


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March 1975





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MR READER FORUM

"We Can't Go Back—But"

For officers of a certain ilk, Colonel William L. Hauser's "Professional Writing: A Professional Obligation" (*Military Review*, August 1974) provided stimulation and a point around which to rally. His letter (*Military Review*, October 1974) rebuffing Brigadier General J. McKinley Gibson's "We Can't Go Back—But" (*Military Review*, July 1974) was disappointing.

Imagination springs not only from the maturing professional officer, but also from the fully developed professional officer. The usual distinction between these two classes of officers is one of perspective. A fresh, not necessarily new, approach to a topic may well come from that officer who has spent an entire career in analyzing what makes a military unit a good one and what environment best allows for professional and social development. This approach may be far more valid in fact than the opinions of less experienced officers whose analyses may not be tempered with the wisdom of reality and time.

General Gibson's article seemed to have been intended not as "a retreat into yesteryear," but as a point of takeoff for further serious consideration and discussion of what should be done now in preparation for the next war. The gleanings of "some 30-odd years" cannot be dismissed categorically.

The kernel of an officer corps remaining after the reduction in force of recent years consists of many professional company grade officers who are imbued with atavistic approaches to what an army should be. This atavism is highly qualified, however. There is no intent to return to yesteryear lock, stock and

barrel. Traditions which stimulate true loyalty to the officer and NCO corps and to the individual soldier are sought; hard work which ensures a commander's men are cared for is sought; and proper nurturing (not coddling) of subordinates is sought. Many soldiers yearn for these things and there should be no reason that certain traditions should not be returned to the present operation of a modern army.

General Gibson may be saying that what appeared to be socially good for the Army of 30 years ago may still be good for it today. To carry the idea further, it also might be good sociologically for the local community. Colonel Hauser dwells on society in terms of social circles. General Gibson seems to be writing about community, though some references are made in the context of "high society." The Army might well take the lead in slowing the rush of society as it has taken the lead in other areas of social reform.

Perhaps the pendulum has swung beyond the point of the economic feasibility of returning to regimental posts. Perhaps it has not. No US Army posts with divisions conduct division-size maneuvers daily. That does not mean division-size installations have no value. It also does not mean that the larger installations could not provide training opportunities and facilities similar to those provided at the Grafenwoehr complex in West Germany, and in the same manner. General Gibson's article has merit.

CPT Michael Kjolsrud, USA

(continued on page 111)

(continued from page 2)

The Rained-Out War

On 3 July 1754, George Washington with a British force of 300 men fought 1000 French and Indians at Fort Necessity in Pennsylvania. Badly outnumbered, annihilation for the colonials seemed inevitable.

A torrential rain began. The colonials stood in trenches with water to their knees. The battle and the rain continued into darkness. At midnight, the French commander demanded Washington's surrender. Washington refused. About 300 French and Indians had been killed or wounded. The colonials lost 30 killed, 70 wounded. Both sides were watersoaked and weary. Because the downpour had ruined more than half of the gunpowder on both sides, both agreed to an armistice.

The next morning, Washington and his men marched out, as he later reported, "with all the honors of war . . . with our drums beating and our colors flying."

This was probably the only military battle in history that was called on account of rain!

Harry Edward Neal

On Gobbledygook

Perhaps I, a civilian newspaperman with no superior officer looking over my shoulder, can most safely protest the windy gobbledygook that clogs too many articles in your otherwise fine review.

I suggest that muddy, pretentious writing is bad enough in the daily news and mass of business communication, and that it approaches professional incompetence when used by writers dealing

with nuclear weapons, NATO and tactics that might have to be used in battle next week.

It is astonishing to me that Argus Tresidder's refreshing piece "On Gobbledygook" (*Military Review*, April 1974) seems to have sunk without a ripple in a bottomless pit of foggy language and encrusted, pseudoprofessional jargon. If the contributing experts can't write clearly, perhaps the *Review's* editors should translate them. I suspect that in the process it might be discovered that some of the writers don't think very clearly, either.

Jay Scriba

Possible Historical Mistake

I have decided to write this letter as a reply to some statements made by Dr. Chabert in his article "A Possible Historical Mistake: The Causes of the Allied Military Collapse in May 1940." Unfortunately, Dr. Chabert has fallen into a trap; this trap is a simple solution to a very complex phenomenon.

The good doctor asserts that the French High Command had to deal with a dilemma, that being the deeply pacifist nature of the French nation. This rather simple view does not stand up to scrutiny. A simple stroll through the Invalides and the tomb of Napoleon would easily dispel any charge of pacifism on the part of the French.

He makes reference to an army of pacifists and to this as a weakness of the conscript army of any democratic state. He appears to feel that these two factors were responsible for the French defeat of 1940. Examination of the facts does not bear him out.

Like it or not, a large portion of the collapse rests with the Army High Command. The French political establish-

ment, both the right and the left, bear the other half of the responsibility for 1940. The political interests waged an unnecessarily cruel social war dating from 1930 to 1940. Rather than compromise, both sides preferred to ruin the Third Republic rather than let the other side hold office for more than six months.

This in-fighting had a bad effect on the French officer corps. They had become estranged with the Republic during the Dreyfus Affair and events speedily deteriorated after this time. Unfortunately, Dr. Chabert has never read Paxton's *Parades and Politics at Vichy*. This book makes one wonder why some senior officers of the French Army still wore French uniforms.

Intellectually, the army had died in 1918. Weygand and Gamelin simply did not understand anything about mobile or mechanized warfare. The army did not do a good job in preparing for the nation's defense. If the High Command had had its way, De Gaulle would have wound up

as quartermaster at an army post in the Atlas Mountains for life.

Conscript armies are as good as their leadership. Recent lessons can teach us that we need highly skilled and intelligent junior officers and noncommissioned officers, not careerists and yes men. On higher levels, the generalship of conscript armies must be first-rate. In 1940, the French General Staff liked limousines, dress uniforms and fancy balls.

Today, we do not need air-conditioned trailers and battalion commanders riding at 7500 feet in their personal helicopters. Dr. Chabert has opened Pandora's box. A careful examination of facts and the records themselves do not bear out his limited observations.

I am happy to see some articles that cause controversy since this issue has never been properly handled.

Daniel A. David



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LOOKING AHEAD

Fortunately, the flow of manuscripts continues to reach the offices of *Military Review*. Looking at the planning board for the next few months shows some interesting and provocative articles in store for our readers.

Lieutenant Colonel William Murry takes a new look at the nine principles of war in "Clausewitz and Limited Nuclear War" while Major Carter Brantner, in a historical piece, applies these principles to Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. Types of leadership are addressed by Dr. Edward Eckert in "The McClellans and the Grants: Generalship and Strategy in the Civil War." The genesis of the General Staff concept in America and the military-industrial relationship are presented, respectively, by Major Marc Powe in "A Great Debate: The American General Staff (1903-16)" and John K. Ohl in "General Hugh S. Johnson and the War Industries Board." We also get a look at Australia's experience with an all-volunteer force in a two-part article by Kenneth Coffey.

But all is not past or present in our coverage. The role of US military power is projected into the 1990s by Lieutenant Colonel William Stokes et al., while Captain Peter Ossorio concentrates on artillery in "From Aachen to Zwolle -The Division Artillery, 1975-80." And, just to tease your imagination, consider the title of Roy Werner's upcoming article, "Down the Road to Armageddon?"

Something for everyone.

The Egyptian Staff Solution

Charles Wakebridge

IN MODERN warfare, the Suez Canal, defended by the Bar-Lev Line, most probably would be regarded as a tactical nuclear target, but scientific research, sound planning, thorough preparation, deception and secrecy on the part of the Egyptians enabled them to take the Israelis by surprise on 6 October 1973. The 1973 Mid-East War opened with a barrage from more than 4000 guns and mortars, and an air strike into the Sinai by 200 Egyptian planes, followed by a first wave of 8000 infantry in 1000 assault boats. Within 24 hours, the Egyptians had put five infantry divisions on the East Bank. Together with 500 tanks, they took about 20 of the 31 Bar-Lev Line forts, knocked out 250 Israeli tanks and killed over 150 Israelis. This was no mean feat in itself, and was all the more commendable in light of the Six-Day War of June 1967 when the Egyptian Air

Force had been destroyed by an Israeli "preemptive" strike and its 90,000-strong army in the Sinai, left without air cover, was scattered, losing most of its new Soviet equipment. President Nasser said later to Premier Mahgoub of the Sudan:

On June 9, when I resigned, there were only 400 soldiers between Ishmailia and my house. Israeli troops could have entered Cairo if they wanted to.

The Israelis made much of this victory, loudly disparaging all aspects of the Egyptians and their armed forces, and they came to believe their own propaganda that it would be at least "two generations" before the Egyptians could draw level with them in the field of technology. The idea of Egyptians planning and mounting a large-scale assault crossing of the Suez Canal never entered their heads. The Israelis thought the Arabs would

not dare resort to conventional warfare against them again but would content themselves with sponsoring and encouraging guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The Egyptians did nothing to disabuse the Israelis of this belief—censorship and perhaps shame made them silent—and when President Sadat's vaunted "Year of Destiny" (1971), in which he seemingly sabre-rattled ineffectually, came to an end without any Arab attack on Israel, the Israelis were further lulled into complacency.

When President Nasser died on 27 September 1970, he was succeeded by Anwar Sadat as leader of the Egyptian nation. Sadat has since said that, although he was prepared to give diplomacy a chance, from the first day he took office, he knew he would have to fight the Israelis. His relations with the Russians were mercurial, and, although they continued to provide considerable military equipment and assistance, they were selective and occasionally put on the brake. For example, in April 1972, when President Sadat visited Moscow to ask for more advanced, sophisticated weaponry, his request was refused because the Soviet Union did not then want a war in the Middle East, being more interested in a mild détente at the time. When Richard Nixon was re-elected President in November 1972, Sadat knew that American policy in the

Middle East would not change and that he would have to take military action. Beginning on 12 November 1972, he began to formulate his plan, eventually called Operation *Spark*. The plan was a twofold one, the first part being a military offensive of limited gains to "spark" a crisis into which both the United States and the Soviet Union would be drawn in the hope that the two big powers would force Israel to make concessions.

Limited War Chosen

In October 1972, President Sadat appointed Ahmed Ismail as Defense Minister and Commander in Chief and entrusted him with planning the military part of the offensive which eventually became known as Operation *Badr*. He was assisted by General Saad Shazli as Chief of Staff, one of the few senior officers who had come out of the Six-Day War with his military reputation intact. General Ismail was faced with the alternative of resuming the war of attrition or launching a conventional limited war. He chose the latter. His main reasons were that a war of attrition had been tried by Nasser without the Israelis making any concessions, and, with the Suez Canal as the sharp, practical separating line between them, it was not certain the Israelis would let their armed forces be drawn piecemeal into the "meatgrinder." On the other hand, Egyptian acts of attrition, even small ones, might provoke massive reprisals, costly to Egypt, that would defeat the Egyptians' political aim.

General Ismail decided to make a huge strike, the largest possible, and, in doing so, he anticipated the Israelis would hit back. He knew he must be prepared for that too. Next, he decided

Charles Wakebridge is a free-lance journalist, concentrating mainly on current military-political affairs. During World War II, he served in the British Army and, in 1948, became a journalist, specializing in foreign affairs. Since then, he has reported on wars in China, Greece, Korea, the Middle East, the Congo and Algeria.



The Bulletin

President Sadat

to attack along the entire length of the canal. The Israelis would have to distribute their local counterattacks widely and would not be able to discover where the main Egyptian thrust was directed. Once across the canal, Egyptian troops would consolidate bridgeheads, wait for and absorb the main Israeli counterblow, then Ismail would exercise one of several alternatives open to him. In anticipation of the Israeli counterattack, Ismail decided he would have to construct strong defenses on the West Bank of the canal.

As Egypt and Syria came closer together diplomatically, President Assad of Syria showed interest in this plan, and, on 21 January 1973, General Ismail was appointed Commander in Chief of the "Federated Armed Forces" of both Egypt and Syria. This appointment enabled Ismail to broaden his plan into a joint, simultaneous attack against Israel on two fronts. He gave his appraisal of the Israelis, listing their main advantages as air superiority, technological skill, efficient training and the reliance on quick aid from the United States.

Their main disadvantages were having long lines of communication difficult to defend, limited manpower resources which did not permit heavy casualties, an economy that could not afford a long war and the "wanton evil of conceit."

Planning Begins

In February 1973, a 40-strong team of staff officers working in a large building on "23rd July Street," Cairo, began a series of studies of factors that might affect or influence the projected operation. Minute details were examined and analyzed. Beginning on 23 March, further studies were made to find a suitable date to mount the operation, to forge a strategic deception plan and to estimate anticipated Israeli reaction. Cooperation between top Egyptian and Syrian officers increased as the plan evolved. For example, on 21 April, General Tlass, the Syrian Defense Minister and Commander in Chief, visited Cairo; on 9 May, General Ismail visited Damascus; on 6 June, General Tlass again went to Cairo; and so forth. President Sadat and President Assad, who, on 2 May, had gained the Soviet promise of an anti-aircraft missile screen and 40 more MIG21 aircraft, met periodically to talk about the plan.

Results of the various studies undertaken enabled General Ismail to present a general directive for the strategic offensive, to outline procedures and allocate preparatory operational tasks to each front and to stipulate a time by which they must be completed. After a meeting with General Tlass, Ismail was able to issue further directives. He then began to review the mobilization plans and the

STAFF SOLUTION

reserves available for each front. An Egyptian general, Bahey El Din Nofal, was appointed to regularize details of cooperation between the Egyptian and Syrian planning staffs.

Limited Aims

On 12 June, Sadat gained a political concession from Assad who accepted the limited aim of "recovering the territories lost in 1967" instead of the "destruction of the state of Israel." The previous year, on 17 July, President Sadat expelled the majority, but not all, as is generally supposed, of the Soviet advisors and technicians, numbering about 20,000 in all. He did this he said "to give myself freedom of action." There was little doubt that the presence of so many Soviet personnel, distributed down to units, could have had a dragging effect on any Egyptian plan of action disapproved of by the Soviet Government, perhaps bringing it to a halt, or even nullifying it completely.

Military Problems

Meanwhile, a number of military problems, unusual in themselves, needed answers. The main problem was breaching the strong Bar-Lev Line. The line consisted of 22 defensive complexes embracing 31 individual strong defensive positions, or forts, each built of concrete, and being three or four-story bunkers, bomb and blast proof, surrounded by wire and mines. There always had been a high bank of sand on the East Bank of the canal, but the Israelis had further heightened it, up to 20 meters in some places, and widened it expanding its base to the edge of the canal.

Sloped at an angle of more than 45 degrees, the bank was too steep for amphibious vehicles to mount, should they cross the water. The forts were built within this huge sandbank, behind which was a system of revetted and sandbagged communication trenches and shelters for ammunition, personnel, stores and vehicles. The forward slope was protected by wire, mines and booby traps. Scattered between the forts were some 240 concrete "hardstands" for tanks and guns to use, some 30 of which were usually occupied at a time. Each strongpoint had a high watchtower. This forward line also was supported by secondary defenses.

Early in January 1973, General Ismail selected training areas—mainly on the Nile River—which had terrain similar to that of the East Bank. Accurate models of the Bar-Lev Line defenses were constructed where troops practiced their crossing and assault techniques and experimented with scaling ladders, ropes and other methods of scrambling up the steep slope. Ismail decided that antitank weapons should be with the forward assaulting infantry who would carry maximum weaponry and ammunition and minimum food and water. Their mission was to ambush any counterattacking Israeli tanks. Small handcarts were developed to carry the heavier infantry weapons and ammunition. They could be dragged up the steep sand slope.

The next big problem was how to tear gaps rapidly in the huge sandbank to enable pontoon bridges to be erected and vehicles to pass from them into the desert to the east. The Israelis reckoned that, by using normal methods such as explosives and bulldozers, it would take the Egyptians at least 24 hours or more to do this

which would give them ample warning time to mobilize and to make counter-moves. Experimenting, the Egyptians found that high-pressure water hoses would shift large quantities of sand quickly and could blast a gap in the equivalent of the Bar-Lev Line sandbank within three to four hours. This was their answer. Small high-powered water pumps were obtained and personnel trained to use them.

Another problem was the canal itself. The water was far from still and placid, having both currents and tides which changed every six hours. At the northern end, the tide rose and fell up to 60 centimeters, a figure that increased as one moved southward, until the variation was up to 2 meters at the southern end. The current, which had a speed of 18 meters per minute in the north, increased to about 90 meters a minute by the time it reached the southern end. The canal, which was 175 kilometers long and between 180 and 220 meters wide, was broken by the expanses of the Bitter Lakes and had seasonal disturbances. The canal authority records, going back many years, were carefully analyzed. The canal "looped" at El Ballah where both banks of the western loop were in Egyptian hands. This area was used for training purposes. The commanding general of the engineer corps later claimed that his men had practiced the crossing of the canal over 300 times under "actual conditions."

Those were the main material problems, but General Ismail was faced with one which he called "trench fever." The Egyptian Army had been in static defense for six years. He now had to condition his soldiers to move into the assault which he did by telling them that war was inevitable. Training was tough, continuous and



President Aāsad

repetitious until every man could do his job in battle instinctively, with faith in themselves and their weapons. Ismail then concentrated upon improving the executive ability of his officers, especially the junior ones. The inefficient and lazy were weeded out and dismissed. In January 1971, entry standards for officer cadets had been raised considerably. This action produced a good crop of young officers in time for the October War.

Selecting D-Day

On 6 August, General Shazli made another visit to Damascus, and, later that month, a lengthy conference was held at Alexandria. Top planners from both Egypt and Syria examined the degree of readiness, the efficiency of the armed forces, and matters of coordination. Internal conditions within Israel were reviewed and calculated. The group studying data to find the most suitable date to launch the operation reported its findings, with a mass of technical details to back them up, recommending that it be in either September or October, with preference for October if that were politi-



U.S. Army

General Ismail

cally possible. The actual date was selected by the two political leaders, Sadat and Assad, and, for many weeks, was known only to Sadat, Assad and Ismail. They decided upon Saturday, 6 October, which was the 10th day of Ramadan and the anniversary of the Battle of Badr, one of the Prophet Muhammad's first victories in Arabia—hence, the military part of Operation *Spark* became known as Operation *Badr*. The Arabs refer to this war as the War of the Tenth of Ramadan.

Factors that affected the selection of the 6th as D-day (in the Middle East, it is known as "Y," or Yom, that being the word for day in both Arabic and Hebrew) included the political one that it would be a time when Arab and world support for Egypt and Syria would be at its maximum. Anything additional would have to be gained by force of arms. It would be a day when the climate would be temperate with hydrographical conditions favorable to the navies. Also, the night was at its maximum length—about 12 hours—the first part having bright moonlight to enable the attackers to consolidate their footholds

and the second part without too much moonlight to enable large numbers of men, vehicles and stores to be brought forward without being seen.

As the day fell in Ramadan, when Muslims fast during the daylight hours, the Israelis, who were involved in working up to a general election for 28 October, would not be expecting an attack. The Egyptian planners deny that they were influenced by the fact that the 6th was also Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Hebrew calendar. They pointed out that, on that day, the Israeli authorities knew exactly where every reservist was—either at home or at the synagogue—as opposed to the Jewish New Year (27 to 29 September) when the Israelis were out and about and much less contactable.

The Deception Plan

General Ismail is reported to have explained in an interview in the Egyptian newspaper, *Al-Ahram*:

In every war there are two plans, one an operations plan, the other a decoy plan I believe we succeeded in planning our decoy plan at a strategical and mobilizational level, and fixed for its timings and tables which marched parallel with the operations plan and in harmony with its timings and tables.

Ismail's "decoy" plan worked well and included building strong defenses on the West Bank, both to absorb any subsequent Israeli counterblow and to give the Israelis the impression the Egyptians thought they were preparing to meet an Israeli offensive westward across the canal. Ismail admitted the project was "expensive and difficult." Under cover of constructing these defensive works, camouflaged

positions and shelters for weapons, vehicles and ammunition were built. The materials were brought up during the night and stockpiled well forward. Bridging equipment, for example, which is large, bulky and difficult to hide, was left well back until the last moment. Then, much of it was brought up at night in huge containers, put into prepared pits and covered over. Also, behind the sandbank that was being raised on the Egyptian side of the canal, concrete hardstandings were constructed for guns and tanks.

For at least the last 10 years, the Egyptians had carried out autumn maneuvers of varying scope in the canal zone, and, for the previous four, they had culminated in an "assault crossing of a water obstacle and advance into the desert." It seemed to the Israelis that once again the Egyptians were repeating themselves, but they hardly expected them to do anything else on annual maneuvers. It did not alarm the Israelis at all.

The Egyptians also began a "feint" project. The extreme northern tip of the East Bank, a triangle of salt marsh and flats, was held by them, but, because of the nature of the ground, the Israelis had not shown any interest or intention of moving to occupy it, so the Egyptians began building a causeway to give the impression they were making a road from which they could jump quickly on to, and advance eastward along, the northern Sinai coastal road.

Other deception moves included the Schonau Castle Affair in which Egypt reluctantly agreed to the use of Syrian guerrillas who, on 28 September, hijacked an Austrian train, took hostages and demanded that Schonau Castle in Austria, used as a transit camp for Jews coming out of the So-



U's Army

General Tlass

viet Union on their way to Israel, be closed down. The Austrian chancellor agreed to this demand, much to the annoyance of the Israelis who were extremely upset and agitated by this decision. The Schonau Castle Affair suddenly loomed large in Israel, almost blotting out interest in the forthcoming general election. Other deception measures were reports in *Al Ahram* that lists were open for Egyptian officers to go on the *Oomrah*, the Little Pilgrimage; the demobilization of 20,000 reservists on 3 October; and the announcement that the Rumanian Minister of Defense would be visiting General Ismail on 8 October.

The Countdown

On 6 September, General Ismail issued more federal directives, including one placing Egyptian and Syrian Armed Forces on a "five-day standby" as of 1 October. At an Arab summit meeting, held from 10 to 12 September, Jordan was brought back into the Arab fold, and King Hussein, who was given a vague outline of the scope



Crossing the Suez Canal

Stern magazine

of Operation *Spark* and Operation *Badr*, agreed to cooperate by openly mobilizing and moving troops toward the River Jordan to "threaten" the Israelis on the West Bank and so cause them to deploy forces away from the other two fronts. On the 13th, an air battle occurred between the Israelis and the Syrians in which the Israelis claimed to have brought down 12 Syrian jets with no loss to themselves. The Syrians admitted losing eight aircraft. This caused anxious moments to the planners as the angry Syrians wanted D-day to be advanced, but the calm Ismail would not be moved.

On the 24th, the Syrian military buildup opposite the Golan cease-fire line became noticeable to the Israelis, and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan placed the Israeli Armed Forces on a "low alert" which, in practice, did not mean very much. But, quietly and without publicity over the New Year period, he moved an armored brigade from Beersheba to the northern sector of the Golan Plateau—a move that

probably saved the Golan Plateau from initial complete Syrian occupation. The New Year period ended without hostilities, and the Israelis began to relax even more. On the 30th, General Ismail sent a cautious message to General Tlass, telling him that Operation *Badr* was imminent.

On 1 October, the Egyptian and Syrian Armed Forces were put on a "full state of readiness," and Syrian tanks began moving to their assembly areas. On the Egyptian front, the commanders were told that it was a mobilization exercise which would enable the engineers to strengthen the canal defenses and to complete the northern "feint" causeway. The buildup of manpower forward began, with brigades going westward in the morning on a training exercise and with only one battalion returning in the evening. The remainder stayed hidden in their forward assembly areas. Only a few knew when D-day was to be, and, in the first days of October, it was released sparsely on a "need to know" basis. King Hussein

was never told. He heard the first news of the outbreak of war over the radio. Colonel Gaddafi of Libya was not brought into the plan at all.

H-hour still had not been fixed because of a difference of opinion. The Syrians wanted it to be early in the morning, and the Egyptians in the evening, both wanting to have the sun behind them as they advanced and shining in the eyes of the enemy. On the 2d, General Ismail went to Damascus where a compromise was reached. H-hour was set for 1405. The actual countdown began at 0600 on the 5th when Egyptian engineers began to thin out certain sections of the huge sandbank they had built, preparatory to sandblasting through it at H-hour. The flow of water in the network of "fresh water" canals was stilled by closing all locks so it would not hamper bridging necessary to enable vehicles to move across them.

The Israeli Secret Weapon

At the 11th hour, one problem remained the Israeli secret weapon. All the Bar-Lev Line forts (except two on the Great Bitter Lake) had a large tank of oil buried in the sand with pipes running from it down to the water's edge. The idea was that, in the event of a mass assault crossing, the oil would be released on the surface of the water and ignited, thus incinerating the attackers. During the night of the 5th, Egyptian commandos quietly crossed the canal, cut the pipes or blocked the outlets with wet concrete. Only one damaged pipe was discovered the following morning, and the engineer sent to repair it was one of the first prisoners taken by the Egyptians after H-hour.

The Culmination

At noon on the 6th—D-day—all involved in Operation *Badr* synchronized their watches by the normal time signal given out over Radio Cairo, and, at 1330, President Sadat entered the operations hall in the General Command Center, underground in the sand a few miles east of Cairo, and took his place on the dais. On his right sat General Ismail and on his left General Shazli. All maps of the deception exercises were taken down and put away, safes were opened and operational maps taken out and put in their places. At 1340, orders were given to stop all civilian air and shipping activities.

At 1405, flashing lights and indicators on screens, maps and charts on the walls showed that Operation *Badr* had begun on time and that, in the predicted sequence, the plan was being translated into practice as the canal was crossed and the Israelis pushed back. It was the successful climax of months of planning. The Egyptian staff solution chagrined the Israelis, delighted the Arabs and surprised the watching world. Surprise had been complete, and even the exodus of Soviet personnel and their families from Cairo back to the Soviet Union on the 4th and 5th had not alarmed the complacent Israelis but, rather, had strengthened their belief that the Egyptians could not fight without Soviet aid. President Nixon was awakened at 0600, Washington time, and told of the imminent operations which meant that, owing to the time difference in the Middle East, he knew of it only one hour before H-hour.

—X—

Electromagnetic Pulse

Edwin James Gaul

ONE tends to think of the effects of a nuclear detonation in terms of blast, thermal radiation and nuclear radiation. The one effect which may be most critical to the army in the field, however, is the electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Commanders, tacticians and analysts at all levels need a clear understanding of EMP if the Army is to function effectively prior to or in a tactical nuclear war. Many misconceptions about EMP seem to be floating about in the Army community - for example, EMP will wipe out all the communications no matter what we do, or our lightning protection will protect us against EMP.

The electromagnetic pulse is critical because of its unique properties and effects:

- It does *not* affect people, just equipment—in particular, command, control and communications equipment and electrical and electronics systems.

- The EMP's large "killing" range—hundreds of kilometers from a high-altitude nuclear burst, perhaps tens of

kilometers from a surface nuclear burst.

- The EMP is capable of causing disruption or damage to electronics from a burst at distances where other weapons effects such as nuclear radiation, blast and thermal radiation effects are not important as damage mechanisms.

- Modernized command, control and communications is feeding the threat. The EMP affects electronics, the most susceptible being the complex systems utilizing semiconductor technology. The Army's increasing dependence on sophisticated command, control and communications systems enhances the EMP threat proportionally.

The magnitude of the EMP threat is best visualized by comparing it to other electromagnetic phenomena. Figure 1 lists several electromagnetic power requirements.

The complete quantification of the EMP threat and its impact on doctrine and tactics is not available yet. However, statements can be made

about the EMP: the EMP threat is solvable (a Gordian knot perhaps, but not a sorcerer's curse), and enough scientific and engineering knowledge is currently available to attack the vulnerability and survivability of command, control and communications systems to EMP.

This article provides a survey of the EMP situation, to include defining what the phenomenon is, why it occurs, how it can damage Army equipment and what can be done to overcome the threat. Without this knowledge, a commander could easily cause

phere. Figure 2 represents a nuclear weapon detonation showing the forms of energy release.

Nuclear radiation consists of gamma rays, x-rays and neutrons emanating from the point of detonation. Gamma rays are the dominant source of radiation which leads to the production of the EMP, and the EMP results from a nuclear detonation at any altitude from subsurface to exoatmospheric. Figure 3 shows the burst height altitude regimes from an "EMP production and propagation" viewpoint. The regimes are exoatmospheric, air, sur-

ELECTROMAGNETIC POWER COMPARISON

| Power/Energy Source | Power Density (watts per square meter) |
|---------------------------|---|
| Typical Radio Receiver | 10^{-3} |
| Typical Radio Transmitter | 10^2 |
| Directional Pulse Radar | 10^3 |
| Electromagnetic Pulse | 10^6 |

Figure 1

his communications systems to be knocked out at a critical time.

The EMP can be defined as a broad bandwidth electromagnetic energy pulse of short duration produced by the interaction of radiation from a nuclear burst with the atmosphere or the atmosphere and the earth's surface.

One is tempted to think of the electromagnetic aspect of EMP in terms of lightning. Although the simile of being electromagnetic in nature is valid, they should be handled as two separate electromagnetic phenomena, both of which require protective measures.

EMP is best considered at its beginning, the interaction of radiation from a nuclear burst with the atmos-

phere, near-surface and subsurface heights of burst.

A nuclear burst at any altitude produces two kinds of electromagnetic field in two different regions as shown in Figure 4—the source field region or volume, and a radiated field. One can think of this in terms of a super large antenna; antennas have strong electromagnetic fields within and radiate an electromagnetic field.

The EMP source region is physically defined by the volume of atmosphere in which gamma ray interactions take place with air molecules. This produces strong electric currents, and, just as in an antenna, if the currents are produced asymmetrically, a radiated field is launched. The radiated energy propagates away from the




Figure 2

source region and is called radiated EMP. The strength and area coverage of both types of EMP, source region and radiated, depend on height of burst and yield of the weapon.

Figure 5 summarizes the strength and area coverage of the source and radiated fields from different heights of burst. A land-based Army system would experience these strengths. The source region in some height of burst cases is low strength or no effect be-

cause the source region is not touching or connected with the ground so that its effect on land-based systems can be neglected. The same applies to weak radiated fields. An examination of Figure 5 shows that there are two critical cases to land systems: radiated field from an exoatmospheric burst and source region fields from surface near-surface bursts. The area coverage of the EMP on the ground is also critical—tens of thousands of square




Figure 3

SOURCE REGION AND RADIATED EMP




Figure 4

kilometers resulting from the exoatmospheric burst, and tens of kilometers from the surface near-surface burst.

How does EMP affect equipment?
Before discussing the effects of EMP on equipment, it is necessary to understand the composition of the EMP. As defined above, the EMP is broadband composed of a wide range of frequencies. The analogy diagramed in Figure 6 may help to provide an insight into

the frequency composition of an electromagnetic pulse. Consider a large number of high-power radar and radio transmitters, no two operating at the same frequency, all turned on to full power at time zero and turned off microseconds later. The result would be a block of electromagnetic energy several microseconds in duration, composed of many frequencies, each frequency having a considerable amount of electromagnetic energy associated

STRENGTH AND AREA COVERAGE OF EMP ON LAND SYSTEMS

| | Source Region | | Radiated | |
|----------------|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| | Strength (Square Kilometers) | Area | Strength (Square Kilometers) | Area |
| Exoatmospheric | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | High | 10 ⁶ |
| Air | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable |
| Near-Surface | <u>Low-High</u> | <u>10</u> | Low | 50 |
| Surface | <u>High</u> | <u>10</u> | Low | 50 |
| Subsurface | High | < 1 | Not Applicable | Not Applicable |

Figure 5

with it. This fairly well characterizes the makeup of the EMP, a high-energy pulse of electromagnetic energy composed of a broadband of frequencies.

Materiel with good electrical conduction properties, such as cables, wires, antenna and metal structures, all absorb EMP energy to a varying degree. The degree of absorption depends on the electrical properties, size and shape of the materiel. This is analogous to the design and operation

rents in the materiel, and, should the materiel be connected with a component, device or system which is voltage or current sensitive, damage could result.

Modern communications and electronics equipment are sensitive because of the extensive use of microcircuit transistor technology. Without special design considerations, these devices normally cannot handle the voltage and current surges that result

EMP FREQUENCY CONTENT




Figure 6

of a typical field radio. One tunes the radio to amplify the operating frequency desired. But, if the wrong antenna is used, the desired frequency may come in weak. Using the correct antenna allows a sufficient amount of the signal to be picked up or absorbed and amplified within the radio.

All electrical conducting parts have the characteristic of absorbing some frequency ranges better than others, and to a varying degree of efficiency. The term usually used is "coupling," and materiel which couples with electromagnetic energy may absorb a sufficient amount of energy from the EMP. This induces voltages and cur-

rents from EMP coupling. EMP may couple into cables, wires, antennas and metal enclosures which can transmit the energy to sensitive electronics within. Burn out of transistors, upset of digital functions or equipment performance degradation would result. Extensive test and analysis can determine the extent of EMP energy coupling and the resultant performance degradation levels. Possible locations for design or retrofit procedures to correct the vulnerability include:

- Protective devices installed in cables, wires and antenna lead-ins.
- Replacement of damageable transistors by less susceptible transistors

EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY DISTANCES




Figure 7

(usually more expensive).

- Modification of grounding techniques.

- Electrically shielding the metal enclosure.

It must be stressed that it is not possible to determine "a priori" what the quantitative effects of EMP on a complicated piece of communications or electronics will be. However, the Army has developed a nuclear surviv-

ability program to protect critical equipment against EMP. This program requires the specification of nuclear survivability criteria and a comprehensive design, test and analysis program against these criteria.

The US Army Nuclear Agency specifies nuclear survivability criteria for Army equipment. It begins with an equipment concept in a required operational concept document where the

EQUIPMENT NOT EMP SURVIVABLE




Figure 8

need for nuclear survivability criteria should be established: EMP survivability is then obtained by integrating EMP design, subsystem test and analyses, system test and analyses, re-design, and production control into the normal developmental cycle.

An EMP survivability program includes testing of individual electronic components, electrical circuits, subassemblies, end items and full-scale system tests. The latter are performed at large EMP simulator facilities such as the transportable EMP simulator operated for the Defense Nuclear Agency.

Tactical operations and equipment nuclear survivability. The implications of equipment nuclear survivability on the theater of operations depends on the enemy nuclear threat. If high-altitude, large-yield nuclear bursts are postulated, then all theater unhardened command, control and communications equipment might be vulnerable. This follows from the preceding discussion on high-altitude burst area coverage (Figure 5) which showed an EMP area coverage on the ground of thousands of square kilometers.

The impact of enemy surface nuclear bursts is more subtle. Consider Figure 7 which graphically illustrates what equipment survivability "buys" for commanders in a tactical nuclear environment. The first case of interest—equipment is designed nuclear survivable—is shown by the "protective brick wall." The tactical commander knows that his people and equipment will survive at distances of 1 to 2 kilometers from a nuclear burst.

What happens if the equipment is not EMP hardened (Figure 8)? Past experience indicates that other weapons' effects (blast, thermal, radiation) lose their sting at 2 to 4 kilometers

from a burst, while EMP vulnerability may exist 5 to 10 kilometers away. These facts tell a tactical commander that he may lose his critical electronics at some distance, perhaps up to 10 kilometers from a nuclear burst.

Conclusions. EMP is a critical effect because of the energy involved, the area of coverage, and the possibly large vulnerability radius of modern electronics.

EMP protection requires a comprehensive design-test-analysis-field test program. If EMP protection is integrated into a system from the conceptual stage, the costs are low compared to having retrofit EMP protection to fielded systems.

A nuclear survivability program provides the commander with information to assist in planning and implementing tactics and operations with an increased degree of confidence.



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from

THE
BRITISH ARMY
REVIEW

Pigsticking or the Rat Race?

Can't We Make Soldiering More Fun?

Major O. J. M. Lindsay, British Army

IN THE first half of 1973, the applications for voluntary retirement of officers showed an increase over those for the previous five and a half years. Why? Perhaps the retiring officers believed that soldiering was no longer the fun that it used to be.

This article seeks to establish, first, whether the reasons which made the army officers of the 1920s and 1930s enjoy their soldiering so much are relevant today and, secondly, to examine what steps can be taken to make soldiering more fun in the 1970s and 1980s. It is only concerned with officers, and only those in their first 15 years of service.

The Past

Between the two world wars, there was no problem of officer recruiting. There was also no lack of officers of an outstanding caliber judging by the

fact that Gort (in particular), Brooke, Alexander and Montgomery were among the principal commanders in the closing days of the Dunkirk evacuation.

Yet the army officer between the two world wars had to suffer many forms of military frustration and difficulty which, one would have thought, might have discouraged even the most enthusiastic.

In the early 1920s, pacificism, disarmament and a repugnance for war swept the country. The jazz era rose to its height, as did the cynicism of the general public and their disillusionment with the military profession.

The early 1920s was also a period of far worse overstretch than is known today. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson told the Geddes Committee that, with troops scattered all over the world, with 69 battalions fighting in

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Ireland at one-third of their proper strength, and with only four battalions in Great Britain to cope with crippling industrial unrest, there was absolutely no reserve anywhere. This evidence did not avert the ax; many battalions, regiments and batteries were disbanded, and little money was made available for new equipment or for research and development.

The equipment for the armed forces became progressively obsolete. As the years wore on, the British Army in Great Britain became reduced largely to a flag basis. On exercises, lance corporals sometimes carried boards round their necks proclaiming: "This represents a section." When they carried out a reconnaissance exercise, they hung the board on a tree and went forward as a scout themselves. General Horrocks tells the story of the young officer who, on receiving his first orders to move into the desert to fight the Italian Army, asked his commander whether the Italians understood that a green flag represented an antitank gun.

Promotion was desperately slow. It was not unusual for subalterns in some regiments to find themselves, after 12 years' service, 12th from senior subaltern. It was no different for the outstanding. It took Montgomery 16 years of peacetime soldiering before he reached the rank which he had previously held in 1918.

Having referred to some of the difficulties and frustrations which then faced the young army officer, it is less easy to explain why they enjoyed themselves so much.

In view of the lack of equipment, money for training and shortage of soldiers, the army officer stationed in Great Britain had very little to do. Although the total number of officers at certain divisional headquarters had

increased from two in 1913 to 10 by 1935, Wavell noted that the one staff captain only occasionally found it necessary to work in the afternoons.

Life centered more and more on sport and leave. Officers had no difficulty in obtaining leave to follow their inclinations whether they were training in pentathlon for the Olympic Games or following huskies in an arctic blizzard across Greenland. Army life provided opportunities for seeing much of the world, with normal postings including such a variety as the West Indies, Egypt, India, Burma, Malaya and China and, for indigent officers, the opportunity of secondment to various units in Africa where there was excellent cheap polo or big game shooting, as indeed there was in many other overseas stations—a contrast indeed to service in Ulster or with the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). Those sportsmen who loved animals had the opportunity of shooting them in virtually every country throughout the world.

In India, a little soldiering was more intense, yet very few could have failed to enjoy themselves. Sir John Smyth wrote:

I worked at high pressure in a very key job, although I somehow managed to combine this with the mastership of the Delhi Foxhounds, much lawn tennis and a certain amount of pig-sticking, perhaps the most thrilling sport in which I have ever engaged.

Despite the greater gulf which then existed between officers and soldiers, the "camaraderie" between the two was probably closer than it is today, because officers today spend so little consecutive time in their units. Then, many infantry and cavalry officers spent the greater part of their service within the regiment in which their fathers and grandfathers had served.



Riding in pentathlon

They regarded their regiment as their family, although perhaps not all went to the extreme of the Gurkha regiments. When their officers married:

... they set up home under the shadow of the officers mess, and their wives, while treated with a certain reverence, were always regarded as secondary in importance to the Regiment.

Between the two world wars, the most devastating criticism that could be made of an officer was to say that

he was "ambitious." Very few were pursuing the "rat race" and assessed their chances at the expense of a brother officer. One former distinguished warrior summarized soldiering between the wars simply as: "A lot of jolly fellows with a Band."

Officers were comforted with the knowledge that they would be a good deal worse off in civilian life with prospects of the vast unemployment and the lingering belief that a profession in trade was still a social stigma.

Undue emphasis should not be attached to private means being the sole criterion for officers having enjoyed themselves. Possibly less than one-third of the officers in the 1930s had a private income, and it was exceptional for it to exceed about £100 per annum. True, such a sum went a long way when a subaltern's pay in 1935 was only £230 per annum. However, officers on arrival in India found that a large number of servants required but a few shillings per week in wages.

The doubling of the reserve army, re-equipping, massive reorganization and conscription were only introduced when the second world war was imminent. In any event, they were initially followed by catastrophic British defeats in Norway, Europe, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, Greece and North Africa.

To summarize, it is very surprising that army officers enjoyed themselves so much in view of disbandment and redundancies, very slow promotion, totally inadequate equipment, and little money for training and few soldiers to train.

The public regarded their profession until well into the 30s with cynicism. Yet by all accounts, the officers regarded soldiering as a magnificent life because they had abundance of leave and sport, opportunity and am-

ple time to follow their inclinations, the "camaraderie" of the regimental life, no "rat race," and pigsticking etc'

The Present

It is immediately apparent that the difficulties and frustrations which must have hampered enjoyable soldiering between the world wars are not so evident today.

The country's respect for the armed forces may never have been greater in peacetime than today. Promotion is comparatively rapid. The principal complaint from infantry commanding officers is that there is too much sophisticated equipment in the BAOR for the infantry private soldier. United Kingdom battalions are now given the opportunity to train overseas annually, and there are still enough soldiers to make training worthwhile. Finally, the Northern Ireland crisis has seen the expansion of the infantry representative companies and the creation of the Ulster Defence Regiment.

It would appear, therefore, that we have little to complain about.

The most accurate available guide to the reason why officers become disillusioned is to be found in a report which asked army officers who were retiring voluntarily to select one or more reasons for leaving the service. The replies were on the following lines: 68 percent, uncertain future of a career; 47 percent, insufficient recognition and advancement; 41 percent, declining status of a military career; 35 percent, better pay elsewhere; and 27 percent, dissatisfaction with the nature of the job. (The figures show the percentage of officers selecting each reason).

Too much should not be read into these possibly outdated statistics.

However, in the 1920s and 1930s, the inferior pay, poor career prospects and general frustrations did not discourage officers from soldiering on. What, then, can be done to make soldiering more fun?

Two immediate solutions, regrettably, must be immediately dismissed. (Perhaps to the disappointment of the Inland Revenue!) there is no possibility of a really significant army pay increase because we cannot expect the percentage of the gross national product spent on defense to be increased. Secondly, the turbulence and pressures of soldiering over the next decade are unlikely to decrease. Therefore, clamoring for more pay and less turbulence offers no realistic solutions.

The complexity of modern equipment, the necessity for extremely detailed contingency plans, and the concentration on a really cost-effective, professional and efficient service, all ensure that the pressure of work on officers cannot be reduced under the present system. It is, therefore, more difficult for officers, particularly those holding key appointments, to be readily spared for generous periods of leave, sport or relaxation.

The need for a "balanced career" ensures that an officer aged 25 may have to spend the greater part of his next 10 years' service Extra Regimentally Employed, rather than serving with his friends in his battalion. As a result, only the Sergeants' Mess provides real continuity.

The present system of selection for the Staff College ensures that the "rat race" is installed in the young officer almost after leaving Sandhurst.

Two points have emerged: obviously, the reasons why officers enjoyed their soldiering so much in the 1920s and 1930s are no longer relevant today. The clock cannot be put back.

Secondly, the difficulties and frustrations of soldiering before the second world war are not applicable today.

What can be done about it?

Proposals

Many articles have been written about the career structures for officers or on officer recruiting problems. Perhaps it is interesting to note some of the fatuous proposals statements which have been made in all seriousness, although it may be unfair to quote them out of context:

- "There is no place in the regimental system for the professional major" (*The British Army Review*, Number 27).

- [We must] "attempt to influence young officers not to get married until about the age of 25" (*The British Army Review*, Number 34).

- [There must be] "a substantial cut in the deadwood at staffs . . . (and) a massive cut in the administrative element would help . . . the Army should offer a career to the age of thirty" (*The British Army Review*, Number 35).

- [The officer] "must in fact have a second career running side by side with his first or military career" (*The British Army Review*, Number 37).

- [It is desirable] "to eliminate all officers failing to pass into the Staff College. The Army of the 1970s should not give flowers to officers failed" (*The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, January 1969).

What a merry army we would become if the above proposals were implemented!

New Staff Promotion Exam. The present exam is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Officers serving in Northern Ireland, for example, do not have the same opportunity as others to study for the exam or attend the preexam

cramming courses. Wavell disapproved of all examinations; when asked if he had views on promotion exams, he replied: "Yes, abolish them."

On the other hand, it is insufficient to rely entirely on annual confidential reports. The reduction in the number of examination papers from eight to three is in the right direction but does not go far enough. The administration paper should be omitted, and no preexam cramming courses whatsoever should be permitted. Officers should be allowed to take the exam younger, and the two remaining papers should seek to discover only if an officer can write fluent English and if he has original thoughts on matters with a bearing on his profession.

These proposals are designed to prevent the officer burying himself in correspondence courses, poring over books and worrying over exams when he should be working with his soldiers and enjoying himself, militarily or otherwise. The proposal would also make the system fair for all and reduce turbulence.

Consultation on Postings. It is surprising that young officers are not given the opportunity, regularly and officially, to state where they wish to serve and in what capacity.

Part of the annual confidential report should contain a form in which officers could state, with reasons, their preferences. Officers involved in the army's various organizations which select officers for appointments would be required to inform the young officer, in writing, within four months, of what was being done to meet his request or, alternatively, the reasons why it was not in the interests of his career or of the service that his preferences should be met. The Staff College takes a number of factors into consideration before deciding an offi-

cer's posting, but the factor to which least importance is attached is the officer's own preference.

This proposal seeks to ensure that the young officer will have a better opportunity to serve where he will be more motivated and happier. In large regiments and in corps, there should be plenty of flexibility as to where officers could serve. It is true that some extremely rusty consultation machinery exists somewhere and some regiments do consult young officers about where they wish to serve. Nevertheless, this proposal should certainly be implemented.


A Sabbatical Year. Officers could have more opportunity to enjoy themselves. It is proposed, therefore, that there should be a year of absence from strictly military duties for up to 100 regular officers each year between the ages of 26 and 32, just as those who are taking part in the current 73/74 "Round the World" yacht race or the 74/75 Zaire River expedition already get leave.

The year should be spent traveling or studying, but only providing that the selected undertaking was, in the broadest sense, in the interests of the service, and the career of the officer. Examples of suitable undertakings for the sabbatical year are:

- Studying problems of law and order with the police in America or of industrial unrest in such countries as France or Japan. (Political sensitivity prevents such studies in England.)

- Writing a comprehensive tactical summary of the lessons to be learned from the Middle East wars, or of guerrilla operations in Africa or South America.

- Studying the relationship of defense expenditure to the economy as a whole, the meaning of the balance of payments in defense terms, etc.



Soldier photos

The Sabre and crew, participants in the 73/74 "Round the World" yacht race

- Secondment of technically trained officers to those industries relevant to their specialization.

- Serving on the staff of the United Nations, but not in UNFICYP (United Nations Forces in Cyprus) of which many officers now have experience.

- Attachment to the Special Branch dealing with terrorist activities.

- Studying the military implica-

tions of less petrol at greater cost.

The major objection to removing officers from their regiments or staff for the sabbatical year is that there is already a shortage in some infantry battalions of four or five officers. However, do companies/batteries/squadrons stationed in England really need seconds-in-command? If officers really cannot be spared from such dull and undemanding appointments, then the 66 officers now commanding Cadet Training Teams (CTTs) or Army Youth Teams (AYTs) should be returned to regimental duty and be replaced by good warrant officers, many of whom are already successfully commanding some CTTs and AYT's. By this step, which is desirable anyway in the case of the AYT's, officers can be spared more readily for the sabbatical year.

Officers would be required to serve for four years beyond the sabbatical year to discourage them from using it merely to arrange a civilian job.

The advantages of this proposal would be:

- Regular officers would have an opportunity of broadening their minds while obtaining new experience in a field of their choice, outside the ordinary, which would be of subsequent value to their career and the army.
 - Many officers would be encouraged to soldier on to obtain the sabbatical year.
 - The more adventurous officers would attract good publicity for the army.
 - It would be an excellent recruiting factor.
 - The year should be enormous fun.
- Other Proposals.* Lack of space prevents a detailed discussion of the following points.
- Are not regimental and staff officers now doing much work which

should be, and used to be, done by their warrant officers and clerks respectively?

- Do not some regiments/corps discourage their better officers from seeking exchange/secondment posts, alleging that they cannot be spared?

- Could the terminal grant not be made available earlier in order that, after careful investment, it could be increased prior to retirement, without extra cost to public funds?

- Has there not been a breakdown in communication between the Ministry of Defence and the young officer over the understanding of the Military Salary concept, over which many young officers are, at the least, skeptical?

- Is the married quarters point system sufficiently weighted in favor of the young officer with a family?

- Are not too many good officers on the staff, or being trained for it, or on endless courses instead of serving with their soldiers?

- Cannot the emphasis on the importance which is attached to being a graduate of the Military Staff College be reduced?

Conclusions

The number of voluntary retirements of officers will continue to increase unless soldiering can be made more fun. Due to the loss of the Empire and the undoubted need for military professionalism in the future, the factors which made soldiering so enjoyable between the wars cannot be reintroduced. Nevertheless, a sabbatical year for selected young officers, close consultation over postings and a new staff promotion exam are among the principal measures which should be introduced immediately.

Anyone for pigsticking? **SIR**

A MAN UNDER AUTHORITY

Some Thoughts on Discipline and Obedience

Lieutenant Colonel Fielding Lewis Greaves, United States Army-Retired

... I SHALL go forward with my history, describing equally the greater and the lesser cities. For the cities which were formerly great, have most of them become insignificant; and such as are at present powerful, were weak in the olden time. I shall therefore discourse equally of both, convinced that human happiness never continues long in one stay.¹

So says Herodotus in his introduction to *The Persian Wars*.

Such as are at present powerful usually gained their power through the disciplined strength of their armies. The fall from power by those which were formerly great was often presaged by a breakdown in the discipline of their military forces.

The word *discipline* stems from a Latin root word meaning "to learn," and it bears the connotation of

learned behavior. Among the many definitions of the word found in Webster's unabridged dictionary are:

Training or course of training which corrects, molds, strengthens or perfects . . . control gained by enforcing obedience or order . . . strict government, as of a group, for effective action . . . the quality or state of orderliness gained through self-control . . . orderly conduct.

Military discipline encompasses all of those definitions. Reduced to its most simple terms, the essence of discipline and obedience can be found in the centurion's remark to Christ as recorded in the book of Matthew:

... I am a man under authority, having soldiers under me: I say to this man, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh. . . .²

For a military force to be effective, it must above all else be reliable. It

was the utter *reliability* of that centurion's simple formula which made the Roman legions the most powerful and effective military force of ancient times. Reliability is the sum of many parts—level of training, quality of leadership, state of supply and so forth, but its most important component is discipline.

Periodically, as huge influxes of men from the civilian world pass through the armed forces in time of war, there have been inclinations toward a relaxation of the rigidities of military discipline, efforts to make the services attractive and more "democratic," to minimize or eliminate what have been called the "mickey mouse" aspects of military life. Doubtless, there are still a number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the services today who can recall an era when discipline at the centurion's level was inspired and maintained by the backbone and the hard fists of the "top kick" and his squad leaders. As great numbers of draftees came into the Army in the early 1940s, that hard but effective system gave way to the spectacle of the top sergeant as the "mother" of his troops, as the service sought to reassure the actual mothers that their "boys" were being well-treated.

This relaxation of discipline again has been evident during and following the winding down of an unpopular Asian war. The old Spartan-like barracks have given way to two and three-man-room dormitories. Rules on hair styles have been relaxed to allow approximations of those of the new lifestyle in the civilian world. Even standards of neatness and cleanliness in the public wearing of the uniform were lowered, in at least one jurisdiction, until the resultant—and predictable—grubbiness caused both a



Courtesy of author

Roman centurion

public and a command reaction back toward the former standard.

At a time when many of the ills of the civilian world have been laid at the door of excess permissiveness in the governance of our youth, it is significant that a House investigating subcommittee should conclude that the cause of recent disturbances on the aircraft carriers *Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation* can be traced to "permissiveness"—which is simply another term for an unwise relaxation of discipline.

With the popularity of the military at a low ebb and the services competing for recruits, the nation is faced with the problems inherent in trying to build an all-volunteer Army, to provide the enticements which will persuade men to enlist, while eliminating those harsh aspects of military life which might tend to deter them. At the same time, we seem to live in an era when our youth are more vo-

ciferous than ever before in demanding their rights at an earlier age; yet they demonstrate less respect for the old values of patriotism and are less inclined to recognize that along with rights also go duties to the society of which they are members.

The result is, understandably, pressure from all sides for a further relaxation of the trappings of military discipline.

I submit that it would be the utmost folly to listen to such urgings. I suggest that we may already have gone too far and that it is high time for the pendulum to start its swing back in the other direction toward a somewhat more austere and authoritarian, and less "democratic," military life.

Robert Ardrey, in his book on the origins of mankind, *African Genesis*, had a most interesting observation on war:

Let us not be too hasty in our dismissal of war as an unblemished evil. Are you a Christian? Then recall that Christendom survived its darkest hour in the fury of the Battle of Tours. Do you believe in law? The rule of law became a human institution in the shelter of the Roman legions. Do you subscribe to the value of individual worth? Only by the success of the phalanx at Marathon did the Greeks repel the Persian horde and make possible the Golden Age. Are you a materialist? Do you regard as a human good the satisfaction of economic want? The Pax Britannica, made possible by the unchallengeable supremacy of the British fleet, gave mankind the opportunity to lay the broad foundations of the Industrial Revolution. . . . Do you care about freedom? Dreams may have inspired it, and wishes promoted it, but only war and weapons have made it yours.³

In every case that Ardrey cites, discipline or its lack was the key. The Muslim warriors of Abdurrahman were distracted from giving full attention to the enemy at Tours by concern over the safety of their loot, gathered from the ravaging of France. The result was that their indiscipline brought about his death and their defeat at the hands of the Franks commanded by Charles Martel. Roman legionary discipline has already been mentioned; that of the British Fleet was not unlike it. Only the steadfast discipline of the Greeks at Marathon let them stand and hold and ultimately win over the vastly superior numbers of the enemy—an enemy that was more an undisciplined mob than a disciplined military body.

The maintenance of good order and discipline has been a major preoccupation of military leaders and military thinkers throughout history. At a time when there is pressure to relax the disciplinary standards of our forces—a step which might literally jeopardize the safety of the Republic and put us on the road toward joining those states which Herodotus tells us were "formerly great . . . in the olden time"—it is well to look back at history and review what some former leaders and thinkers have said on the subject.

In distant China, writing about 500 B.C., the warrior-sage and author of the treatise, *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu, had this to say:

Soldiers must be treated with humanity, but kept under control by iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. If in training soldiers, commands are habitually obeyed, the army will be well disciplined. . . . If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted but unable to enforce your



Machiavelli

Courtesy of author

commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder, then your soldiers must be likened to spoiled children; they are useless for any practical purpose.⁵

Significantly, the world's largest army today, that of Communist China, as well as the entire nation itself, boasts of being bound by a "united, iron discipline." Also worth noting is that the Red Chinese military thinkers of today give serious attention to the works of their ancient military scholars, including Sun Tzu.

A century after Sun Tzu, and half-way around the world, the Greek city states were plunging into their chaotic but localized "world war" in the Peloponnesus as opposing alliances headed by Athens and Sparta strove for supremacy. Note the words of Archidamus, King of Sparta, as he exhorted his troops before they marched off to war:

Remember as you follow where you may be led to regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so much to the credit and safety of an army as the union of large bodies by a single discipline.⁵

A half century before Archidamus, the tragic poet Aeschylus, who had fought with distinction as a hoplite (heavily armed spearman) at both Marathon and Plataea, observed that: "Obedience is the mother of success, the wife of safety."⁶

Only a few years after Archidamus, Xenophon was to say:

Where soldiering is concerned . . . it is discipline that makes one feel safe, while lack of discipline has destroyed many people before now.⁷

Xenophon, perhaps above all others, could speak on both sides of the problem for his was the most difficult task ever facing a military leader, that of reconstituting a thoroughly demoralized army, outnumbered and trapped deep in the enemy's land, and leading it successfully and safely back home.

Niccolo Machiavelli is best known for his political treatises and is generally regarded as the father of modern political science. Less known is the fact that he was a thoughtful student and astute writer on military subjects. Drawing his lessons from history, especially that of the ancient Romans whom he greatly admired, he noted in his book *The Art of War* a fact reflected in a current US Marine Corps recruiting slogan: "According to the saying of Cyrus to Xenophon, it is not the number of men, but the number of good men, that gives the advantage."⁸

Elsewhere in the same work, Machiavelli indicated the source of those good men:

DISCIPLINE AND OBEDIENCE

*It is not the natural courage of men that makes an army bold, but order and good discipline. . . . Neither the Greeks nor the Romans being remarkable either for natural ferocity, or for implicit submission to their princes, they were obliged to have recourse to good discipline.*⁹

The famous Ottoman sultan Mehmet II, better known as Fatih Mehmet ("the Conqueror"), toppled the last bastion of the once great Byzantine Empire when, in May 1453, he captured Constantinople after a 53-day siege. Following the custom of the ages, he made a lengthy speech of exhortation to his officers and senior noncommissioned officers just before the final assault on the city walls. Recorded after the event by his Greek scribe, Kritoboulos, the speech included this passage:

*Then be brave yourselves and urge all the men under you to follow you bravely, and to use all zeal and diligence in the task, in the belief that there are three elements in good fighting: the will to fight, a realization of what is and is not honorable, and obedience to authority. Know that this obedience involves each keeping his own position and going to the attack quietly and in good order so that one can quickly hear the commands given and pass them on to the rest: when they must advance silently, to be silent, when they must shout and yell, to do so with fearsome yells. For while many of these things are wise in every sort of fighting, they are not the least so in battles at the walls. As for the rest, order them to do everything well and in good order and discipline.*¹⁰

High on the list of important military writers is the name Karl von Clausewitz. It is appropriate to note that Clausewitz flatly asserted: "There

is nothing in war which is of greater importance than obedience."¹¹

That such obedience and discipline are matters which apply at all levels should be self-evident. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in his biography *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, assessing Jackson's place in history, contrasted him with his superior commander, General Robert E. Lee:

*Jackson kept his subordinates in their place, exacting from his generals the same implicit obedience he exacted from his corporals. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg because he allowed his second in command to argue instead of marching.*¹²

The reference, of course, is to Longstreet's failure to move out promptly as ordered on the second day at Gettysburg when the outcome still hung in the balance. Others have faulted Lee for his tolerance, and Lee himself remarked that "The greatest difficulty I find is in causing orders and regulations to be obeyed."¹³

On the opposing side in the Civil War, General Ulysses S. Grant, architect of ultimate victory for the North, was speaking of himself when he declared: "For a soldier, his duties are plain. He is to obey the orders of all those placed over him, and whip the enemy wherever he meets him."¹⁴

In a letter to Congressman Washburne before the Battle of Shiloh, Grant wrote:

*So long as I hold a commission in the army I have no views of my own to carry out. Whatever may be the orders of my superiors and the law, I will execute. No man can be efficient as a commander who sets his own notions above law and those whom he has sworn to obey. When Congress enacts anything too odious for me to execute, I will resign.*¹⁵

Failure to follow this fundamental



U.S. Army

Grant



U.S. Army

MacArthur



Truman

dictum of Grant's led directly to General Douglas MacArthur's abrupt relief from command by President Truman. MacArthur, one of the greatest soldiers in our history, on this one occasion signally failed in the duty of a soldier; he continued his argument past the point of his commander's final decision in a military matter. He locked horns with a man who, though his essential military experience had ceased two wars earlier in the grade of captain, was, nevertheless, now his commander in chief. A lesser President than Harry S. Truman might have backed off from a showdown with so formidable a figure as America's foremost soldier, a man with more years in the grade of general than most could count in their entire careers from first commissioning to final retirement.

But, in this historic confrontation, the former captain from Missouri showed that he understood, better than did the legendary general, that simple formula of the Roman centurion, that straightforward soldier's code so well expressed by Grant. Truman, like Stonewall Jackson and Archidamus of Sparta, insisted upon a "single discipline" for his military command. He recognized, as MacArthur strangely for once did not, that when a subordinate commander had—to use the homely expression—grown too big for his breeches, that subordinate, no matter how experienced or how exalted, had to step down. While there may be many who take issue with the abruptness of manner in Truman's relieving so highly honored and justly famed a warrior as Douglas MacArthur, none may fault him for the deed itself. By his own actions, General MacArthur had left his President no other choice but to remove him from command.



Rommel

U.S. Army

Nearly a century after Grant's letter to Congressman Washburne, the outstanding German tank commander of World War II was to comment succinctly on a point related—though in markedly different circumstances—to both Grant's dictum and the Truman-MacArthur conflict. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, remarking on his reaction to Hitler's futile "hold or die" order at El Alamein, said: "I had always demanded unconditional obedience from others and, consequently, wished to apply the same principle to myself."¹⁶

Commenting, before his death, on



Montgomery

At. Comantoir

the orderly withdrawal of his forces across North Africa before the overwhelming pressure of superior Allied armies, Rommel noted the constancy of German discipline:

*From my officers, I demanded the utmost self-denial and a continual personal example, and as a result, the army had a magnificent esprit de corps. There was never any surrender due to apathy or fatigue. Discipline was always maintained and never had to be enforced even in the most terrible situations.*¹⁷

Rommel's British opponent in North Africa, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, whose honors include the title "of Alamein" in recognition of his victory there, remarked on the importance of discipline in connection with the advances in modern weaponry:

*As extensions became wider in the face of the increased power of small-arms fire, so the soldier might often be separated from his comrades; when this happens fear appears; hence the importance of discipline, the object of which is the conquest of fear.*¹⁸

Another outstanding British military leader of World War II, who fought in the jungles of Burma against an environment of the most hostile nature as well as an enemy which outnumbered him, was Field Marshal Viscount William Slim. In his book, *Defeat Into Victory*, he commented at length on discipline:

... discipline means that every man, when things pass beyond his own authority or initiative, knows to whom to turn for further direction. If it is the right kind of discipline he turns in the confidence that he will get sensible and effective direction. Every step must be taken to build up this confidence of the soldier in his leaders. . . .

The raising of the standard of discipline throughout the army, which, especially in many of the newly formed units, had deteriorated, was taken vigorously in hand by all commanders. . . . In the Fourteenth Army we expected soldiers to salute officers — and officers to salute in return— both in mutual confidence and respect. I encouraged all officers to insist wherever possible . . . on good turnout and personal cleanliness. It takes courage, especially for a young officer, to check a man met on the road for not saluting properly or for slovenly appearance, but, every time he does, it adds to his stock of moral courage, and whatever the soldier may say he has a respect for the officer who does put him up. . . .

*With growing confidence in the possibility of defeating the Japanese, the lift that the establishment of Southeast Asia Command gave our hopes, and the rapid improvement in discipline, the intellectual foundations of morale were laid. . . .*¹⁹

Slim's remarks on the importance of the outward signs of discipline, and his emphasis on personal cleanliness and smart appearance, bring to mind at once the close parallel with the Third Army of General George S. Patton. That flamboyant commander and stern disciplinarian insisted, in the worst winter conditions of mud and snow, on a daily change of socks by every soldier—with the result that trench foot, that crippler of many units, had little effect in Third Army. Almost a fanatic on those outward signs of discipline—saluting, polished vehicles, creased trousers and neckties—he molded an army stamped in his own image. It was the finest fighting force in Europe.

In a final section of his book, called "Afterthoughts," Field Marshal Slim



U.S. Army

Slim

makes the most telling and eloquent argument of all for a high standard of discipline in any military force:

The more modern war becomes, the more essential appear the basic qualities that from the beginning of history have distinguished armies from mobs. The first of these is discipline. We very soon learned in Burma that strict discipline in battle and in bivouac was vital, not only for success, but for survival. Nothing is easier in jungle or dispersed fighting than for a man to shirk. If he has no stomach for advancing, all he has to do is to flop into the undergrowth; in retreat,



U.S. Army

Patton

DISCIPLINE AND OBEDIENCE

he can slink out of the rear guard, join up later, and swear he was the last to leave. A patrol leader can take his men a mile into the jungle, hide there, and return with any report he fancies. Only discipline—not punishment—can stop that sort of thing; the real discipline that a man holds to because it is a refusal to betray his comrades. The discipline that makes a sentry, whose whole body is tortured for sleep, rest his chin on the point of his bayonet because he knows, if he nods, he risks the lives of the men sleeping behind him. It is only discipline, too, that can enforce the precautions against disease, irksome as they are, without which an army would shrivel away. At some stage in all wars armies have let their discipline sag, but they have never won victory until they made it taut again; nor will they. We found it a great mistake to belittle the importance of smartness in turnout, alertness of carriage, cleanliness of person, saluting, or precision of movement, and to dismiss them as naive, unintelligent parade-ground stuff. I do not believe that troops can have unshakable battle discipline without showing those outward and formal signs, which mark the pride men take in themselves and their units and the mutual confidence and respect that exist between them and their officers. It was our experience in a tough school that the best fighting units, in the long run, were not necessarily those with the most advertised reputations, but those who when they came out of battle at once resumed a more formal discipline and appearance.²⁰

There is little else that can be said on the subject of discipline after so cogent an argument by so experienced and competent a commander. It remains only to leave a small reminder

Army News Photo Features



Ridgway

of what discipline can accomplish.

Major Burton F. Hood, writing some years ago in the *Military Review*, warned that:

In our haste to achieve weapons superiority over our potential enemy, there is a constant danger that we may overlook the ability of small groups of determined men to decide great issues by bold exploit.

Napoleon spoke to a similar point when he commented:

How many things have appeared impossible, which nevertheless have been done by resolute men who had no other recourse than death!

And General Matthew B. Ridgway has said:

There is still one absolute weapon . . . the only weapon capable of operating with complete effectiveness—of dominating every inch of terrain where human beings live and fight, and of doing it under all conditions of light and darkness, heat and cold, desert and forest, mountain and plain. That weapon is man himself.


Those are stirring words, and the pages of history bear eloquent testimony with numerous examples of their truth. But, for those words to have

meaning, for those examples to have been realized in the past or to occur again in the future, there has always been, and there always will be, one essential ingredient in the makeup of the military organization and of its individual members: DISCIPLINE.

As we strive to build an all-volunteer force, let us bear that fact in mind and never permit any unwise

relaxation of our disciplinary standards which might ultimately result in jeopardizing the safety of our country and its people in this uncertain world.

Our leaders at all levels of command must understand and foster a high sense of discipline, *that one indispensable quality which is a sure foundation for an effective and reliable military force.*



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A CENTO for the 1970s

Colonel Sammy J. Cannon, United States Army

IN THE current age of détente, it seems as if the whole world is in a state of flux. This state of change is particularly noticeable in the relations between the US and its allies. President Nixon, in declaring 1973 as the year of Europe, hoped to reshape the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to meet the changing conditions in the world. Elsewhere, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) has been blamed, in part, for the US involvement in the Republic of Vietnam, and there are powerful voices crying for US withdrawal. In such a climate, it is surprising that little or nothing has been said about another member of our security system, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a little-known defense pact designed to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East.

CENTO, in case everyone has forgotten, consists of the Middle Eastern countries of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, together with the United Kingdom and the United States.* Starting out originally as the Baghdad Pact, the alliance was moved from Baghdad to An-

kara and given its present name in 1959. This precipitous change was caused by the withdrawal of Iraq from the Pact following a revolution in that country in 1958.

Today, in spite of the October War, the Arab oil embargo, or the threat of Soviet expansion into the Indian Ocean, few strategists consider or even acknowledge the existence of CENTO. It is as if the alliance did not exist. Perennially, questions arise in Congress, among the military and even between members of CENTO regarding its value and contribution. These questions are usually answered by statements like "The alliance doesn't hurt anything so why change it," or "Why not maintain the status quo," or, further, "Don't disturb the situation." These answers have sufficed for years, and CENTO has continued down its anonymous path. With all the changes taking place, it is apparent that the situation in the Middle East is not that of the past decade. A shortage of oil has strained Western economies; the Soviets are increasing their influence and presence in the Red Sea-Indian Ocean areas; the Middle Eastern members are more favorably disposed toward the US; and the Middle East has

* The United States is not a member of the Central Treaty Organization but does participate fully as an observer in activities of the various countries of the alliance.

emerged as the area of major import during the 1970s.

With the current climate in the Middle East, it appears an opportune time for a change has arrived—an opportunity that the US must not lose! The US must find a way to secure continued access to Persian Gulf oil; it must counter the growing presence of the Soviets in the region; and it must have freedom of action for its military forces in the area. These needs cannot be accomplished easily without increasing US interest and involvement in CENTO.

Background

Since 1960, CENTO has been oriented more to the political and economic side than toward mutual defense, and the organization of the alliance reflects this direction. CENTO did not develop a force structure or sophis-



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
ticated military command system like that of NATO. In fact, none of the members have dedicated forces committed to CENTO. Since there is no command apparatus for the alliance, guidance is provided through the Military Committee, a group consisting of the senior military chiefs of each country (the US is represented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs). The member governments have provided a skeleton staff consisting of five officers from each country responsible for the planning and conducting of combined military exercises and the development of contingency planning for regional defense. Although the staff is skeletal in nature, it is prepared to act as the cadre of a headquarters of a supreme military command of CENTO.

In parallel with its orientation, most of the accomplishments of the Central Treaty Organization have been economic, albeit with significant military application. As late as 1962, William Carter wrote in *The Royal Air Forces Quarterly* that, in the CENTO region:

Rugged mountainous terrain forms a natural barrier against Russian penetration but by the same token and particularly due to the lack of good lateral communications, it handicaps coordinated defensive efforts between Turkish and Iranian forces.

Since that was written, highways have been built, railroads constructed and communication networks established, all economic measures which have provided a stronger military integration of the region. Under the auspices of CENTO, the port facilities of Iskenderun and Trabzon in Turkey have been developed to provide terminals for the CENTO rail and highway systems, thus giving both Iran and Pakistan more direct service to Europe.

On the military side, there has been con-



siderable progress toward strengthening the armed forces of the three Middle Eastern countries and ties between the US military forces and their counterparts in the alliance. Currently, with a combined military force of over one million, the regional members could defend themselves against any likely aggressor except the Soviet Union. To enhance this military potential further, the CENTO-sponsored training program is based on the conduct of combined exercises in the region. This annual program includes combined maritime maneuvers in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea, air defense exercises, war games, small arms competitions and air search-and-rescue exercises. Such training provides the member countries with

opportunities to understand each other's methods of operation and provides a forum for developing standardization techniques between the forces.

Although originally created to deter Soviet aggression against the strategic Middle East, the Central Treaty Organization has done much more. There has been no direct Soviet aggression in the area in the past 28 years. Even though in recent years there has been a lessening of the outward manifestation of the Soviet/Communist threat, the continued presence of the military shield of CENTO provides a bulwark behind which the regional countries are able to progress economically, politically and culturally. If CENTO is a good thing, then the

question begs—why change it? The why appears when one looks at the countries of the alliance, the problems that besiege them and their changing relations to one another.

Climate for Change

Since its inception, CENTO has been under attack from first one side and then another. One group would criticize it for lack of "teeth," another group would cry "obsolete," and still a third would charge "imperialist." From time to time, its supporters would be detractors and its critics, supporters—all dependent on conditions having little to do with the alliance itself. In fact, because of these conditions, a kind of paralysis existed during the past 10 years which, in turn, provided little incentive for change. The causes of such a paralysis are easy to see in hindsight.

During the 1960s, not only had the USSR penetrated the CENTO barrier, but it also established a strong presence throughout the Arab world, particularly in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Furthermore, it countered the US in the Mediterranean with a flotilla comparable to that of the Sixth Fleet. In a very short time, the Soviet Union had become a major power in the Middle East in spite of CENTO.

During the same period, the alliance's regional members became more and more concerned about neighbors other than the Soviet Union. Turkey spent the better part of a decade in a confrontation posture with Greece over the Cyprus dispute; Iran demonstrated great anxiety about Iraq and the safety of its southern oil fields; and Pakistan engaged in two wars with India, the last resulting in the loss of East Pakistan. While the Middle East members were occupied with neighborhood quarrels, the remaining member was no less concerned

with things other than CENTO. The United Kingdom (UK) with its chronic economic problems, continued to withdraw into itself and, in 1971, removed the last vestiges of its strength in the Persian Gulf.

The US, deeply involved in the Vietnam War, spent much of the time trying to act as referee to keep the regional countries from fighting with their neighbors. For instance, following the Cyprus crisis of 1964, the US leaned heavily upon Turkey to prevent its military intervention in Cyprus. This move naturally rankled the Turks, and, for the remainder of the 1960s, a strong anti-American current ran throughout the country. On the other side of the region, the US attempted to halt the 1965 war between Pakistan and India by withholding military supplies from Pakistan and declaring support for neither side. This upset the Pakistanis so much that they almost dropped out of CENTO, becoming in reality a "de jure" member only.

Iran, on the other hand, wanted to redirect the alliance toward the south since it perceived the threat to the region to be from the Arabs, particularly Egypt and Iraq, not the Soviet Union. In 1967, Iran made a \$110 million purchase of arms from Russia in exchange for natural gas and oil.

It is of little wonder that, for the past decade, the most that could be expected from CENTO has been along the lines of regional economic development, with the US an interested, but not too active, participant. Has the situation changed? First, conditions affecting the three regional members are different. In Turkey, the Cyprus question appeared for a time to become dormant, and, with the death of the Greek Cypriot leader Grivas, there was even talk of a settlement between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus. Unfortunately, this seemingly benign atmosphere was shattered

with the overthrow of the Cypriot Government and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by the Turks. Although this chain of events may eventually lead to a final solution to the Cyprus question, there currently is a paucity of support for the Turks in the halls of the US Congress. At the same time, the US Government's hands-off policy and the ongoing attempts to continue support to Turkey in spite of the opposition in Congress have done much to overcome the residual anti-American feeling in Turkey—a direct result of the earlier heavy-handed approach toward the Turks during the 1964-67 confrontation over Cyprus. Even today, Turkey's dual commitment to NATO and CENTO make it the staunchest ally the US has in the Middle East.

With the loss of its eastern province in the war with India in 1972, Pakistan was weakened considerably vis-à-vis India. Two developments of that war, however, have significant impact on Pakistan and its position within CENTO. US support of Pakistan during the 1972 war helped offset the animosity created by US "neutralism" in previous Indo-Pakistani encounters. Secondly, the loss of Bangladesh caused Pakistan to turn away from South Asian affairs and look to the Muslim Middle East for its future. A third factor bearing on Pakistan's future role in CENTO is the growing Soviet presence in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The USSR, the principal supporter and military supplier of India, is developing as a significant threat to Pakistan from the south. India, of course, remains the primary threat from the east, and, as Afghanistan becomes more a client state of the Soviets, they are threatened from still another direction.

Iran, with the departure of the UK, has exerted much effort toward preventing any outside power from gaining influence in the

Persian Gulf region. It has significantly increased its military strength in the Gulf and has declared itself to be the protector of the Strait of Hormuz. Although Iran is the strongest economically of the three regional countries, it too relies on the US to help keep the Soviets out of the Persian Gulf and to prevent Soviet hegemony along the Southern Arabian Peninsula. As recently as February 1974, the Shah of Iran stated that while Iran could maintain stability in the Persian Gulf, the Shah would look to the US to counter any Soviet intervention into that area.

Since 1948, each new outbreak of hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors has found the US and the Soviet Union becoming more polarized on opposite sides. Slowly, the moderate Arab states and the US have pulled further apart over the question of US support for Israel. As a result of the 1973 Mid-East War, it appeared that the US had finally lost its remaining prestige and influence in the Arab world. Secretary Kissinger, however, dramatically healed that split with his peace efforts between Egypt, Syria and Israel. These efforts, ever so bright in the beginning, are once again flickering. If these peace maneuvers fail completely, then the backlash of Arab hostility toward the US could become even more severe than that experienced in the early days of the October War. Even at best, if some settlement is reached between the Arabs and Israelis, the chances of the US gaining its former position among the moderate Arab states is still remote, particularly since any kind of settlement will be contingent on some form of US guarantee of Israel's borders.

Although by 1967 the USSR had achieved parity with the US with regard to naval strength in the Mediterranean, its success with the countries of the Mediterranean lit-

toral has not been as great. In fact, it could be said that, in spite of massive amounts of military and economic aid, USSR influence and prestige in the Mediterranean region has diminished over the past 10 years. On the other hand, the USSR has made significant inroads recently in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Soviet expansion includes a modern Russian-built port at Hodeida, Yemen; a strong Soviet presence with military aid in Aden and South Yemen; Soviet construction of a new port at Berbera in the Somali Republic; Soviet fishing rights and the use of the Port Louis facilities in Mauritius; Soviet assistance in the construction of an Indian Navy base at Vishakhapatnam, India; and a new (1972) treaty of cooperation and mutual support with Iraq. In short, while becoming less of a threat to NATO's southern flank, the Soviets are busy encircling the CENTO region. It is apparent that the Soviets are determined to become the major power in the Indian Ocean.

The last factor for change is the effect of oil from the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf on the security of the Western nations. The disruption of the oil flow from this region during the October-December 1973 period caused severe repercussions throughout the Western World. The slowly integrating European economic community became a center of disunity. Even the bonds of mutual security binding the NATO countries together became very elastic. The major lesson from the oil crisis is that the oil from this region is, in reality, the jugular vein of Western security. The US must ensure that this flow of oil to Western Europe is not interrupted for at least the next decade.

It is believed that, for the US, the 1970s will be the decade of the Middle East as the 1960s were for Southeast Asia. As the US

turns to the Middle East after a decade or more of neglect, opportunities and threats appear that did not exist before. Disharmony between the US and the regional members of CENTO has been reduced considerably; the region itself is more closely aligned and integrated; the Soviets are rapidly expanding around the CENTO region and the rich oil reserves of the area; and oil has emerged as a major factor in the equation of security for the West. The question remaining, however, is how the US can best use the CENTO alliance to protect its interests in the Middle East and counter the Soviet threat to the Indian Ocean.

A New Image for CENTO

As the US turns toward a decade of involvement with the Middle East, it is faced with a multiplicity of problems. First and foremost, there is a vital need to ensure that the US, Western Europe and Japan have unrestricted access to the oil resources of the area, particularly those of the Persian Gulf. Second, some way must be found to counter the rapidly growing Soviet presence along the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and in the Indian Ocean. This Soviet threat may become even more acute if and when the Suez Canal becomes available to the Soviets. Lastly, the US needs some new means through which it can obtain ready access to the area in the event of contingencies, particularly since its continuing commitment to Israel has further limited US freedom of action in the Middle East. In spite of this dark outlook, there is a feasible, viable alternative available which can provide solutions to the above problems with a minimum cost to the US—CENTO!

Throughout 1973, public pronouncements by the US have emphasized the continuing need for alliances as a requirement for détente. It is not foolhardy, then, to propose

to continue CENTO, nor is it foolish to talk of militarily strengthening the alliance. For a number of years after the alliance was formed, both Iran and Pakistan proposed that CENTO be strengthened into a NATO-type organization. The US opposed this, insisting that the military role of the alliance be restricted to planning for exercises and regional defense.

It is now time for the US to reverse its position and propose a set of new initiatives for CENTO. In order to make these initiatives credible to the other members, the US must take the lead and offer the following:

- The US should provide a supreme commander for the alliance along the lines of NATO. The skeleton staff to support this commander could be formed from an expanded combined military planning staff. Such an action by the US would demonstrate our resolve and would make the alliance more militarily realistic.

- The US should commit naval forces to CENTO. These forces, joined by forces from other CENTO members, would serve to counterbalance the Soviet naval fleet operating in the area. This military commitment to CENTO would demonstrate our determination to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean and would provide protection to the southern part of the CENTO region. If the US naval contingent could be homeported in Karachi, it would provide easy access to the Persian Gulf and concurrently strengthen US-Pakistan relations. Up to now, the only permanent US military presence in the area has been a small naval force with headquarters in Bahrain; however, as a result of the 1973 Mid-East War, the US was told to evacuate this facility. If the US were to provide naval forces to CENTO, this would alleviate the need for the Bahrain operation; it would enforce the growing US naval facilities at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean;

and it would provide a credible balance to the expanding Soviet presence.

- While US naval forces would be the only military elements committed to CENTO, US air and ground forces should also be involved in CENTO activities. The US should offer to participate with air and ground forces in the various CENTO exercises and maneuvers. Although such maneuvers and exercises take place annually, the last time the US ground troops were actually involved in a CENTO exercise was in 1964. US ground force participation since that time has been minimal.

The changing climate in the CENTO countries, the restraints that now exist, and the new threats looming on the horizon present a signal challenge. The US, however, is in the advantageous position of having a response to this challenge available for the asking. Moreover, if the steps outlined above are taken to increase US participation in CENTO, our position will be strengthened. The increased American presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area would be an indicator of US determination to maintain the flow of oil to its allies. If the US achieves parity with the Soviets, this balance should provide invaluable assistance in halting Soviet expansion in the area and could, as in the Mediterranean, even reverse the trend. The increased involvement in CENTO will provide the US much easier access to the Middle East in case US military forces are required in the area. Furthermore, this increased close-working relationship with the member nations should significantly strengthen our friendship with the Turks, the Iranians and the Pakistanis.

At the moment, the Persian Gulf nations hold the key to the future security of the West. The US must make certain that its military policies assure continued access to this most vital area.

■



"FIGHTIN' MEANS KILLIN' "

Colonel William R. Brooksher, United States Air Force
and"

Captain David K. Snider, United States Air Force

CAPITULATION of the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg was the principal objective of Union forces in the West in the autumn of 1862. Grant's army, joined later by Sherman's forces, applied the major pressure. Moving through west central Mississippi, Grant was steadily pressing Pemberton's back against Vicksburg and the river. By 20 November, the pressure was so great that Pemberton called on Bragg for help.

Positioned east of the Tennessee River, Bragg did not send reinforcements but told Pemberton he would use cavalry to create a diversion behind Grant. This force would strike the Union communication and supply line that paralleled the Mississippi Central Railroad across west Tennessee. To lead the cavalry force, Bragg

selected Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Forrest, totally lacking military background and education, had already proven to be an effective and tenacious leader. His lack of formal military training was offset by an instinctive ability to grasp a military problem and quickly divine its solution. He had little but contempt for textbook fighters and expressed it by saying, "Whenever I met one of them fellers who fit by note, I gen'ally whupped hell out of him before he pitched the tune." He inspired both fear and devotion in his troops. This, coupled with audacity and unorthodox methods, enabled him to wreak havoc with Union commanders sent against him.

These same traits led Bragg to conclude that Forrest had little potential

other than as a raider. Consequently, he had been shifted about and consistently given raw, poorly trained and equipped troops to command. As often as not, he was forced to recruit and equip his own force. This was the case with his current cavalry brigade consisting of Russell's 4th Alabama, Bille's 9th Tennessee, Starnes' 4th Tennessee, Dibrell's 8th Tennessee and Freeman's battery. All, except the Alabamians and the artillery, were green troops armed mainly with shot-guns and flintlock muskets and critically short of percussion caps for weapons that used them.

When Bragg ordered this force into west Tennessee in early December, Forrest objected—his troops were raw and had not been provided adequate arms and equipment. His objection was ignored by a peremptory order from Bragg to "move without delay." Forrest accepted the order, but thought it was mad. He was convinced that the order to cross a wide river in midwinter, patrolled by gunboats, to engage a vastly superior enemy force was a deliberate attempt to sacrifice his command. But Forrest was neither a fool nor a martyr. Anticipating Bragg's action, he had dispatched men into west Tennessee. Part were to determine Union strength and disposition, some were to build two ferries to cross the Tennessee, and one "citizen" was instructed to "liberate" the needed percussion caps from Union stores at Memphis. On 11 December, Forrest moved toward the river.

On the 10th, Rosecrans had wired Grant, "Tell the authorities along the road to look out for Forrest." This word was quickly passed to Dodge at Corinth, Davies at Columbus and Sullivan at Jackson. In addition, Forts Donelson and Henry and forces in Kentucky were warned.

Rain and low lying fog blanketed the Tennessee River Valley when Forrest arrived at Clifton on the 15th. A number of troopers were quickly dispatched up and down the river to huddle in the freezing rain and cloying fog while they kept watch for gunboats. The remaining force immediately started boarding the two ferries. It was an agonizingly slow crossing. Each boat could hold only 25 horses and men. To cope with the strong current, the boats had to be taken upstream each trip and crossed at an angle, pioneer-style. Finally, on the 17th, all 2100 rebels were on the western bank and the boats were sunk for concealment and later use. The force then moved 8 miles inland where, for the first time in two days, the cold, miserable graybacks built fires and dried out. Here, the citizen who had gone to Memphis met them with 50,000 percussion caps.

Despite their preventive efforts, the gray force's activity had been observed. On the day the crossing started, Sullivan wired Grant, "Forrest's cavalry . . . are crossing the Tennessee River at Clifton today." Grant quickly ordered reinforcements to Jackson to support Sullivan and asked for additional forces from Forts Henry, Donelson and Heiman. Sullivan ordered a column of cavalry, infantry and artillery, under Colonel Ingersoll, forward to meet the invaders. Cut off by the river to his rear and surrounded by superior forces, Forrest should have been easy prey, but the Union Army quickly discovered he was not.

The next morning the rebels made contact with the leading elements of Ingersoll's column. The Union force fell back immediately and took up a strong position in some woods behind Beech Creek which crossed the road



leading into the town of Lexington. They rendered the creek impassable by tearing up the flooring of its single bridge.

Forrest's Alabamians, led by Major Gurley, arrived at the creek first to find the 2d Tennessee drawn up on the opposite shore waiting for them. Gurley's men quickly concentrated heavy fire on the Union force and drove it back into the woods. The bridge floor was replaced using fence rails, and the graybacks moved to the attack. Meeting heavy fire from the blue artillery, Forrest decided against a direct assault. Instead, he put Freeman's battery into action against the Federal cannon, sent the Alabamians to the right, and made a demonstration of attacking from the front.

The Alabamians used the cover of a ravine to move to the immediate rear of the Union artillery which was now protected by the 2d Tennessee. A rebel charge completely routed the

Tennessee troops, and Gurley was on top of the Union battery almost before they saw him. With a wild rebel yell, the Alabamians rode them down even though the blue artillerymen died by their guns, their last round killing Gurley's first sergeant when he was within 15 feet of the cannon's muzzle. The loss of the artillery ended the fight. The Union surrendered about 150 men (including Ingersoll), 70 horses and two pieces of artillery.

The Federal commander was overwhelmed at his misfortune. He told Forrest:

I thought I was a soldier, but you surrounded and captured me before I knew what it was all about. I'm not a soldier, and I'm not going to try to be.

One of Forrest's troopers put it this way, "Ingersoll made a good fight but if he really believed that there is no hell we convinced him that there was something mightily like it."

Reports to Grant grossly overestimated the size of the Confederate force. They credited Forrest with as many as 10,000 men; some even suggested that he had been joined by Cheatham's division. Unimpressed by the reports and acutely aware of the danger Forrest posed, Grant was determined to stop him. He ordered Dodge north from Corinth and told Lowe to take 1500 men from Forts Henry and Heiman and attack the rebels. Brayman arrived in Jackson to bolster Sullivan who wired Grant he could hold against 10,000 and go out and whip 5000. Grant responded by telling him, "Don't fail to get up a force and attack the enemy. Never wait to have them attack you." Sage advice which Sullivan failed to heed.

The rebels pushed on rapidly from Lexington, sweeping up stragglers as they went, and arrived in the vicinity of Jackson just before dark. Forrest knew he was in danger and was determined to hold Sullivan in the city. He had no intention of attacking Jackson but wanted Sullivan to believe otherwise. To accomplish this, Forrest immediately set about convincing the Union general he was faced by an overwhelming force. Troops marched back and forth in the enemy's sight, kettle drums were beaten at various locations to suggest infantry movements, hundreds of extra campfires were lighted, and no opportunity overlooked to exaggerate the size of the force to local civilians or to prisoners deliberately allowed to escape. Sullivan held his position and braced for an attack. About 8 o'clock that night, convinced that Sullivan was frozen in position, Forrest struck in two directions.

Baffle and Cox raced south to destroy the railroads leading to Corinth and Bolivar. They reached their ob-

jectives in a few hours and encountered practically no resistance as they tore up large sections of track, destroyed bridges and culverts and repeatedly cut telegraph lines. The only incident that marred their trip was that the break in the road to Bolivar came too late to prevent Fuller's brigade from joining Sullivan.

Meanwhile, Dibrell charged north in the covering darkness and hit Carroll Station at a gallop just at daybreak. The hard riding Tennesseans chose a moving train as their first target but could not stop it even by pelting it from engine to caboose with heavy fire. The train lost, they swung back toward the station and charged its stockade on foot. It took only a few minutes for the defenders to decide that the graybacks were too much for them. After only token resistance, the 101 Union soldiers turned themselves over to the attackers. The rebels quickly converted all they could carry to their own use and put the stockade to the torch. The railroad and telegraph lines were torn up for some distance in both directions. Within 36 hours, both forces had rejoined Forrest.

Reinforced by Fuller, Sullivan now decided to probe forward with six regiments led by Colonel Englemann. This force was instantly in trouble. Forrest caught them in an artillery crossfire, and the Union force quickly fell back although Englemann rather petulantly observed that they did so ". . . without having first obtained any orders from me to that effect." They soon received such orders, however, as Forrest, keeping up the pretense of a general assault, drove them back into Jackson. Once again, Sullivan girded for an attack that never came. Finally, on the morning of the 20th, confused and tired of waiting,



Sullivan decided to mount a full-scale attack against the rebel force. Leaving 2000 men to guard Jackson, he reached eastward, but Forrest had vanished.

While Sullivan waited for the expected attack the previous night, Forrest was on the move. Using the 4th Alabama as a rear guard, he marched north to Spring Creek and spent a portion of the night waiting for his separated force to regroup. All arrived by daybreak. Now, Forrest split them again. Dibrell was ordered to destroy the stockade on Forked Deer Creek, Starnes to take Humboldt, Biffle to get in the rear of Trenton while Forrest attacked from the front, and Russell again covered the rear.

As Sullivan groped fruitlessly to the east on the 20th, the ill wind that was cooling Yankee fortunes rose to hurricane force. As Forrest's men fanned out to the north, Van Dorn struck a body blow in the south. Charging out of the predawn dark-

ness, his cavalymen rode over the huge Union supply depot at Holly Springs. By nightfall, they had completely destroyed it and tied down a strong Union force that could have been used against Forrest. Meanwhile, Forrest was obliterating the Union line of communication through Tennessee.

Dibrell moved quickly to Forked Deer Creek intent on destroying its bridge and stockade. Again, he met a train, but, this time, it was filled with Union soldiers who were disposed to fight. Dibrell's troopers managed to fire one volley into it before it moved across the bridge and unloaded the troops. They quickly took cover in a wooded area and laid down such effective fire that the rebels had to leave the bridge. Turning to the stockade, they found it also a tough nut to crack. Boggy ground kept Morton from bringing his guns into action, and a spirited defense prevented a successful assault without artillery.

FIGHTIN' MEANS KILLIN'

Recognizing the futility of pursuing a hopeless effort, Dibrell retreated to rejoin the column.

At 1 o'clock, Starnes hit Humboldt like a summer storm. His thundering charge into the town was so sudden and overwhelming that the Union force surrendered with hardly a shot fired. Starnes' bag consisted of 100 prisoners, four caissons, 500 arms, 300,000 rounds of ammunition and large stores of supplies. In keeping with their pattern, the rebels took what they could carry and put the remainder to the torch. This included a magazine that provided a splendid display of fireworks. Again, the railroad, culverts and telegraph lines were destroyed. Starnes then hastened north to rejoin his leader.


Forrest arrived at Trenton at 3 o'clock and charged without preamble. The Union force, under Colonel Fry, was waiting this time, barricaded behind cotton bales and hogsheads of tobacco with sharpshooters posted on the tops of buildings. They let such a hail of lead fly into the charging rebels that Forrest immediately broke off the attack. Not one to risk men uselessly, he started dispersing his force to surround the town and ordered up the artillery. Before it got into position, Biddle arrived and completed the action to surround Fry. Rebel sharpshooters kept the bluecoats occupied until Freeman could position his artillery. He chose a depot in the center of the barricaded area as his target. Three quick rounds from the field pieces smashing through this area convinced Fry, and the white flag went up. With Trenton, Forrest took 250 prisoners, 13 wagons, 7 caissons, 20,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 400,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, a large number of horses and mules and a considerable

store of supplies. As his world crumbled around him, Fry offered his sword to Forrest commenting that it had been in his family 40 years. Forrest examined it, then handed it back saying, "Take back your sword, Colonel, as it is a family relic; but I hope, sir, the next time you wear it, it will not be against your own people."

North of Spring Creek, Russell's rear guard waited like a spider on its web for any pursuing force. Late in the forenoon, their prey, in the form of an infantry column out of Jackson, cautiously crossed the stream. Without warning, Russell's force, half as infantry and half as cavalry, pounced on the bluecoated foot soldiers. The swarm of yelling rebels led by a sheet of deadly fire was too much for the startled pursuers. They panicked and fell back across the creek burning the single bridge behind them. Russell waited on the opposite shore until darkness, then slipped northward to join his leader. Sullivan promptly upped his estimate of Forrest's strength to 20,000.

While his lieutenants joined up one by one through the night, Forrest held Trenton, re-equipped the remainder of his force and continued to practice the fine art of deception. He now had almost 1200 prisoners which he determined to parole. As this process was going on, he loudly instructed "couriers" to tell various "generals" to bring up their "commands." Again, extra campfires were built, and detachments of troops were marched about with the net result that all the parolees were convinced that Forrest had an extremely large force at his command. Before the night had ended, all of Forrest's commanders had rejoined him, and Napier had arrived with an additional 430 troops.

With Sullivan minimized as a threat



because of his own indecisiveness and inflated estimate of his opposition, Forrest was keenly interested in intimidating Davies and his 5000 troops at Columbus. Davies accommodated him by being as susceptible as Sullivan to Forrest's deceptions. Davies was convinced that it was really Bragg who was approaching and had no intention of leaving Columbus. In fact, as time passed, he became so nervous that he started loading \$13 million worth of supplies on boats, dug a network of trenches, and ordered the commander of Island No. 10 to spike his guns and destroy the ammunition.

Daybreak on the 21st saw the Confederates in action again. The stores at Trenton, after having been systematically looted to equip the raiders, were destroyed, and the rebels again moved north. It was a greatly changed force now. Every man was completely equipped, courtesy of the Union Army, and their number had actually increased since crossing the river.

The rebel line of march followed the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. In turn, Rutherford Station, Kenton, Union City and, finally, Moscow, Kentucky fell before the gray tide. As they marched, the rebels systematically and thoroughly destroyed the railroad. A common statement heard during the war was that railroads destroyed by cavalry were back in operation almost before the hoofbeats died away. No such accusation could be leveled at Forrest's men. When they left a railroad, it took new rails, ties, bridges, culverts and a lot of work to put it back into use.

On the 24th, the rebels arrived at the Obion River bottoms. Here, the Mobile and Ohio had some 15 miles of bridges and trestles snaking their way through the swampy bottom land. Arming his men with impressed axes, Starnes assaulted the railroad. It proved a formidable challenge. The gray riders slogged about hip deep in mud and slimy water in freezing cold

while they hacked sway at timbers "as hard as horn with axes as dull as froes." To aid their efforts, they split wood and built fires around supporting timbers and on trestles caked with ice and sleet. Before night fell, the cold, muddy troopers had the satisfaction of seeing the great trestle topple over into the frigid swamp. That same evening, Forrest received word that 10,000 troops were moving to cut off his retreat and that a sizable force under General Haynie was nearing Union City.

Despite this disquieting news, Forrest decided to give his men a day of rest. The 25th was spent in relaxation. The troops loafed through the day, lounging around fires, idling away the hours smoking, drinking coffee and swapping stories. Their commander wandered about among them telling jokes, praising their efforts and making certain that they knew he had seen and appreciated all they had done. When darkness fell on that Christmas Day, it blanketed a proud rebel force, filled with confidence, ready to tackle anything in its way. The next day, they would have to get out of west Tennessee—if they could.

On the 26th, Forrest turned southeast to avoid Haynie. A bone chilling rain fell through the day, turning already miserable roads into almost impassable quagmires. Nevertheless, the raiders made 26 miles and destroyed an important bridge on the Paducah branch of the railroad. At nightfall, they were in Dresden where they halted for the night, waiting for word from scouts that had swept the country during the day.


Forrest's intelligence clearly showed that the stumbling Union juggernaut had finally gained purposeful motion. Lowe was waiting for him to the north; gunboats were covering the

river up as far as Clifton; all ferries had been destroyed; the bridges from Paris south to Jackson had been destroyed and strong forces were on guard at all crossings; Dodge was moving north from Corinth to block Forrest if he moved south; and Sullivan had Dunham and Fuller underway from Trenton to hit the rebel flank. A blue noose had been spread around the raiders. All that remained was to jerk it tight.

At 11:00 p.m. on the 27th, Dunham pulled out of Trenton with 1800 men followed at daybreak by Fuller, accompanied by Sullivan and Haynie, with 2000 men. The Union commanders, certain that Forrest would attempt to cross the Tennessee at Reynoldsburg, were intent on striking a paralyzing blow to his flank. But, on the morning of the 27th, Forrest moved southeast instead of east and, at dark, went into camp above a branch of the Obion near McKenzie and just above the Union line of march. The raiders held this position through the night while Dunham passed by on the other side, headed east.

At sundown on the 28th, Forrest pulled his force up on the bank of the Obion that separated him from the Union force. Here, an old bridge, so decrepit that no one had bothered to destroy it, offered the only unguarded crossing in the area. In addition to its appalling condition, the bridge had quarter-mile causeways on each end which gave the appearance of impassable bogs. It offered little hope to the weary riders looking for a way to escape.

Night came as it can only in the South in the dead of winter. Gloomy and foreboding, the gathering darkness was filled with a smothering mist punctured by freezing rain. Slipping



and sliding in the muck, Forrest carefully examined the bridge, then dismounted his men and started them repairing it. He led the way in person, swinging an ax alongside his troopers to provide timbers while others struggled on the wet, slimy structure repairing it in the fitful light of torches and candles. Within an hour, the first of the cavalry was crossing the shaky structure.

Once the cavalry was over, Forrest ordered the wagons to follow but found the drivers reluctant to commit their charges to the dilapidated bridge. Losing his patience, Forrest clambered onto the lead wagon, grabbed the lines and urged the team forward. Lunging and slipping on the muddy causeway, they scrambled onto and over the bridge. This example encouraged the other drivers, and the wagon train started to move. Unfortunately, the next two wagons overturned, and the

operation stopped as the rebels stared in discouraged disappointment. Forrest now completely lost his temper and waded through the troops shouting and swearing to jar them out of their despondency. Under the lashing tongue of their leader, they plunged into the icy water, righted the two wagons and got them across.

Now, Forrest put the men to repairing the causeways by filling holes with sacks of captured sugar and coffee. This done, he had every vehicle surrounded by men and set the train in motion again. Men pulled on vehicles, pushed on teams, fell into the freezing mud and water but with much cursing, sweating and straining the last of the force was over the river at 3:00 a.m. The raiders now lay in the bottoms between Fuller, who was camped at Shady Grove, and Dunham who was several miles to the east.

At daybreak on the 29th. Fuller

moved out toward Huntington, arriving there in the afternoon. Sullivan wired Grant that he was in Huntington before Forrest knew that he had left Trenton and that he had the enemy in a tight place with his troops closing from three directions. Sullivan would have been astonished to know that Forrest knew exactly what he was doing and was, at that time, bivouacked 16 miles from Lexington at Flakes Stores in the rear of the Union force.

Forrest now decided to change his objective and destroy Grant's last large store of supplies located at Bethel Station. Grant had already recognized this possibility and had wired Sullivan that the road south of Jackson had to be protected "peradventure." It was no longer within the capability of the outmaneuvered Sullivan to provide the desired protection, however, if Forrest chose to strike.

Forrest was aware that a strike at Bethel Station under the existing conditions would force him to run grave risks. He knew he could destroy his objective, but he would be left with an exhausted force to use in breaking through to the river. The time it would take him to completely destroy Bethel Station would also provide enough time for Dodge to join Sullivan. Then, he would face a force too strong for him when he broke for the river. After thinking this over, Forrest decided that he would first destroy Sullivan. He determined to rest his force on the 30th, split Sullivan's brigades and crush them piecemeal on the 31st, and destroy Bethel Station on 2 January. He was so positive he could do this that he sent a company to destroy the telegraph lines and bridges and prepare forage 12 miles south of Jackson.

With Dibrell guarding the flank

toward Trenton, Forrest made his first move on the night of the 30th. He sent his brother, Bill, and his company, christened "The Forty Thieves," to draw Dunham out. He wanted him at a place called Parker Cross Roads about 7 miles below Clarksburg where the Clarksburg and McLemoresville roads intersected. Bill hit Dunham and immediately fell back in the desired direction. Dunham started a forced march to cut off Bill's retreat and wired Sullivan for immediate reinforcement. Sullivan was stunned when he heard Forrest was in his rear and delayed making any move for fear that he was being made the victim of another deception.

With Sullivan reacting as he had anticipated, Forrest sent four companies to watch him and closed on Dunham. The two forces were about equal in strength, but Forrest had eight pieces of artillery to Dunham's three. Never willing to risk men unnecessarily, Forrest decided to defeat Dunham with artillery.

The gray artillery pulled up on the crest of a hill to find the Union force drawn up in line of battle about 400 yards in front of them. Their first round was answered immediately by the blue artillery, and the duel was on. In about half an hour, the rebels had destroyed one Union gun and forced Dunham back to the top of a ridge. The rebels now advanced in good order, and, after a short fight, the blue force gave up the ridge. They regrouped quickly, however, and charged the ridge but could not stand the cloud of musket balls, grape and cannister that enveloped them.

Forced steadily back, Dunham took cover in a wooded area enclosed by a rail fence and surrounded by open fields. Forrest moved up more artillery and sent Russell to the right rear

and Starnes to the left rear of the opposing force. Dunham, observing this move, immediately charged the weakened rebel front. Again, a hail of grape and cannister broke the charge and forced the Union troops to fall back. Before they could regroup, Russell hit their right rear and captured their wagon train. Simultaneously, Starnes crashed into the blue left rear but could not break it. Forrest now increased the pressure on the front and broke the 39th Iowa, but they quickly rallied and regrouped at the edge of the woods.

Napier had been holding on top of a nearby knoll. Forrest now told him to crush the Union right flank which had moved out of the woods. At a word, Napier's troopers swung into the saddle and, with a screaming rebel yell, galloped into the blue force. The bluebirds broke under the charge and dashed back into the woods losing their artillery in the process. Here, they held and forced the attackers to withdraw with heavy losses.

The gray objective had been gained, however. Dunham was now covered on three sides and had lost both his artillery and wagon train. Here and there among the blue troopers, white flags began to wave, and Forrest ordered the firing to stop. He sent an orderly forward to take the surrender and, in his words, "save further effusion of blood." At the same time, he advised Dunham that, if he did not surrender, "I will put every man to the sword."

Dunham knew he was whipped but still hoped reinforcements in the form of Fuller's brigade would arrive in response to his wire to Sullivan. Playing for time, he sent word to Forrest that he could pass on unmolested if he desired. Forrest had no interest in passing on and was about to tell Dunham so when the sound of heavy

firing came from his rear.

According to a story, probably apocryphal, Colonel Carroll of Forrest's staff dashed up to the general and excitedly told him, "General, a heavy line of infantry is in our rear. We're between two lines of battle. What'll we do?"

The unruffled Forrest is alleged to have quickly replied, "Charge both ways!"

Forrest did rush to his rear to find Fuller's troops already among the horseholders. Boxed between the two Union forces, the raiders were looking disaster squarely in the eye. A quick move by Dunham at this moment, might well have tipped the scales, but rapid reaction by Russell and Starnes prevented it. Guessing the meaning of the firing to the rear, they charged Dunham from two sides, nailing him in position. In the meantime, Fuller pressed his advantage. He swept over part of the Confederate force capturing 300 of Napier's troops and their horses, two rebel artillery pieces, and recapturing the three pieces Dunham had lost. He also got a section of his artillery in position and poured heavy fire into the fleeing rebels.

Dibrell's men, after a killing march from Trenton, took the full force of the cannon fire. Seeing the heavy casualties his troops were taking, the enraged Forrest supplemented his escort with 50 of Dibrell's men and led a headlong charge at the Union guns. This act was so totally unexpected that the surprised gunners and their infantry support were completely scattered in minutes. The rebels grabbed two of the Union caissons and rapidly rode free. Forrest, now clear of Fuller and behind Dunham, regrouped his scattered troopers and dashed toward Lexington.

Behind him, Sullivan wired Grant

that, "Forrest's Army is completely broken up" and that all he needed was "a good cavalry regiment to go through the country and pick them up." Grant immediately dispatched the cavalry regiment. How much Sullivan believed what he told his commander is indicated by the fact that he held his position at Parker Cross Roads for 24 hours expecting a counterattack at any moment!

The rebels arrived in Lexington in the early evening and went into bivouac. At 2:00 a.m., Forrest ordered, "To Horse," and they moved out toward the Tennessee River. Forrest was deeply troubled about being surprised by Fuller. Unaware that his patrol had misunderstood his order and passed parallel to Fuller rather than meeting him head on, Forrest rode along deep in thought trying to unravel the puzzle.

Morton, riding beside his general, felt the hot breath of a musket ball as it whispered by him and saw Forrest's head drop. "General, are you hurt?" Morton asked anxiously.

Forrest reached up, pulled his hat off, and stared at the hole drilled in it. After a moment, he shook his head and said, "No, but didn't it come damn close to me?"

With men ahead to raise the ferries, the column moved easily almost to Clifton. Here, they met the "good regiment" of cavalry Grant had sent to pick them up. The "good regiment" hardly knew what hit it. Dibrell stormed through its center while Starnes and Biffle rolled up the flanks. In minutes, it was over—the end of Union efforts to stop the raiders.

At noon New Year's Day, the return river crossing started. Vehicles and equipment crossed by ferry; the horses were forced to swim the river, each group led by a trooper in a skiff hold-



*Sketches by Major James B. Chanvon,
United States Army*

ing the bridle of a lead animal; and the men rode the ferries, made rafts or swam the wide stream. At 8:00 p.m., the last trooper hit the eastern shore and the raid was over.

At last, Sullivan, whom one of his officers described as a "genius at tardiness," moved again to the complete disgust of everyone in his command. They knew Forrest was gone and pursuit useless. Nevertheless, they stumbled through the cold, rain and mud in a last futile effort. Late on the 2d, they arrived at the river to find only rain, misery, silence and a long, grueling walk home.

The South was jubilant over Forrest's success. His reputation as a winner was clearly established. He had taken a green, ill-equipped brigade across the river. Although he lost 500 men, he added more than he lost and returned with a brigade in which every man was fully equipped and battle-hardened. He had captured, wounded or killed 1500 Union troops, including the colonels of four regiments; captured 5 pieces of artillery, 11 caissons, 38 wagons, destroyed im-

mense stores of supplies; utterly disrupted communications; and severely damaged the railroad. Most importantly, the Union plan for Vicksburg failed completely. Grant was forced to give up operations relying on a long rail line for logistics support and had to fall back out of central Mississippi.

The untutored general had outwitted the best the Union could throw against him and succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of his own commanders. Completely fearless, possessed of boundless confidence in his own ability and absolutely realistic in his approach to war, Forrest had proven himself a master at his newly acquired trade. Those who marveled at such ability in an untrained general could have learned much of the secret to his

success from this story: After returning to camp, Forrest was examining a saber he had taken at Trenton. He noticed that, in keeping with time-honored custom, it was sharpened only at the point. He called an orderly and put him to turning a grindstone while he sharpened the blade to razor keenness along its entire length. An officer with years of service in the Regular Army was appalled at this. Screwing up his courage, he protested to Forrest that what he was doing was in violation of all military precedent. Forrest transfixed the officer with a cold, emotionless stare for a few moments and then said, "War means fightin', and fightin' means killin'." Then he turned back to the slowly revolving grindstone.



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Paul Revere and WHO?

Major John A. Hardaway, United States Army

AS OUR nation approaches its 200th birthday, every major event and personality in its history will receive repeated and in-depth attention. It is appropriate that some of the lesser figures receive due recognition for their significant contributions. One such figure was William Dawes Jr. of Boston.

Every American is familiar with Paul Revere's ride, beginning with the display of lanterns from North Church. The story is told repeatedly in history books and was immortalized in Longfellow's poem. What few know is that William Dawes made an equally important ride for the same purpose on that momentous evening.

The immediate act precipitating both the rides of Revere and Dawes and the American War of Independence began with a letter from the British Colonial Secretary to General Gage in Boston. This letter directed Gage to take military action to restore British authority in Massachusetts. General Gage determined that the first act should be to capture Colonial military stores located at Concord, approximately 20 miles from Boston.

The problem confronting the patriots in Boston was not what Gage intended to do because this was generally known. The important question

was when did he plan to dispatch his force? Dr. Joseph Warren of the Boston Committee of Safety designated Revere and Dawes to carry the warning to Lexington and Concord as soon as the British began their move. A warning to Lexington, about midway between Concord and Boston, was crucial not only to arouse the Colonial militia but also because two of the colonies' leading patriots, John Hancock and Samuel Adams, were staying there.

Dawes, a member of the patriotic Sons of Liberty, had long been deeply involved in anti-British activities. Most importantly, Dawes was instrumental in the theft from the British of some small brass cannon. The limited war material in the possession of the patriots made these cannon most important. They had belonged to Massachusetts Colony for some time but, after trouble began, were kept under strong British guard. How this theft was managed is an exciting story in itself. Suffice it to say here that the operation required great stealth and involved storage of two of the cannon for sometime in a nearby school wood-box.

As was to be expected in the rapidly deteriorating situation in and around Boston, the British had clamped tight

controls over traffic in and out of the city. When the time came for Revere and Dawes to begin their rides, escaping from the city was a significant problem. Knowing the objectives of the British forces but not being aware of the route they would take provides the answer as to why Dr. Warren selected two riders to spread the warning. Revere was to cross the Charles River and proceed from Charleston to Lexington which was the shorter route. Dawes was to take the longer route which involved getting out of the city by way of the narrow neck connecting Boston with the mainland and proceeding to Lexington via Cambridge. The neck was guarded, but Dawes had made his preparations carefully. He had taken great pains to become friendly with as many of the British guards as possible.


British troop movements and other activities on the afternoon and evening of 18 April 1775 indicated that the time for the British had arrived. Dawes was the first to depart Boston. Dr. Warren sent him out in the early evening with the job of getting to Lexington and warning Adams and Hancock of the British movement. Fortunately, one of the British soldiers he had previously befriended was on duty that night, and Dawes was able to escape the city without difficulty. Revere departed sometime later, crossing the Charles River and picking up a horse as previously arranged. He also had as his principal duty the warning of Hancock and Adams.

After experiencing some slight difficulty with a British patrol, Revere reached Lexington before Dawes. Both men had issued the alarm as they jour-

neyed to Lexington. Their warnings prompted many other patriots to ride throughout the countryside alerting the militia. Dawes and Revere, having warned Adams and Hancock in Lexington, continued toward Concord. They were joined by Dr. Samuel Prescott, a resident of Concord, who had been visiting a lady friend in Lexington.

The trio gave the alarm as they moved along the road to Concord. While Dawes and Prescott had halted at one house, Revere rode slightly ahead. Without warning, the three riders rode into a British patrol that had been dispatched from Boston earlier that day. As the patrol began to move the three patriots away, Prescott signaled his compatriots that he was going to make a break for freedom. All three riders spurred their mounts away from the British. Dawes and Prescott managed to escape but Revere was recaptured. Prescott continued on to Concord and gave the alarm to this community. Dawes managed to lose his pursuers but, in the process, also lost his horse. He returned to Lexington on foot.

Although Paul Revere has gained principal credit for alerting the militia, due credit also must be accorded Dawes. Prescott was the only one who reached Concord. He also has received little attention and credit for his role on that important night.

William Dawes Jr. was 30 years of age when he participated in the great events of 18 and 19 April 1775. Obviously a daring young man who contributed significantly to the early Revolutionary movement, the history books do not record his later participation in the war although we can assume he did. William Dawes died on 25 February 1799 and was buried at Kings Chapel in Boston. 

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The Chinese Army and Psychological Warfare:

Past, Present, Promise

Colonel Jack L. Mohler, United States Army Reserve
and

Lieutenant Colonel George D. Livingston Jr., United States Army

The Chinese have a greater fondness for stratagems and tricks of war . . . than for head-on battle. . . . Skill in psychological warfare and emphasis on acts of propaganda are Chinese traits. The Chinese were some of the earliest users of psychological tools in war . . . often deferent in exploiting the moral and psychological weaknesses of the enemy.

PSYCHOLOGICAL warfare is a traditional weapon for Chinese commanders who, for centuries, have considered it an integral part of their battle plans.

Sun Yat-sen included the study of political warfare in the military academy he established for the Chinese Nationalist Army. The concept of political commissars as advisors to military commanders was added by the Russian Communists when they worked with the Nationalist Chinese after World War I. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has since carried on the system introduced to Chiang Kai-shek's forces to include

exporting it to allies such as the North Koreans and North Vietnamese.

The Beginnings

Historically, political warfare in the PLA has had two major missions: to indoctrinate its own troops with Communist ideology (psychological defense) and to undermine the enemy's will to fight (psychological offense). For example, to these ends, the responsible staff element in the PLA's general headquarters plans and conducts armywide campaigns that include self-criticism meetings, political indoctrination schedules and

education; it even specifies the books which personnel of the army can and cannot read. The Political Bureau also plans and conducts psychological warfare against the enemy.

The Political Affairs Department of the 8th Route Army, the original Chinese Communist force, was well-developed by 1937. Its main mission was to indoctrinate its own troops in "correct" political thinking. It also contained an Antienemy Work Section for psychological warfare. This section had a bureau in each division and brigade, a section in each regiment and a cell in each company. Policies and plans for psychological warfare campaigns were formulated by the Political Affairs Department general headquarters located in Yen-an. Instructions and directives went down

through channels to where eventually company cells trained the soldiers in the proper attitude toward prisoners of war (PWs) and distributed pamphlets and leaflets. They also trained the troops to shout slogans at the enemy and to collect frontline psychological warfare intelligence.²

Psychological warfare was first used by the PLA against the Nationalist Chinese forces before World War II and early in the civil war. Leaflets and handbills, wall posters and shouted slogans proved to be successful.

Against the Japanese

In opposing the Japanese in World War II, the 18th Group Army of the PLA tried the same methods such as shouted slogans and promises of good



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treatment, but without much success. Leaflets were belligerent in tone: "Overthrow the Emperor," "Down With the Militarists," and "Carry Out the Revolution in Japan." They only succeeded in antagonizing the Japanese. In November 1938, Mao pointed out that the war was equally hard on the common people of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China. He called for a "united front" of all these peoples against the war of aggression. This appeal likewise failed to produce the desired reaction among Japanese troops.

The Antienemy Section interrogated PWs to find the reasons for its lack of success. It discovered that the Japanese responded favorably to a friendly, sympathetic approach, but that the principal reason for the failure of its appeals was the fear among Japanese troops of the treatment they would receive as captives.

The first task then was to overcome Japanese fear of mistreatment. The Antienemy Section formulated and indoctrinated its own troops in "battle discipline" on how to treat PWs: any injury or insult was forbidden; the sick and wounded were to receive medical treatment; prisoners were to be released to their own lines if they wished. Li Ch'u-li, Chief of the Antienemy Section, explained the strategy: "Through softening their hostile feelings toward us, we build a bridge for propaganda to reach them."

In 1939, Japanese PW volunteers formed the Awakening League which eventually became the Japanese People's Emancipation League. They listed 228 specific demands in a pamphlet entitled *Demands of the Soldiers*. According to captured Japanese documents, this pamphlet was a potent psychological warfare weapon. Severe punishment was meted out to

any Japanese caught with it in his possession.

Japanese PWs began to be used extensively in PLA psychological warfare. The Japanese Workers' and Peasants' School, established at Yen-an in 1940, trained PWs in psychological warfare techniques. The improved methods began to show results. PWs reported increasingly severe punishment for troops caught with PLA propaganda. Surrenders increased.

Eventually, the 18th Group Army turned over the responsibility for all psychological warfare aimed at Japanese troops to the PW psychological element. Policies were set in conjunction with the Antienemy Section, but the psychological element carried them out independently. The Antienemy Section helped with some of the frontline work where psychological units were not adequate. The Chinese felt that only Japanese could appeal to Japanese effectively—the propaganda was in the correct idiom and was not coming from "foreigners."

The Japanese Workers' and Peasants' School in Yen-an had a Propaganda Committee of 18 students. It devised campaigns and prepared leaflet ideas. The material was radioed to psychological units in the field where most of the leaflets were produced. The Antienemy Section also sent messages to its subdivisions twice weekly with propaganda suggestions.

PW reports were the main source of material for psychological warfare. They were studied closely as a guide for making changes as the situation changed.

The good treatment of PWs was the cornerstone of the 18th Group Army's psychological warfare. From the moment of capture, PWs were treated as friends. They were given medical treatment if needed. They were sent

to the rear for "education" in the "true nature" of the war. If they wished, they were released, often with gifts and after a farewell party. The more hostile they were, the sooner they were let go. Japanese PWs returning to their lines were living proof that the Chinese had not mistreated them. Japanese who wished to stay and work with the Chinese were encouraged to do so. Of one group of 3000 PWs, more than 300 were trained to conduct psychological warfare.

The Civil War

After the defeat of the Japanese, the PLA continued to use psychological warfare in the civil war. In 1948, General Su Yu sent his battalions into the battle for Tsinan with posters and paste pots. In each city block, Su's infantrymen had orders to paste up posters. "Paste-shoot," "shoot-paste" was the order of the day. Nationalist Lieutenant General Sun Li-jen tells how the PLA "prepared" the battle scene:

The usual procedure was infiltration of political commissars, followed by floods of propaganda, exploiting discontent, fomenting unrest and fraternizing with the local populace with the objectives of gaining sympathy, facilitating good supply and gaining valuable information. . . .

Edgar O'Ballance describes the end of the civil war:

The Red victory at Suchow, followed by the fall of Peking, completely altered the character of the war and a spirit of defeatism began to eat seriously into the Nationalist hierarchy and the ranks of the army. Previous defections had not been taken over-seriously, as they were a national trait. Now there were wholesale surrenders of Nationalist troops and defections

*of commanders and officers, which grew to embarrassing proportions in the ensuing months. Taken by surprise, unable to cope with them, unable to keep them properly in captivity and unwilling to let them loose, the defectors were incorporated into the PLA by whole units, under their own officers. . . .*¹

Psychological operations played a major role in the defeat of the Nationalist forces and was widely exploited.

Tibet

The Chinese Communist invasion force for Tibet was seven divisions, 35,000 strong. Prior to the attack, Chinese agents started a "jitter" campaign among the Tibetans. On the evening of 18 October 1950, the Chinese leading elements reached the lonely fortress of Chamdo. The 3000 defending Tibetan troops expected a conventional attack. Instead, during the night, they were shocked by a crescendo of explosions and a pyrotechnic display of bursting star shells and rockets. Rumor added to the panic, and the garrison commander rode off into the night. The troops were not long in following the fleeing general. Reportedly, not a shot was fired.⁴ Chamdo was proof again that the Chinese liked battle ruses—they sometimes work, and they always add to the enemy's fear and confusion.

Korea

In Korea, the first American units to face attacking Chinese troops were startled to hear gongs banging and bugles blaring. The bugles normally are blown for purposes other than to frighten. However, their psychological impact is a bonus effect. Communication facilities in PLA units are poor, so they rely on time-honored bugles

跟我們走保證你的安全
FOLLOW US! WE GUARANTEE YOUR SAFETY

1. 我們將你送到後方安全的地方去。
We will take you to a safe place in the rear.
2. 在我們的後方有你們成千的伙伴，他們過着安全愉快的生活，到後方後你就可以看到他們。
Thousands of your fellow soldiers are in the rear. They have peace and safety. You will see them soon.
3. 我們志願軍不傷害俘虜，不虐待俘虜，不要俘虜私人的東西，這是我們的紀律。
We Chinese Volunteers do not harm, and do not maltreat war prisoners, nor do we take any of their personal belongings. These are our regulations.
4. 你受傷了嗎？我們有人給你醫治。
If you are wounded, you will get medical treatment.
5. 你可以寫信給你家裏報告你平安的消息。
You will be able to write home and tell your folks you are safe.
6. 我們已經釋放了許多英美俘虜，你們將來也一定得到釋放。
We have already set free many American and British prisoners. You will certainly be freed and get home in the end.

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER FORCES

(發給每一個戰士，備捉俘虜後用)

and whistles; like the US Army of old, they have bugle calls to attack, to withdraw, and so forth.

The psychological warfare methods employed by the PLA against Americans in Korea were not nearly as good as their psychological approaches to their own people or to the Japanese. Some of the themes used in leaflets aimed at Americans included:

Your Families Need You Back!
'Old Soldiers Never Die' but

YOUNG Ones Do!
Korea's where the GI's die
Home's where the politicians lie
You risk your [sic] life
Big Business rakes in the dough.
Follow us! We Guarantee Your
*Safety.*⁵

The American Army has never been susceptible to surrender passes and psychological operations. The ones produced by the PLA in Korea were crude, with no visible attempt to make

them readable or interesting. Many of the leaflets and posters used against our troops evoked amusement rather than action or attitudinal change.

Possibly, because of their long isolation and limited education, the Chinese Communists lack insight into Western mental characteristics. But, whatever the reason, PLA psychological warfare to date shows that their propagandists simply do not understand Americans.

In the Korean Conflict, the PLA's handling of PWs differed greatly from its relaxed attitude toward the Japanese in World War II. The PLA policy toward PWs was called the "Lenient Policy," but it was far from it.

rewarded by the Chinese.

In 1951, the Chinese tried to organize a Peace Committee among American PWs. Many PWs were exploited for propaganda purposes. The most publicized episode was the confession of American flyers admitting that they had engaged in germ warfare. Another example was an article published in a Communist periodical entitled "May We Be Heard?," which was endorsed by 400 American PWs.⁶

The harsh treatment of PWs is underlined by the figures shown in the chart:

Why did the Chinese treatment of American PWs contrast so sharply with their earlier treatment of Japa-

| OF TOTAL AMERICANS MISSING IN ACTION | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|
| | World War II (percent) | Korea (percent) |
| Got Back Safely to Own Lines | 18 | 17 |
| Were Later Repatriated | 39 | 30 |
| Dead | 43 | 53 |

For example, of 320 American PWs who started a march from below the 38th Parallel, hardly a third reached a PW collecting camp 40 miles north of Pyongyang. Of 650 Americans who marched from this camp, only 200 arrived at the final PW camp on the Yalu. But these survivors were so weakened that only nine lived through the winter and eventually returned to the United States. American PWs were subjected to torture, starvation and constant indoctrination. Food and the promise of eventual repatriation were linked to indoctrination. "Study hard and you will be rewarded." Those who "confessed" and criticized themselves were considered "friends" and

nese PWs? Why had the PLA policy on PWs changed so drastically in less than a decade? The answer is not clear. One possibility is that, in World War II, the Communist Chinese were still rebels and had not yet established a viable nation. In the Korean Conflict, the People's Republic of China was a going concern with a great desire to be accepted as a world power. It was more conscious of the value of and more adept in the conduct of worldwide propaganda. To create favorable output, it was trying very hard—too hard—to indoctrinate American PWs.⁷

The PLA's harsh brainwashing methods may have appeared to the



China Pictorial

PLA to be leading to success, but the PW exchange at Panmunjom told the real story. Under the terms of the armistice, each PW on both sides was interviewed individually and subjected to explanations so he could decide on which side he chose to be released. Of 3300 American PWs, only 23 men said they did not want to come home. Of 76,000 North Korean and Chinese PWs, 22,000 chose not to return to their Communist country.

Today

At present, a small but violent "propaganda war" goes on unabated between the Communists on the mainland and the Nationalists on the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. Radio stations and loudspeakers, leaflet shells and airdrops, propaganda balloons and floating rafts are used by both sides. The Nationalists even op-

erate a fisherman relief station to welcome mainland fishermen who choose to defect.

The strongest defense the PLA has against psychological warfare is its constant and incessant indoctrination of its troops. There is no escape from it. It follows the soldier when he marches away, and it is there to greet him at his destination. Along the route, there are political education stations which run off hand-printed or mimeographed march column newspapers, combining chitchat, local news and political slogans. Posters, handbills, books, magazines, broadcasts and proclamations all bang away at the PLA soldier. "The PLA never takes anything from the people without paying for it" attempts to improve military-civilian relations. "The PLA is superior to all other generations of Chinese soldiers" aims at

building PLA morale. Political indoctrination pounds home ideological themes hour after hour, day after day, until many of the troops know the Communist line by heart.

As further defense against enemy psychological operations, the PLA maintains strict control and discipline over their soldiers so that it is very difficult to escape. This also serves to create a fear of punishment for attempting to escape since the PLA has the harshest of punishments for infractions of its rules and regulations. Consequently, the men hesitate to disobey or desert. In Korea, 86 Chinese PWs were asked, "What made you follow the PLA to the last, undergoing so many hardships in this war?" Sixty-two said that ever-present surveillance gave no opportunity to desert. Seventeen said desertion would have been futile; they would have been caught.

In the Future

Would an opponent face an impossible psychological task vis-à-vis the PLA? Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rigg says:

No. . . . the average Chinese soldier knows when to surrender. There comes a time when he will 'break.' That time may be after a prolonged period of military failures, or after violent strategical or tactical surprise.⁸

In Korea, the closer the PLA soldier came to death or capture, the more willing he became to believe the promises of good treatment made in US psychological warfare. In December 1950, elements of the 1st Marine Division were fighting their way out of an encirclement. To their surprise, considering the fact that they were encircled, the Marines found 200 Chinese walking up to them and surren-

dering. They were "tired of war" and had been cold and unfed for five days. Surrender was the smart thing to do.

The Chinese Communist soldier would undoubtedly fight hard in his country against foreigners, but he appears to lack a fatalistic "do-or-die" attitude. In adversity, he might seek the traditional "avenue of escape" rather than fight a back-to-the-wall battle—particularly in an offensive foreign war.

It is well to remember that the PLA has never stood up to serious competition on the modern battlefield for any length of time. In the guerrilla days, it "hit and ran." In the civil war, it faced the cracking, crumbling Nationalist armies. In Korea, when the PLA volunteers were finally hit by the modern US Eighth Army in a classic counterattack supported by air power in May and June 1951, they were defeated quickly and were on the verge of disaster when the cease-fire ended the action. As the Eighth Army pushed the Chinese back:

Chinese military morale declined sharply, requiring PLA leaders to place greater reliance for combat enforcement on coercive controls provided in each combat unit. . . .⁹

General Van Fleet's summary: "We met and routed the enemy. We had him beaten and we would have destroyed his armies. . . ."¹⁰

The Chinese soldier's aggressive qualities and his probable conduct in the face of superior modern arms are problematic. He has often been mercurial on the battlefield. The chances are that, down deep, his character has not changed very much. It is interesting to speculate what might happen when one day his Communist gods and ideals are shattered.

Lieutenant Colonel Rigg believes: . . . to defeat the PLA, it is neces-

sary to resort to unconventional weapons combined with a concentrated campaign of psychological warfare. . . . The emphasis must be on generating fear, confusion and doubt.

He suggests, for example, that luminous paint be sprayed on road intersections with warnings not to cross "poisonous" areas. Literature should allude to new and powerful weapons. Capital should be made of the inherent Chinese fear of death by lightning or electrocution:

*To win a war against the PLA, an opponent should develop a trunkful of tricks and ruses designed to play on Chinese soldiers' minds. Potent weapons, combined with imaginative psychological warfare methods, can disintegrate the morale of the PLA. . . .*¹¹

Lieutenant Colonel Rigg points out that the PLA is well-acquainted with conventional weapons. But, like all men, they fear the unknown. Atomic weapons used against them would produce utter havoc. Over and above the physical damage, the fear that these dread weapons would generate

would precipitate mass surrenders. The psychological effects would outweigh the destructive or purely military effects. Apparently, the Chinese leaders recognize this danger because they have a massive campaign to prepare the country physically and prepare their people psychologically for nuclear warfare.

The Chinese Communists believe, or pretend to believe, that Mao Tse-tung has discovered a basic law of war: Man is superior to material; the strength of the true believer is as the strength of 10. As a result, the PLA is "invincible and impregnable" and "all imperialists are paper tigers."¹² Perhaps so. But Korea showed that a paper tiger can be very troublesome—and future paper tigers may be even more troublesome. The PLA, which has achieved so many victories—like that in Tibet—on the basis of generating fear in enemy ranks, is itself vulnerable to the same technique. Let us ensure that we are prepared to exploit that weakness if we again are engaged in warfare against the People's Liberation Army.

NOTES

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3 Edgar O'Ballance, *The Red Army: A Short History*, Praeger Publishers Inc., N. Y., 1964.

4 Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg, *China's Fighting Hordes: A Realistic Account of the Chinese Communist Army by a US Army Officer*, The Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1951.

5 Major R. D. Connolly, "What Will the Enemy

Tell Your Men?," *Military Review*, September 1957, pp. 38-42.

6 In the civil war, the Chinese Communists broadcast "confessions" and "statements" by Nationalist officers. Later, the same techniques were used on American PWs in North Vietnam.

7 The Korean Conflict was the first war in which an enemy tried to change the political views of American PWs—but not the last as Vietnam has already proved.

8 Rigg, *op. cit.*

9 Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath*, Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1960.

10 *Ibid.*

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from

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

Tremors in the Western Pacific

Micronesian Freedom and US Security

Eugene B. Mihaly

THIRTY years after the Pacific campaign of World War II, the fortunes of the island groups of Micronesia are once again crucial to the disposition of American military power in the Pacific. And that disposition, according to the prevailing view, will, in turn, constrain and shape the United States' post-Vietnam role in Asia.

A confluence of events in Asia and in Micronesia (formally the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) has brought the islands back onto the stage. Political and military shifts in Asia have dimmed prospects for US military installations elsewhere in the Western Pacific. The United States will have withdrawn all but token forces from the Asian mainland in the near future. Force levels in Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan are falling for reasons peculiar to the bilateral

relations with the former two states and to US-China relations in the case of the latter. And deployment of the forces that remain in these countries is constrained by diplomatic considerations. That leaves only the US territory of Guam, an island that is geographically but not politically Micronesian, as an assured site for US military facilities. A renewed military interest in the trust territory was inevitable.

As that interest has wakened, the nationalism which swept away Europe's empires in the Fifties and Sixties has belatedly touched Micronesia. The United States, as administrator of the territory under the UN trusteeship system, has come under increasing pressure to resolve Micronesia's political future. All the trust territories, with the exception of New Guinea and Micronesia, have gone off

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on their own. New Guinea is self-governing and, joined with the Australian colony Papua, is scheduled to attain independence. Micronesia is not self-governing; it has attained a lesser degree of autonomy than any other major territory in the Pacific.

The combination of these trends—contraction of base sites in Asia and rising pressures to give Micronesia autonomy or independence—creates an issue for the United States to the extent that US policy is based on two assumptions: that the defense of the United States necessitates maintenance of a number of forward positions well to the west of Hawaii, and that the United States should maintain in those positions forces capable of supporting its commitments in limited and counterinsurgency wars in Asia. By these lights, Guam alone is not adequate. The island is small, and military installations there are practically contiguous. And, if the nearby Micronesian islands are accessible to other powers, the island is particularly vulnerable—a lesson drawn from World War II.

The basic assumptions are questionable and I shall examine them below. The point here, however, is that they now determine Washington's policy vis-à-vis Micronesia. This then raises the question: Is there an inherent conflict between US policy and the interests of its wards, the Micronesians?

II

The United States wrested the Micronesian island groups—the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines—from Japan after a protracted and costly struggle. At the war's end, the US military urged annexation of the territory, with its 2140 islands and 3 million square miles of ocean space astride the mid-Pacific sea and air


lanes. President Truman opted, instead, to place it in the UN trusteeship system. As a concession to the military, Micronesia was designated a "strategic trust," a unique status that gave the United States virtually a free hand. The United States, however, also committed itself to offer the Micronesians (then less than 100,000 in number, today 114,000) the exercise of self-determination in the indefinite future. In 1947, decolonization seemed far off, and the white man's burden was still heavy.

Washington, and specifically the Department of the Interior, has ruled benignly. Through 1961, budgets were very small—a maximum of \$7 million—and the Interior Department could neither repair war damage and clear away the debris nor bring economic activity up to the prewar level. It could only maintain law and order and a few social services. Micronesia, in those years, was a caricature of Somerset Maugham fiction: it was a tropical slum. The Kennedy administration recognized this and initiated a spending program.

One early Department of Interior program was relatively successful though not in terms of its initiator's expectation. This was a scheme to introduce democratic institutions. In 1966, the year-old Congress of Micronesia, a territorywide bicameral body elected by universal suffrage, launched a campaign to revise the political status of the territory.

The Micronesians' initial desires were quite modest in the context of the times. They wanted the territory to become a commonwealth of the United

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States along the lines of Puerto Rico. Washington was irritated. Then, as later, Washington had difficulty in viewing Micronesia as a foreign, and thus colonial, problem. Perhaps this was an inevitable result of the bureaucratic management of the territory. Micronesia was a responsibility of the bureau that also manages Eskimo and Indian affairs. The Department of Interior countered in 1970 with the suggestion that Micronesia become a territory of the United States, with the same standing as American Samoa and Guam. The Interior Department declined to address the Micronesians' principal concerns: cultural integrity and eminent domain, control over land. On small Pacific islands, land is the central political issue, for it is the most precious resource. Washington, on the other hand, was constrained to keep all options open for the military. Thus began a minuet in slow motion that still plays on. One partner dwarfs

the other and consistently moves a beat behind the music; the other moves with agility but responds to music wafting in from other rooms.

The Micronesians flatly rejected the territory option. Washington then, in mid-1970, offered Micronesia commonwealth status, with qualified eminent domain. It did so under growing pressure from the Micronesians and the Western powers in the Trusteeship Council where Micronesia was becoming a minor scandal. By that time though, the Micronesians had become incensed at American attitudes and emboldened by their awareness of decolonization on other continents and in the Pacific. They proposed a "Free Association." This relatively new type of political status entails a recognition of qualified sovereignty, but leaves foreign affairs and defense, plus an obligation to subsidize, with the former metropolitan power. Either party can terminate the relationship at will.



A member of a US Navy civic action team blasts coral which will be used for roadbuilding in Micronesia

Britain has such a tie with six of the smaller Caribbean states. The Micronesians reasoned that Free Association would serve American security interests (base rights which they were ready to concede, and denial of the territory's lands and seas to other powers) on the one hand and give them the wherewithal to run an economy that had become highly dependent on US fiscal support on the other. Washington responded that the proposal was outlandish and that Micronesia was not ready for self-government. The talks were suspended from May 1970 to October 1971. By then, voices in the territory were clamoring for independence—and Washington was talking Free Association.

This almost theatrical thrust and parry of ever greater demand and reluctant concession was very much in the historical decolonization pattern. The emergence of an independence movement should have signaled that

the last act was about to begin. It did not. Rather, it proved to be only a minor event in a process that has seen the United States and Micronesia drift together into an imbroglio that is unique in the postwar history of decolonization.

As elsewhere, violence erupted as discontent with the metropolitan power's policies mounted. Interest in independence intensified. And, as other metropolitan powers before it, Washington reacted by taking the Micronesian question seriously for the first time. The simultaneous acceleration of the phasedown of American participation in the Vietnam War and deterioration of prospects for US military facilities in other Asian areas undoubtedly played a role in subsequent events. Responsibility has shifted for negotiations with the Micronesians from the Interior Department to the National Security Council. In 1971, F. Haydn Williams, head of

The Asia Foundation, was appointed to lead the talks, with the rank of ambassador (a signal that the Micronesians were no longer, in administrative terms, overseas Eskimos), and he received the bureaucratic weight to resolve interdepartmental disputes on the issue. Heretofore, American positions had been compromises worked out by an Assistant Secretary of Interior between the views of the Department of State which tended to reflect UN pressures toward decolonization, and those of the Department of Defense (DOD) which resisted all changes that would limit its options.

Williams' first accomplishment was to induce DOD to articulate, for the first time, what it wanted in Micronesia. The military wanted, in the context, quite a bit: a major airfield on Tinian (the launch site for the 1945 atomic bombs) in the Marianas for the Air Force; indefinite use of the existing missile test site on Kwajalein in the Marshalls for the Army; an option on a small harbor and land for a logistics facility in Palau in the Carolines for the Navy; and—apparently for the sake of symmetry—another option on 30,000 acres in Palau for Marine maneuvers. Most important, DOD wanted assurance that other powers' forces would be denied access to Micronesian lands and waters—indeinitely.

The Micronesian negotiators provisionally accepted the base demands, in large part because of an expectation that the United States would pay rents of similar magnitudes to those paid Spain. The sticking point was the future. The Micronesians balked at any arrangement that did not offer them the option to break away from the United States to become an independent state. To them, the "free" in Free Association meant precisely that.

On this, as on previous points of

conflict, Washington ultimately came around. By the round of negotiations in April 1972, the American position incorporated all the principal Micronesian demands. The moment should have been climactic. But, again, Micronesia broke from the conventional pattern. The two sides not only failed to reach a settlement, but the prospect of agreement began to recede precipitously.

III

The problem was, and is, fragmentation. Elsewhere, internal disunity has generally followed independence. In Micronesia, the sequence has been accelerated. Micronesia is fragmenting before its political future is resolved. The explanation for this trend, however, is traditional. Micronesia is an artificial political entity. Its boundaries are a by-product of European, American and Japanese political ambition. The territory is in fact six discrete units—the Marianas, the Marshalls, Palau, Yap, Truk and Ponape—each with a language (or two), a complex and developed culture, and a distinct traditional political structure. Allegiance commonly extends no further than the clan. Because of the vast ocean spaces between these units, now formally constituted as the trust territory's administrative districts, the peoples of Micronesia have had more contact with outsiders than with each other.

Micronesian unity began to take root in the educational system and in two political institutions: the Congress of Micronesia and the trust territory government. The generation of political leaders now in office schooled together and took degrees at the Universities of Guam and Hawaii together. The Congress of Micronesia, now eight years old, brought them into

an institution focused on territory-wide problems. A few from this group entered the American administration which, for a time, served as a unifying force. Until recently, the territory was run much like a British colony: an all-powerful high commissioner appointed by the President at the center and senior administrators in each district to ensure that the chief executive's writ ran to the peripheries. The congress was primarily an advisory body. So were the six district legislatures, also elected by universal suffrage. Traditional political leaders (clan chiefs) continued to wield some authority—directly on local issues and indirectly through the young men holding office.


The building of Micronesian identity and political unity halted, and then reversed, roughly two years ago. One cause was that universal political issue—money. The congress had passed a modest income tax bill. This triggered a squabble over the division of tax revenues which then led to the first serious contention over the allocation of US financial inputs. A second source of trouble was the status negotiations with Washington. The frustratingly slow pace, in the context of accelerating expectations, and the apparent intractability of Washington in the early stages unleashed an inter-district antagonism. Politicians found votes and a chance to build a territory-wide reputation in attacks on the United States and the Micronesian leadership of the moment. District ambitions came into play, with each district jockeying for what it conceived to be financial and political advantage at the starting line for a future state.

The policies pursued by the American administration contributed to the problem. In the context of rhetoric extolling unity and of expenditures in

the tens of millions on physical infrastructure that could serve unification (airfields, telecommunications, shipping), High Commissioner Edward E. Johnston elected to decentralize major decisionmaking to the district level and appointed local men as district commissioners. His stated aim was to hasten Micronesian assumption of authority. The result was a virtual re-birth of the districts as autonomous political units.

These changes transformed the Congress of Micronesia. Previously, the Congress and its status committee had spoken with one voice. The congress now became a Babel. Negotiations within the Congress, among representatives of the six parties, were far more complex than negotiations with Washington.

By late 1972, the United States was no longer negotiating with just one committee. It was conducting simultaneous negotiations with the Congress of Micronesia and with the Marianas District. The Marianas had decided to remain closely tied to the United States, as a commonwealth like Puerto Rico if possible. At first, this portended the emergence of two new political units. The Marshall Islands, however, have since established a political status commission and have signaled Washington that they too want a separate deal. To indicate their seriousness, the Marshallese have held conspicuous talks—ostensibly about merger possibilities—with Nauru, the phosphate-rich but land-poor republic of 6000 people in the South Pacific, and with the Gilbert Islands, a British colony likely to achieve a new status soon. The Marshalls district legislature has voted to end participation in the Congress of Micronesia (an act of indeterminable significance). In the western Caroline Islands, the Palau



This coral, which will harden into a suitable surface for vehicular traffic, is being distributed at the site of the Dublin Road project in Truk

District has threatened to go down a similar path.

Against this background, the principal Micronesian negotiator, Senator Lazarus Salii, proposed in early 1974 that a Free Association arrangement not come into force until 1981. Such gradualism was once the dream of colonial administrators reluctant to surrender power. That the suggestion came from a nationalist politician is doubly remarkable. At present, virtually no voices in the territory call for independence. Only a few advocate a unitary or federal Micronesian state, associated or not. The notion of a loose confederation of states somehow attached to the United States is gaining ground, more from despair at the lack of a feasible alternative than from optimism that confederation would work. Others envision a patchwork arrangement, with some districts closely tied to the United States and other districts independent under some sort of American protection.

IV

The United States and Micronesia have arrived at a critical point. The present internal structure and the Trusteeship are no longer feasible. The alternative governmental structures under discussion are grim. Confederations have a dismal history. The patchwork notion is an administrative, economic and political nightmare. However, the effort to replace the Trusteeship with a compact of Free Association between the United States and five of the six districts¹ continues. Free Association, with the financial ties it implies, would exert a centripetal force. It could prevent disintegration. It could offer a chance to build a viable state.

In April 1974, the Micronesian chief negotiator, Senator Salii, with his legal adviser, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke, met his American counterpart, Ambassador Williams, and, within a matter of days, agreed to a preliminary

draft compact. In view of the Micronesians' previous response to similar though financially less generous terms, this was a remarkable breakthrough and something of a volte-face. The probable explanation: on the one hand, money; on the other, the quickened pace of the separatist drive by the Marshall Islands served as a strong inducement to get a preliminary agreement in hand as soon as possible—to preempt direct dealings between the Marshalls and Washington. The United States had already demonstrated in its willingness to discuss a commonwealth arrangement with the Marianas that impatience and military interest, legitimized by the longstanding American commitment to the concept of self-determination, could override concern for territorial unity. And from the perspective of the other districts, the loss of the relatively prosperous and populous Marshalls, following on the defection of the Marianas, would be devastating to their bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States and to prospects for future viability.

The derivation of the draft compact, and its terms, presage a Perils of Pauline future for the proposal, not only in Micronesia, where there will be hard bargaining among the deeply divided districts, but in the United States and the United Nations. But this effort offers the best, and perhaps the last, chance of concluding a negotiated agreement in the mid-Seventies.

The terms of the draft, in brief, are these: The United States and Micronesia would enter into a Free Association after a transition period of up to six years. During that period, Micronesia would choose its own form of government in a constitutional convention (in 1975) and then vote, by referendum, on the compact by mid-1976. Fifteen years, after the compact

finally came into force, Micronesia could opt for independence providing that, prior to doing so, it reached agreement with Washington on a mutual security pact. The pact would guarantee the United States indefinite tenure for its military installations and would commit the Micronesians to deny their lands and waters to other powers' forces. The United States would subsidize Micronesia for the transition period and for three 5-year periods thereafter during which the subsidy would gradually decline. The US contribution would total more than \$1 billion.

The proviso that subsidies should decline is an imaginative attempt by Ambassador Williams to undo the harm done by recent American largesse. After the financially dry years prior to 1961, budgets for the territory spiraled. Today, appropriations are nearing \$70 million, or almost \$700 per capita (more than the per capita gross national product (GNP) of all but a few developing countries), and they are rising. The results have been mediocre in the short term and damaging as regards long-term prospects. Physical infrastructure is only moderately developed—airports, ports, roads and power supplies range from poor to adequate. The territory still lacks good sanitation and clean water. Social infrastructure—schools, hospitals, welfare—is fairly well-developed, but of low quality, not suited to local conditions, and expensive.

The high cost reflects the magnitude of the government bureaucracy. Micronesia's administration, in relative terms, is one of the world's largest and most costly. One result is the emergence of a middle class, almost all on the government payroll, with American consumption habits. Yet the establishment of income-producing en-

terprises that could support the government structure has been largely ignored. The data are poor, so one can only estimate the nongovernmental element of the GNP at about \$125 per capita. This derives largely from copra production, tourism, retail trade and a small fish-processing industry. Prospects are not encouraging. Tourism and fishing offer the best possibilities for expansion. Barring an oil or mineral discovery, Micronesia will be hard-pressed in the foreseeable future to sustain living standards without large-scale external support.

The economic facts clearly limit Micronesia's political options; they also limit options for the United States and the United Nations. This is no guarantee that the Free Association proposal, which is the only formula offered so far that addresses the economic issue, will survive. The number of hazards cannot yet be counted. The minimum steps, each a potential pitfall, are these: First, in Micronesia, the proposal must go through the negotiating committee, the congress, then a constitutional convention (not a formal hurdle for the compact, but a gathering at which it could come under effective fire) and a plebiscite. The action will then shift to Washington where the US Congress will be asked to accept the proposal in its final form. At the least, the assumption of defense responsibility for an overseas territory, virtually in perpetuity, and the provision for new and potentially expensive bases should arouse more than a little interest on Capitol Hill. The same can be said of the 21-year forward commitment of funds in the 10-figure range. The entire package will be vulnerable. Finally, the UN Security Council will be asked to legitimize dissolution of the Trusteeship and the new status. Free Association



These Navy team members discuss the easiest method to open an old Japanese drainage ditch to alleviate a water problem on one of the Micronesian islands

is not popular in New York; nothing short of independence is. The United States may find itself faced with the choice of proceeding in the face of an adverse vote, or of starting all over again. The former course will be politically feasible only if the Micronesians overwhelmingly endorse the arrangement in a plebiscite observed by UN-designated officials. Thus, the key to final settlement may be at the starting point in Micronesia.

V

The United States and Micronesia have been on the verge of agreement several times before. In recent years, the fissiparous tendencies in Micronesian politics have proven an insurmountable obstacle. They may be so again. The question is: Assuming the effort is bound to falter at some point, what steps could improve the chances of ultimate success? In my view,



This Micronesian mechanic trainee receives on-the-job instruction from a member of a Navy team

Washington will need to reverse several American policies and revise the American military desiderata.

Agreement, and progress through a constitutional convention to a plebiscite, presuppose interdistrict cooperation. Recognition of economic necessity could conceivably produce that cooperation in the coming 12 months. Barring such a fortuitous outcome, the United States will have no option but to alter the territory's political equation. The present structure discourages the coalition politics on which interdistrict cooperation would be based. The central government is feeble, but it still must allocate revenues among districts. The government is in American hands. Micronesian politicians are thus induced to coalesce exclusively on district lines to compete for shares of the pie. The first step toward breaking the impasse would be appointment of a Micronesian as high commissioner. Preferably, the appointee should come from the district now moving fastest in a separatist direction, the Marshalls. A Micronesian chief executive with resources at his command and political ambitions would have the in-

struments and the incentive to build broad support for his policies and to begin building political unity. To the extent that he succeeded, he could speak for Micronesia in dealing with the United States. An alternative approach to the same end would be replacement of the high commissioner with an executive council, with one member per district and a chairman elected by and from among the members. Such changes have a more general virtue. Experience has demonstrated that the earlier an indigenous government is formed, the better the prospects for smooth handling of a constitutional convention and other elements of transition. (The Congo illustrates the opposite approach.)

The administrative decentralization of the territory should be reversed. The Secretary of the Interior can order the return of now-surrendered powers to the center. Next, Washington should assert as emphatically as possible that it will not deal with individual districts. As long as that door is perceived to be open, the temptation to go through it will be disruptive.

Negotiations with the Marianas

probably cannot be halted. A commonwealth agreement may be reached soon.² But a lesson can be learned. The Marianas were encouraged to go it alone by the announcement of the military's interest in a large and, therefore, locally economically attractive facility in Tinian. Hostility in the Marianas to the other less Westernized districts, plus a boom in Japanese tourism and related investment, were also factors. It is no coincidence that the strongest separatist tendencies today are in the two other districts where the military has interests: the Marshalls and the Palau District of the Caroline Islands. Washington has mitigated the problem by minimizing direct base rents in the proposed compact. But salaries and potential economic multipliers of bases are at least as significant as rents. The Marshalls, because of the existing Army facilities on Kwajalein, generate nearly 60 percent of the entire territory's income taxes.

A more drastic change in policy, I believe, would better serve both Micronesian and American interests. That would be elimination of plans for new bases in the Marianas and the Carolines, and acceleration of the inevitable phaseout of the Marshalls facility. For the islands, such a shift would remove a divisive element from the political equation. And it would avert future economic distortion and social dislocation.

From the American perspective, the argument for elimination of bases in Micronesia rests on an evaluation of their potential utility and on an assessment of the military's priorities. The proposed bases in the Marianas and the options in the Carolines are a backup for Guam: two additional baskets for the military eggs. Guam by itself is clearly vulnerable. The ques-

tion is: Would the construction of nearby, and equally vulnerable, bases improve the odds markedly? It will be difficult to justify further spending to bolster a forward strategy based, in part, on development of a capability to support US commitments in limited Asian wars. Intervention in such wars is widely believed to be politically insupportable at home. And thus the threat to intervene is not a credible political instrument. If these assumptions are valid, additional bases in the islands will have little value. Guam, in the context of a Micronesia closed to foreign military forces, should be sufficient to meet US requirements.

The question of bases obscures a more immediate and greater threat to US security in the Pacific—a threat which action in Micronesia could diminish. That is the prospect of a naval arms race, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the initial and principal actors, and Japan, China and others as future players. The buildup of ships has begun though it has not yet gained the momentum of the race in the Mediterranean. One ominous indicator of the direction events are taking was an overture by the Soviet Union to Western Samoa for refueling and other privileges. The Samoans declined, but there will be other attempts.

The Soviet Fleet now operates over long supply lines from Vladivostok. Supply and maintenance points in the mid and South Pacific have the same attraction to the Soviet Union that Diego Garcia has to the United States in the Indian Ocean. Given the number of small and impoverished Pacific island states, it would seem just a matter of time before one or another state finds a Soviet base arrangement irresistible. The United States would then be confronted with a Soviet Fleet op-

WESTERN PACIFIC TREMORS

erating out of harbors relatively close to Hawaii on or near the major sea lanes from the United States to Asia and Australia. The US response is not difficult to predict. The potential impact on stability in the area could only be negative. For the US budget, it would mean new burdens; for the islands, the prospect of economic and social distortion.

The Micronesia imbroglio affords an option that might head off at least this aspect of a naval race in the area. That option is neutralization of the South and Western Pacific island states—creation of a zone clear of foreign military forces. The United States would take the lead by eschewing construction of any bases in Micronesia for a trial period of, for example, four years. It would simultaneously propose or, preferably, urge one of the island states to sponsor, an agreement among the states in the area to refuse base rights to foreign powers and refueling and service facilities to foreign naval vessels. The United States, the USSR and other naval powers would be asked to endorse the arrangement and to increase their economic aid to compensate for revenues forgone by the islands. Such endorsements are not likely to be forthcoming in all cases, particularly from the USSR, but the agreement could conceivably work without them. The island governments have so far demonstrated a strong resolve to husband their sovereignty. They are likely to accept a foreign military presence only if their economies are in desperate straits. Thus, American and other external financial assistance, if adequate to the need, should tip the scales against new bases. The agreement would clearly stand a better chance if both the United States and the USSR were formally committed to respect it.

This suggests a bilateral deal that would cover not only the neutralization question, but also naval force levels and perhaps submarine missiles and the number of submarine patrols.

Neutralization per se freezes a status quo that favors the United States, with its facilities in Guam and American Samoa. Territories would not come under the plan. US willingness to forgo bases in Micronesia is thus a *sine qua non* if such a plan is to have a chance, either with or without an American-Soviet agreement.

For the United States, Micronesia has been a story of lost opportunities. Five years ago, an amicable partnership was possible. Today, there is a chance for establishment of a formal relationship, but the years have taken their toll and any relationship will be difficult. This is unfortunate in view of the congruity, rather than conflict, of interests. Micronesia needs American financial support; the United States needs assurance that Micronesia will not fall into potentially hostile hands. The Free Association arrangement could serve these ends. At this point, recognition of self-interest by the Micronesians and a more enlightened American administration of the islands could retrieve some ground. And a serious attempt to try the neutralization approach could make Micronesia a key to stability in the area rather than an old battleground once more in reserve for future conflict.

NOTES

1 The talks with the Marianas are proceeding.

2 Any such agreement, it now appears, is likely to face stiff opposition in the US Congress. There is not expected to be much enthusiasm for a new commonwealth with a population of only 14,000. Guam, moreover, will certainly demand that it receive at least as good a deal as the Marianas, that is, that its status be upgraded. The Marianas may ultimately be faced with a choice of merger with Guam or re-entry into Micronesia.

THE PATHWAY TO PROGRESS

An Examination of Credibility in Military Education

Major Robert E. Shea Jr., United States Army

LIKE medication, instruction can be given when none is needed. It is also a possibility as in prescribing medication to instruct when some other remedy would be more to the point.¹

The chalk-like dust rose in clouds as the dispatch rider reined to a halt at the camp superintendent's office. After dismounting, the rider stamped his feet and stretched to ease the ache of muscles cramped by the three-day ride to deliver the high-priority message to the forward construction camp. Each time he was called on to make the trip, his ride was longer, for the crews had extended the Palisades to Pacific (PTP) Railroad tracks further toward the high mountains on the Western horizon.

The camp was located along muddy Packstone Creek, a temporary intrusion of civilization into the emptiness of buffalo grass and nameless buttes. Approximately 700 men lived in the drab bunk cars and scattered gray tents surrounded by piles of rough-hewn ties, steel rails and kegs of spikes. Each man, skilled or unskilled, was part of a specialized crew dedicated to the PTP's goal of reaching Futility Pass before the first snows fell.

PATHWAY TO PROGRESS

The camp superintendent broke the wax seal on the brown envelope and wondered to himself what business the home office in St. Joseph considered important enough to warrant a special messenger. He stared at the company's letterhead and smiled at the slogan emblazoned across the top of the paper. Using the initials of the company, a young Eastern executive had persuaded the railroad's president to use "Pathway to Progress" to describe the PTP's effort of extending rails to the Pacific. Even the railroad's rolling stock now bore the Pathway to Progress emblem to symbolize the company's commitment and visibly to inspire each worker.

The letter announced company personnel actions for three of the camp's key foremen. In each case, the action was effective in 10 days. Jeremiah Jacobs, the chief of the roadbed survey crew, had been selected to attend the PTP's Railroad Management Institute "due to exceptional performance in surveying railroad routes through hostile territory." Ling Chow, the leader of the Chinese cooks, had been chosen to attend the renowned Academy of Construction Management "to further his understanding of railroad construction management at echelons above the construction camp." Abner Bailey, the revered boss of the rail layers, was given notice of his termination as a PTP employee for "not advancing professionally as indicated by continued nonselection for career enhancing training."

The superintendent took off his glasses and rested his head on his hands. Three key men were leaving his camp, he thought, and each for the wrong reason.

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"It's a hell of a way to run a railroad," he said aloud and turned down the coal oil lantern.

Fortunately, the Palisades to Pacific Railroad never existed, for, had these and similar events really happened, the Western terminus of the continental rail system might still be along the banks of the Packstone Creek. While the loss of Jacobs, Chow and Bailey would not, of itself, have been a crippling blow, the PTP's basic philosophy of personnel development would certainly have been counterproductive in building the Pathway to Progress.

The US Army is not building a railroad to the Pacific, but, like the PTP, some of its personnel development practices have been challenged recently as not being consistent with the requirements and objectives of a military force in the 1970s.

For officers, the single most significant change is the introduction of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) which recognizes the need for commissioned specialists. The officer generalist will join the blocked hat and the technical sergeant as once good ideas now relegated to history by progressive thinking.

Department of the Army (DA) has announced that the "commitments of the Army's leadership to the full implementation of OPMS is unequivocal."² Accordingly, changes have been directed in the promotion process in the manner of assignment selection and in the significance attached to certain jobs. To demonstrate the credibility of the new management plan, specific major actions include eliminating the use of the Order of Merit List (OML) for many personnel actions, revised promotion board letters of instruction and new assignment policies.

The blueprint for OPMS, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Utilization*, defines OPMS as the sum total of policies and procedures "by which officers are procured, trained, assigned, *developed*, evaluated, promoted, and separated." (Emphasis added.)³ This pamphlet also defines professional development as the process of meeting the "needs of the Army through planned assignments and schooling."⁴ It is interesting to note that, although professional development includes both assignments and schooling, no innovation or policy changes have been

announced to align the Army's education system with the tenets of OPMS. However, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has been tasked with responsibility for developing an officer education system for OPMS. Changes should be forthcoming by Fiscal Year 1976.

Should training and education philosophies be changed, or are today's concepts in concert with OPMS? Those questions cannot be answered without a definition of the role of training and education in the contemporary environment of OPMS.

What is military education? For an officer, it is all the training and education actions taken during his career, both formally and informally, to prepare him to perform effectively in his assigned duties at each grade and level of responsibility. It is a continuing process with multiple means. These include common resident military courses, specialty-tailored resident military courses, nonresident military instruction, civil education programs as well as on-the-job training.

While education is a generic term for the long-term process of developing the officer, each segment or individual element in this process must be evaluated in terms of requirement, objective and scope to ensure consistency with the goals of OPMS. What are these education criteria?

Requirement: In most cases, education will be required by an officer when significant changes occur in the level or type assignments appropriate to his grade and area of expertise.

Objective: All education, less on-the-job training, represents a specific commitment of funds, time and personnel resources. Consequently, each segment of the process must have as its objective the preparation of the officer for postgraduation, near-term job requirements. With technological and doctrinal changes introducing continual obsolescence of knowledge, each element of the education process should focus on actual or potential assignments within a four to five-year time frame. General William E. DePuy, Commanding General of TRADOC in a "DePuy Sends" message emphasized this point by stating that the officer student should be trained for "jobs that he is about to undertake—not jobs for which he must wait many

years."⁵ Although here General DePuy was describing basic and advanced course philosophy, such guidelines should be used for all military education.

Scope: All education should be tailored to the individual OPMS specialty requirements, the individual officer's assignment and professional development requirements, and the Army's collective skill requirements. By the end of calendar year 1974, Project EASI (Expanded Additional Skill Identifiers) had coded each officer position in the Army, and the Army's requirements by grade and specialty quantified. Brigadier General John F. Forrest, former Director of the Officer Personnel Directorate, US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), stated on 16 July 1974 that "... our officer assets will be tailored to meet requirements."⁶ Likewise, any Armywide education common to a significant percentage of the officer corps can be justified only if it too meets this requirements criteria.

This philosophy becomes the focal point of the definition process for education. Once requirements are identified, the educational system must support them. This statement appears so logical that its acceptance should be unquestioned, for even the basic directive on Army training, Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training*, defines training as a process consistent with individual capabilities and the "skill requirements of the Army."⁷ The unquestionable logic of education based on requirements, however, is in fact contrary to the real or imagined traditional success indicators of the officer corps—that is, "tickets." Historically, nonselection for attendance at the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) or the US Army War College (USAWC), for example, has been viewed as a career setback indicative of professional shortcomings. This success indicator syndrome persisted whether or not the educational experience was appropriate to the individual, his area of expertise or his projected utilization. If OPMS is to succeed, this perception of education's purpose must be eliminated.

In the environment of the foreseeable future, the Army will be experiencing austere times, and a need will arise to reduce the time an officer spends away from normal assignments with a concomitant reduction of resources committed to education. This belt-tightening is nothing new to service school commandants. In November 1973, Headquarters, TRADOC, advised that, when developing curricula,

the following guidelines would be used: reduce officer time devoted to the pursuit of education and emphasize "lean instruction, and eliminate enrichment training."⁸ Instead of providing the traditional educational system within these guidelines, however, it would appear that the time has come to revitalize the military education process by concentrating on the requirements as defined by OPMS and Project *EASI*. Bareboned traditionalism must give way to required and pertinent military education.

Thus, education not germane to an officer's specialty and his assignment requirements should be eliminated. Midcareer resident education (roughly equivalent to today's Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), USACGSC, or advanced degree programs) must be limited to those officers requiring such education to meet assignment responsibilities effectively. Ling Chow, the PTP cook, certainly would not attend the Academy of Construction Management under this concept. Likewise, the chaplain or nurse who today spends weeks learning to be a division G2 or a corps G3 would be eliminated without prejudice from USACGSC attendance. Officers in this category could be selected for advanced education appropriate to their area of expertise consistent with the Army's needs. To engender in the specialist an understanding of high-level staffs and the interrelationships of the military community, other means of education should be available with a reduced expenditure of time and resources. Attendance by many specialists at the "senior institution for tactical instruction in the Army Education System"⁹ is a luxury that is inconsistent with both austere times and OPMS.

Similarly, education should not be used solely as a reward for past accomplishments. Jacobs may have been the best survey boss in the PTP system, but his development should be guided only by his future utilization. If the PTP intended to utilize his acquired skills in high managerial positions, his selection was appropriate. Otherwise, it became a means of obtaining the required punches in his ticket, his personal Pathway to Progress.

In this vein, the Army today appears to overtrain a segment of the officer corps, and undertrain the remainder. A survey by the US Army Logistics Management Center (USALMC) of logistics officers at the midpoint in their careers indicated that approximately one-third of these officers were selected for USACGSC/AFSC, civilian

institution master's degree programs and the prestigious Logistics Executive Development Course of the USALMC. The remaining two-thirds of the officers were rarely offered equal professional development education.¹⁰ The supereducated category of officers can, at one time, occupy only one-third of the Army's logistic positions, and yet they represent nearly the entire pool of officers educated after career course completion. A more equitable distribution of education opportunities, if required by assignment responsibilities, appears to be in order. Bailey might not have been terminated by the PTP if such a policy had been used by the railroad.

While every job in the Army must be considered important—DA staff as well as Fort Polk¹¹—certain assignments are of such a critical nature that the MILPERCEN career branches must ensure that officers of only the highest caliber are selected for them. In this case, the individual's abilities and professional reputation should determine assignment suitability, not selection for and attendance at a course of instruction.

If the MILPERCEN career branches were directed to utilize a modified OML or similar discriminating management tool to align individual capabilities and position criticality, the man-job match could be ensured without the unnecessary expenditure of education resources. Such a directed change would also be consistent with the specialization doctrine of OPMS and the lean training guidelines of TRADOC.

It would appear from this appraisal that the existing philosophy of military education is not compatible with the guidelines of OPMS and contemporary military thinking. The practices discussed above are not those of a mythical railroad, but, rather, those of today's Army in a period when credibility in officer management is receiving attention at each level up to the Chief of Staff.

To test the credibility of OPMS, 52 captains attending the Ordnance/Chemical Advanced Course were asked to evaluate the new management system. Ninety-six percent (50) agreed with the doctrine of OPMS but were skeptical of its potential for implementation due to the long-existent traditional value system of the officer corps. "A sound well-intentioned system but it won't work" was the almost unanimous consensus.¹²

The Officer Personnel Management System then does have a credibility problem with junior officers who will be most affected by the new system. DA has recognized this fact and has directed promotion and assignment policy changes. However, the field of education has not been publicly addressed. To make OPMS a viable management system, the concept of military education being requirements driven, tailored to the individual officer and his specialty, must be defined—and publicized.

The details of such a system must be developed considering the assignment and education interface. When an educational requirement is identified and evaluated in terms of requirement, objective and scope, the next decision is how best to provide the learning experience. Resident and nonresident, civil and military, on-the-job and off-the-job—all are possibilities that must be considered. Traditional avenues of education, like the officer generalist, must give way to OPMS.

When this action is taken and publicly announced as Army policy, the education of Army officers will have achieved credibility. A "Pathway to Professionalism" will become evident to each officer.

NOTES

1 Robert F. Mager, *Goal Analysis*, Fearon Publishers, Belmont, Calif., 1972, p 5.

2 Department of the Army Message DAPE, Subject: The Officer Personnel Management System, date-time group 191640Z July 1974, paragraph 3.

3 Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Utilization*, March 1974, paragraph 1-1a.

4 *Ibid.*, paragraph 2-1a

5 US Army Training and Doctrine Command Message ATCS (DePuy Sends), Subject Officer Basic and Advanced Course Curricula, date-time group: 062020Z September 1973, paragraph 4.

6 Brigadier General John F. Forrest, addressing the Ordnance/Chemical Advanced Course students, US Army Ordnance Center and School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md, 16 July 1974.

7 Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training*, 29 October 1973, paragraph 1-4f.

8 US Army Training and Doctrine Command Message ATTS-PF-CE, Subject: OPMS Education System, date-time group: 271840Z November 1973, paragraphs 3 and 4.

9 Message From the Commandant, Major General J. H. Cushman, *Command and General Staff Officer Course, Nonresident/Resident Program Booklet*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1974-75.

10 Colonel Cyrus V. Bracato, Chairman, Logistics Career Development Department, US-ALMC, in an address at the Career Development of Logisticians Conference, US Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Va., 15 January 1974.

11 "Merit Lists to End," *Army Times*, 31 July 1974.

12 OPMS Questionnaire, administered to advanced course students by the author, US Army Ordnance Center and School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md, June 1974.

Soviet Technological Preparation for Night Combat

Captain Eugene D. Bétit, United States Army

PRIOR to World War II, the night attack was regarded as an extremely difficult and hazardous undertaking, possessing negligible tactical value and enjoying little probability of success. This view changed radically as night attacks were used increasingly with better effect to secure first limited, and then somewhat more ambitious, objectives in less time and with fewer casualties than during the day. Night attacks were used in all theaters in World War II. During the Korean Conflict, they became almost routine, especially after the Chinese Communists entered the struggle. At El Alamein, General Montgomery, in one of the most carefully planned night attacks in modern military history, deployed an entire British army to smash Rommel's *Afrika Korps*.¹

During the "Great Fatherland War" (World War II), the Soviet Army also made widespread use of darkness to conduct a variety of operations ranging from the regrouping

and concentration of forces for major offensives to pursuit operations which exploited successes initiated during daylight hours. The Soviets made extensive use of the cover of night for resupply operations.² The last major Russian effort of the war, the drive on Berlin, was launched by a night assault across the Oder River by three Soviet fronts (the equivalent to the US Army Group).³ Most of the Soviet Army's opposed water crossings occurred under the cover of darkness.⁴

Today's Soviet military leaders stress the ability to continue operations throughout hours of darkness. Not only is this ability demanded in regulations, but it is also amply underlined in the Soviet military press with emphasis on the value of night operations under conditions of nuclear warfare and the widespread use of mass destruction weapons:

The resolute and highly maneuverable characteristics of modern combat,

the striving of both sides to defeat the enemy with minimum losses and in the shortest possible time—all this makes it incumbent on subunits to carry out combat actions continuously, by day and night. Night cannot be a reason for decreasing activity. On the contrary, the dark of night is used to achieve surprise, increase the rates of advance, and win time. Continuous combat actions by subunits at night are therefore becoming an objective necessity, and night action the usual type of action. (Emphasis added.)⁵

Another exposition on the subject appearing in the Soviet press declared:

Soviet military theoretical science,



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The author wishes to thank Dr. Arthur G. Volz, formerly of the USA-REUR Technical Intelligence Center, for his help in researching this article.

exploiting the rich experience of the Great Fatherland War and the post-war development of armed combat, attaches considerable significance to night combat operations. The appearance of nuclear-armed missiles and other destructive means, as well as radar, infrared, and other apparatus, has significantly increased the possibility for night combat. . . . Night offensive actions and actions under reduced visibility make possible the attainment of surprise, create conditions for the destruction of the enemy by smaller forces and with fewer losses.⁶

There can be no doubt of Soviet interest in this aspect of modern combat. A series of articles covering nearly every aspect of night action appeared in *Voennyi Vestnik* and *Soviet Military Review* over the past four years. "Night Training of the Armed Forces" was one of four special themes to which an entire issue of *Voennyi Vestnik* was devoted in 1974.⁷

As could be expected of a technologically advanced nation, the Soviet Armed Forces are equipped with a variety of infrared scopes and night vision aids for surveillance, driving and night firing. Moreover, recent articles have disclosed that quantities of starlight scopes were captured from the Arabs during last fall's Arab-Israeli confrontation. It can, therefore, be assumed that Soviet and probably other Warsaw Pact forces have been issued this equipment on a large scale.

The APN series of infrared sighting equipment with a reported range of "several hundred meters" is employed on Soviet and Warsaw Pact recoilless guns, as well as on antitank and field guns of 57 to 100mm for direct fire upon tanks or fortified posi-

tions. Similar night sighting equipment is known to be installed on medium tanks from the *T54* to the *T62* series.

On the *T54*, an *FR82* filter is mounted on the conventional *FG10* tank headlight, providing a normal effective range of about 90 meters and a field of view of 29 meters at 50 meters.⁸ The *T10M* heavy tank and the *ASU85* airborne assault gun also have on-board infrared sighting and navigation systems. A binocular head-set-type device, the *PVN57*, is in service for navigating tracked vehicles, artillery vehicles and a variety of normal and over-sized engineer equipment. Commander's surveillance devices also are used on tanks and most models of armored personnel carriers, as well as amphibious scout cars.

The Soviets supply their troops with field glasses equipped with an infrared detection system, a good passive detector. The same system is employed in the scope for the *Dragunov* (*SVD*) sniper rifle, making it a capable "discourager" of undisciplined infrared use by any possible opponent.

According to recent Western press reports, the ranges of Soviet starlight scopes captured by the Israelis during the October War are significantly greater than the infrared equipment just surveyed. One scope reportedly could detect movement of individual troops at 732 meters, while it could pick up vehicle movement out to 1646 meters. Recently, the *Army Times* disclosed that the US Army has increased emphasis on the procurement of night-sighting equipment for anti-tank missiles, as well as night vision goggles for infantrymen and tankers, as a result of the equipment taken from the Arabs.

Possibly of even greater interest is the extensive Soviet use of some

rather technically advanced navigational equipment to facilitate movement during periods of darkness or reduced visibility.⁹ This equipment comes in three configurations: the most basic consists of a directional gyroscope; the second includes both coordinate and course indicators; and the most sophisticated, found in command vehicles, features a console which actually plots the vehicle's course on a topographical map. The equipment also is useful in forested areas, in cities which have suffered extensive destruction and in desert or steppe areas where prominent terrain features are lacking. One Soviet publication has mentioned that the equipment is expected to be useful in areas which have been devastated by nuclear strikes.¹⁰

Many Soviet combat vehicles, including all medium tanks and scout cars (*BRDM*), carry either *GPK48* or *GPK59*¹¹ gyroscopic compasses (directional gyro) which accurately reflect the vehicle's course (azimuth) within 2° for periods of up to 1.5 hours before it must be resurveyed. According to Soviet manuals, if special care is taken in surveying the start data, the machine may be used up to five hours before a recheck of the vehicle's location is required. The gyroscope is connected to the vehicle in such a way that it reflects the change of direction whenever the vehicle turns.

The gyroscope may be switched on only with the vehicle motionless, and it must remain stationary for at least five minutes while the operator goes through a detailed check-out procedure. Before setting out, the directional angle or magnetic azimuth of the vehicle's longitudinal axis must be determined and entered into the gyro. Three methods are used for surveying

NIGHT COMBAT

the vehicle, none of which are very complicated or time-consuming.

Not only must the vehicle remain in place during a five-minute warmup period, but failure to switch off the gyro's braking mechanism before setting the vehicle in motion results in equipment breakdown. Unfortunately, no material is available concerning maintenance or equipment "downtime," but, on the surface, the equipment appears somewhat vulnerable.

Prior to movement, vehicle commanders must plot their route of march on a map and prepare data tables giving distances and various azimuths along the route. The driver determines distance covered on a speedometer, and, when the distance indicated by the table is reached, he turns the vehicle, with the gyrocompass determining the prescribed angle. En route, the commander checks the location of observable landmarks against his map. Soviet doctrine stresses that, conditions permitting, the gyrocompass base angle should be rechecked every 1.5 hours, definitely before five hours of use.

Articles in the Soviet press indicate that the Soviets place great emphasis on the use of this equipment on night marches. As far as can be determined from open sources, the system is more feasible than it sounds. One of the Soviets' more interesting application of the gyro is to maintain course during tank river-crossing snorkeling operations, and at least one article has described a combat assault by a tank battalion guided only by gyrocompass.

The navigation equipment package without console is found predominantly in artillery units where it is used extensively to establish survey data¹²—which would seem to reflect the mechanism's accuracy. The system's components include: gyroscopic

indicator, control panel, route indicator, coordinate display, two course indicators and a transformer. Average error is no more than 1.3 percent of the course covered; the set's gyro is accurate to within ± 20 feet over a half-hour period.

Approximately 10 to 15 minutes is required to ready the equipment for operation, and it may be used continuously for up to 3.5 hours before it has to be resurveyed. If the march is of greater duration, Soviet doctrine stipulates that several terrain features, preferably near rest areas, should be preselected for reorientation of the set. No matter what the length of the march, the map is "prepared" beforehand. The required sheets are glued together, and distance and azimuth readings worked out. For off-road movement, especially at night, the map is annotated with all directional angles and distances. A Soviet sergeant writing in *Voennyi Vestnik* stated that, on a march involving only four or five turning points, 15 to 20 minutes is needed to compute the route data. He developed a plastic calculator to accomplish the computations much more rapidly. Using the course indicator and speedometer, the driver can navigate although he must stop every 10 to 20 minutes to check his position. Apparently, the Soviets use *GAZ69* jeep-like vehicles equipped with this navigational configuration to lead columns during night marches—the others "following the leader" under blackout conditions.

When entering coordinates into the mechanism, care is taken to turn the knob only from plus to minus values. Otherwise, there will be play in the kinetic chain and inaccuracy will ensue. The equipment's accuracy is markedly decreased on ice, in deep

snow or in swamps because of the vehicle's spinning wheels.

The final Soviet navigational configuration, usually found in *BTR50* command vehicles, includes a map-plotting console plus course and route indicators. The error of the gyroscopic course indicator is, according to Soviet writings, ± 20 feet per hour. The apparatus continuously provides the vehicle's coordinates and the azimuth while plotting the route as it is covered. Map scales of 1:25,000, 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 may be used with the equipment. A good guess would be that these maps correspond to battalion, regimental, and divisional and higher echelons. Two map boards are provided so that the next map can be prepared as the plotter approaches the edge of the first.

Once set in motion, the apparatus is to be turned off only when the vehicle is stopped. The gyrocompass requires four to five minutes to come to a halt once it has been switched off. If the situation is such that the vehicle cannot stop, however, the re-

mainder of the apparatus can be switched off while the gyrocompass remains operating.

Admittedly, a number of questions remain unanswered. Of paramount interest is hard data on the system's accuracy under actual field conditions and the actual state of the art of its employment by Soviet troops.

Limited as this survey is by the availability of pertinent data in the open press, it is evident that the Soviets have reason to be proud of their technological preparation for night combat. Soviet troops have been equipped with considerable quantities of quality hardware, including both starlight and infrared systems, to aid in night movements, observation and weapons sighting. Moreover, the three configurations of Soviet land navigation equipment endow Soviet reconnaissance, armor, artillery and command and control elements with a considerable advantage vis-à-vis any future opponent not so equipped. At present, this includes all Western armies.

NOTES

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2 B Krzhivskii, et al., *Nochnoi Boi (Night Combat)*, Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, Moscow, USSR, 1963 This is an abridged translation of a Czech work first published in Prague in 1960 Although not completely up to date, this is a valuable, comprehensive treatment of the subject.

3 Cornelius Ryan, *The Last Battle*, Simon and Schuster Inc., N. Y., 1967, p 331.

4 Major L. Chyzankov, "Cherez Vodnuu Perr-grady Noch'iu" ("Across Water Obstacles at Night"), *Voennyi Vestnik*, June 1971, p 44.

5 Colonel I. Vorobyov, "Night Offensive," *Soviet Military Review*, June 1972, p 13.

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8 *Communist Weapons and Equipment Handbook*, SUP R 66152, (DINRI), US Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Md., January 1969, p 21

9 All data for this section is derived from A. M. Gavorukhin and M. V. Gamezo, *Spravochnik Ofitsera po Voennoi Topografii (Military Topographic Officer's Handbook)*, Military Publishing House, Moscow, USSR, 1968, particularly Chapter VIII, "Premechnoe Navigatsionnoi Apparaty pri Orientirovani" ("Use of Navigational Apparatus for Orientation"), pp 201-26

10 Colonel A. Krylov, "V Uslovniakh Ogranichennoi Vidimosti" ("In Conditions of Limited Visibility"), *Voennyi Vestnik*, July 1973 p 39.

11 Major E. Krylov and Major S. Balaban, "Orientirovaniye Tanko po Kompassu," ("Tank Orientation Using Compass") *Voennyi Vestnik*, November 1972, p 43.

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ARTICLES OF INTEREST

Negotiation: The Art of Diplomacy Compared to the Art of War

By Alain Plantey

Défense Nationale, June 1974 (France)

Translated and condensed by
COL John W. Price, USAR

Diplomacy is not too different from war. Negotiations usually precede, accompany and follow war. Both are ways of settling conflicts between groups. The great peace conferences have been fully as important as the great battles. As contacts between nations increase, negotiation becomes of greater importance, especially since modern states rarely begin hostilities without first cultivating alliances.

In diplomacy, the use of power has more limitations than on the battlefield, as a nation does not feel bound by a treaty it has been forced to sign.

It has been said that trading nations have been more inclined to negotiate, whereas continental nations with exposed frontiers have been more inclined to resort to war, ignoring negotiation and seeking domination. But this thesis does not hold up, for domination can be obtained through negotiation, and trading nations often have been conquerors. Both warriors and diplomats seek to establish inequality, in favor of their side.

It is as difficult to establish rules for diplomacy as compared to those for war. The good negotiator depends on observation, analysis, deduction and even intuition as much as he does on knowledge of law, customs and tradition. Negotiation is a living thing; it must adjust quickly to the reactions of the other side, especially to the unforeseen.

Diplomacy is not always an instrument of peace; it can lead deliberately in the direction of war.

In battle, victory on the field is the simple aim, but, in negotiation, the usual outcome is not a rout but a compromise or even a postponement of the question. The refusal to open negotiations some times can tell us as much as the refusal to give battle. One should always calculate the consequences of a stalemate, and the man who is determined—whether through weakness or vanity—to come away with a signed agreement as evidence of “success” has failed to do his job properly.

Negotiations should be regarded not as tactics but as part of strategy. The Munich agreements were tactical in the sense of being a maneuver to placate the ambitions of a statesman—hence, a battle lost, but they also pulled apart the whole strategic balance of Europe—hence, the equivalent of a war lost. Many a conference has been lost because the chief negotiator had no clear conception of a strategic goal in mind.

Both diplomats and warriors try to discover vulnerable points in the opposition, but the negotiator must have a wider view of the possible consequences of each move, not merely for the parties present, but also for those absent. Diplomacy like war, demands clear thinking, complex maneuvering, scores of stratagems and infinite subtlety.

The Mentality of Soviet Soldiers

By COL Erich Sobik

Truppenpraxis, January 1974
(West Germany)

It is hard to stereotype Soviet soldiers, but examples of several common denominators provide a fairly accurate composite picture.

Historically, Russians have had to learn to survive severe geographic and climatic conditions. The Soviet soldier of today can endure many more physical hardships than the average Western soldier is accustomed to facing. Soviet soldiers also seem to know how to use this environment to its fullest advantage. Such stamina contributes to the Soviet soldiers' combat effectiveness.

The people who make up the Soviet Union today often were subject to brutal

slavery in the past. Although Soviet soldiers often show almost childlike tenderness and a big heart, they also are just as often brutally insensitive to human feelings and death of the enemy, his comrades or himself. This fluctuation is unpredictable and thus gives the advantage to Soviet soldiers in guessing games among commanders during combat.

More recent Soviet history has contributed conflicting characteristics to the Soviet soldier. Love of fatherland, absolute hatred of the enemy, harshness and discipline drilled into the soldier benefit him in combat. Negative characteristics ingrained through Soviet ideology include the lack of open initiative, intellectual creativity and constructive criticism. These factors which inhibit self-sufficiency seem to be most detrimental to the effectiveness of noncommissioned officers in the Soviet Armed Forces.


Although the Soviet Union consists of people of many different races and cultural heritages, Soviet soldiers have enough in common historically and environmentally for us to gain a better understanding of the mentality of the Soviet soldier.

(The author is a G2 who has done extensive research into the area of Soviet soldiers and has written several articles on this subject.)

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more detailed accounts, readers should refer to the original articles. No official endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements in these items is intended or should be inferred.—*The Editor.*

UNITED STATES

F14



The 100th *F14 Tomcat* air superiority fighter takes off from Grumman Aerospace Corporation's Flight Test Facility. Two *F14* squadrons, consisting of 24 aircraft, are already operational with the fleet aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* in the Pacific while preparations are underway for the deployment of two additional squadrons aboard the USS *John F. Kennedy* next year. Grumman is currently delivering *F14s* to the US Navy at the rate of five per month.

HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The 399th Civil Affairs Group is researching its history. Former members of the 99th Military Government Group or the 34th, 49th, 57th, 63d or 71st Military Government Companies are asked to write the 399th Civil Affairs

Group, ATTN: Historian, Eagle Road, Danbury, Connecticut 06810. Former members of the 40th Infantry Division who have knowledge of these units also are asked to contact the 399th.

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HELLFIRE DEMONSTRATED

US Army Missile Command gunners recently fired two laser guided missiles almost simultaneously and hit two tanks at Redstone Arsenal marking the first successful ripple fire demonstration of the Army's new *Hellfire* weapon system.

The missiles were launched from a *Huey-Cobra* helicopter. One tank was illuminated by an airborne helicopter and the second tank by a ground designator. The missiles were "coded" to home on their respective targets approximately 60 feet apart.


During a rapid-fire demonstration, the *Cobra* gunship launched two missiles eight seconds

apart and both scored direct hits, using only one laser designator.

Hellfire, being developed for air launch from attack helicopters, will provide the Army with a family of terminal homing seeker weapons to engage a variety of tank and hardpoint targets. It is the first antitank weapon designed especially for helicopter launch.

Rockwell International provided the *Hornet* missiles and laser seekers used in the test. Hughes Aircraft Company developed the ground laser designator, and Northrop Corporation provided the airborne designator.

MINE-CLEARING PLOW



The track-width plow, under development at the US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, uncovers mines and casts them aside undetonated. Each moldboard has four protruding teeth. A chain curtain detonates tilt rod mines before they can reach the tank's belly.

MANPACK RADIO



This *Manpack* radio, providing over 280,000 high-frequency band channels, is being produced for the US Marine Corps by Hughes Aircraft Company. Disassembled, the radio is composed of the receiver/exciter, a 20-watt amplifier/coupler and battery pack. Reassembled, the radio is about the size of one encyclopedia volume. The model, designated the AN/PRC104, is virtually automatic—the antenna is tuned, the set is aligned and the transmitter comes up to full power when the radioman selects his frequency and hits the press-to-talk switch.

HISTORIES NEEDED

In spite of its official status as one of the newest branches of the Army, the Military Police Corps can trace its lineage through the various units that have performed military policy or provost functions back to the *Marechausie* Corps (mounted constabulary) of the Revolutionary War. But there are great voids in this history, particularly because the early provost organizations were called into service only during wartime or national emergencies, and then they disbanded with the return to peacetime and smaller armies.

The US Army Military Police School is attempting to fill these voids by gathering

information pertaining to military police uniforms, equipment, organization and operating procedures during the various periods. Documents, photographs, firsthand accounts and items of military police equipment are being solicited for the Military Police Museum.

All interested persons are urged to provide information, documents for the library, donations for the Military Police Museum, or "leads" to new sources of information. Any assistance or support should be directed to the Commandant, US Army Military Police School, ATTN: Historical Society, Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905.

POLAND

TRAINING AMMUNITION



New training ammunition was developed for Polish mortars on the basis of cost efficiency. The new ammunition is a subcaliber pyrotech-

nical rocket which is put into a mortar shell for firing. The launching shell remains in the barrel after firing.—*Soldat und Technik*, © 1974.

NBC MASK



A new NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) mask has been introduced into the Polish Armed Forces. In contrast to the older type mask, it has enlarged, oval-shaped goggles and a built-in filter. It seems to be either a modification of the similarly shaped Rumanian *M10* NBC protective mask in use since 1970 or a Polish development.—*Soldat und Technik*. © 1974.

OFFICER BY ACCOLADE

Cadets become lieutenants in this dubbing ceremony which takes place in Warsaw every year on 12 October, the anniversary of the Polish Army. Knighthood might seem to be a contradiction in a classless society, but the ritual seems to reinforce the conviction that the new class now holds the power.—*Kampftruppen*.



UNITED KINGDOM


ARMED FORCES EXPANDED

The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is expanding its armed forces. The armed forces are trained by British regular and contract officers. As part of the expansion, a women's corps is

being organized; the air force is modernizing its air fleet and adding additional squadrons; and the navy is being equipped with fast patrol boats and inshore launches.

USSR

MOBILE TRAINING CENTER



The officers' academy for Soviet airborne troops has devised a mobile station for training up to 12 students at a time to be platoon leaders.

This mobile training center consists of a *BTR50P* armored personnel carrier topped with a welded removable cabin. There are 11 training positions in this cabin, and the 12th is in the armored personnel carrier to the right of the

driver's seat. The cabin has a built-in tape recorder and loudspeaker system. Each training position has a closable peephole and is furnished with observation and communications equipment. The throat microphone at each station is connected to the leader's console which is equipped with three transistorized cassette recorders. The students' commands and orders can be recorded for later evaluation.—*Soldat und Technik*, © 1974.

STRATEGIC REACTION FORCES


Twelve airborne divisions form the nucleus of the Soviet strategic reaction forces. All 12 divisions are stationed west of the Urals. Each division has about 7000 men and consists of two to three paratrooper regiments with three infantry battalions of 450 men each, two artillery battalions with three firing batteries consisting of six 85mm field guns each and

rocket launchers, one parachute mortar battalion and one antitank battalion, plus engineers, signal detachments and combat service support troops.

Logistics support poses one of the main problems for these forces.—*Flugwehr und Technik*, © 1974.

SWITZERLAND

PIRANHA VEHICLES



6X6


Mowag of Switzerland has developed prototypes of a new family of armored transport vehicles called *Piranha*.

The standard 4X4 version is a 10-man armored personnel carrier (APC) armed with a machinegun. Special models of this vehicle have been modified as cargo or command and communications vehicles.


The standard 6X6 is an APC with a 20mm or 30mm gun, an 80mm automatic rocket launcher, a 90mm antitank gun, a 20mm twin anti-aircraft gun or a 120mm mortar. Modified versions can be used as cargo, command and communications, or ambulance vehicles.

The 8X8 APC is armed with a 20mm or 30mm gun, a 30mm twin anti-aircraft gun or a 120mm mortar.

The *Piranha* vehicles have a maximum speed of 100 kilometers per hour and meet NATO requirements.—*Soldat und Technik*, © 1974.



4X4



8X8

MR BOOKS

SCHOOL FOR SOLDIERS:

West Point and the Profession of Arms

By Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore.

291 Pages. Oxford University Press. 1974. \$9.95.

If you're a career Army officer—"grad" or "nongrad"—you probably have spent some time talking about "ring-knockers," "the WPPA," or the fact that Chapter 1 in Ward Just's *Military Men* is titled "The Academy" which he later describes as "the place where the professional army begins."

Whatever your point of view, you will enjoy *School for Soldiers*, an interesting analysis of West Point's curriculum and educational environment, as well as a treatment of some very important aspects of the profession of arms itself.

The authors suggest that "outsiders should approach West Point with the critical but sympathetic attitude of an anthropologist studying a different culture." Ellis and Moore are not outsiders, and their judgments are frequently severe and often unsympathetic. As nongrads who completed their active duty obligations teaching at West Point—Ellis in History, Moore in English—they were not socialized by the system but had a chance to observe it closely. Both are now college professors but apparently found it hard to perform that role at the Academy because they insist West

Point is not a college where one might ponder and test hypotheses, but a professional school with a very specialized curriculum.

The issue is "how soldiers should be educated." Ellis and Moore disagree with statements in *Barron's Profiles of American Colleges* that the Academy has a "two-fold mission—military and academic; that the cadet emerges as a man of independent mind and will; or that intellectual stimulation can develop in him an investigative and probing mind." The authors quote many faculty members to support their view that the Academy's mission is strictly military—to graduate Regular Army officers. But, again, the question is what should a soldier be? Ellis and Moore believe the cadet regimen and the Academy curriculum produce an uncritical, automatic response to the orders of established authority, the inability to develop intellectual curiosity, the refusal to ask prior questions, and a desire for simple, short-term answers—in short, "the military mind." They argue that the desire to create mental toughness, rather than encourage inquiring minds, results in officers ill-equipped

to struggle with complexities such as Vietnam or problems concerning race or drugs. *School for Soldiers* says West Point:

... has merely systematized a process for producing industrious professionals whose success has little connection with either a social good or an ethical imperative. . . .

The authors' criticism is not, as Josiah Bunting once put it, "the petulant exorcism of preconceived dislike for the military." But neither is *School for Soldiers* the balanced account the authors suggest it is. Ellis and Moore accurately describe the "survey" nature of many courses and the "over-scheduled" cadet week. But they fail to mention opportunities for validation, advanced placement and honors courses; they soft-peddle the elective program though it includes an interesting variety of courses, including a Black Studies Program which Ellis helped develop; they do not describe the cadets' extensive participation in the Fine Arts Forum— a program of cultural activities to which Robert Moore made a significant contribution; and nowhere in the book is there any reference to the very positive evaluation made by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.

Many officers will be annoyed by statements like:

... the academic proficiency necessary to teach college level courses is qualitatively different and takes longer to develop than the kind of skill an officer must master when he assumes command of a battalion.

This is a presumptuous, perhaps ignorant, perception which overlooks the fact that the officer prepares for command throughout his career and that he must have not only skills, but a broader, more humanistic attitude

which the authors themselves favor. Nor does such a statement allow for the possibility that Army officers enthusiastic about their material and the teaching challenge may be more effective than inexperienced graduate assistants or scholars with dog-eared lecture notes. But readers should not be distracted because the discussions of certain aspects of the Academy which clearly set it apart from civilian colleges, such as the Fourth-Class System (Beast Barracks) and the Honor System, are interesting, enjoyable and provocative. And read the notes!—a collection of pertinent, often fascinating material, some of which should have been included in the text.

MAJ ROBERT C. STIEPOCK,

Department of Command, USACGSC

HITLER'S WAR AIMS: The Establishment of the New Order by Norman Rich. 548 Pages W. W. Norton & Co 1974 \$14.95.

In Volume one of Norman Rich's study of *Hitler's War Aims*, the author makes a solid case concerning the *Fuhrer's* expansionist programs arising out of his ideological conceptions.

In this book, *Hitler's War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order*, Rich argues that Hitler after 1939, almost from the beginning of the New Order, had to improvise Nazi rule over all captured nations. What passed for ideology in *Mein Kampf* later had to be modified or abandoned once reality forces the Reich to adopt pragmatic measures in dealing with occupied Europe.

Only one consistent policy was pursued by Hitler in regard to the non-Aryans: the Jews. In *Mein Kampf*, he called for the expulsion of the Jews from the Reich, and, by 1938, after more than five years of rule, the "Jew-

ish question" in Germany was on the verge of being solved. But, as Rich demonstrates, when Hitler occupied Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Lowlands, France, the Balkans, the Baltic states, and western Russia, the incorporation of millions of "new Jews" only exacerbated the question until it became an imperial—rather than national—problem. Only the "final solution" suggested by Himmler and the SS, which was implemented in halting stages before 1941, seemed to provide the best approach to Hitler's insatiable mania against the Jews.

Rich's book goes far beyond the Jewish question, especially in his methodical and highly integrated analysis of Hitler's new order for each of the unfortunate 17 countries that experienced direct Nazi subjugation. The administrative, economic, social and political factors involved in assessing each nation's particular status within the new order are skillfully detailed and combined to form a fascinating portrait of horror and cold reality.

This concluding volume is not only well-written and historically informative, but is crucial to an understanding of imperial politics confronting free man in the 20th Century. When one reads the chronicle of tragedy during the Nazi era for these plundered nations, the invidious comparison of Soviet imperial politics in its New Order for Eastern Europe's captive nations can come to mind. Although the two systems are fundamentally different in ideology and controlled terror approaches, the common bond of slavery for their victims is enough to give any thoughtful reader real grounds for serious concern.

JOSEPH R. GOLDMAN,

Department of Strategy, USACGSC

TO CONQUER A PEACE: The War Between the United States and Mexico by John Edward Weems
500 Pages Doubleday, 1974. \$12.50

Because it has been so inextricably linked with the Civil War, America's war with Mexico often has been considered as little more than a prelude to that larger conflict. True, it was a nasty, peculiar little war with social and political implications that would not be settled before Appomattox. Controversial, too, with schools of historical thought that remain unconvinced today about the real causes of the Mexican War: the slavery issue, Manifest Destiny, sectional or national interests or the deliberate design of President James Polk. Still, the war against Mexico was important in its own right for at least two reasons, each of which constitute the double-barreled approach of John Edward Weems in *To Conquer a Peace*: the forging of an American Army through exceptional junior officer leadership, and the executive direction of the President as Commander in Chief. The author scores heavily in both areas.

This book describes the experiences of war from the soldier's viewpoint, the rivalries between Volunteer and Regular units, the dreadful human cost of inattention to military sanitation, the myriad of problems concerning pay, clothing and provisions and the controlled chaos of the battlefield. Coping with these problems was a body of young officers who would soon again meet on other battlefields as opponents: Grant, Lee, Beauregard, Pickett, Johnston, Sherman, Meade, McClellan, Bragg and Thomas. Their successes, their seasoning, their innovations on Mexican battlegrounds would be of inestimable value when the winds of civil war engulfed the

nation some years hence.

At the other end of the battle spectrum was the American Commander in Chief. That some called this Mexican conflict "Mr. Polk's War" was no misnomer. His executive direction of the war was complete and explicit. He set objectives, named field commanders and even outlined campaign instructions. He was a forceful, energetic Commander in Chief who never lost sight of political considerations stemming from the war. To dampen the presidential aspirations of his Whig generals, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, Polk tried to commission and place Senator Thomas Hart Benton over them. Failing that, he placed political commanders of dubious military merit in their armies. Right or wrong, Polk explored the realm of presidential decisionmaking and set boundaries which later Presidents would follow.

Augmented throughout by numerous maps and illustrations, *To Conquer a Peace* is an excellent account of America's first successful invasion of foreign soil and should earn the attention of anyone interested in America's "little wars" and their impact on the American way of war.

LTC JOHN G. FOWLER JR.,

Department of Tactics, USACGSC

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONGO, 1960-1964 by Stephen R. Weissman. 325 Pages Cornell University Press 1974 \$13 50

Studies of our foreign policy during a certain period and in a certain place almost always are done by authors who believe the policy was wrong. This book is an excellent résumé of the available information on the violent birth of Zaire. It is successful in clarifying the chaos of social and political

upheaval that showed so little rhyme or reason to most observers at the time. But the general slant of cause-effect interpretations and the conclusions are predictable: Other policies would have better served the United States, Zaire and perhaps others.

Specifically, Mr. Weissman would have had us recognize Patrice Lumumba as the only man capable of organizing the volatile situation in the early 1960s and unifying the numerous, diverse Congolese interest groups, some of which seemed wildly misguided. He may be right. Lumumba may have represented the best route to unity, stability and development. But the book does not conclusively demonstrate this thesis. Nor is it convincing in its argument that US policymakers should have seen through a veneer of radical language and recognized the Lumumbists as pro-West in the Cold War context of the time.

The underlying flaw in the book is its basic assumption that communism in the Congo need not have been regarded as a threat to Western interests—that neither the Soviet Union nor China had the means or desire to gain control there, and that the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson administrations should have realized this and resisted any temptation to support the interests of the former metropole (a NATO ally) or Congolese leaders who seemed to be more moderate in their political philosophies. Finally, the author indulges himself not only in the pleasures of hindsight, but also in the safest and most fashionable of criticisms of foreign policy decision-making—that the public and the Congress should be more involved in the process and that sinister forces in the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency should be less influential.

On balance, the book's strengths are

greater than its weaknesses. Mr. Weissman's research and his unemotional presentation of facts make a useful contribution to our knowledge of those eventful years in Africa. The author presents those responsible for the policy decisions often as ill-advised but sincere public servants rather than as seekers of power or wealth. Even though he would not endorse the manner in which they were achieved, he does not ignore certain favorable results of Western efforts in the Congo. No one doubts that Zaire now stands as a proud unified nation, its political and economic freedom and independence growing day by day, a leader in African affairs, enjoying constructive relations with Communist and non-Communist nations of the world. And that is what most honorable men hoped for in a city called Leopoldville on 30 June 1960.

LTC DAVID M. PARKER,

Department of State, Malawi

ARMING AMERICA: How the U.S. Buys Weapons
by J Ronald Fox 484 Pages Harvard University
Press 1974 \$15 00

This book is one that would be of interest primarily to a novice or student in the weapons acquisition field. Anyone with experience in the field will find nothing new in this writing. The subtitle tells exactly what it contains, "how the US buys weapons." However, the text is of value for one entering the weapons procurement field as it gives a good basic background that "covers the waterfront" of the complexities and intricacies of the acquisition process. It also might serve as a refresher to one receiving another procurement assignment after a lengthy absence. It will serve as a good reference source.

At the outset, the author states:

... the research supporting the book is not simply a collection of statistics from a large number of Defense and Aerospace Programs, rather, my analysis is based on:

1. An examination of procurement regulations and practices.
2. An examination of contractor bids and proposals to perform work for the Government.
3. An examination of records of actual performance by contractors on large development and production programs.
4. Interviews with Government and industry personnel directly involved in the Defense and Aerospace business.

The Harvard University Press bills it as a follow-on study to the *Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis* by Merton J. Peck and Fredric M. Scherer and the *Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives* by Fredric M. Scherer. Those volumes, also published by the Harvard University Press, are still classics in the field of procurement. I do not believe *Arming America* can be compared with them for either innovative research or significance of recommendations.

The book does include a concise review of the economics of weapons acquisition, Government-industry and Government-Congressional relationships, planning for procurement and production, procurement methodology, budgeting, costing, contracts and program management in a well-organized study.

A discussion of "buy-ins" in the Government source selection process is compared to civilian marketing. Profit philosophy, overhead and capital allocation to specific contracts are also of note. However, similar writ-

ings are readily found in other sources. Dr. Fox concludes that the procurement function needs a major restructuring which must begin with the individual citizen's vote and Congressional reaction to that mandate. Recommendations include a less time-consuming source selection process, centralization of the cost estimating function by service, Government involvement in every aspect of the acquisition process, better control of engineering requirements and a career field and incentives to keep good project management procurement personnel on the Government team. His proposals for solution are broad, generalized and lack sufficient detail for any short-range implementation.

This reviewer was disappointed that an individual of Dr. Fox's education (Ph.D. and former Associate Professor at the Harvard Business School) and experience (former Assistant Secretary of the Army) did not produce a more significant contribution to the weapons acquisition field.

MAJ THOMAS J. ATKINSON,

*517th Transportation Company
(Aircraft Direct Support)*

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS, 1808-1826
by John Lynch 433 Pages W W Norton & Co
1973 \$15 00

Even if you are not interested in climbing the Andes with San Martin, dashing through the llanos of Venezuela with Jose Antonio Paez, or proclaiming liberty for all Americans with Bolivar in Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, this volume belongs in the repertoire of those interested in Latin-American history. The events related in the *Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826* occurred over 150 years ago. Yet the discriminating reader will note in these pages the causes of much

of the turmoil which plagues contemporary Latin America. The introduction succinctly outlines the economic, intellectual and geopolitical events which precipitated thoughts of nationalism in Latin America during the last half of the 18th Century. The epilogue puts into perspective the effects of the revolutions:

... The rise and fall of caudillos, the frequent turnover of presidents, the repeated golpes, the suspension of constitutions, the constant political clamour, masked a basic stability and durability in post-independence society which made Latin America one of the least revolutionary places in the world. For these were superficial changes, struggles for power within the ruling class, factional not revolutionary conflicts, and they did not affect the mass of the people. . . Latin America still awaited—still awaits—those further revolutions in social structure and economic organization without which its independence must remain incomplete and its needs unfulfilled.

Between the introduction and epilogue, Professor Lynch relates the spread of conflict and independence throughout the Spanish-American empire, organizing the material by geographical regions between chapters, and chronologically within each chapter. As he discusses each region and its movement toward independence, Professor Lynch enumerates the economic, social and political advantages and disadvantages for the ruling elites, comprised of Spanish-born and American-born Spaniards, for the mestizos, progeny of racial miscegenation between Spaniards and Indians, for the Indians and for the slaves imported from Africa. This discussion in each chapter builds to the conclusion that any benefits accrued from

the independence movements were reaped by the ruling elites and that economic and social readjustments are still lacking in Latin America.

While some readers might disagree with the philosophical conclusion posited by Professor Lynch, the volume merits reading for other reasons. It is a well-balanced social, economic and political perspective of history, rather than a mere recitation of political and military developments of the revolutionary period. Further, it includes an extensive bibliographic essay divided according to geographical region and special topics for those who would pursue specific topics in more detail. Finally, one is prompted to ponder whether such phenomena as the terrorist bombings and kidnappings of contemporary Argentina, the recent guerrilla Tupamaro movement in Uruguay and the brief Marxist experiment terminated by a military coup in Chile are symptoms of the latent "further revolutions" against the social and economic structure of Latin America which Professor Lynch sees as antecedent to a complete independence in Latin America.

GARY L. SCHILMOELLER,
University of Kansas

WAR TO THE DEATH: The Sieges of Saragossa, 1808-1809 by Raymond Rudorff. 278 Pages Macmillan 1974 \$8.95.

The setting is Spain in 1808. The Spanish people explode in opposition to the French. In all of Spain, there were only 86,000 regular troops, including about 15,000 foreign mercenaries. This Spanish Army was short of money, supplies and equipment; only the artillery was an effective force. Yet Napoleon suffered his first humiliation as Dupont's army surrendered to a Spanish force near Baylon.

Saragossa, sparsely populated and poorer than most of Spain, became one of the first centers of resistance. Don José Palafox, local nobleman and member of the royal bodyguard, became Saragossa's leader and was soon a national hero.

During the first siege, the city had no fortifications and few regular military. The fighting was vicious on both sides, and the results reveal how a determined, untrained force can stymie a stronger, well-trained enemy. Official French losses were given at 3500, but this was considered conservative.

For the second siege, France sent its very best, but Saragossa now had 32,000 regular troops with artillery, engineers and cavalry. The French had 40,000 infantry, 3500 cavalry, 1000 engineers, sappers and miners and 132 guns. Before the battle began, both sides were plagued with sickness and disease. In the last two weeks of December, 10,000 Spanish troops were either ill or wounded, and an additional 1000 died in action. Spanish prisoners were not taken. Rather, the Spaniards fought to the death from rooftops, underground or from room to room. Mining and countermining became common. Finally, the city which was the last Spanish stronghold in Spain surrendered:

As the guns fell silent, dying men and women staggered out of ruined houses and cellars to die in the open, gasping in vain for fresh air in an atmosphere poisoned by smoke and the stench of decaying corpses . . . 6000 bodies were counted in the streets.

The conquerors described it as a horror to behold and believed it impossible that the city would ever recover. Some 54,000 Spanish persons had died in a gigantic cemetery that was once a city. The reader will sym-

pathize with the Spanish. It was a shame that such a dedicated group of people should sacrifice so much only to lose in the end. Historically, the battle was the turning point in Napoleon's career. The confidence of the French soldier had been shaken, never to recover fully. The era of total war had begun. The book is both entertaining and rewarding.

LTC CARL M. PUTNAM,

Headquarters, Forces Command

NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY-1813

by F Loraine Petre. Introduction by David G Chandler 403 Pages Hippocrene Books 1974 \$10.00

Francis Loraine Petre wrote this book in 1912, and the reprint in 1974 confirms how scholarly a job he did as a military historian.

The study will be enjoyed by all who are attracted by the Napoleonic period. One becomes immersed in the portrayal of battlefield pressures and in the daily actions of the corps and the fate of the commanders. The author set the precedent of analysis and commentary by which a notable school of more recent British military historians has become well-known.

Leipzig, justly called "The Battle of the Nations," culminates the campaign involving four major battles as Napoleon's opponents, perforce, Allies but far from being a cohesive command, were learning better tactics. The character of war was changing as whole peoples became involved and fought as nations as opposed to previous battles by hired armies. It is interesting to note the extensive mention of artillery, the terrific losses as masses of guns fired counterbattery at 700 yards and as various types of cavalry swept down on infantry trying to hedgehog themselves with cold

steel in their hollow squares, especially when heavy rain left whole regiments with muskets which would not fire.

The author comments that the emperor Napoleon, through political obstinacy, became the master of the general Bonaparte. His marshals and generals were beaten in detail as the widened field of battle no longer allowed Napoleon's personal style of action and his centralized command to be effective.

Furthermore, his personal judgment failed as he lacked tactical intelligence and visualized enemy intentions without knowing the capabilities of his own remote commands.

COL HERMAN W. W. LANGE,

USA-Retired

BATTLE FOR THE BUNDU: The First World War in East Africa by Charles Miller 353 Pages Macmillan 1974 \$9.95

This book should be required reading for any officer who considers himself a professional. The author, who traveled extensively in Africa and has published previous works about the continent, has compiled a very readable account of how a small German Colonial Army tied down a British force of nearly 250,000 men for four years. Eventually, this small band became Germany's only undefeated army in World War I.

For the strategist, the book provides a vivid example of how not to lose sight of national aims in a conflict. The tactician is offered a plethora of examples of muddled mission statements, poor leadership, faulty intelligence and efforts to fight a "modern" war in a not so modern environment. *Battle in the Bundu* has above-average map coverage. However, the officer may well have to supplement the coverage with a few large-scale

maps to follow the narrative more precisely.

The book is not without omissions: the author superficially covers the German unit organization and logistical system. He does not discuss how Von Lettow-Vorbeck, the German commander, exercised his command or how his intelligence net operated. Such nitty-gritty could have been covered in one of the chapters, permitting the casual reader to by-pass it, but it would allow the military reader to learn a great deal.

Battle for the Bandu will stand on my shelf as one of the better military books to have been released in the last four or five years.

MAJ JOHN B. HUBARD.

US Armu Armu and Engneer Board

ARMAGEDDON IN THE MIDDLE EAST by Dana Adams Schmidt 269 Pages John Day Co 1974 \$8.95

Written with commendable objectivity, Dana Adams Schmidt, for many years foreign correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* and for *The New York Times*, tells of the aspirations and frustrations motivating both sides of the several Arab-Israeli conflicts. This volume illustrates the highest level of professional journalism without the short-of-breath excitement or the partisan advocacy so often employed in reporting on Middle Eastern recurrent crises.

The tangled web of unconventional diplomacy and the equally unorthodox application of terrorism in pursuit of what are essentially political goals is made clear. In this context, the policies of the Palestinians and the tactics of the commandos are understandable. The author identifies and evaluates Zionism; he explores the "striking similarities in the tradi-

tional law of the Jews, and that of the Moslems." He does not ignore the actualities and the potentialities of the "oil weapon" and its application to NATO and to the United States. He tells of the ebb and flow of the arms race and of the distant governments that participate in it.

Schmidt is generous in crediting former Secretary of State Rogers' proposals for settling the longstanding disputes. He asserts that only the great powers working together can break the vicious circle of aggression, threats and retaliation. He concludes that new borders between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries should be guaranteed by the Soviets and the Americans. If there are further battles between the Arabs and Israelis, he expects that the latter will win albeit each time less decisively and at greater cost.

WILLARD F. BARBER,

University of Maryland

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Expanded Edition by Henry A Kissinger 304 Pages W W Norton & Co 1974 \$6.95

It seems clear that professional soldiers owe it to themselves to keep abreast of not only the events, but also the foundations of American foreign policy. In this book, Mr Kissinger lays the foundation in two essays, one called "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," the other, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy." He, then, in a collection of speeches and other essays, ranging in subject from SALT through Europe to the Middle East, goes on to show how policy develops.

There have been, of course, major events since 21 December 1973, the date of the last speech in this book: we have a new President, the energy

and food crises have been "discovered," and the West is in economic trouble. Nevertheless, this book offers an excellent starting point for a study of the US world position.

This book offers the reader two other opportunities for thought. First, Kissinger's essay on the interplay between domestic structure and foreign policy offers some keen insights into the impact of administrative structure and leadership style which any military commander or staff officer could, with reflection, find seminal. Second, it should be most interesting to compare Kissinger the statesman, under the pressure of events, with Kissinger the academic, analyzing and commenting upon American foreign policy.

The book's major weakness, that its structure—a collection of essays and speeches—leads to much repetition, is not so severe that I would not recommend it to members of a profession that is, after all, very much involved with American foreign policy.

CPT HARTMUT H. LAU,

Department of History, USMA

THE MEMOIRS OF HENRY HETH. Edited by James L. Morrison 303 Pages Greenwood Press 1974 \$13.95

Several trends appear evident in current Civil War historiography. One is in the direction of scholarly regimental histories with a strong social orientation; another is the surfacing of secondary characters for study. Both fill out the current picture of Civil War times.

Morrison's edition of the Heth memoirs is an example of the latter. Although the Heth manuscript has been available for many years—Douglas Southall Freeman used it effec-

tively to prepare his monumental biography of Robert E. Lee—Morrison makes it available on a general basis for the first time in print. This book is a must for students of military history.

Henry Heth had a slight tendency to relate secondhand accounts of events as his own eyewitness descriptions when these versions touched upon his reputation or interests—a human failing common to many memoirs and autobiographies. Morrison's scholarship points this out and highlights sections where Heth's recollections conflict with official records, other narratives, or current interpretations, thereby adding to the charm and value of the book.

Of particular interest to students of history are Heth's accounts of life in the Army and the United States before and after the Civil War. His portrayal of military frontier life in the 1850s is an invaluable addition to our understanding of westward expansion, and his memories of events during and after Reconstruction illuminate those tumultuous times.

Morrison's introductory essay on Heth the man, Indian fighter, Confederate general and loyal Virginian, is a masterpiece of scholarship, subtle wit and graceful writing, marred only slightly by a quaint bias against West Pointers. Heth was a West Pointer, but, like Morrison, he was also a Virginian. The book has merit in that either the biographical essay or the memoirs proper could stand alone. Nonetheless, they complement each other very well in their current juxtaposition. Morrison deserves congratulations for his impeccable scholarship, effort and achievement.

MAJ W. SCOTT DILLARD,

*Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations*

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

ADMIRAL OF THE NEW EMPIRE: The Life and Career of George Dewey by Ronald Spector. 220 Pages Louisiana State University Press 1974 \$10.00.

ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1972: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. Text by Science and Technology Division, Library of Congress 580 Pages US Government Printing Office. 1974. \$4 85

AGAINST THE TIDE: The Argument in Favor of the American Soldier by Colonel Peter B Petersen 288 Pages Arlington House 1974. \$9 95

ALMANAC OF LIBERTY- A Chronology of American Military Anniversaries From 1775 to the Present by Benjamin F Schemmer and the Editors of Armed Forces Journal 262 Pages Macmillan 1974 \$15 95

BELLAMY PARK. Memoirs by Brigadier General Bradford Grethen Chynoweth, US Army Retired 301 Pages Exposition Press 1975 \$10 00

BRITISH ESCORT SHIPS by Trevor Lenton 64 Pages Arco Publishing Co. 1974 \$5 95 clothbound \$3 95 paperbound

CHIEF OF STAFF: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall- Volume Two; 1940-1944. Edited by Brian Bond 216 Pages Shoe String Press 1974 \$14 50

COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: Official Background Notes of the U.S. Department of State Covering Contemporary Political and Economic Conditions, Government Policies and Personnel, Political Parties, Religion, History, Education, Press, Radio and TV, and Other Characteristics of Each Nation. Reproduced from the Department of State's "Background Notes" Series 950 Pages Gale Research Press 1974 \$12 50

COUP!: Allende's Last Day by José Manuel Vergara and Florencia Varas 182 Pages Stein & Day 1974 \$7 95

THE CROUCHING FUTURE: International Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy—A Forecast by Roger Hilsman 666 Pages Doubleday & Co 1975 \$12 50

DIE GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN PANZERWAFFE, 1916 1945 by General Walter K. Nehring 393 Pages Motorbuchverlag 1974. \$12.80

THE THRESHER DISASTER: The Most Tragic Dive in Submarine History by John Bentley 372 Pages Doubleday & Co 1974/1975. \$8 95

BECOMING MODERN: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries by Alex Inkeles and David Horton Smith. 437 Pages. Harvard University Press. 1974. \$15.00.

GENERAL MAURICE SARRAIL, 1856-1929: The French Army and Left-Wing Politics by Jan Karl Tanenbaum. 300 Pages. University of North Carolina Press. 1974. \$12 95.

THE GREAT NAVAL RACE by Peter Padfield 382 Pages. David McKay. 1974. \$11.95.

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