the King’s use of the “imperatives of leadership.” John Keegan outlines these imperatives in his book The Mask of Command. Keegan also provides the best analysis of this medieval battle in his earlier book The Face of Battle.

Leadership Imperatives

There is no record of exactly what Henry said to motivate his troops. We do not know his thinking, his strategy or his discussion with the other leaders who accompanied him, although a fairly detailed outline of how the battle took place is available from a number of sources.

French troops, provoked by flights of English arrows, moved forward toward the enemy line and apparently became so tightly packed they could not effectively wield their arms. The battle soon became a slaughter. French soldiers, in heavy armor, slipped on the bodies and entrails of their countrymen and fell in heaps. The archers joined the slaughter on the French flanks, and the press of additional French troops in the rear prevented their successful retreat.

The next morning, local officials buried 6,000 French soldiers. When Henry and his troops moved north toward Calais, they were accompanied by several hundred wounded and more than 2,000 French prisoners.

William Shakespeare wrote the drama Henry V centuries after the battle. He likely had sources for information about the battle that we do not. Still, it is probable that most of the dialogue is fictional. The passage describing Henry’s speech before the battle remains one of Shakespeare’s most famous, and in Shakespeare’s version, the elements of the “imperatives of leadership” are revealed: “We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For he today who sheds his blood with me shall be my brother, be he ne’re so vile this day shall gentle his countenance and gentlemen in England now abed shall think themselves accursed they were not here and hold their manhoods cheap while any speak who fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day.”

Kinship

Kinship is the first of the imperatives essential to effective leadership—“We band of brothers.” In some way, a leader can communicate with his troops that he is “one of them.” For the company or battalion commander, the unit size is such that there is opportunity to move about, getting to know many of the soldiers and allowing them to get to know him. In larger units this identification is more difficult.

In brigades, divisions and larger commands, one way a leader can identify with those he commands is through his staff and subordinate commanders. This group becomes the commander’s intimates. For Henry, the group included his “generals”—the Duke of York and Lord Camoys. As Henry did, an effective leader surrounds himself with other leaders with whom he can be open and honest. They are also those from whom he can hear his soldiers’ concerns and needs.

Ideally, these leaders, the “captains of the thousands,” will be sufficiently soldierly to hold the respect of their own men. Respect for the higher commander and his for them should be readily perceivable by the soldiers and should give them the opportunity for identifying with the higher commander. To maintain this respect and identification, a commander should examine the trappings that come with the office—reserved parking, priority housing, no-waiting status in medical clinics—and determine whether these benefits strengthen or threaten his kinship with his soldiers.

Prescription

Every successful leader must be able to convey what he expects of his soldiers. He must be able to communicate his vision and expectations in simple terms, infused with motivational factors to inspire accomplishment: “He today who sheds his blood.” English infantrymen who sat and looked across the muddy field at the superior French force knew exactly what was required of them. Henry’s vision for his command was not abstract—the enemy stood between them and the
The significance of missions our soldiers must accomplish, both in training and during deployment, might be subtler. A mission’s meaning might be lost on junior officers and enlisted soldiers. The successful leader must be able to crystallize the task into terms all can readily understand and repeat.

In The Mask of Command, Keegan quotes Raimondo Montecuccoli and outlines the elements of the “exhortation of the host.” According to Montecuccoli, there are four ways to challenge soldiers to risk their lives. First, the commander can convince them of the importance of the battle, including the justice of their cause, the good they are accomplishing and a sense of patriotism for the country they represent. Second, he can shame them into a fear of infamy if they show themselves to be cowards and shrink before the challenge. Third, riches and fame can be promised as the rewards for participation in the fight—“Whiles any speaks who fought us upon Saint Crispian’s day.” And finally, a commander can demonstrate his own confidence through a positive attitude and conviction of a victorious outcome.

Sanction

The commander has the authority to use punishment to deal with those who will not follow his orders. Henry’s soldiers undoubtedly knew they might be beaten or executed if they deserted. Equally important to punishment is the positive reinforcement provided to those who faithfully obey. Shakespeare mentions two aspects of this: position and honor.

Many of the archers who joined Henry were condemned men and criminals who had chosen to serve with the King’s campaign rather than go to prison or be executed. For Henry to say: “This day will gentle his countenance” was for him to promise them some improved social position as a result of their participation. He stated that the significance of the battle would raise them to the position of “gentlemen.”

Military service for soldiers today can be a similar “ticket out” of generations of low social standing and underachievement, as many commissioned and noncommissioned officers can attest. An effective leader will stress the significance and rewards that participation with the unit will provide.

The second thing promised to Henry’s soldiers was honor. “Gentlemen in England now abed will think themselves accursed they were not here.” In fact, Shakespeare records Henry’s wish that only those who hungered for honor as he did should stand and fight with him. “But if it be sin to covet honor, I am the most offending soul alive...” [H]e which hath no stomach to this fight, let him depart. . . . We would not die in that man’s company, that fears his fellowship to die with us.”

Honor is not a word frequently heard today. Yet in some form, it is a frequent theme for those who write about the so-called Generation X. Many people believe this generation is in search of something to believe in and follow—something larger than themselves. Commanders can promise those they lead that they will know the honor which comes from serving others and giving themselves to something beyond the common pursuit of security and pleasure. As Charles Allen notes, “No person ever really lives until he has found something worth dying for.”

There is also honor that comes from doing something difficult and challenging, especially when it benefits others more than the one undertaking the effort. Of course, the challenge to commanders is to be role models their subordinates will strive to imitate. They will embrace the principles of honor they see the commander embody and will possibly adopt them as their own.

Action

The imperative of action includes not only a willingness to act but also the insight to think and visualize a situation before taking any action. This requires the commander to do the difficult job of sifting through all of the situation reports and information available on the way to making a decision.

In Shakespeare’s account, on the day of the battle, Gloucester asks Bedford where the King had gone. Bedford replies, “The King himself is rode to view their battle.” Henry made his own reconnaissance of the battle situation and, historically, po-sitioned his troops based on his own knowledge of the terrain. There is no substitute for personal observation in “sizing up” a problem.

The importance of staff work cannot be overstated, especially when the volume of data available is beyond the ability of one person to process. Keegan points out that the rise of the general staff began in the 19th century when available data began to overwhelm one person’s ability to assimilate and interpret all of it. Of equal importance, as a leader seeks to “see and know” the important aspects of every situation his soldiers will face, his ability to be seen “seeing” so the troops know he is personally involved with the process of assessing the situation.

Many of this century’s generals, notably those of World War I—the so-called chateau generals—have been rightly accused of ignoring this responsibility. They left a “glowing” record of the ineffectiveness of their command style. A commander owes it to his troops to avoid the tendency to command from the rear and to make decisions without information gained from thorough, personal investigation and analysis.

Example

Henry challenged his men—“He today who sheds blood with me”—to join him in the battle. Several historians record his performance in personal combat. In fact, the helmet he wore was dented by an enemy’s blow. As an effective commander, he communicated to his men he was willing to share the hardships and dangers they endured.

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The trappings that accompany a senior position allow leaders to sleep in dry, warm environs even though their troops are cold and wet. But an effective leader must balance the benefits of rank against his soldiers’ perception that he is unwilling to share their hardships. There is a need for a commander to conspicuously display his willingness to share every discomfort of the lowliest soldier’s lot. The most effective leaders have convinced subordinates of their willingness: “We ate, then he ate. . . . [W]e slept, then he slept.”

A Commander’s Legacy

Keegan’s imperatives of leadership remain as examples of critical aspects of a commander’s behavior. Readily apparent in Shakespeare’s account of Henry’s actions at Agincourt, these imperatives can be summarized as follows:

▪ I am with you (example).
▪ I am one of you (kinship).
▪ I have looked at the thing which we must do (action: seeing and knowing).

▪ We will do it (prescription).
▪ Because you can do it (sanction).

NOTES

4. Ibid.
5. Keegan, Mask.
8. Shakespeare, 4.3, line 2.

“Better leaders are transformational more frequently; less adequate leaders concentrate on correction and passivity.” So reads one conclusion posited by Bernard M. Bass in Transformational Leadership. This statement sums up only one of the lessons the reader can glean from this book.

This book allows readers to delve into a portion of the research and development that has gone into quantifying and explaining the concept of transformational leadership. However, there are other models or methods of leadership. Bass discusses two: passive, which includes laissez-faire and management by exception (MBE-P); and active, which includes management by exception (MBE-A), transactional or contingent reward and transformational. In the passive method, the leader waits for people to make mistakes or for errors to occur before taking action to correct the situation. In the active method, the leader actively monitors situations in order to take immediate corrective actions.

Bass cites four components of transformational leadership: idealized influence (charisma), inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration. In “idealized influence,” leaders are seen as possessing certain characteristics that make followers identify with and emulate their behavior and beliefs. “Inspirational motivation” leaders motivate and inspire followers by providing meaning and challenges to their followers’ work. “Intellectual stimulation” leaders help
followers expand their capabilities and develop more skills, thus becoming more competent. “Individualized consideration” leaders, acting as coach or mentor, pay particular attention to each follower’s needs for achievement and growth.

Bass shows that transformational leadership is more effective and satisfying than transactional leadership. And, transactional leadership is more effective and satisfying than strictly corrective and passive forms of leadership. Passive leadership is least effective and satisfying.

Bass provides noteworthy insight into transformational leadership components but acknowledges that more research would provide more adequate understanding and help us make fuller use of transformational and transformational leadership. He also tries to shed some light onto the idea of “charismatic leaders,” their behaviors and the key personality traits underlying those behaviors.

For those who want to delve deeper into this discussion, there are two other books that complement this one. They are Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (Bernard M. Bass, The Free Press, New York, 1985) and Leadership for the Twenty-First Century (Joseph C. Rost, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1991).

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In what turned out to be brilliant “casting,” Major General William A. Cohen selected former US Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogleman to write the foreword of Cohen’s practical guide to applying military leadership—The Stuff of Heroes. Fogleman is the only former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recent memory to voluntarily step down from his exalted position because of a matter of principle and honor. By his deeds, he showed that he not only understood the requirements of heroic military leadership, he actually lived its principles. Fogleman’s dramatic demonstration of moral courage, loyalty and strength of character in refusing to participate in the “scapegoating” of a subordinate is a living example of exactly the “stuff of heroes” Cohen writes of in this excellent little book on leadership.

None of Cohen’s “eight universal laws” of leadership should surprise those who have served in the US military forces for any length of time. However, he contributes to the body of literature by presenting them in a simple, straightforward manner and includes many examples of how these “laws” have been applied. Most leaders know these laws or variations of them, but not all have the moral courage to live by them.

The laws are the foundation for a military leadership worthy of the name—maintain absolute integrity, know your stuff, declare your expectations, show uncommon commitment, expect positive results, take care of your people, put duty before self and get out in front. Cohen exhorts those who would benefit from adopting these laws to put them into action, thereby validating their utility, applicability and timelessness.

The book is more than just a checklist of the bedrock principles of “heroic” military leadership. It presents the laws in a logical, cohesive manner, permitting the leader—whether military or civilian—to use the book as a teaching text for developing and schooling the next generation of leaders. The laws are further validated by the use of many appropriate examples taken from the experiences of current dedicated, competent and caring military leaders of character and principle. Cohen includes the following outstanding leaders exemplifying those traits: General Richard Trefry, former inspector general of the US Army; General Andrew Goodpaster, former NATO commander and US Military Academy superintendent during a time of unprecedented ethical crisis; and General Frederick Kroesen, former US Army Europe commander in chief.

For professionals, it is always instructive and beneficial to relearn the important lessons of principled leaders and continue studying and teaching these important laws. As Trefry notes, “This is a profession that requires a lifetime of service to teach yourself that you never know everything. As a matter of fact, when you stop learning and teaching, you stop growing.” Well said, Sir.

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Using Zen Buddhism as a model, author Jon Tetsuro Sumida argues that US Navy officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) is like a great master who can only be understood through “submission to the authority . . . , scrupulous attentiveness and prolonged mental exertion.” It is apparent that Sumida has undertaken such a task.

Mahan saw naval history and theories as means to enhance the quality of naval officers’ decision making, and he professed that it was the man, rather than the ship, who served the cause of victory in war. This might be a lesson the military community wants to revisit as it enters the information-warfare age.

The key tenets typically ascribed
to Mahan are that naval supremacy precedes national greatness, and naval operations directed by certain strategic principles result in decisive naval victory. Yet Sumida maintains that these and other interpretations of Mahan are, at best, “misleading to the point of error.”

Sumida’s serious book attempts “to correct widespread and long-standing misperception of [Mahan’s] treatment” of naval grand strategy and the art and science of command. In so doing, he provides a new perspective from which to understand Mahan and his writings. Sumida focuses on Mahan’s main themes while tracing the evolution of Mahan’s thoughts on five subelements: political, political-economic, governmental, strategic and professional arguments. Central to Sumida’s thesis is the paradox of “a body of famous work [Mahan’s] that has received a great deal of study but has been misunderstood completely.” Sumida wants his book to serve as a point of departure for future study and discussion that will resolve the paradox.

Part of the misperception concerning naval grand strategy concerns the evolution of Mahan’s thoughts on the need for naval supremacy, which embodied the government argument. Sumida traces Mahan’s thoughts on the role of sea power, from the need for naval supremacy to a navy adequate to serve as a deterrent to one that could form part of a “transnational naval consortium” — a position likely to cause consternation among sea power advocates. Sumida’s arguments are well laid out, using Mahan’s major works. However, the question remains unanswered of whether Mahan’s last position was the correct position. Obviously Sumida believes it is.

The other misperception Sumida attempts to correct is the view that Mahan advocated a Jominian-like system of rules to govern naval command and decision making. He argues that Mahan was more like Carl von Clausewitz in that Mahan believed command in war placed greater emphasis on art than on science. Much of the evidence Sumida uses to support his contention is drawn from Mahan’s lesser works, making it difficult for the average scholar to critique this position. Yet, Sumida’s arguments transcend time because they reflect current debates about critical leadership issues. Sumida also describes Mahan’s struggle with the role of doctrine in ensuring effective command in war and the liability of it becoming a set of rigid principles that impair judgment—an issue present today.

Those who have studied the works of Mahan beyond The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890), will appreciate Sumida’s extensive research on Mahan and should enjoy a lively debate about the arguments he puts forth. Those who aspire to be serious students of Mahan will appreciate the extensive bibliography and the selected analytical index.

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The US Army War College Foundation Press recently reprinted Once An Eagle—the book some have called America’s War and Peace. Once an Eagle was first published in 1968 to wide critical acclaim. After the story appeared as a 1970s’ 12-hour television miniseries, the book returned to the New York Times best seller list and reached number one. It has been published in 19 languages.

Once an Eagle is one of the most important military novels ever written. In its stark and realistic descriptions of men in combat, it ranks with Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front (Fawcett Books, New York, 1995) and Stephen Crane’s The Red Badge of Courage (Tor Books, New York, 1997). In its penetrating analysis of human and technical challenges and leadership and command’s moral dilemmas, it is a fitting companion to Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny (Little Brown and Co., New York, 1992) and C.S. Forester’s The General (The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co., Inc., Baltimore, 1988).

Once an Eagle is the story of Sam Damon, a Nebraska farm boy who wants to go to West Point but does not have the political connections necessary to gain an appointment. He enlists in the regular Army and serves in the 1916 Mexican border operation. Two years later, in France, he becomes an infantry squad leader and wins the Medal of Honor and a battlefield commission.

At World War I’s end, Damon, a major, must revert to the rank of first lieutenant to remain in the postwar Army. As a company grade officer, he survives through the long, lean interwar years, moving from post to dreary post in the American west and to overseas bases such as the Panama Canal Zone and the Philippines.

Author Anton Myrer paints a sharp portrait of the Depression-era US Army. He accurately portrays the often-degrading conditions endured by soldiers’ families, including those of George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton Jr. and Omar Bradley, as the men honed their professional skills in preparation for the expected war.

Throughout Damon’s career, he is overshadowed by Courtney Massengale. Although Massengale does not have Damon’s leadership skills or combat experience, he is seen as
the epitome of the ambitious, poised and polished staff officer.

Damon, continually dogged by his “Mustang” origins, resolutely defends enlisted soldiers and their interests during an era when enlisted soldiers were considered little more than unskilled laborers. Damon’s critics, Massengale foremost among them, dismiss him as never having made the psychological shift from being a noncommissioned officer to being an officer.

When World War II begins, Damon is sent to the southwest Pacific, where his competence in combat eventually leads to division command. Near the war’s end, Damon once again faces Massengale, now Damon’s corps commander. Damon’s division is decimated in a Japanese counterattack after Massengale prematurely commits the division’s reserve elsewhere for no sound operational purpose other than that of receiving the glory of having captured intact a Japanese-held city. Damon survives the action but is faced with the moral conundrum of how—or even whether—to expose the powerful and politically connected Massengale. The story easily could have ended here. But, in a short, final section, Myer extends the story by following Damon—and Massengale—into the early years of the Vietnam conflict.

Recalled in 1962 from retirement as a lieutenant general, Damon is sent on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam (called Khotiane in the book). Damon must once again confront Massengale, who is now a four-star general and the commander of the military advisory group. Damon discovers and attempts to derail an effort by Massengale to bring the United States into a full-scale war in Southeast Asia. However, before Damon can act, he is killed in a guerrilla grenade attack.

In creating the character of Sam Damon, Myer provides the benchmark for what an American officer can and should be. Damon, though, is human and, therefore, far from perfect. What sets him apart is that he continually analyzes himself and tries to be the best officer he can be. On another level, Damon is a metaphor for the US Army itself in the first seven decades of the 20th century. It came of age in World War I, achieved greatness in World War II and withered in Vietnam.

This new edition of Once an Eagle carries a foreword by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey Jr., whose own career might well offer the closest parallel to that of the fictional Damon. Current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Henry H. Shelton writes: “Sam Damon has been and will be a beacon of moral and physical courage for young American warriors.”

By republishing this book, the US Army War College Foundation has made this vital work accessible to a new generation of Army leaders. Many of today’s general officers and colonels read the book early in their careers, and because of that, the book has profoundly influenced the shape and character of the post-Vietnam US Army. Re-reading the book allows today’s senior leaders to reflect on the course of their own careers.

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General Harold K. Johnson, Bataan Death March survivor and recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross in Korea, was named chief of staff of the US Army in 1964 and served in that position until retirement in 1968. During his tenure, he presided over the turbulent and controversy-filled period of the US military’s early involvement and buildup in Vietnam. It is this period, far more than for his service in World War II and Korea, for which Johnson is remembered.

Sorley devotes one-half of Honor-able Warrior to Johnson’s role in developing a military response to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ambivalence toward Vietnam. Harold Johnson was a deeply religious man who struggled to reconcile the differences between his loyalty to the president, whose desire was to fight the war “on the cheap,” and his own recognition that such a policy could only lead to military disaster.

The general was caught up in the conflict between the president, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler and the other Chiefs. The President was attempting to emphasize his Great Society program while de-emphasizing the growing war in Southeast Asia. McNamara was attempting to fight that war based on statistical analysis and cared little about military judgment. Wheeler was unwilling to challenge either the president’s or the secretary’s faulty concepts of warfighting. The other Chiefs were attempting to elevate their own services over any meaningful consensus or unified position regarding the proper military strategy for the war. Unfortunately, Sorley only superficially addresses this tangle of conflicting viewpoints.

H.R. McMaster points out in Dereliction of Duty (HarperCollins, Scranton, PA, 1997) that the professional relationship among the Chiefs was so colored by parochialism they were ineffective as a body. Their internal conflicts were so acrimonious that the president and McNamara were able to proceed down the road to military disaster with little opposition.

One question that haunts historians, particularly those who understand the conflict between loyalty to the Constitution and the nation and loyalty to one’s convictions, is why the Joint Chiefs, including General Johnson, did not resign in protest over the flawed policies taking the nation to war in Vietnam. Several times Sorley describes the contempt in which the Chiefs were held by their civilian superiors. Once the president cursed them and told them to “get the hell out of my office” when they expressed their concerns. In another instance, the Chiefs attempted to persuade McNamara of the criticality of calling up the Reserve Components. Believing they had his support, they attended a White House meeting in which the president announced he would not
take such an action and McNamara supported him. According to Sorley, the Chiefs “sat through this meeting in shocked silence.”

It is General Johnson’s silence that so frustrates those who recognize his honor and integrity. They are left wondering why he did not speak up more forcefully or resign in protest. Sorley acknowledges that the general was in anguish over the course of events. But, with the other Chiefs, General Johnson concluded that if he or they resigned, their successors would be lackeys for the civilian leaders rather than soldiers who would stand fast and give their honest opinions. However, the result was that they, in fact, became the lackeys themselves. General Johnson later recognized his fault: “I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back.”

To understand the military’s entry into Vietnam, one must understand the thinking of that era’s military and civilian leaders. Sorley provides a valuable resource to help historians better understand the still highly controversial time in the nation’s history. To fully understand Harold Johnson’s role and fault in determining US military policy toward the Vietnam War, Sorley’s book should be read along with analyses of the Joint Chiefs’ interactions and critical reviews of McNamara’s role as secretary of defense.

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Cigars, Whiskey & Winning: Leadership Lessons From Ulysses S. Grant is an analysis of management techniques derived from Grant’s military leadership during the Civil War. The book is an interesting, well-written account of “life lessons” and their impact on Grant’s warfighting decisions. Each lesson begins with a short vignette of Grant in action and concludes with a lesson learned. The first lesson begins with Grant registering as a cadet at the US Military Academy. The final lesson shows an ex-president Grant struggling to complete his memoirs.

Grant’s leadership qualities of determination, persistence, common sense, clarity of purpose and mastery of detail without the sacrifice of a larger vision are equally relevant to today’s study of leadership. The lessons provide the reader with a look into the life of an ordinary and flawed man who transformed himself into a progressive leader.

Author Al Kaltman describes Grant as a pragmatist who learned from his own and others’ successes and as a man who brought new dimension to strategic planning. Kaltman views Grant as a man who was adept at seizing and exploiting opportunities as they presented themselves, boldly shattering paradigms long before the term made its way into leadership jargon.

Serious students of leadership would welcome a cogent examination and discussion of the character traits and basic core beliefs of one of America’s greatest military leaders. Kaltman’s abridged discussion, however, moves too quickly from one topic to the next and manages to generate more questions than answers or insights. Neither the vignettes nor the lessons learned are portrayed in the text as coming from Grant. In fact, Kaltman acknowledges in the chapter titled “Addendum” that, during his presidency, Grant failed to use many of the managerial lessons he must have learned as a successful general. Kaltman must assume that Grant would have realized the lessons learned as described in the text. However, he fails to provide any evidence that Grant, as general or president, took time to reflect on his managerial or leadership skills.

This book does provide great opportunity for readers to gain a better understanding of their own leadership and management skills. Kaltman attempts to capture compelling leadership lessons that are currently relevant. However, the depth to which he presses his analysis limits his success. The brief lesson statements sometimes read like those of Sun Tzu. They are broad-brushed and require considerable thought by the reader on how to implement them in day-to-day practical applications.

COL John P. Lewis, USA, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Readers looking for a comprehensive history of US special operations from 1976 to 1996 will not find one in this book, but it does have some redeeming qualities. We get a “smidgen” of information about current special operations force structure and a cursory chronology of special operations at the end of the book. Otherwise, the reader gets a great history of how and why the US military has a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Retired US Air Force Colonel Rod Lenahan provides rare insight into the reasons why this little-known command is nested in the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. And, after the journey through this history, the reader understands why past JSOC commanders have become top military leaders.

that resulted in the initial rescue mission’s cancellation at “Desert One.” The book fills in the entire planning, preparation and execution panorama, whereas Charlie Beckwith and Donald Knox’s book Delta Force (out of print) and James H. Kyle’s Guts to Try (out of print) provide narrow service perspectives of some specialized US Army and Air Force unit leaders. Lenahan, Joint Task Force (JTF) 1-79’s intelligence officer, offers an insider’s commentary on the JTF’s formation, tribulations, training and operations.

To those who have participated in “pick up and go” military task forces, this book offers familiar recollections. Joint planning and training become real to the reader when Lenahan provides declassified memorandums showing how the “bill collectors” were managed by the JTF’s boss through the service chief and theater command bill payers while operational security was maintained.

The most disturbing images are those concerning how the United States lacked human assets to gather information in the target area and to provide critical logistic support during the operation. For all the paranoia about the Central Intelligence Agency’s being “everywhere,” it just as every other agency, was unable to be everywhere to conduct or support covert operations in the area. This impotence resulted from a belief in technical means as a replacement for comparatively “unreliable” humans. By casting a wide net over all the military services, exceedingly brave and ingenious people were hastily provided. These uncelebrated few gave the United States the chance to conduct the rescue attempt, even though it failed because of inadequate technical support.

What is special about Lenahan’s “field report” is how the US military went from “quick fix” and “catch up” in the early 1970s to develop an efficient, stand-alone, joint organization for dealing with terrorism. The military actually learned and applied lessons from that incomplete first large hostage rescue effort. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the military the budget and command authority to provide an institutionalized command organization for procuring equipment, organizing and training mission-ready joint teams and commanding and controlling special operations forces from all services to combat terrorism and support theater commanders’ operations in all levels of warfare.

LTC Bruce C. Ressner, USA
Task Force Eagle
Russian Separate Airborne Brigade,
Camp Ugijevik, Bosnia-Herzegovina

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From the Editor

This special edition of Military Review is dedicated to General Dennis J. Reimer, the US Army’s 33d chief of staff (CSA). Hailed as the “Steward of Change,” CSA Reimer personally touched every aspect of the profession of arms—from leadership doctrine and Army Values to Force XXI operations and the Army After Next. A soldier’s soldier, he was the catalyst behind Army force digitization and modernization. From the depths of the jungles in Vietnam to a remote observation post overlooking the demilitarized zone in Korea, or from the halls of Congress to the frozen banks of the Sava River, he didn’t tell us how to do it—he showed us. From his first day in office, he “led from the front” showing soldiers, Department of the Army civilians and their families that he “gave a damn!” In a world long on talk and short on action, he “walked the talk,” always leading by example.

A firm believer in empowerment, General Reimer encouraged each and every Army leader to “Be All You Can Be” while driving home the importance of Army values and consideration of others. Steadfast and always looking forward, he built an army of unsurpassed professionalism, discipline and technological skill. He made training the Army’s top priority and challenged us to institutionalize our training principles and forge future leaders that would assure the Army’s enduring legacy of competent, confident and highly trained soldiers. Despite the specter of drawdown and declining defense budgets, he never let us lose sight of the fact that our Army’s sole purpose is to fight and win the nation’s wars.

When our only constants seemed to be change, turbulence and high OPTEMPO, General Reimer asked us to dig deep, work smart and never forget that “Soldiers are our Credentials.” By showing us how to “build predictability” into our training schedules and combat training center rotations, he transformed a drawdown army into the finest fighting force on earth—one soldier at a time. And whether it was telling the Army story to the media and Congress or observing the Brigade Strike Force at the National Training Center, he ensured America’s Army was trained to succeed across the full spectrum of military operations as a capabilities-based force—a force that was constantly put to the test in Haiti, Korea, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Southwest Asia, just to name a few.

CSA Reimer’s vision, direction, stewardship and passion for soldiering transformed an already top-notch force into the world’s best army, trained and ready for victory. America’s Army is a total force of quality soldiers and civilians; a values-based organization; and an integral part of the joint team, equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide—an army able to respond to our nation’s needs and meet the challenge of change today, tomorrow and in the 21st century.

The legacy General Reimer leaves is quality soldiers, dynamic leaders, innovative doctrine, realistic training and modern equipment—in short, a land force without equal. In a world undergoing unprecedented and accelerating change, he has given us a strategic, highly capable force designed to shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. As we pause to capture brief snapshots of General Reimer’s tenure as Army Chief of Staff, Military Review proudly salutes one of our nation’s greatest leaders. On behalf of our readership, Sir, thanks for a job well done.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael I. Roddin
Acting Editor in Chief
The Army After Next: Knowledge, Speed and Power

By General Dennis J. Reimer, US Army
INCE ITS genesis over three years ago, the Army After Next (AAN) project has provided valuable information concerning land power’s future requirements. Most important, it has helped us develop an AAN vision, the Army of 2025. Our future Army will be a fully integrated, multicomponent force capable of rapidly deploying and fighting as a vital joint-team member. It will also be a hybrid Army, like its predecessors, with a mixture of special operations, light mechanized and strike and battle forces. Our vision has since been conveyed to the concept development community so that it can begin the difficult task of turning AAN into reality.

In the meantime, a key challenge we must face is how to describe the AAN. The journey toward the Army of 2025 is still too new to discuss specific systems or organizational size and structure. These will undoubtedly change as we move forward. Instead, the best way to describe AAN is in terms of the principles that underpin it—knowledge, speed and power.

Knowledge

We are now moving at “warp speed” in that ever-accelerating transition from the Industrial Age to the information age. That means leveraging the tremendous capabilities available through information-age technology. These capabilities will enable us to revolutionize the way we control our forces on the battlefield—the warfighter’s oldest and most difficult problem. At this revolution’s heart are three questions:

• Where am I?
• Where are my buddies?
• Where is the enemy?

We want to be able to answer these questions successfully anywhere, anytime. That has been the goal of our advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs) since 1994. Increasing our battlefield knowledge has also served as the basis for our initial work on the division redesign and will continue to provide the key to further advances.

Knowledge means embracing information-age technology in peacetime. It is simply training the way we fight. We want an Army of soldiers and leaders for whom information technology is second nature. That is why we have begun to focus the Army on the advantages of using the Internet for career field designation and for many of our day-to-day operations. That is also the reason we have invested in Total Asset Visibility. Knowing where our parts are at all times enables us to improve our operations during peace and war.

Knowledge is also one of the reasons we implemented Officer Personnel Management System XXI (OPMS XXI). A core of leaders trained and experienced in operations, operational support, information operations and institutional support will allow us to expand our knowledge base and most 21st-century challenges.

Speed

Speed refers to tactical agility as well as strategic responsiveness. It is the old principle of getting there “firstest with the moestest.” We know that one soldier on the ground early on is worth five later. Speed implies mental and physical agility. It means deciding and acting faster than our opponent—getting inside his decision cycle. Speed also means greater strategic responsiveness—putting decisive combat power in-theater in a matter of hours.

Speed refers to tactical agility as well as strategic responsiveness. It is the old principle of getting there “firstest with the moestest.” We know that one soldier on the ground early on is worth five later. Speed implies mental and physical agility. It means deciding and acting faster than our opponent—getting inside his decision cycle. Speed also means greater strategic responsiveness—putting decisive combat power in-theater in a matter of hours.

Speed expresses itself in multiple dimensions. It means lightening heart, hand, and mind. It also means shortening decision time, so that more time is left to make decisions. Speed also means speeding up the cycle of development, so that we can impose our will on our enemy quickly. Speed means, finally, that we do not get caught up in the decision cycle, but power through time and space to get there firstest with the moestest.

Speed implies mental and physical agility. It means deciding and acting faster than our opponent—getting inside his decision cycle. Speed also means greater strategic responsiveness—putting decisive combat power in-theater in a matter of hours. This is a major break from the way we have done business in the past. Historically, the Army’s strategic challenge has been how to get to the fight. Limited air- and sea-lift capacities meant that we had to arrive in stages, which in turn put tremendous constraints on how and where we fought. In the future, some AAN forces will have self-deployment capabilities which will allow them to get to the fight early. This kind of capability will enable us to “checkmate” the enemy by putting superior combat power in positions that curtail his options and force him either to concede to our terms or to fight at a severe disadvantage. It also means we should be able to end conflict on terms that are most conducive to a lasting peace.
Logistically, speed means velocity management. It means reducing our cycle time during peace while getting the parts to the right place at the proper time during combat. That is why we are moving toward embedded diagnostics and prognostics and why we are focusing on ultrareliable systems. We can improve this process further by looking at it in terms of three fundamental questions—what is, what should be and what could be. What is refers to the process as it is. What should be refers to what we can do to make the process more efficient without major investments. What could be is the “mark on the wall” for future efforts. These three questions are as important to a revolution in military logistics as our three knowledge questions are to AWEs.

Achieving superior levels of agility, responsiveness and velocity management is only possible with leaders who can harness the tremendous power of information-age technology. That is why we put so much emphasis on our core competencies: quality people; leader development; realistic training; modern equipment; current doctrine; and proper force mix.

**Power**

*Power* means projecting military force anywhere in the world to meet the diverse requirements of the new, post-Cold War environment. It means having the right force at the right place at the right time to accomplish the mission quickly and with minimum casualties. It also means having forces with enough flexibility and adaptability built into them to respond to unforeseen situations.

Obviously, we must tie together *knowledge* and *speed* to achieve *power*. We cannot move quickly unless we have a good idea of the situation and what force is required to accomplish the mission. While Cold War force structure packages do not always meet today’s strategic environment requirements, we should not jettison them completely. Rather, we should concentrate on making them more adaptable. To maximize its capabilities in terms of power, the
Combining knowledge, speed and power on the battlefield will produce an effect greater than the sum of its parts. It will enable us to capitalize on the synergy that comes from integrating fire and movement—a tactic as old as hurling one’s javelins just before charging. Combining fire and movement beyond the tactical level of warfare was always difficult because of the relatively immature state of information, firepower and maneuver technologies. In the 21st century, we expect that such technologies will offer us the unprecedented ability to integrate fire and movement across the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare simultaneously.

AAN must embrace Joint Vision 2010’s tenets: dominant maneuver, precision strike, force protection and focused logistics. Again, in order to achieve power, we are going to need the combined expertise of all four functional areas embedded in OPMS XXI.

In Combination

Combining knowledge, speed and power on the battlefield will produce an effect greater than the sum of its parts. It will enable us to capitalize on the synergy that comes from integrating fire and movement—a tactic as old as hurling one’s javelins just before charging. Combining fire and movement beyond the tactical level of warfare was always difficult because of the relatively immature state of information, firepower and maneuver technologies. In the 21st century, we expect that such technologies will offer us the unprecedented ability to integrate fire and movement across the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare simultaneously.

Combining knowledge, speed and power will also give us more freedom to decide how and where we will engage. It will enable us to put “boots on the ground” in the right locations, quickly and with the right capabilities to control people and places. It will thus help us respond to the full spectrum of conflict—from major campaigns to peacekeeping operations—more effectively. Knowledge of the capabilities and locations of friendly and hostile forces, the ability to move quickly (speed) anywhere on the globe with the right number and kinds of forces (power) to do the job will greatly facilitate our execution of all types of stability and support operations.

Initial Strides

The Strike Force that we are creating from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) will embody knowledge, speed and power. It will provide an
The Strike Force that we are creating from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment will embody knowledge, speed and power. It will provide an adaptive, near-term, early-entry force capable of rapid strategic deployment. The Strike Force will possess the characteristics of agility and decisiveness required to conduct operations in a rapidly changing strategic environment. When fielded, it will serve as a prototype for testing organizational structures, operational concepts and critical leader and soldier skills for the Army of 2025.

A convoy from the 2nd ACR arrives at Camp Demi, Bosnia-Herzegovina, to relieve the TF in place.

The over-the-horizon U.S. presence in the Balkans has given us a glimpse of the future of war. The changing nature of conflict will demand new ways of organizing, training and equipping forces. The gulf between the U.S. forces and the forces of our competitors will not narrow. Our retention, education and training systems will have to operate at higher levels of performance. The Strike Force concept is one tool among many that promises to enhance the combat power of our forces.

The Strike Force would be an effective way to structure our forces to respond to a crisis involving any combination of conventional or asymmetrical threats. This is the most cost-effective means of adapting the Cold War structure to post-Cold War requirements while still pulling forward the technology needed for the future. Such a force might include elements of the new security architecture. The key to the Strike Force’s adaptive capacity will be the command and control (C2) capabilities we embed in the 2d ACR’s headquarters elements.

These capabilities will provide the core around which we can task-organize the full spectrum of Army assets and link them to the right set of joint capabilities in response to a crisis involving any combination of conventional or asymmetrical threats. This is the most cost-effective means of adapting the Cold War structure to post-Cold War requirements while still pulling forward the technology needed for the future. Such a force might include a designated C2 element. This procedure would reduce the disruption that now occurs at division- and corps-level headquarters when we form TFs today. It would also provide a core around which the Strike Force commander can develop and sustain essential planning and operational cohesion within his headquarters. As the situation changes, the Strike Force’s commander might add or delete units from his original organization. Likewise, newly formed Strike Forces, perhaps organized with different capabilities, might arrive to relieve those already in-theater. Thus, as the name implies, the Strike Force will be a fast-moving, hard-hitting, multimission force that we can tailor to meet specific requirements.

Other steps toward the AAN include fielding the first fully digitized division in the year 2000 and the first digitized corps before the end of 2004. This will allow our heavy force to leverage the significant capabilities associated with situational understanding and, ultimately, information superiority. Our light forces will complement the heavy force by concentrating on turning night into day so that the Army maintains a balance of capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict. The battlefield awareness (knowledge) that our digitized systems will impart to every unit in the Army remains a prerequisite for achieving the proper balance between dominant maneuver and precision strike over all types of terrain—from urban and restricted to open.

With regard to leader development, OPMS XXI and the new Officer Evaluation Report (OER) were developed in parallel and are currently being implemented. Promotion and selection boards have told us that the new OER is much better and enables
Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer and then Major General Paul J. Kern, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) commander, discuss the Applique computer system and the division’s Force XXI Brigade during a visit to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin California.

Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer is the US Army chief of staff. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.S. from Shippensburg State College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in joint and allied assignments in the Continental United States, Europe, Korea and Vietnam, including commander, US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; US Army vice chief of staff, Washington, D.C.; deputy chief of staff, Operations and Plans, US Army, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, Washington, D.C.; commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado; assistant chief of staff, C3/J3, US Combined Forces Command, and chief of staff, US Army Element, Combined Field Army, Korea; commander, III Corps Artillery, and deputy assistant commandant, US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and chief of staff, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Bad Kreuznach, Germany. General Reimer has over 37 years of commissioned service and will retire this summer after four years as the Chief of Staff. His article “The U.S. Army and Congress: Thoughts from the Chief” appeared in the March-April 1999 edition of Military Review.

focus on this extremely important part of leader development and help transmit the changes as well as their underlying rationale to the Army’s future AAN leaders. Knowledge, speed and power are the capabilities that will underpin the operational and institutional Army of 2025.

Challenges Ahead
Perhaps our biggest challenge in the near term is to ensure that we properly man the force. Here again we are working the balance among recruiting, retention and attrition. We know what has to be done. It is simply a matter of execution. We are not about to let quality slip from our grasp. We have put Operation Desert Storm force-quality indicators as our floor, and we will not let our quality indicators go below the Desert Storm force level. We are truly the world’s best army, but we must not rest on our laurels. We have experienced an erosion of some of our training skills, not because we have lost our knowledge, but because of the resource challenges we face. Last year was the eighth straight year of drawdown and the 13th straight year of declining buying power. The recent plus-up in dollars will allow us to reinvest more resources—people and money—in our training system and important quality of life programs.

We have weathered the storm. Bright days are ahead for the Army. A recent Harris Poll showed that we are the most respected institution in the nation. I attribute this to what we have accomplished and what we continue to do. We are doing what needs to be done in a very professional manner and without a lot of fanfare. There is no secret about our key to success—it is and always has been people. They are led by some of the most experienced and caring leaders I have seen in my 37 years of service. I am convinced that we are on the right track and that we will continue to meet the nation’s needs. Our soldiers—our credentials—have always answered the nation’s call, and they always will. MR
There has been a 300-percent increase in our potential deployments overseas. . . About 20,000 soldiers are deployed away from home station on a daily basis. Our soldiers spend an average of 138 days a year deployed away from home station, and that varies by MOS. I recently talked to a soldier and family on their seventh deployment since Operation Desert Storm. That is a lot of turbulence. It is a lot of moving out and picking up your rucksack and going for it.

We represent the example to the world of what “values” really mean. We are a values-based organization, and we need to recognize that. . . All of us in leadership positions must be able to exemplify values. Talk is not enough—you must be able to back up your words with deeds.

We have the best leadership training program in the world for noncommissioned officers and officers. . . The leaders I see out there are top notch, and the people we are getting in are good quality. What we have to do is figure out how to make the quality move to the top.
Treat others as you would have them treat you. This is a simple restatement of the golden rule—but it is a critical issue. Every soldier must feel he is being treated fairly and that you care and are making an honest attempt to ensure he or she reaches full potential. Initiative will be stifled and creativity destroyed unless soldiers feel they have been given a fair chance to mature and grow.

Leaders create command climate. Positive leadership can eliminate micro-management, careerism, integrity violations and the zero defects mind-set. . . . Major General James Utino once said that morale exists when “a soldier thinks that his army is the best in the world, his regiment is the best in the army, his company is the best in the regiment, his squad is the best in the company, and that he himself is the best damned soldier in the outfit.” Our job as leaders is to foster that attitude and morale.
I want to share a couple of rules for success I think will stand you in good stead. The first one is called *platoon leaders up front*. It is a tradition that began at the end of World War I and continued into World War II. Briefly, the company commander would move his company until it came to a situation where it needed to deploy and start fighting. He would then send a signal back, “platoon leaders up front.” The platoon leaders would then come forward and lead their platoons from the very front. We do not do that much today during dismounted operations, because we operate a little differently. But we do that a lot in terms of leadership. What it means is that platoon leaders—really, all leaders—must lead up front. In other words, do what your soldiers do.

Colonel Albert Jenkins was talking about the relationship between leaders and soldiers and said, “To our subordinates, we owe everything that we are or hope to be, for it is our subordinates, not our superiors, who raise us to the dizziest of professional heights. It is our subordinates who will, if we deserve it, bury us in the deepest mire of disgrace. When the chips are down and our subordinates have accepted us as their leaders, we don’t need superiors to tell us. We see it in their eyes and in their faces, in the barracks, on the fields and on the battle lines. And on that fatal day that we must be ruthlessly demanding, cruel and heartless, they will rise as one to do our bidding, knowing full well that it may be their last act in this life.” Think about it. It is a powerful statement but very true.

The second rule is *give a damn*. That’s right—*give a damn*! It means to care deeply about your soldiers. Again, Marshall’s career illustrates that in many ways. One of my favorite stories about him took place in China where he was a regimental commander. A young lieutenant saw him teaching squad tactics and thought that it was beneath Marshall as the regimental commander to be doing so. Later, as the lieutenant matured, he realized Marshall cared deeply about his soldiers. That was why he was teaching them squad tactics. Marshall clearly showed what *give a damn* means.
Training: Our Army's Top Priority And Don't You Forget It

General Dennis J. Reimer, US Army

July-August 1996

America's Army must be trained to succeed across the full spectrum of military operations. We must be a capabilities-based force that provides options for our nation, which faces a wide variety of circumstances. General Douglas MacArthur stated our primary purpose in 1962: "Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars." It was true then, it is true today and it will be true in the 21st century.

In developing a training strategy, each commander must maximize the appropriate simulations and simulators. We can no longer afford to treat simulations and simulators as enhancements. The Army is committed to getting the most out of each. We must trust simulations and simulators, treat them as trade-offs to other more expensive training and figure out how to get the most training transfer from each training opportunity.

Eliminate training distractions, enforce the contract and "help stamp out dumbness" wherever you see it. Remember, if we don't slow down the train and reduce PERSTEMPO, good soldiers will vote with their feet. We run a very serious risk of losing good soldiers, noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers who form our core competency. We must address this issue in a meaningful way.
Developing Great Leaders in Turbulent Times

General Dennis J. Reimer, US Army

January-February 1998

The Army’s purpose for being is to “win our nation’s wars,” but this means far more than just killing or the willingness to be killed. The American warrior has been and will always be more than the soldier fighting at the point of the spear. We deter and respond to aggression, but we also shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. The Army’s responsibilities include everything from destroying targets to caring for and safeguarding civilians and dividing warring factions.

[FM 22-100, Army Leadership, provides] concise and understandable doctrine that demonstrates the important linkages between the intent and actions of soldiers and junior and senior leaders. The field manual puts the “mystery” of leadership into clear, plain language, reaffirming the Army’s tested and proven approach to leading. The manual makes clear there are no easy answers, no substitutes for competent, caring and courageous leadership.

Some worry that a “zero defects” mentality will resurrect itself and that opportunities for assignments and promotion will diminish. Others fear a return to a “hollow army”…[or] concerned that the high OPTEMPO will detract from training to the point that units will lose their warfighting edge. These concerns…highlight another important constant we can never compromise—the Army’s concern about taking care of people.
The Army and Congress
Thoughts From the Chief

General Dennis J. Reimer, US Army Chief of Staff

Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power “to provide for the common defense . . . to raise and support Armies . . . to provide and maintain a Navy . . . to make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces . . . to declare war . . . and to make laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out the foregoing powers.” Congress’s role is central. Its constitutional responsibilities for national security encompass every aspect of the military’s functions, except direct executive authority. Our professional military education must emphasize these points and foster in rising leaders a respect for the role that Congress plays in the military affairs of this representative democracy.

March-April 1999

During the Cold War, and especially Vietnam, Congress became more and more involved in the details of almost every aspect of the military. Concurrently, their need for information about the Army has increased many times over. As a result, providing that information has become a duty for far more of us—the Army needs your help in letting Congress know what we need to continue to be the best army in the world.

Just as in any other operation, [senior leaders] set the standards for performance, communicating the commander’s intent. This means letting subordinates know that congressional relations and telling the Army story are important. Giving accurate information to members of Congress is not just the right thing to do; it is the smart thing to do. They want to help and part of their job is “to provide for the common defense.” Showing them our equipment, training, facilities, homes and soldiers allows them to know how well they are fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities.
The Army's fundamental purpose is to fight and win our nation's wars as part of a joint team. The NMS requires the Armed Forces to be able to fight and win two major theater wars. To meet that requirement, the Army maintains a mix of heavy, light and SOF that give it the ability to apply decisive force across the entire spectrum of military operations. The combination of quality soldiers, innovative doctrine, realistic training and modern equipment produces a land force without equal, a strategic force capable of imposing its will on an adversary with minimum casualties on both sides.

July-August 1997

Army XXI...will be a power-projection force that is more agile, lethal and, most important, better able to provide the nation full-spectrum dominance. Army XXI will have the capabilities to win the nation's wars, establish order, prevent conflict and sustain operations as long as required. In short, it will be a force capable of shaping the strategic environment as well as responding in decisive fashion to whatever missions it is called on to perform.

The demise of Soviet power may...have promoted new and potentially destabilizing trends. The rise of new economic centers of influence, political organizations and regional military powers may presage new competition for territory or resources. The breakup of a nation-state, such as in the former Yugoslavia, can have a significant impact on regional peace and stability.
Army Values

LEADERSHIP

Loyalty:
Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit and other soldiers.

Duty:
Fulfill your obligations.

Respect:
Treat people as they should be treated.

Selfless-Service:
Put the welfare of the nation, the Army and your subordinates before your own.

Honor:
Live up to all the Army values.

Integrity:
Do what's right, legally and morally.

Personal Courage:
Face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral).

First and always, we must remember that we are a profession of arms. Our profession is unique and, as General Douglas MacArthur once said, predicated on "the will to win." The sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory. If you fail, the nation will be destroyed." We are a profession committed to unlimited and unrelenting service to nation,whenever and wherever America calls.

Our profession's purpose says a great deal about our soldiers and what they do everyday. Our mission is too great to be achieved by any one individual or any single task. There is a tremendous depth and breadth to our profession. The Army's purpose is to fight and win our nation's wars," but this means far more than just killing or the willingness to be killed. The American warrior has been, and will always be, more than the soldier fighting at the point of the spear. We deter and respond to aggression, but we also shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. The Army's responsibilities include everything from destroying targets to caring and safeguarding civilians and detaining war criminals. Often these very different tasks have to be done by the same force, with precious little time and space dividing one mission from the next. It takes a combined effort and sacrifice of the total Army team to perform such extraordinary service. Every team member and mission contribute to the victories that secure America's place in a free and prosperous world.

In the American profession of arms, even apparently mundane tasks take on extraordinary meaning. Throughout our proud history, these tasks have always been part of our mission and they always will be.

The Army is, at heart, a community of active and Reserve soldiers, civilian employees and their families. Communities thrive when people care about one another, work with one another and trust one another. I believe today's Army carries within it this spirit and sense of community, the commitment to address our shortcomings and build upon our strengths. I am optimistic about the future and convinced that because we hold tight to a strong tradition of commitment to one another we are and will remain the best Army on Earth.

Underlying the constants that make our Army what it is are Army values. We must never be complacent about the role of values in our Army. That is why we have made a concerted effort to specify and define the Army values depicted in this special insert. Army values are thoroughly consistent with American society's values, but it is a bad assumption to presuppose that everyone entering the Army understands and accepts the values that we emphasize. The Army is a values-based organization that stresses the importance of the team over the individual. Values that emphasize only individual self-interest are cold comfort in times of hardship and danger. Rather, the Army emphasizes "shared" values, the values that make an individual part of something greater than himself. Army values build strong, cohesive organizations that in turn, become the source of strength and solubility to their members in difficult and turbulent times. Values-based leadership means setting the example and then creating a command climate where values can put values into practice. It is leadership best described by the simple principle "If he knows, do it." Leaders must not only exhort Army values in their words and deeds, they must create the opportunity to reverse any solider in their command to live as well to do anything less is to be less than a leader.

General Dennis J. Reimer
Army Chief of Staff