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From the Editor

There has been a lot of discourse lately on the formulation of strategy and the making of strategists. Critics have questioned the adequacy of the United States' national strategy, the appropriateness of its military strategy and the ability of its military institutions to produce strategic thinkers. The US Navy's maritime strategy has been scrutinized and assessed from nearly every conceivable angle. The dialogue on the emerging "competitive strategies" is heating up. All of this debate merely reflects our democratic way of life and promises to strengthen our national security.

Regardless of what one thinks of our current national and military strategies and the level of our strategic thought, the future promises to demand even more of our civilian and multtary strategists. The best explanation as to how to meet the future challenges to strategy formulation appeared in a recent article in *Defense* 89 by General John R. Galvin, commander in chief, US European Command and supreme allied commander Europe. Titled "How We Can Nurture Military Strategists," the article presented three ways to develop strategists: "self-development, in-unit education and formal schooling." It should be required reading for all military officers and the faculties of Department of Defense service schools and colleges.

The underlying theme to General Galvin's approach comes through loud and clear. It is this: there are no shortcuts to developing competent military strategists. It is a long, arduous process, and a lot is required of each officet in the form of professional reading and self-study throughout his career. Checklists and short catchy principles will not suffice to prepare him for a future role as a strategist. The "executive summary" of warfighting is out. In-depth study and reflection are required.

With the above educational goals in mind, this issue of Military Review offers a few articles on strategy and strategic thought. Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr., US Army, Retired, and professor of military strategy at the US Army War College, defines military strategy and provides a general concept for its development. He warns us that if any one of the three elements of strategy formulation is out of balance, there is a resultant risk to national security.

Steven Metz, a member of the strategy committee in the US Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint and Combined Operations, asks the question: "Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?" He finds the answer in certain cultural, organizational and historical factors inherent in our society. Addressing the "strategy" theme and continuing the dialogue on low-intensity conflict, Lieutenant Commander Charles P. Mott, US Navy, calls for a "Realistic LIC Strategy in Central America." He critiques the current strategy and offers some proposals of his own. Analyzing a contemporary strategic issue in light of historical lessons, Major John R. Martin contrasts today's maritime strategy with the Navy's pre-World War II War Plan Orange.

In a short fictional narrative, Colonel Michael A. Andrews, using modern military concepts and terminology, explains "how President Abraham Lincoln could have won the Civil War in two years." His unique approach to strategic thought and analysis reinforces the methodology presented by Colonel Lykke.

Speaking of fiction as an acceptable way to study military strategy and warfighting, Colonel Henry Gole, US Army, Retired, provides an insightful review of Tom Clancy's four novels. His title, sounding much like an incantation from the three witches in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, is "Friction, Fun, Fog and Fiction." Come to think of it, this phrase is apropos to the study of strategy and strategic thought.

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Articles to Watch for:

Rear Operations in the Light Division

Brigadier General William M. Matz Jr., US Army, Major Kenneth M. Wojick, US Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Atchison, US Army

Failed Attacks and Flawed Overwatch: A Lack of Mass and Speed in the Offense Brigadier General William W. Crouch, US Army, and

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas V. Morley, US Army

A Mobile Division for Future War Brigadier General John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, US Army, Retired,

and Colonel Robert C. Stack, US Army, Retired



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New Hall of Fame HONOREES

General Jonathan M. Wainwright and General Carl A. Spaatz are the newest members of the Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame. Induction ceremonies are scheduled at the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) on 16 May 1989.

The Hall of Fame was established in 1970 to recognize outstanding US soldiers who have served at Fort Leavenworth and have made significant contributions to the Army and their country. It is co-sponsored by the USACCSC and the Henry Leavenworth Chapter of the Association of the US Army.

Both served at Leavenworth as students in the USACGSC, Wainwright graduating fourth in the class of 1931 and Spaatz graduating in 1936, the same year he was promoted to lieutentant colonel after 18 years as a major.

Wainwright, who was the first captain of the corps of cadets at West Point, was commissioned in the cavalry in 1906 and assigned to the 1st Cavalry Regiment. Wainwright saw action in the Philippines against the Moro rebels and commanded a cavalry troop on the Mexican border.

As World War I approached, he was transferred to the field artillery and went to France with the 27th Infantry Division. He also served as the G3 of the 82d Infantry Division during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne oftensives of 1918.

During the interwar years, Wainwright served on the War Department staff, was schooled at Leavenworth and the Army War College, served as commandant of the Cavalry School, and commanded the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Fort Bliss, Texas.

In 1940, he took command of the Philippine Division and when General MacArthur was ordered to leave the Philippines, Wainwright directed a complicated and effective fighting withdrawal. When Bataan was forced to surrender, he moved the remainder of his force to the Island of Corregidor, where he was forced to surrender his mostly sick and wounded command on 6 May 1942. After Soviet troops liberated him in August 1945, he was flown to Tokyo to witness the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri.

Wainwright was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Truman for his "intrepid and determined leadership" and his "courage and resolution" against greatly superior enemy forces.

In January 1946, he took command of Fourth Army as a general and retired in 1947. He died in September 1953 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Spaatz graduated from West Point and was commissioned in the infantry in 1914. In 1915, he transferred to the aviation section of the Signal Corps and served with the 1st Aero Squadron during the Mexican Punitive Expedition. In November 1917, Major Spaatz became the commander of the American Aviation School in Issoudun, France, and was singularly successful in training fighter pilots for combat. Spaatz spent one month at the front and participated in the St. Mithiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, earning him the Distinguished Service Cross.

Between the wars, Spaatz continued to pioneer aviation and commanded the famous "Question Mark" flight.

During World War II, Spaatz commanded the US 8th Air Force and, in July 1942, became commander of all US Army Air Forces in the European Theater, also serving as General Eisenhower's senior air adviser. In December 1943, Spaatz was appointed to command the US Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe, where he oversaw the planning and directed the execution of operations Point Blank, Argument and Cobra.

Following the German surrender, Spaatz assumed command of the USSTAF in the Far East, where he became the only American flag officer to witness both surrender ceremonies.

In December 1945, Spaatz succeeded General Henry "Hap" Arnold as commander of the US Army Air Force and became the newly created US Air Force's first chief of staff in September 1947.

Spaatz retired from active service in 1948 and died in 1974.



General Jonathan M.&Wainwright



General Carl A. Spaatz .



Articles to Watch for:


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A Mobile Division for Future War Brigadier General John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, US Army, Retired and Colonel Robert C. Stack, US Army, Retired



Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr., US Army, Retired

In the wake of Vietnam and with the rise in emphasis on lowintensity conflicts, many have blamed military shortcomings on the absence of a comprehensive national and military strategy. The author here presents a conceptual approach to military strategy. He defines it, describes its basic elements, derives a model to show how the elements are related and concludes with some observations on the nature of military strategy.

*S = Strategy, E = Ends, W = Ways, M = Means

HAT is military strategy? In ancient Greece, it was the "art of the general." In its glossary of military terms, the US Army War College lists eight definitions of military strategy. This highlights the first of many problems in the study of this important but complex subject. There is no universal definition or even the approximation of a consensus. Today the term "strategy" is used altogether too loosely. Some call a line drawn on a map a strategy. Others believe a laundry list of national objectives represents a strategy. The problem is not just semantics; it is one of effectively and competently using one of the most essential tools of the military profession. In trying to decide between alternative strategies, we are often faced with a comparison of apples and oranges, because the choices do not address the same factors. Only with a mutual understanding of what comprises military strategy can we hope to improve our strategic dialogue. There needs to be general agreement on a conceptual approach to military strategy: a definition, a description of the basic elements that make up military strategy and an analysis of how they are related. For the purpose of this discussion, we will use the definition approved by the US Ioint Chiefs of Staff:

"The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force."

During a visit to the US Army War College in 1981, General Maxwell D. Taylor characterized strategy as consisting of objectives, ways and means. We can express this concept as an equation: Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved). This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strategy military, political, economic, and so forth, depending upon the element of national power employed. We should not confuse military strategy with national (grand) strategy, which may be defined as:

"The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives."²

Military strategy is one part of this allencompassing national strategy. The military component of our national strategy is sometimes referred to as national military

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strategy—military strategy at its highest level and differentiated from operational strategies used as the basis for military planning and operations. Military strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which is defined as "a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives." In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.

With our general concept of strategy as a guide—strategy equals ends plus ways plus means—we can develop an approach to military strategy. Ends can be expressed as military objectives. Ways are concerned with the various methods of applying military force. In essence, this becomes an examination of courses of action designed to achieve the military objective. These courses of action are termed "military strategic concepts." Means refers to the military resources (manpower, materiel, money, forces, logistics, and so forth) required to accomplish the mission.

If we fail to consider military resources as an element of military strategy, we may be faced with . . . inadequate military capabilities to implement the strategic concepts and to accomplish the objectives of a military strategy. This is the usual case when we are developing a long-range strategy requiring improved military force structure capabilities.

This leads us to the conclusion that mulitary strategy equals military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources. This conceptual approach is applicable to all three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. It also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy, operational art, and tactics. Strategists, planners, corps commanders and squad leaders are all concerned with ways to employ means to achieve ends.

Some readers may question this idea, thinking that while military resources are necessary to support a strategy, they are not a component of that strategy. They would limit military strategy to a consideration of military objectives and military strategic concepts. However, in discussing the importance of superiority of numbers, Carl von Clausewitz stated that the decision on the size of military forces "is indeed a vital part of strategy."4 And Bernard Brodie points out that "Strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons systems . . . "5 By considering military resources as a basic element of military strategy, we may also alleviate the problem of disregarding the importance of military

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objectives and strategic concepts while concentrating mainly on force structure issues.

There are two levels of military strategy: operational and force development. Strategies based on existing military capabilities are operational strategies-those that are used as a foundation for the formulation of specific plans for action in the short-range time period. This level of strategy has also been referred to as higher, or grand, tactics and operational art. Longer-range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives and requirements, and are therefore not as constrained by current force posture. These longer-range strategies are more often global in nature and may require improvements in military capabilities. Military strategies can be regional as well as global, concerning themselves with specific threat scenarios.

Military objectives and military strategic concepts of a military strategy establish reauirements for resources and are, in turn, influenced by the availability of resources. If we fail to consider military resources as an element of military strategy, we may be faced with what has come to be called a strategycapabilities mismatch; in other words, inadequate military capabilities to implement the strategic concepts and to accomplish the objectives of a military strategy. This is the usual case when we are developing a long-range strategy requiring improved military force structure capabilities. However, it may be disastrous if we are concerned with an operational strategy upon which contingency plans and military operations will be based. That is why operational strategies must be based on capabilities.

Let us zero in on the first basic element of any military strategy—a military objective. It can be defined as a specific mission or task to which military efforts and resources are applied. Several examples come to mind: deter aggression, protect lines of communication, defend the homeland, restore lost territory and defeat an opponent. The objectives



There are seldom "purely military" or "purely political" objectives. National leaders may choose to use the military element of power in pursuit of national policy objectives that are primarily political or economic in nature . . . Military commanders may then have difficulty deriving feasible military objectives from the objectives of national policy.

should be military in nature. While Clausewitz, V. I. Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung have all emphasized the integral relationship of war and politics, military forces must be given appropriate missions within their capabilities. B. H. Liddell Hart stresses that:

"In discussing the subject of 'the objective' in war it is essential to be clear about, and to keep clear in our minds, the distinction bereacen the patients and military objective. The two are different but not separate. For nations do not wage war for war's sake, but in pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence the military objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily---that is, practically--impossible."⁶

In our definition of military strategy, the ultimate objectives are those of national policy. Sometimes policy guidance is difficult to find, unclear or ambiguous. National policy also concerns itself with all the basic elements of national power: political, economic, sociopsychological and military. To make things even more interesting, national policies in these various fields are often overlapping and may even be contradictory. There are seldom "purely military" or "purely political" objectives. Naturnal leaders may choose to use the military element of power in putsuit of national policy objectives that are primarily political or economic in nature. This can cause problems. Sometimes military force is not the appropriate tool. Military commanders may then have difficulty deriving feasible military objectives from the objectives of national policy.

Now let us examine a military strategic concept. It can be defined as "the course

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of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation." Military strategic concepts may combine a wide range of options, such as forward defense (forward


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basing and/or forward deployment), strategic reserves, réinforcements, show of force, prepositioned stocks, collective security and security assistance. These are a few of the ways military forces can be used either unilaterally or in concert with allies. The determination of strategic concepts is of major importance. However, do not make the mistake of calling a strategic concept a strategy. Strategic concepts must always be considered in relation to military objectives and resources.

Finally, we should study the means portion of our military strategy equation-the military resources that determine capabilities. These may include conventional and unconventional general purpose forces, strategic and tactical nuclear forces, defensive and offensive forces. Active and Reserve forces, war materiel and weapons systems, as well as manpower. We should also take into consideration the roles and potential contributions of our allies and friends. The Total Force package must be well-rounded with combat, combat support and combat service support elements adequately equipped and sustained. Depending on the type of strategy we are developing, the forces we consider using may or may not currently exist. In short-range operational strategies, the forces must exist. In longer-range force developmental strategies, the strategic

concepts determine the type of forces that should exist and the way they are to be employed.

Now that we have looked at the basic elements of military strategy, let us try to put them together in some meaningful way. The figure shows one possible model. National security, our most vital interest, is supported on a three-legged stool titled "Military Strategy." The three legs of the stool are labeled "Objectives," "Concepts" and "Resources." This simple analogy leads one to the observation that the legs must be balanced or national security may be in jeopardy. If military resources are not compatible with strategic concepts, or commitments are not matched by military capabilities, we may be in trouble. The angle of tilt represents risk, further defined as the possibility of loss, or damage, or of not achieving an objective. It is, of course, the



duty of the military to determine if there is risk associated with a strategy, assess the degree of risk, and bring it clearly and forcefully to the attention of civilian leaders.

Let us test our model with an example to see if it is useful in explaining military strategy. The Carter Doctrine was a statement of national policy:

"Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. Such an assault will be re-



The means portion of our military strategy equation ... may include conventional and unconventional general purpose forces, strategic and tactical nuclear forces, defensive and offensive forces, Active and Reserve forces, war materiel and weapons systems, as well as manpower. We should also take into consideration the roles and potential contributions of our allies and friends. The Total Force package must be well-rounded with combat, combat support and combat service support elements adequately equipped and sustained.

pelled by any means necessary, including military force."

We must devise a military strategy to carry out this policy. One implied objective is securing access to our Persian Gulf oil supplies. We should first translate this economic/ political objective into military objectives, such as maintaining freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz and defending key oil fields, refineries and ports. The strategic concept might be by means of a rapid deployment force from our strategic reserves. But, do we have sufficient strategic mobility and power projection capabilities in being today to keep the stool level? Which leg needs to be adjusted? Military resources? To program and produce the required airlift and sealift forces may take years. In order to have a feasible short-range operational strategy, it may be wiser to change the strategic concept to that of forward defense and station or deploy more US military force in the region.

Perhaps we have examined the subject of military strategy in sufficient depth to arrive at some initial conclusions regarding its nature. First, it is not the title of a strategy that is important; it is the content that counts. The names are often changed for cosmetic reasons, reflecting little substantive alteration. A study of history shows that military strategies have been identified by a wide variety of labels. The "Massive Retaliation" of the Eisenhower administration, the "Flexible Response" of the Kennedy administration and the more recent "Realistic Deterrence" have all been referred to as strategies. We had the "2 1/2-war strategy" of the Johnson administration changing to a "1 1/2-war strategy" following the Sino-Soviet split, and the realization that buying a military force in time of

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We had the "2 1/2-war strategy" of the Johnson administration changing to a "1 1/2-war strategy" following the Sino-Soviet split, and the realization that buying a military force in time of peace that could fight 2 1/2 wars simultaneously was just too costly. These latter examples of strategic statements describe procurement guidelines for a force structure rather than military strategies.

peace that could fight 2 1/2 wars simultaneously was just too costly. These latter examples of strategic statements describe procurement guidelines for a force structure rather than military strategies. Other names for "strategies" over the years have been: attrition, annihilation, countervalue, counterforce, deterrence, warfighting, direct and indirect approach, search and destroy, oil spot, assured destruction, containment and countervailing.

One should remember that under ideal circumstances, military objectives and strategic concepts determine force structure and worldwide deployments of military forces. However, military objectives and strategic concepts are necessarily affected by the capabilities and limitations of the military forces in being. Military strategy may be declaratory or actual. In other words, as stated by our leaders, it may or may not be our real strategy. US military strategy has seldom been clearly expressed and infrequently described in sufficient detail for all to understand. Some say that it is unwise, impossible or even dangerous to openly enunciate a military strategy. This very act may limit our options in a crisis situation or tip off our potential adversaries on what our actions might be.

A nation may need more than one military strategy at a time. For instance, if a nation has only a deterrent strategy and deterrence fails, what does the nation do then? Surrender? Submit to piecemeal attacks and incremental losses? Unleash a massive strategic nuclear attack? These are some of the options, if it does not also have a war-fighting strategy. Military strategy can change rapidly and frequently, since objectives can change in an instant. However, it takes much longer to alter the military forces so that they may be responsive to new objectives and concepts.

In summary, military strategy consists of the establishment of military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives and the use of military resources to implement the concepts. When any of these basic elements is incompatible with the others, our national security may be in danger. $^{\infty}H_{\pm}$

NOTES ,

 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1 June 1987), 232.
Ibid., 244.

4. Carl yon Clausewitz, On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Pe


ter Paret, (Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1976), 196 5. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 361

6. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351.

7 JCS Pub. 1, 349

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^{2.} IDid., a 3. Ibid.



The current problems that American leaders seem to have in developing national or grand strategy are reflective of our history, traditions and cultural underpinnings as a nation, according to the author. He describes the systems and processes that hamper strategy formulation and offers insights to those in uniform who must struggle in the development of military strategy.

ODAY American security professionals and policy makers are inundated with calls for a coherent national security strategy. Critics contend that no comprehensive strategy emerged to replace the one shattered by the trauma of Vietnam. And, the argument continues, the absence of a unified strategy is rapidly passing from a bearable handicap to a true danger. Even those who do not go so far as to insist that the United Strates has no grand strategy admit that strategy is not a na-

tional strength. In general, Americans "have not developed a native tradition of strategic thought and doctrine" and exhibit an "inability or unwillingness to think strategically."

No one is more aware of this than military officers who deal on a daily basis with the threats facing the nation. Since all military missions flow from strategy, vagueness and inconsistency in the national strategy hampers the efficient performance of military tasks from the platoon level to the Pentagon. Skill in tactics or the operational art is useful only as a reflection of strategy; thus, the coherence or incoherence of national strategy reverberates throughout the military.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency — Editor

Strategy, according to B. H. Liddell Hart, is a process of calculating and coordinating means and ends.² Given the absence of a strategic tradition, the US currently faces a mismatch between commitments and the capa-

Vagueness and inconsistency in the national strategy hampers the efficient performance of military tasks from the platoon level to the Pentagon. Skill in tactics or the operational art is useful only as a reflection of strategy; thus, the coherence or incoherence of national strategy reverberates throughout the military.

bility to attain or protect these commitments.³ There are three potential solutions to such a dilemma:

An increase in means.

A decrease in commitments.

• The development of more efficient and effective ways of using existing capabilities.

It is unlikely, given political and economic realities, that a substantially larger proportion of national resources will be devoted to security in the upcoming decade, and retrenching on global commitments is both difficult and dangerous. This leaves only the drive to squeeze the maximum impact from existing capabilities. One way to do this is through a superior national strategy that coordinates all elements of national power in pursuit of clear objectives.

During the last 40 years, there were 13 attempts to craft a broad national security strategy.⁴ Most recently, Congress mandated the publication of an annual statement of American national security strategy by the president. In an associated move, the blue-ribbon Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy produced a number of suggestions.⁵ Yet, as concrete blueprints for a coherent national strategy, both of these suffered from serious shortcomings. The White House document was more a statement of "here's what we're doing" than a framework for the future, and the commission's findings proved so politically controversial that they were not embraced by top national security policy makers.

Retired Senator Barry M. Goldwater, who is painfully aware of the mismatch between national commitments and national means, bluntly stated, "We need a grand strategy and we need it now."6 Clearly, the nation is beginning to suffer the consequences of an approach to the world driven by whims and disjointed policies. Such an ad hoc technique is short on precisely the characteristics that define strategy: vision, consistency and creativity. But even while the US desperately needs a coherent strategy, security professionals and policy makers seem incapable of developing one. The causes of this conundrum lie deep within our national psyche and encompass cultural, organizational and historical factors. Since the military is an active participant in the drive for a national strategy, the better an officer understands these obstacles, the better he is equipped to transcend them.

Cultural Factors .

Impatience permeates American culture. Whether in personal finances or national economics, the thirst for quick gratification generates a "credit card" mentality. Resources are used wantonly and frugality rejected, since, like the grasshopper of childhood myth, the nation assumes that the future will take care of itself. Deficits and weaknesses can be confronted later rather than now. This results in a "throw away society" where next week's fashion, automobile or song must, by definition, be radically different than this week's.

American foreign and national security policy reflects this. Where Asians and Europeans appear willing to wait decades for the attainment of objectives, the United States flits from tactic to tactic, giving each only the



As the keeper of the purse, Congress is a vital actor in strategy formulation, but the natural antagonism between the legislature and the executive branch, when combined with the domestic orientation of Congress, hinders consistency. The congressional budget process, which leads to erratic funding levels for international commitments, amplifies this problem.

briefest period to generate tangible results. This impatience amplifies rapid swings in popular moods, particularly concerning the extent of American responsibility for the construction and maintenance of world order. Over time, attitudes range from megalomaniacal confidence that our system of social, political and economic organization is appropriate for all nations to morose self-doubt, characterized by the belief that the exercise of American power invariably generates evil.

From this comes a variant of liberal internationalism—the American ideology which is essentially antivisionary. American liberalism is process-oriented rather than value-prescriptive. As long as the proper processes are followed—representative democracy, capitalism, rule by law, constitutionally guaranteed liberties—the ideology does not specify codes of individual or group behavior. The dilemma for the United States comes when the appropriate processes do not generate the expected outcomes, such as political stability, individual rights and economic prosperity. On one hand, the United States hesitates to dictate outcomes to other nations—witness our discomfort with manipulation of the election in El Salvador to as sure the election of José Napoleon Duarteyet becomes frustrated when liberal processes are perverted by estswhile allies.

In a sense, any sort of central planning is considered a potential threat to freedom. A rigid plan is seen as the depersonalized equivalent of a dictator, and instead flexibility, manifested as "muddling through," is favored. Traditionally, Americans believed that "grand strategy was the agenda of monarchs, serving their needs at the expense of their people." This mitigates against what Edward N. Luttwak calls the "discipline of strategy." Further hindrances to strategic thinking come The dilemma for the United States comes when the appropriate processes do not generate the expected outcomes, such as political stability, individual rights and economic prosperity. On one hand, the United States hesitates to dictate outcomes to other nations... yet becomes frustrated when liberal processes are perverted by erstwhile allies.

from the general American approach to problem solving. This favors atomist and reductionist techniques that stress dichotomies and differences rather than linkages and relationships.⁹ The outcome is national security policy stressing a historical and politically sterile quantitative analysis.¹⁰

Organizational Factors


Čultural proclivities affect the way that decision making is structured. Organizational factors, in turn, create obstacles to the development of strategy. Two elements of our political organization are particularly problematic. The first is the dispersion of power—the system of checks and balances integral to the American political system. From Montesquieu on, political theorists touted the ability of checks and balances to preserve individual liberty and protect against state repression, but this same feature also mitigates against coherence and creativity.

Strategy making in the American system is essentially a process of consensus building. Power is spread among a multitude of agencies, and authority and responsibility are often quarantined. This is especially evident in relations between the branches of government. As the keeper of the purse, Congress is a vital actor in strategy formulation, but the natural' antagonism between the legislature and the executive branch, when combined with the domestic orientation of Congress, hinders consistency. The congressional budget process, which leads to erratic funding levels for international commitments, amplifies this problem.

The electoral process erects further obstacles to a coherent and consistent strategy. Policies are susceptible to radical quadrennial swings. In fact, such swings are virtually guaranteed by the need of political challengers to draw distinctions between themselves and incumbents. In addition, the spoils system, which is a traditional part of American politics, often leads to the selection of policy makers based more on loyalty to the president or possession of proper ideological credentials than on an understanding of history, statecraft or strategy."

Within this political turbulence, the intended vehicle of stability is the professional elite—both civilian and military—that staffs the national security bureaucracy. This talented group does, in fact, impart some sorely needed steadiness to American security policy. But the problem, as Henry A. Kissinger noted, is the essential lack of creativity and unrovation inherent in any bureaucracy.¹² Standing operating procedures, precedents, and the imperatives of interagency consensus and intra-agency conformity often stifle new ideas, and repressively channel policy into tested patterns reflecting past problems rather than present ones.

Beginning in the 1960s, the predominance of a "managerial" style within the Department of Defense (DOD) further isolated those rare planners who did think in strategic terms. Associated with the DOD reorganizations of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, this was initially an attempt to solidify civilian dominance of the military.¹³ The services quickly adopted the position, "if you can't beat them, join them," and began to stress management technique and quantitative analysis in their own practices and training.¹⁴ The predictable result was a decline in the skills needed for strategy.



Twentieth century experience further reinforced the belief that industrial production, rather than skill at strategy, determined national security. The ability of the United States to mobilize resources appeared boundless, hence these did not have to be used with efficiency. It was only conflict with an adversary equally deep in military resources—the Soviet Union—that began to chip away at this confidence.

Historical Factors

Shackles on innovation are not simply the creation of bureaucratic socialization, and rapid swings in political moods do not come solely from the absence of courage in contemporary elected officials. The reasons lie deeper than that. In fact, the "astrategic" nature of the American approach to the world grew directly from our historical experience.

Centuries of isolationism, the absence of clear threats to national security and abundant natural resources meant that there was little need for strategy. Attention naturally turned inward, and domestic matters received priority over international concerns. In addition, the geographic isolation of the United States, during the crucial period when the nation's political culture and *weltanschauang* developed, led to a self-centeredness and misunderstanding of other cultures. Any coherent strategy must be grounded in comprehension of both one's own values, proclivities and perceptions and those of potential allies and enemies. The psychological isolation of the United States, which lingers to this day, hinders such understanding.

In a great twist of irony, American military success was thought to prove that a peacetime grand strategy was unnecessary. In the 19th century, the only truly difficult war fought by Americans was, in fact, fought *among* Americans.¹⁵ Twentieth century experience further



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reinforced the belief that industrial production, rather than skill at strategy, determined national security. The ability of the United States to mobilize resources appeared boundless, hence these did not have to be used with efficiency. It was only conflict with an adversary equally deep in military resources—the Soviet Union—that began to chip away at this confidence. In a new variation of this traditional belief, Americans concluded that technological superiority could offset quantitative weakness, and again, skill, frugality and efficiency—all features of strategy—were ignored.

Finally, the post-World War II transition of the US world role from that of liberal reformer to cautious conservative also cramped the development of strategy. Strategy is essentially goal-oriented. The clearer the notion of the goal to be sought, the easier it is to craft a strategy to attain it. Conservatism, on the other hand, is antivisionary and seeks to prevent or limit change rather than encourage and control it. Thus, it is easier to construct a strategy of reform or revolution than a strategy of the status quo.

Clearly, the United States has not become a purely conservative or reactionary power along the lines of Prince Metternich's Austria. There is still something of the old liberal spark in American foreign policy and at least a misty vision of a preferred future world. But at the same time, the conservative tendencies in our statecraft are undeniable, and all too often we seek to thwart change rather than encourage and manage it. Whether one supports or opposes the conservatism that accompanies global responsibility and world leadership, the obstacles posed to the generation of a national strategy remain.

The "astrategic" characteristics of Americans are at their worst in the realm of grand strategy. It is there, where the need for integration and the impact of cultural and organizational factors is the greatest, that creativity. consistency and vision are in the shortest supply. Military strategy suffers somewhat less. Because the military is, to some extent, isolated from the rest of society, a distinct military subculture, which includes patterns of analysis, understanding and problem solving, exists. As a general rule, the military subculture is less hostile to strategic thinking than the wider American culture. But while the military subculture softens the impact of cultural, organizational and historical factors, it cannot totally deflect them. After all, military strategy must be accepted by the wider political leadership and, on a personal level, no officer is totally divorced from the nonmilitary dimension of American culture. Military strategy is simply one small part of a larger whole, since, as Gregory D. Foster noted, "strategy in the modern age can only be thought of as grand strategy."16 Thus, the military strategist must understand the impact

that both his immediate environment and the wider social context have on strategic planning.

Yet, however useful it is to understand the reasons for the "astrategic" tendencies of the United States, such understanding is, at best, a small step toward resolution of the problem. The real key is to search for ways to transcend these limitations. But given the pervasiveness and depth of the constraints on strategy, partial solutions are the best that can be expected. Many of the factors, particularly cultural and historical ones, are beyond the control of the cognoscenti who decry the lack of an American strategy. Even organizational factors, though more controllable, can prove extremely resilient to reform. The failure of the most serious and sustained attempt to organize American national security strategically-that of Richard M. Nixon and Kissinger-illustrates how truly difficult this is.

The unhappy conclusion is that in the short term, the United States must accept the costs that accrue from the inability to

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craft a coherent and consistent grand strategy. The consensus required to truly transcend the factors that hinder the development of a national strategy will only emerge as the costs of an "astrategic" national security policy become glaringly clear. Even the officer who is aware of this cannot enact major changes in the essence of the American system; but armed with understanding, he can learn to tolerate the frustrations that come from striving for strategy in an "astrategic" setting. MR.

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Lieutenant Commander Charles P. Mott, US Navy

US Southern Command has a strategy for low-intensity conflict (LIC) in Latin America. The national strategy for LIC is articulated in the National Security Strategy and in a National Security Decision Directive. The author finds that the direction and resources to implement either are woefully inadequate. He offers recommendations for a more realistic approach to LIC strategy.

UCH thought and work have gone into the development of a viable LIC capability for the US military. Regrettably, the present political and economic environment leads one to question the relevance of this effort. The US Congress and people have shown little or no inclination to support the long-term requirements, whether they are economic aid, security assistance, US military involvement or combinations thereof, that US strategy stipulates are necessary for success in LIC situations. Therefore, even if our assistance programs worked and the military were to prove adept at meeting the long-term challenges of LIC, the environment is one in

which the political will and extended resource commitment to sustain the effort would be missing. Our enemies are well aware of our political and economic restrictions and have observed past conflicts that showed the value of waiting us out. Nowhere is the situation described above more true than in Central America, where low-level insurgencies and underlying problems drag on because of circumstances beyond military control. And our present efforts, lacking widespread political support and sufficient funding, appear destined to do little more than maintain stalemates that eventually favor our enemies.

Our present LIC strategy in Central America leaves the military haphazardly committed and provides little in the way of specific obiectives that, if accomplished, would contribute to victory. When one reflects on similar situations in our recent past, most notably our unsuccessful involvements in Vietnam and Lebanon, it is difficult to be optimistic about our chances for success in Central America. The first order of business for LIC planners must be to participate in the formulation of a strategy that provides specific political objectives. If our country's political leadership intends to use military assistance in accomplishing these objectives, we must be able to translate them into tasks that the military can accomplish, which are adequately funded, popularly supported and which will contribute to victory. The strategy must overcome --rather than merely complain aboutdomestic political and economic objections. If such a strategy cannot be formulated, military leaders should stridently recommend against our involvement in a conflict.

Responding to Third World conflicts that pose threats to US security interests but which take place at levels below conventional war, the US military has sought to improve its capability to conduct LIC. William J. Olson, Director of the Low-Intensity Conflict Organization in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, notes several steps that have been taken by our government. The January 1987 National Security Strategy provided a LIC policy. President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive for LIC. A new unified command for special operations has been established as has an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

The services are working to improve their capabilities in this area and the Defense Intelligence Agency has a new division focusing on LIC intelligence demands.⁴ Military journals feature LIC-related articles in almost every issue. The US military has taken this aspect of its work very seriously. But whether these efforts will prove to be of any utility remains to be seen.

There is a definite awareness on the part of US policy makers that LIC often will be a long-term proposition, but our political and

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economic ability to sustain a long-term commitment also remains to be proved. In 1984, the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission) made it clear that for the United States to have a positive impact on insurgencies there, "U.S. military assistance programs require greater continuity and predictability."2 The 1987 National Security Strategy published by the White House and signed by the president notes that LICs "often involve a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies," and that "an effective US response to this form of warfare requires the national will to sustain long-term commitments." The 1988 National Security Strategy asserts that "the most appropriate application of U.S. military power is usually indirect through security assistance-training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment."4 The same document later admits, however, that "the security assistance account now falls significantly below the level needed to maintain, with

no expansion, programs critical to our national security interests."⁵ The executive branch can argue that Congress is to blame, but this is of little consolation to US friends in Central America and a clear sign to adversaries that there is much to be gained by waiting us out.⁶

For those in the US military working on the LIC problem in Central America, there is little reason to be optimistic that additional support for long-term programs will be forthcoming. In addition to the enormous budgetary problems that constrain funding, the domestic political considerations that had such a profound impact on US participation in the Vietnam conflict now apply in Central America. Polls in the early 1980s revealed that Americans were essentially ignorant about Central America, but as public opinion expert William Schneider has noted, this "vast uninformed majority is generally 'predisposed against US involvement in other countries' affairs, unless a clear and compelling issue of national interest and national security is at stake."7 Furthermore, the key determinants that the public uses to decide whether or not

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to favor US intervention in these types of conflict may be "just how long and how costly intervention is likely to be."⁸ While a degree of quibbling may be justified as to whethey the US security assistance programs in Central America constitute intervention, the bottom line remains that there has been no public outcry to support funding the type of consistent, long-term programs advocated by the Kissinger Commission, the Reagan administration and recent commanders in chief of the US Southern Command.

A realistic appraisal of the problems facing US friends in Central America, coupled with the present US resource shortfall for dealing with these problems, leads to the conclusion that there are serious limitations on what the United States, and particularly the US military, can accomplish in the region. General Fred F. Woerner, commander in chief of US Southern Command, writes that uncontrolled population growth, unemployment rates of 40 to 50 percent, enormous international debt obligations, declining foreign trade, illicit drug traffic and the presence of 27 subversive groups are placing severe strains on many of the governments in Central America.9 Against this background, Howard I. Wiarda of the American Enterprise Institute argues that the United States is now in a generally weaker position vis-á-vis this area than it was 15 to 20 years ago. US foreign assistance has decreased and no major new foreign aid program is likely. Outside actors have become considerable influences. The countries in question have become increasingly assertive and independent, and there is considerable apprehension over whether the United States "can carry out a coherent, sustained, bipartisan, long-term foreign policy."10 Woerner notes that "US Southern Command receives 4 percent of the worldwide security assistance. It receives 0.6 percent of the DOD manpower and 0.1 percent of the fiscal 1987 DOD budget."11 Obviously the military is not being held responsible for solving all the social, economic and political problems in Central America, but even making meaningful progress on the military problems appears increasingly questionable in the current political and resource environment and, perhaps more important, with the present strategy.

Despite the publication of documents that



The key determinants that the public uses to decide whether or not to favor US intervention in these types of conflict may be "just how long and how costly intervention is likely to be."... there has been no public outcry to support funding the type of consistent, long-term programs advocated by the Kissinger Commission, the Reagan administration and recent commanders in chief of the US Southern Command.

purport to set forth US strategy for dealing with current or future LIC situations, there is little evidence to suggest that the types of specific political objectives lacking during the Vietnam conflict have been elucidated for US military leaders today. The 1987 and 1988 versions of National Security Strategy of the United States have sections on strategy for LIC. They include statements such as "when it is in the U.S. interest to do so, the United States will . . . take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by employing appropriate instruments of U.S. power."12 The problem for the military leader and perhaps the American people as well, is that the when, where, how and why of these measures constitute rather large unknowns, particularly when popular support and funding for them is missing.

Equally disturbing is that these documents refer only obliquely to winning these con-

flicts. In his book On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. remarked that while the United States unsuccessfully struggled with determining what it was trying to achieve in that country, the enemy kept the conquest of South Vietnam as their objective.¹¹ It is prudent and realistic to recognize that LICs may be protracted struggles; it is militarily inexcusable to commit resources or men to a conflict with only a vague intention of prevailing at some unspecified later date. As the US strategy is now stated, there is no end in sight.

The military must find a way to become more assertive in the strategy formulation process or it will continually find itself participating at one level or another in unpopular stalemates. We in the military must do more than patiently wait for the civilian leadership to provide specific political objectives. Otherwise, we are apt to be disappointed again and again with underfunded security assistance Ϊ,

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programs or with undefined peacekeeping and presence missions, caught between the executive and legislative branches and left to perform missions at which we are not skilled and which the American people oppose or are indifferent toward.


One begins to suspect that the difficulty of obtaining specific objectives has deterred the military from participating in the process. Summers notes that after World War II, "the conventional wisdom among many Army officers was that 'the Army doesn't make strat-'egy." He goes on to say that this is a mistake, that "the Army General Staff is still charged with 'determination of roles and missions of the Army and strategy formulation'"¹⁴ and that "the task of the military theorist, Clausewitz said, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance among what he calls the trinity of war—the people, the government, and the Army."¹⁵

Pinning down the civilian leadership to worthwhile objectives was never accomplished during Vietnam and has not been done in Central America. Former Secretary of the Navy, James H. Webb Jr., stated that "in many instances, we have a breakdown in merging our diplomacy and our use of military forces in areas that are less than wartime environments."¹⁶ Writing in the Naval-War College Review, Webb noted that there is a need to "establish a better balance between our political objectives and our military forces."¹⁷

Because of what Webb describes as "areas in defense policy where the needs of the policy makers and the realities of the implementers diverge," we must make painfully clear to our civilian leaders what their policies realistically can be expected to accomplish.18 Muddling through LIC situations with ever-decreasing aid levels can be expected to produce stalemates such as those we see today. Periodic hollow displays of force when the force is never used invite questions as to a country's credibility. As one author points out, "capital ships offshore and jets swooping about overhead are irrelevant to internal politico-military struggles waged at subliminal levels."19 The same might be said of US troop deployments to Honduras in response to border violations in which the troops are prohibited from going to the border that has been violated.

Former Army Chief of Staff, General Fred C. Weyand, has stated that the military's primary mistake during Vietnam was failing to educate the civilian leadership about the "capabilities and limitations of American military power."20 He further notes that there are tasks for which the military is well suited-for example, defeating the enemy on the battlefield, blockading ports and cutting lines of supply. The American military is limited. however, in its ability to perform political, economic and social tasks.²¹ In the epilogue to his book, Summers echoes these sentiments on the nature of military forces, describing the military as "a battle-ax," and bemoaning the fact that "in the past we have tried to use them [military personnel] to accomplish tasks for which they were not designed-nation-building in Vietnam being the most recent case in point."22

Some of the elements for a viable LIC strategy in Central America have been articulated. A starting point is a serious definition of specific US interests in the region. Wiarda contends that our primary interests are to maintain access to raw materials, primary products, markets and sea lanes; to protect sea



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lanes around the Panama Canal; to protect our borders and those of our friends; to maintain stability; and to keep out hostile foreign powers. The United State's should make it clear that it will not accept intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another, attacks by one state on another or an alliance with the Soviet Union that leads to Soviet bases in the area.²³ The Kissinger Commission generated a general strategic objective for US policy in Central America—"to reduce the civil wars, national conflicts and military preparations there at least to the dimensions of the Central American region."²⁴

No matter how our country views its interests in Central America, however, the miltary must find a way to escape the quagmire in which it finds itself today. The United States will not adequately support the noend-in-sight strategy that presently is being pursued. Under these circumstances, two sets of recommendations with regard to specific objectives can be made to our political leadership.

One set of objectives would involve threatening and, if necessary, undertaking the bold military initiatives that could contribute to victory. Colonel Rod Paschall, director of the US Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, writes that "our range of options against insurgency should include mid-intensity, not low-intensity, offensive ground operations against those nations that sponsor insurgency."25 He goes on to say that in two wars since World War II, the United States essentially ceded the enemy contiguous sanctuary. "The payment for this policy has been a lack of US military success; protracted. indeterminate combat: erosion of American public support for US aims; and, most impor-



As one author points out, "capital ships offshore and jets swooping about overhead are irrelevant to internal politico-military struggles waged at subliminal levels." The same might be said of US troop deployments to Honduras in response to border violations in which the troops are prohibited from going to the border that has been violated.

tant, increased US casualties."²⁶ The Kissinger Commission asserted that "protracted guerrilla insurgencies require external assistance"; that the insurgents had to be cut off from their sanctuary, propaganda support, money, arms, training, logistics, communications and intelligence; and that without such external support an insurgency could not pose nearly as severe a threat to a friendly government.²¹ If the United States truly is committed to assisting a friendly government in defeating an insurgency, the military should recommend our employment in the ways that Paschall and the Kissinger Commission suggest would contribute to victory.

Similarly, if the United States is serious about reducing military preparations in the area to Central American dimensions, there are objectives the military can accomplish. The US military, if appropriately tasked, can reduce the offensive armor and air assault threat which the Sandinistas now pose to their Central American neighbors. The military can destroy the facilities from which these assets operate. It can take specific steps to convince the Sandinista leadership that completely terminating support to Central America insurgent groups is in the best interests of Nicaragua. In formulating a strategy that includes objectives as outlined above, there doubtless will be arguments over whether these objectives are politically feasible. They may not be. If these objectives are not politically feasible, however, and if our government and people cannot make the longterm commitment to prevail in LIC situations that our present strategy says is required, then the military should recommend a change in strategy.

An alternative strategy would have a set of objectives that are reduced in scope. This strategy would require an admission by our political leadership that our country does not have the political will to commit resources and men to a particular LIC in sufficient quantity to win. The strategy would recognize that the conflict is internal and not of vital interest to the United States. However, the strategy would contain provisions for taking specific military actions at a later date if specific national interests are threatened. In arguing against extensive US military and political involvement in areas such as Central America, Alan Tonelson believes that "specific security challenges . . . such as the establishment of a second Soviet military base or a local threat to the Panama Canal, are best handled by the threat, and, if necessary, the use, of force aimed directly at the challenge." If we attempt to do more, we get caught up in "costly and unpromising efforts to prop up friendly dictators or to modernize societies that are proven historical failures."28 A strategy with reduced objectives would recognize that, as Christopher Layne writes, "America can balance its power and commitments in two ways: It can increase its power or reduce its commitments."29 It would also take into account that "Americans strongly oppose prolonged and costly military involvement in Third World countries and know that there are many more potential Vietnams than potential Grenadas."30 Most important

for the military, such a strategy would again use our forces in the manner in which they function best. It would extricate the military to some degree from legislative and executive arguments and would leave us in harmony with the American people.

Summers writes on Vietnam that "our military leaders evidently assumed that although their strategies were preferable, the United States would prevail regardless of what strategy was adopted."31 The scope of the problems, the US resource shortfall to assist in dealing with these problems, and the US political environment strongly suggest this is not a chance our military leaders should be willing to take in Central America. Neither set of objectives offered above will be easy for the political leadership to adopt, but unless a rational choice is made, we in the military will continue to fall prey to political indecision. The present ill-defined, unsupported strategy will in large part negate any progress the defense establishment makes in LIC capabilities. MR

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In this article, current Navy strategy is analyzed alongside the historical lessons gleaned from the shortcomings of World War II's War Plan Orange. The similarities and differences are identified and assessed, with emphasis on today's strategic concerns. The author, an Army officer, warns against an unbridled offensive maritime strategy. T IS easy to look back on the centuries of practice of the military art and find examples of leaders who should have benefited from the lessons of history. Perhaps if Adolf Hitler had only studied Napoleon Bonaparte's campaigns, he would not have launched his ill-fated invasion of Russia. If Napoleon had studied the Peloponnesian wars, perhaps he would have known how his continental power could have defeated Great Britain's maritime strength. With the perfect vision of hindsight, the novice historian can quickly point out what someone "should" have done had he only understood the lessons of history.

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A far more difficult task is to take those same lessons of history and to apply them to present and future operations. Would-be makers of strategy are called to this task. Most strategists simply use existing policy and threat capabilities to do their work. The good strategists, however, take the teachings of the past, apply them flexibly to the present situation and develop a strategy to achieve current policy goals. Analysts and critics then dissect the strategy to find its strengths and weaknesses, frequently using similar historical comparisons. Such an analysis is represented by a contrast of today's Maritime Strategy with the pre-World War II Navy War Plan Orange. Although many factors in the two strategies present themselves for comparison, not all of them are of equal relevance. The parameters of this comparison include the degree to which the threat was considered, the evolution and suitability of the strategies, and the joint nature of the plans.

The Army-Navy Basic War Plan Orange of 1907 to 1938 was the national strategy to be followed in the event of war with Japan. Plans of that era were oriented against one particular country, and were color-coded for security purposes. Orange was the code for Japan. There were numerous plans for various countries, including War Plan Red, which early in the 20th century envisioned an unlikely war against Great Britain. Although War Plan Red was subsequently dropped, War Plan Orange went through numerous transformations from its inception in 1907 until its incorporation into the Rainbow war plans of 1939. The Rainbow series of war plans described wars in which the US might find itself fighting in a single theater or in multiple theaters.

War Plan Orange provided for an "offensive war, primarily naval in character." Although War Plan Orange went through numerous revisions, its principles were usually the same. A war with Orange would see an initial Japanese attack on the Philippines. The overpowered US fleet would be forced to leave while the Army remained behind to hold, or at least to control, Manila Bay. The Navy would then come steaming back with the remainder of the fleet to relieve the Army garrison. This would be done in six months. The fleet would then be in a posture to apply its numerical superiority in continued prosecution of the war with Japan. Planning for the subsequent invasion of lapan was not done in detail. This was due, at least in part, to the hope that the appearance of the fleet would induce the lapanese to terminate the war.² The dearth of planning also reflected Army and Navy disagreement about the involvement of Russia in the invasion. The Army (unlike the Navy) did not believe that US naval action alone would secure the defeat of the Japanese Empire; they believed an invasion-including Soviet troops-would be necessary in the end.3 ş.

The Maritime Strategy

The Maritime Strategy of today is the naval element of the national strategy for global war. Compared to the decades of development of War Plan Orange, the Maritime' Strategy is still in its infancy. Even with its relative youth, the strategy has already undergone several major changes. The present version, in its unclassified form, was written by many people but best presented by Admiral 4



The US fleet, with its overwhelming naval superiority, will wrest the initiative from the attacking Soviets, forcing them to react to US actions, rather than vice versa. The ships of the Soviet navy will be in their naval bastions as predicted and the US Navy will begin the process of destroying them (or will at least neutralize them by keeping them "bottled up"). Protection of the sea lines of communication, so vital to the forces fighting in Europe, will be accomplished far forward with an offensive strategy.

James D. Watkins during his tenure as chief of naval operations (CNO). He described the Maritime Strategy as consisting of three phases, encompassing the "global use of naval forces from peacetime through global war to war termination." Phase I is labeled "Deterrence or the Transition to War." Watkins recognizes that the primary mission of the US Navy and all the US Armed Forces, is to deter the global war they are prepared to fight. Such deterrence is best accomplished with forward deployment of US naval forces during peacetime and with rapid forward reinforcement in crisis situations.⁵ Without dwelling on the difficulty of obtaining them, Watkins also recognizes that "speed and decisiveness in national decision making are crucial" to achieve such reinforcement and the resultant deterrent posture in Phase I crises.

"Seizing the Initiative" is the title given to Phase II. This is the period of potential Mahanian sea battles. The US fleet, with its overwhelming naval superiority, will wrest the initiative from the attacking Soviets, forcing them to react to US actions, rather than vice versa. The ships of the Soviet navy will be in their naval bastions as predicted and the US Navy will begin the process of destroying them (or will at least neutralize them by keeping them "bottled up"). Protection of the sea lines of communication, so vital to the forces fighting in Europe, will be accomplished far forward with an offensive strategy of seeking out the enemy fleet and striking it. The defensive strategy of convoy defense, though probably necessary for certain high-value cargo shipments, will be discarded. Some convoy operations will still be conducted, but they will be relatively low on the list of priorities for allocation of forces.

The third and final phase of the Maritime Strategy is called "Carrying the Fight to the Enemy." This is probably the least well-defined of the phases, justified by the difficulty of predicting how war termination will be achieved. The US Navy will continue the efforts started in Phases I and II, completing the destruction of the Soviet fleet and projecting power ashore as required. As a postscript to Phase III, Watkins insists that the US Navy "provide options and broad concepts to assist the unified commanders in implementing their detailed plans."⁶ This latter point is the central theme of the Maritime Strategy: providing naval options for consideration by the war-fighting unified commands.⁷

Before contrasting various elements of War Plan Orange and the Maritime Strategy, it is important to note that it is not an "apples and oranges" comparison. There are enough similarities in the two strategies to justify a broad comparison. However, two glaring differences point out the need to exercise caution when making a general comparison. First, War Plan Orange was a plan for a singleenemy war, "confined" to the Pacific, fought by the United States alone.8 The Maritime Strategy is a plan for the United States to fight a global war with the assistance of a coalition of allied nations. Perhaps a better comparison would have used the Rainbow plans. These were plans, evolved in part from War Plan Orange, for a global war against multiple enemies. The trade-off, though, is that Rainbow developed during the years immediately preceding America's entry into World War II. Thus, its drawback is that it was composed in response to an imminent threat. War Plan Orange and the Maritime Strategy were developed in conditions of peace, even if Watkins · chooses to call it a "violent peace." War with Japan, though decidedly not a "global" war,


The basic components of war in the Pacific were sea power and naval bases. The Army's role in War Plan Orange would be a supporting one, defending the bases . . . the Navy, by its continued insistence on an offensive strategy, blocked the Army's desire for a more defemsible Pacific perimeter and may have, in that sense, contributed to the disaster at Corregidor and Bataan.

was significantly large enough in scope—the Pacific—to make valid its comparison with the Maritime Strategy.

The second caveat for a comparison of War Plan Orange and the Maritime Strategy stems from the nonnuclear nature of War Plan Orange. Although the eventual war with Japan ended with the use of atomic weapons, its planners could not have foreseen this. The makers of the Maritime Strategy, like the War Plan Orange strategists, plan for a conventional war. Their plans, however, must be evaluated not only for their conventional value, but also for how they affect the nuclear situation. There is no discounting this dissimilarity. It is just one of the elements to be ⁴/₇ considered when applying the lessons of prenuclear history to the events of today.

Enemy Capabilities

Any good strategy will base itself of the enemy's capabilities. Far too often, strategists devise a plan that will work only if themy and friendly actions occur exactly as scheduled. When the enemy does not oblige the planners, the strategy fails. War Plan Orange, especially in its earliest versions, was more a statement of hopes than capabilities, scarcely more than an abstract idea, with little relation to reality.¹⁰ What the planners most wanted the Japanese to do was not to attack, or at least to wait as long as possible before



(Below) US warships cruising in a multicarrier task group. (Right) Soviet Victor III class nuclear attack submarine armed

War Plan Orange was a plan for "tomorrow's forces," not the forces of 1924, 1939 or even 1941. For example, General Douglas MacArthur thought he could have the Philippine army ready to defend its nation by 1946 if Congress would approve the funds.


Maritime Strategy is purportedly a plan for "today's forces, today's capabilities and today's threat." There is some concern for the Navy budget, however. It is probably no coincidence that former Navy Secretary John Lehman tied the 600-ship Navy to the Maritime Strategy.

doing so. War Plan Orange was a plan for "tomorrow's forces," not the forces of 1924, 1939 or even 1941. For example, General Douglas MacArthur thought he could have the Philippine army ready to defend its nation by 1946 if Congress would approve the funds. In 1922, he would have had some 17,000 US and Filipino soldiers, plus about 18 aircraft, to fight the 300,000 soldiers the Japanese could have landed on the islands in the first month of a war." Clearly, if the Japanese had attacked, the Philippine garrison would have faced dire circumstances.

with 18 533mm torpedges for use against shipping.

In contrast, the Maritime Strategy is purportedly a plan for "today's forces, today's capabilities and today's threat."¹² There is some concern for the Navy budget, however. It is probably no coincidence that former Navy Secretary John Lehman tied the 600-ship Navy to the Maritime Strategy. The Navy should be commended for devising a way to link its procurement activities to warfighting capabilities. All the services should do so. The Navy uses the best possible intelligence estimate, says how it will fight the depicted enemy and asks Congress to approve the required funds and equipment. Where the Navy can be faulted, however, is in its strict adherence to the intelligence estimate, at least when it fits Navy desires. If the Soviet navy acts as expected, the US Navy will contain it, and the convoys essential to the war in Eu- rope will get through. However, if the Soviets are daring enough to surge their submarine fleet before the US policy makers give approval to start fighting, the submarines, due to the low US priority given to convoy escorts, may wreak havoc with allied shipping.13 A lock step forward deployment of the fleet would thus be dangerous for the outcome

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of the decisive battles of Central Europe. The offensive Maritime Strategy, in its Mahanian pursuit of the enemy fleet, could, in this situation, put the resupply of Europe at risk. The defensive strategy of convoy escort, though less glamorous, has a much better chance of making a positive contribution to the war where it matters most.¹⁴ In this sense, then, it behooves current maritime strategists to follow in the footsteps of the Orange planners of 1939 and consider now—in time of peace alternatives to the initial strategy.

Secrecy

War Plan Orange remained highly classified from its inception to its application.¹⁵ The Maritime Strategy has been released for public consumption in a manner that has made some analysts call for more secrecy, fearing that the United States is giving away its secrets. The overwhelming advantage of openness is seen in the dynamics of the document. The Maritime Strategy is designed to provoke thought and discussion, the vast majority of it in a public forum. Only in this way will the strategy receive the broad dissemination required if it is to be widely analyzed. Perhaps if War Plan Orange had been subjected to closer scrutiny, the futility of it would have been realized. The strategy could have been changed, or funds could have been allotted to make it viable. Those calling for secrecy Although MacArthur spoke with disdain of plans made before hostilities started, he still implemented the provisions of War Plan Orange during the first days of American involvement in World War II. A popular phrase among US servicemen today says that they will fight the way they have trained. The same was true of MacArthur.


should remember that War Plan Orange, for all its secrecy, was probably compromised. Naval maneuvers by the Japanese during the prewar years gave some evidence that the plan's details were known. If the Maritime Strategy returns to only its classified form, it will still be subject to compromise, but it will miss the important public debate of its merits and weaknesses.

Joint Operations

Joint operations did not receive the same emphasis in the years before World War II that they do today. The Joint Army-Navy Board, however, which debated national military strategy, was designed to secure cooperation between the Army (including the Army Air Corps) and Navy. Although the idea of cooperation received much "lip service," it was recognized then that the basic components of war in the Pacific were sea power and naval bases.¹⁶ The Army's role in War Plan Orange would be a supporting one, defending the bases (Manila Bay in particular) needed by the Navy. The joint nature of the operation was the dependence of each service on the other. If the Army could not hold Manila Bay, there was no need for the Navy to return unless prepared for a major amphibious operation. The Army, knowing itself to be outnumbered, counted on the Navy to reinforce it as quickly as possible, before its supplies of food and ammunition ran out. At various times in the years between the wars, the Army asked to pull back to a more defensible frontier encompassing Alaska, Hawaii and Panama. The Army was intent on conserving its forces for the land war it saw coming in Europe. MacArthur said, "The Navy has its plans, the Army has its plans, and we each have our own fields."¹¹⁷ Although stressing the need for interservice cooperation, the Navy, by its continued insistence on an offensive strategy, blocked the Army's desire for a more defensible Pacific perimeter and may have, in that sense, contributed to the disaster at Corregidor and Bataan.

In the Pentagon today, "jointness" gets much more homage than in the pre-World War II years. Admiral Watkins is careful to stress the joint nature of global war, but he is also quick to point out the predominance of the Navy when he writes of "warfighting where it matters-at sea."18 Here Watkins appears to confuse the Navy's value in crisis situations with their value in global war. He and other authors have repeatedly stated the case for having a strong navy to respond to localized conflicts and crises. The role of the Army and Air Force is correctly limited in such situations. However, global war is an entirely different matter. In a global conflict, the power projection capabilities of the Navy will be relatively much smaller when compared to the land forces engaged in Europe. For example, Watkins talks proudly of using a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) during Phase III to regain territory.19 The ground component of that force is usually somewhat larger than one Army division. The "power" he considers projecting is far less than onetenth the size of the Army forces to be committed in Europe. The MAF proponents will counter that the Marine air element multiplies the effect of the ground forces. Nonetheless, the significance is still minimal when compared to the overall Army (and Air Force) effort.

This is certainly not to say that the Navy is



The Navy does not deny the vital importance of the sea lines of communication. They realize that the best joint assistance the Navy can provide the Army and Air Force is ensuring that the precious sealift cargo arrives in Europe on time. The Navy's error is in [selecting the strategy] with the most risk for the decisive European battles.

irrelevant in a global war. Even as vocal an opponent of the Maritime Strategy as John Mearsheimer concedes that point.²⁰ However, he states that the central question is not whether the US Navy can hurt the Soviets in a global war, but whether NATO can protect its sea lines of communication-crucial for supplying the European battle-from Soviet submarines.21 The Navy does not deny the vital importance of the sea lines of communication. They realize that the best joint assistance the Navy can provide the Army and Air Force is ensuring that the precious sealift cargo arrives in Europe on time. The Navy's error is in taking a risky offensive strategy in an attempt to do so. Given three choices (forward defense, convoys or some combination) of how to secure the sea lines of communication, the Navy has selected the one with the most risk for the decisive European battles.

Evolution/Plans Versus Principles

War Plan Orange clearly was evolutionary in nature. The plan started in 1907 and remained alive until it was incorporated into the *Rainboiv* plans. The battles were numerous:

• Should the United States hold Subic Bay (Navy position) or Manila Bay (Army position)?

• Was a defensive (Army) or offensive (Navy) strategy better?

• Was Manila Bay going to fall or stand (each position was held at one time or another by both services)?

• Could the fleet relieve the garrison in six months?

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• Should the United States attempt to hold the bay (sea control), just to deny its use to the Japanese (sea denial) or just to make it

The Maritime Strategy says that naval forces can be employed in a number of ways. Marines can be committed to prolonged ground combat... [and] Navy carrier air forces can move to ground bases and reinforce the US Air Force. These, of course, are not the preferred ways to utilize naval forces.

extremely costly for the Japanese no matter which strategy was picked? (This was the option finally adopted, but not communicated to the Army and Navy defenders.)

The Navy, through all the long years, fought tenaciously for what it thought national policy should be. Perhaps it should have accepted the Army's desires to fall back to flexible "positions of readiness" closer to America's borders. As it turned out, the United States had inadequate sea power (reflecting a poor national policy) to execute War Plan Orange, which led to a war with an initial US disadvantage.²² However it turned out, it is nonetheless clear that War Plan Orange was an evolutionary strategy, one that changed to reflect new international situations, the vacillating mood of Congress and military necessity.²³

The Maritime Strategy, as stated earlier, is still fairly "young." It has not had the opportunity to respond to the same stimuli that War Plan Orange had. Despite its "youth," the Maritime Strategy has still changed since its inception. A maritime strategy has long existed, but early in this decade an attempt was made to submit its "broad contours" to "the rigor inherent in codification." The result of that effort became known as the Maritime Strategy." Because of its classified nature, "public debate between its supporters and detractors has often suffered from misinterpretations or exaggerations."²³ There is some evidence that a revised version (the fourth edition) will be issued shortly, after review by the current secretary of the Navy and the CNO. The best evidence that the strategy will continue to evolve is the fact that it has been published in unclassified form. As stated previously, this will help ensure that analysis, criticism and debate continue.

The public nature of the Maritime Strategy can lead to some pitfalls. One of these is that the many readers of the document can come to see it as a plan for action, rather than as a statement of principles. War Plan Orange had similar problems. It also was conceived as a statement of principles. Although MacArthur spoke with disdain of plans made before hostilities started.26 he still implemented the provisions of War Plan Orange during the first days of American involvement in World War II.27 A popular phrase among US servicemen today says that they will fight the way they have trained. The same was true of Mac-Arthur, who had "trained" to fight War Plan Orange for years. To expect him to do otherwise when under attack was unrealistic.

The same mistake must be avoided by warfighting commanders in the next war. They must not see the Maritime Strategy as a fixed blueprint for action. It should be viewed more as a computer menu, presenting options. The naval officers "marketing" the Maritime Strategy must stress this fact. The Maritime Strategy says that naval forces can be employed in a number of ways. Marines can be committed to prolonged ground combat, as they were in World War I. Korea and Vietnam. Navy carrier air forces can move to ground bases and reinforce the US Air Force. These, of course, are not the preferred ways to utilize naval forces. The Maritime Strategy emphasizes the inherent mobility and flexibility of naval forces and suggests better ways to



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use them. If the strategic or tactical situation requires their use in less-preferred ways, at least the commander will make that choice with full knowledge of his options and the trade-offs attached to each.

Strategy Suitability

Frequently, historians judge strategies by the results achieved. If it achieved policy goals, it was a successful strategy. This methodology overlooks the costs of success. Other strategies may achieve the same results without some of the attendant expenditures of manpower, resources and time. Little of this is helpful in answering questions about the suitability of strategies proposed for future application. Governments want military strategies that will achieve their policy goals; they do not want to implement a strategy and simply hope that it works.

War Plan Orange, in retrospect, was an overwhelming failure. It failed primarily for two reasons. First, the funds were not provided to procure the naval and ground force required for its successful execution. This, was due to a limited number of resources and the need, as General Dwight D. Eisenhower said early in World War II, "to quit wasting resources all over the world."²⁸ The limitations existed because of the isolationist Congress, reflecting the interwar mood of America.²⁹

Another reason for the failure of War Plan Orange was MacArthur's sad execution of it. Imbued with the same offensive spirit as the US Navy, MacArthur decided the best way to defend Manila Bay was to meet the Japanese The Soviets have more than five times the number of submarines and the United States has less than half the number of escorts that were available in World War II... Both world wars, however, showed that convoy protection actually turns out to be an offensive action, at least with respect to the number of submarines killed.

on the beaches. By the time he realized the futility of that maneuver and decided to retreat to Corregidor and Bataan, his logistics situation was impossible. He had positioned his supplies forward so he could fight forward. When he decided to fall back to a citadel (as War Plan Orange suggested), he did not have time to move his supplies back. His halfhearted defense of the beaches was fruitless and also spelled doom for War Plan Orange.30 However, even if he had immediately withdrawn to Corregidor, with all his supplies intact and held out for the six months of War Plan Orange, the Navy still would have been over two years away from returning to relieve the garrison. A well-executed War Plan Orange would not have been a bad plan if the resources required to execute it had been available. When it was realized those resources were not forthcoming, the Navy should have given up its insistence on an offensive strategy and taken up the defensive positions in readiness suggested in 1938 by the Army.³¹

Today's resources are still limited, of course, but at least the Navy is making plans that utilize the forces available today, not the forces planned for 10 years from now. They recognize that sequential operations may be required and the Maritime Strategy reflects that. Navy leaders appear to recognize the primacy of the ground action in a continental war and note the Navy's own very important role of neutralizing the enemy's sea lines of communication and protecting its own. Where the Maritime Strategy falls short (as did War Plan Orange) is in its insistence on an offensive strategy. It would be ideal if the Army and Air Force could simply state their needs and trust the Navy to meet them. However, the stakes are too high for the other services to sit idly by while the Navy embarks on a risk-laden strategy of immediate offensive operations. The Maritime Strategy needs an added dimension. The Navy must give better chances of survival to the Army and Air Force by giving higher priority to convoy escort for their crucial sealift cargo.n The naval resources available after accomplishment of that primary mission is assured can be used in ways that take advantage of the mobility, flexibility and offensive capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps team. Escort the convoys first; then do whatever else is possible.

The counterargument to this is that the Soviets have more than five times the number of submarines and the United States has less than half the number of escorts that were available in World War II. The fear is that letting Soviet subs prey unimpeded even on escorted convoys is very dangerous. Both world wars, however, showed that convoy protection actually turns out to be an offensive action, at least with respect to the number of submarines killed. If the bastion theory of the intelligence estimates is correct, not all of those submarines will be free to attack allied shipping. If they are free, the "lessons of history" from both world wars indicate that more of them will be destroyed by convoy defenders than by Mahanian admirals seeking major sea battles. Finally, regardless of how many Soviet submarines sally forth, convoys will always have a better chance of survival if they are escorted.

The "lessons of history" are not easily deciphered. It is more difficult by several orders of magnitude to apply those lessons to plans for present and future operations. There are several important lessons to be derived from a study of War Plan Orarge and the Maritime Strategy. One is about the ultimate importance of interservice cooperation, not just between the Army and Navy, but for all services. The services must avoid fighting "Army plans and Navy plans, each on their own field," and keep fixed instead on the central problem of defeating the enemy. Perhaps the most important lesson is concerned with the need for continued evolution and flexibility of mind toward the strategy.

There is no doubt the Navy will do its best to get the Army and Air Force to whatever port the nation's defense requires. Once there, the joint efforts of all the services must combine to assure final victory. The Maritime Strategy will achieve its great offensive potential if it first does everything possible to ensure that the decisive ground war is not lost. This can be done by focusing more effectively on convoy defense (which, as shown in World Wars I and II, is an offensive concept) for protection of the sea lines of communication. This far outweighs the value of imprudent and unlikely (given the requirement for timely decisions by national leaders) forward and peripheral naval deployments. ^M_E

NOTES

1. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 57.

 This is only a brief summary of the main points of War Plan Orange. For more detail, though still in a shortened form, see Louis Morton, "WAR PLAN ORANGE: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, 1959.

 Incidentally, this view on the need for Soviet forces to defeat Japan was held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until early 1945.

 ADM James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," The Maritime Strategy (supplement to the US Naval Institute Proceedings) (Annapolis, MD. US Naval Institute, January 1986), 4.

5. Ibid., 10. Watkins overlooks the escalatory nature of such deployment in a crisis situation. His statement that such deployment is "not necessarily provocative" is neither proven nor reasuring. A detailed argument to the determines capability of the Mattime Strategy is presented by John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep. The Marttime Strategy and Determote in Europe," *International Society* (Fell 1966).

6. Watkins, 13.

 Like War Plan Orange, the Maritime Strategy has been summarized. Details are available in Watkins' article and in numerous other writings on the sublect.

8. Actually, the War Plan Orange planners did consider the assistance of alled nations. In initially depending on unitatient acton, theough, they realized that "the character, amount, and location of alled assistance ... cannot be predicted." Louis Moton in Command Decisions (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1859), 10 A similar statement could surely be made about the war which the Maritime Stratement could surely denics.

9. Watkins, 5.

10. Morton, World Politics, 231 and 222.

11 William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 142.

12. Watkins, 4.

 I would like to take credit for this innovative strategy, but the idea belongs to Tom Clancy, Red Storm Rising (New York; Berkley Books, 1986).

14. This is an application of minimum.maximum theory. The worst outcome of the dirensive strategy is failure to resupply Europe, which could lead to the expulsion of US forces from the comment. The convoy defense will not "guarantee" all cargo dimensity, but will give them a much higher chance of getting delivered. This lesson was learned the hard way by the strash in World War I and should not have to be reflexing the US Navy in World War III. 15. Letter, Chief of Naval Operations, 1 March 1929, Subject. Navy Ba-

 Bata, One of Nata Operators, That is 1929, Subject Naty Di sic Plan—Orange.
Monton, World Politics, 221

17. Manchester, 194

18. Watkins.

19. Ibid., 13.

20. Mearsheimer, 57.

21 Ibid. 35

 Michael K. Doyle, "The United States Navy-Strategy and Far Eastern Foreign Policy, 1931–1941," Naval War College Review (Winter 1977), 58

23. Morton, World Politics, 232.

24. Watkins, 4.

 Januas A. Barber, Introduction to The Maritime Strategy (supplament to US Naval Institute Proceedings) (Annapolis, MD US Naval Institute, January 1966), 1.

26. "... a big man ... will pay no more attention to the stereotyped plans that may be field in the dusty pigeon holes of the War Department than their ment warrants," Douglas MacArthur quoted in American Ceesar, 160.

27. It will be stated later how MacArthur's poor execution of War Plan Orange contributed to its failure

 Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 28–29.

28 Another reason for the limited resources was the dependence/of both Army and havy leaders on the strength of all powor. They planned to utilize their forces to make up for their weaknesses. MacArthur allowed his air forces to be destroyed on their weaknesses. MacArthur allowed his point moot. BC Vincent J. Eposito, The Wast Point Alas of American Wass, New York: Prager Publishers, 1955, map 119. The whole staff is indicative of the ... ettempts of that generation of military leaders to graple with air power. Yanchester, 195.

30. MacArthur received a Congressional Medal of Honor for his defense of the Philippines it is unteresting to note that those responsible for the smillar debade at Pearl Hatrox were dealt with much more severely. Mac-Arthur should probably have neceived the same treatment. "Political considerations" probably prevented it.


31. Morton, Command Decisions, 11

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National or "grand" strategy is often largely based on one or more major assumptions. That the next large-scale conflict will be of short duration is one such widely held assumption. The author finds the basis for this assumption to be factors very similar to those shared by the powers who prepared for a short war prior to World War I. His message warns of the dangers inherent in an overreliance on an assumption that was found to be in error in each of the global conflicts of this century.

EVENTY years ago, the armies of Britain, France and Germany were engaged in costly pitched battles across "no man's land" for a few square meters of territory along the Western Front. What all powers assumed would be a short war had become a stalemate of trench warfare with horrifying casualties. Why did the nations which were to become involved in the fighting on the Western Front assume that the next great European war would be a short one?

The Armed Forces of the United States maintain their greatest military commitment overseas on the continent of Europe. If one were to ask a military planner, or a civilian member of government, how long he or she believes the next war in Europe will last, one might receive an answer ranging from a few weeks to a few months. Few people, if any, expect the next European war to last two years, and certainly no one would venture to guess that another war in Europe will continue for four to six years, the length of the last two great wars fought there. Why do we believe that our next war in Europe will be a relatively short one?

Some of the reasons that might be given, such as contemporary war plans, unacceptably

high casualty rates, the enormous cost of armaments, the disruption in international trade and commerce, and modern military technology are startlingly similar to the reasons given for the short-war assumption in Europe prior to World War I.

Previous Short Wars

There is a frequently heard adage that military leaders plan to fight the last war. Military tacticians have inevitably planned to fight future wars based upon methods and lessons learned from the largest or most recent past war. This phenomenon of planning to fight the last war was especially apparent during the years before World War I. The Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese wars were the conflicts that most influenced military thinking before World War I.¹ Both were short in the sense that they were decided by one or two great battles which resulted in the complete or partial destruction of one of the opposing armies.

The legacy of Count Helmuth von Moltke (the elder) upon military thinking during the last half of the 19th century, because of his victory in 1870-1871, is apparent. During the Franco-Prussian War, "within seven weeks from the Prussian order for mobilization, and within five weeks from the beginning of serious fighting, the French regular army, except for garrisons besieged in the eastern fortresses. had ceased to exist."2 Von Moltke's personal prestige and the spectacular nature of his victories, however, tended to have a distorted rather than an enlightened effect on the military thinking of succeeding generations. It caused military thinkers to overlook the lessons of the American Civil War, which would be more important in the next great war.'

German military planners were intrigued by the Battle of Cannae. Fought in 216 B.C., Cannae was a battle in which a smaller force of Carthaginians under Hannibal surrounded and defeated a larger Roman army. German staff officers saw Cannae as a classic battle of encirclement and the supreme example of a quick battle of annihilation.⁴ The Battle of Sedan, in which the French army was sur-

Few people, if any, expect the next European war to last two years, and certainly no one would venture to guess that another war in Europe will continue for four to six years, the length of the last two great wars fought there. Why do we believe that our next war in Europe will be a relatively short one?

rounded and captured along with the French Emperor Napolean III, was von Moltke's Cannae, and all German General Staff officers in their military planning sought to achieve a similar result.⁵ The profound influence of von Moltke's victories in the 1860s and 1870s continued to be felt into the 20th century. The Schlieffen Plan, to be discussed later, was envisaged as being nothing more than a Sedan/Cannae-type of encirclement and annhulation using more troops and modern technology.

Understandably, the results of the Franco-Prussian War also influenced French military thinking before World War I. The French believed that the next war would be a total war, involving the entire nation with the objective of a single battle annihilating the energy in the field. Some French theorists saw the German army as the one to emulate and became supporters of broadened conscription laws.⁶ The lessons learned as a result of the Franco-Prussian War were combined with Napoleon's principles of war and incorporated into French tactical and strategic thinking through the veas preceding World War I.²

The British army did not respond immediately to the results of the Franco-Prussian War. It was not until the 1890s that the British army seemed ready to appoint a general staff on the German model, which was generally believed to have been one of the deciding factors of that war. The Hartington Commis-

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sion's recommendation in favor of a general staff was enhanced by the publication, at about the same time, of Spenser Wilkinson's *The Brain of an Army*, a popular account of the German staff.⁸ Britain, however, did not form a general staff until 1904, and it was more a result of the problems of the Boer War than because of the Franco-Prussian War.⁹ Nonetheless, students at the British staff college carefully studied von Moltke's campaigns of 1870.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was slightly less important than the Franco-Prussian War in influencing military thought before World War I. Cavalry tactics were reexamined based upon the observations of the Russo-Japanese conflict.¹⁰ The part played by machineguns in that war was studied closely by France and Germany. The French proposed "disbanding . . . thirteen cuirassier regiments," to provide men "to increase the number of mins in batteries from four to number of guns in . . . batteries from four to six . . ." This proposal was based on the observations of the Russo-Japanese War that cavalry had accomplished little.11 The German General Staff anticipated the value of heavy artillery and machineguns, and according to, B. H. Liddell Hart, was influenced by the reports and analyses of Captain Max Hoffmann, the staff's attaché with the Japa-. nese army in Manchuria.12

Given the European emphasis on short wars in their planning, it is not surprising that the American Civil War did not receive the most attention. The precedents set by that war were certainly not viewed as applicable to modern war in Europe.¹³

For the British, tactical discussions centered on the use of entrenchments and the employment of cavalry. Some saw that the use of railroads would become very important in war, but they were pointed out as being more vulnerable than regular roads. Others saw the lesson of raising and equipping a large volunteer army as the most important lesson for the British to learn.

The Prussians were most interested in the technical aspects of the war, such as the influence of rifled artillery on fortifications, the use of railroads and the handling of General William T. Sherman's long supply lines as he marched through the South. It was the impact of railroads during the Civil War that caused the Prussian General Staff to add a railroad section in 1864, which became one of its most important and prestigious sections in subsequent decades.

In France, the American Civil War was virtually ignored by soldiers and military writers. The French considered their army to be superior to the Union army, and most French leaders felt that the only campaigns prior to 1866 worthy of study were those of their national hero, Napoleon Bonaparte.

Europe's brief interest in the Civil War ended abruptly. The elder von Moltke supposedly said that the American war was being fought by "two armed moles chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned."¹⁴ It was a war of attrition that the Germans sought to avoid, and it was conducted on a distant continent under different circumstances. There was a scorn for nonprofessional armies and militia, and the war was seen as one being conducted by amateurs.¹⁵ The most important reason, however, for the sudden disinterest in the Civil War



Vational Andrees

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was the simple fact that it ended in 1865. The quick Prussian victories of 1866 and 1870–1871 caused all eyes to return to the European continent. "Students at the [British] Staff College were fed a regular diet of Moltke and his campaigns..." and there was a sudden "rush to study everything German."¹⁶ The textbook for entrance to the British staff college in 1895 remained Moltke's Franco-German War, translated by Forbes." The Prussian victory in 1870–1871, which followed "so promptly upon their other victory over the Austrians, persuaded almost every civilized power to organize a mass army on the Prussian pattern."¹⁸

A military writer once stated that "until the beginning of the nineteenth century, European wars were long enough and frequent enough to enable officers as well as soldiers to learn the art of war . . . Since 1815, wars— European wars at least—have been rarer and shorter.¹¹⁹ This author further stated that because of this rarity of wars, war games, such as the German Kriegsspiel, were an alternative form for learning the art of war. Before World War I, this became a standard way of training commanders and staffs in all major armies. The influence of Kriegsspiel upon the development of the Schlieffen Plan by the German army and the Army's confidence, in its success cannot be overstated.

With the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894, the German fear of a twofront war came closer to reality. To counter this threat, Schlieffen's two predecessors, as chiefs of the German General Staff, the elder von Moltke and Count Alfred von Waldersee, envisaged a powerful offensive in the East

Thus, war gaming reinforced the German belief in the short war because the green cloth of the General Staff Kriegsspiel said that after a certain number of weeks, France would be effectively put out of the fight and the full weight of the German army could then be thrown against Russia.

against Russia with a defense in the West against France. France's completion of a strong defensive belt along her Eastern frontier decreased the possibility of an offensive there by either side.³⁰

It was largely the German Kriegsspiel that caused Schlieffen to reject those plans because "as countless war games had abundantly demonstrated, an offensive against Russia, with simultaneous defensive operations in the West, implied . . . a long war . . . "21 With the French in no immediate danger, the Russians would be able to fall back through their Eastern wastes, playing the proven game of trading space for time and eluding decisive engagement. Numerous detailed studies convinced Schlieffen that it was possible to break through near the Vosges mountains and round up the whole French army in a Metz-Sedan operation in about six weeks.22 War games not only led to the development of the Schlieffen Plan, but they enabled the continued refinement of that plan. The German war games of 1904-1905 convinced Schlieffen that the Northern forces were not strong enough to smash the French left wing and execute the strategic function of envelopment. On the other hand, the forces in Alsace and Lorraine were even more successful than he

anticipated.²³ The result was a strengthening of the German right.

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The Financial Impossibility of a Long War

There was, throughout Europe in the years before World War I, a general belief that a long war would be financially impossible. The mobilization of large armies was seen as producing such a disruption to the financial and economic life of participants that it was impossible to visualize a conflict of long duration. In Britain, Field Marshal Lord Roberts saw financial problems as one of the reasons that led to Japan's willingness to bargain during the Portsmouth negotiations ending the Russo-Japanese War.25 Edgar Crammond, in an article in the Times (London), estimated that the average daily cost to the six principal European posers in the next war would be £8.8 million, or more than nine times the daily peacetime expenditures. He concluded that the war policy of the great powers must assume a short war.26 The cost of armaments, even in times of peace, was tremendous. Sir Edward Grey, in a speech delivered before the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, predicted that "exceptional expenditure on armaments . . . must lead to catastrophe and may even sink the ship of European prosperity and civilization."27

In Germany, a 1909 estimate of the costs of mobilization indicated that the first day of mobilization alone would cost more than the entire amount in the War Fund of the Reich.²⁸ Von Schlieffen assumed that a lengthy conflict could not be conducted in an age in which "the existence of the nation is . . . [based] on the uninterrupted progress



The most important reason, however, for the sudden disinterest in the Civil War was the simple fact that it ended in 1865... The Prussian victory in 1870–1871, which followed "so promptly upon their [1866] victory over the Austrians, persuaded almost every civilized power to organize a mass army on the Prussian pattern."

of trade and [commerce] . . . A strategy of exhaustion is impossible when the maintenance of millions necessitates the expenditure of billions.²²⁹ An early victory was necessary to maintain a stable currency, and members of the Reichstag saw a long war as economically ruinous.³⁰

French mobilization plans called for ablebodied men over the age of 20 to leave factories, farms and shops, thus assuring that normal business activity would stop.³¹ Public transportation was to be reserved for military use, and it was thought that society, deprived of the normal flow of goods and services, could not withstand "intolerable" conditions over an extended period of time. French planners believed that it was impossible for the financial resources of any nation to withstand the cost of modern war.³² Even without a guick military decision, it was assumed that financial pressures would soon force one or more belligerents to sue for peace.³³ These thoughts were reinforced by economists who assured military and civilian planners that fighting could not long continue on a large scale, because bankruptcy and economic exhaustion would ensue.³⁴

Réveil National and the Spirit of the Offensive

The period 1910–1914 was one of *Réveil national*, a rediscovery by the French of their patriotism and nationalism.³³ This revival was inspired, in part, by the Agadir crisis of 1911 when, in response to German saber rattling, Field Marshal Joseph J. Joffre was obliged to advise Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux, that the French army's chance of defeating the Germans was less than 70 percent.³⁶ As a result, Ioffre formulated a new offensive battle plan, "Plan XVII," which was seen to be more worthy of the French army than the previous counteroffensive doctrine." French military leaders were almost unanimous in their assertion that an opponent could never be defeated by mere defensive battle, and that the offensive alone would bring results.³⁸ French confidence in their new offensive battle plan was reinforced by their fall maneuvers that incorporated "a single formula for success, a single combat doctrine, namely, the decisive power of offensive action undertaken with the resolute determination to march on the enemy, reach and destroy him."³⁹

With the adoption of the new offensive battle plan and a reorganization of the French High Command, there was a new climate of confidence in the French army. The nation was told that a numerically superior enemy even Germany—could be defeated by an invigorated, offensive-minded French army. An intense propaganda campaign, partly inspired

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by the army, assured Frenchmen that in every way, with the exception of number of troops, they were superior to the foe.⁴⁰

The British expressed similar confidence in the French army and in the ability of their own small army to help in any future Franco-German clash. General James Grierson, director of military operations in 1906, after observing French maneuvers found the French army "... enormously improved in every respect over the past ten years and felt

that he had never seen better staff work in any army, in peace or war."41 Lieutenant Colonel Charles ACourt Repington, the military correspondent for the Times (London) and an unofficial spokesman for the British army, praised the tactics of that same French army and stated that it would be thoroughly ready for any attack.42 Viscount Haldane of Cloan, Richard Haldane, former secretary of state for war and a supporter of the formation of the British General Staff. felt that the French army was comparable to the German army in quality. Other military observers predicted that the French army would take ample revenge for the defeat of 1870-1871.43 In 1912, the members of the French army were described as "splendid" and the officers were called "enlightened and enterprising."44 At the outbreak of war, Hilaire Belloc, a member of Parliament, felt that France was much stronger than Germany.*5

General Sir Henry H. Wilson, who became Britain's director of military operations in August of 1910, was perhaps the most exuberant proponent of French military power among British officers. An energetic Francophile, Wilson was the chief catalyst of the close and detailed planning that took place between the British and the French general staffs during the years before the war. Wilson was generally confident that this strong French army, with the help of the small British force expected to intervene, could quickly repulse any German attack in the first great shock of battle. This confidence was bolstered by the knowledge that any German offensive launched through Belgium would be weakened by greater losses incident to operations. operating on exterior lines, the need to guard long lines of supply and communications, and the expected pressure from Russia beginning on the 30th day of the war. Once the German offensive was stopped in the West, British strategists were confident that Germany could not hold out long against Russia in the East.46



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Germany, on the other hand, had a different view of the most likely scenario. The Schlieffen Plan was the massive and finely honed offensive plan that Germany relied upon for a quick victory. As in France and Britain, the cult of the offensive drew wide support among German military strategists who placed heavy emphasis on rapid mobilization and precise railroad timetables for a quick offensive thrust into France through Belgium and Luxembourg. German victory in a two-front war would require a quick victory over France, which only offensive action could bring.⁴⁷

This new confidence and enthusiasm in the offensive by the French, British faith in the abilities of their entente partner, and Germany's confidence in the massive offensive of the Schlieffen Plan, contributed to the *G* general feeling that the next war would be successfully short.

The years before World War I were part of an age of experimentation with new military technology. Modern weapons were experimented with and supplied to the armies of the world. Some of these weapons were viewed as offensive in nature and were expected to complement the offensive doctrine that would contribute to shortening the next war.

In Germany, military planners were impressed with the swift potency of modern weapons. Airplanes were used for scouting and for adjusting artillery fires. The huge Krupp siege mortars were developed for use against Belgian forts and were expected to destroy them with single direct hits. Other technological improvements, such as field telephones, motorcycles and special signal services could keep columns of troops moving,

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swiftly overwhelming the enemy with a few mighty blows. The continuous refinement of railroad schedules would speed up the tempo of operations, enable the German army to mobilize more quickly and transport troops to the front to strike the first blow. Magazinefed rifles introduced in the mid-1880s and machineguns increased the volume of fire over the single-shot breechloader, and were expected to enhance offensive operations.

. The French startled the military world in 1897 with the introduction of a new rapidfiring field artillery piece, which immediately made all other artillery obsolete. This famous French "75" was equipped with an armored shield to protect its crew from return fire, and its recoil was absorbed by the barrel moving in a fixed cradle, thus precluding the need to re-aim the weapon after each shot. This new rapid-fire artillery was expected to inflict heavy losses in a very short period of time upon exposed troops.48 As with the Germans, the offensive capability of this weapon was chiefly emphasized. The French expected that shrapnel fired by the 75s would neutralize the defensive by forcing the enemy to keep his head down and return only erratic fire.**

The young French air force was considered to be the best in the world. In April 1912, France was reported to possess over 200 modern airplanes with plans to procure 500 to 1000 more by 1913. Although they did not yet fully understand the role that the airplane would play during the war, observers were impressed with the French air maneuvers of 1911.⁵⁰

In the decades before World War I, a number of popular novels were written with the theme of the next great war. The one characteristic that many of these war novels had in common was that they used the short-war scenario. They drew on an "imagination still burdened by a long tradition, which presented war as an affair of brief battles and heroic deeds by individuals . . ."¹¹ Their fictitious operations were based on the experiences of 1870 and the Balkan wars—that a quick and decisive battle or two would rapidly end hostilities.¹²

One such novel was quite prophetic.³⁹ Philip H. Colomb envisioned the next great war as starting in the Balkans as a result of the assassination of a Bulgarian prince by a Serb. He correctly identified all the belligerents, except that Britain fought Russia in the Black Sea area and remained neutral in the Franco-German fight. The only major flaw with the book as a prophecy of World War I is that the author has the war ending after only nine months of fighting. For civilian and military readers, the steady diet of short-war scenarios contributed to the view that a protracted conflict would be unthinkable.

The assumption that the next great war would be a brief one was not universal, however. A number of military and civilian thinkers, some of them influential, expressed opinions that the next war would not be as short as expected.


Among British soldiers, Field Marshal Lord Horatio H. Kitchener, who achieved fame as commander of the British Khartoum Campaign and was appointed minister of war at the outbreak of World War I, predicted that the war would be long. At a meeting of the War Council at 10 Downing Street on 5 August 1914, Kitchener stunned his listeners by suggesting that Britain must be prepared to field an army of 70 divisions and maintain it for several years. Kitchener disagreed with the basic assumptions being made that the war would be a short one and that the traditional British weapon of overwhelming seapower would offset the difference between the small British army and the large conscripted masses of the continent.

General Douglas Haig, who was commander of the First Corps of the British army at the outbreak of the war and who would later replace Sir John French as the commander in chief of the British forces, had a similar opinion. At the same War Council meeting, Haig made the point that Britain and Germany would both be fighting for their existence. Since neither country would acknowledge defeat after a short struggle, he assumed that the war would be a long one and suggested that Britain must organize her forces for a war of several years.

Among Frenchmen, Lieutenant Colonel Henri Mordacq, who later became Chief of Georges Clemenceau's military cabinet, in 1914 published *La Guerre au vingtième siècle* in which he stated that huge numbers of reserves made a quick battlefield decision unlikely, and that he doubted, contrary to popular military opinion, any army would run short of war materials.

It is ironic that the elder von Moltke, the architect of the lightning Prussian victories of 1866, which so profoundly influenced subsequent short-war strategists and theoreticians, believed that the next great war would be a long one. "... Moltke predicted that the [next] war would last seven or even thirty vears."**

In 1898, a self-made Polish railway magnate named Ivan S. (or Jean de) Bloch published in Paris a six-volume work about the future of war.³⁵ Only the last volume, a summary of the whole, was translated into English at about the turn of the century. Bloch predicted that modern conditions would in-



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crease the duration of war. Specifically, the long-range lethality of modern rifles and artillery pieces, Bloch said, would cause armies to dig themselves in for protection, making it The mechanized armies deployed in Europe are organized and equipped to fight a rapid war of maneuver similar to that fought during World War II, the last great war fought there. The more recent Arab-Israeli wars have served to reinforce our belief in the success of mechanized forces engaged in maneuver warfare. Wargame scenarios repeatedly portray ...NATO forces ... restor[ing the] borders after a few weeks.

impossible for the battle of the future to be fought rapidly. The result would be an operational deadlock with enormous casualties over a long period of time, creating an enormous strain on the economies of the combatant countries. Although not all of Bloch's predictions proved to be true, many of his insights were astonishing in their accuracy. Most of Europe's military and civilian leaders, however, chose to ignore or discount Bloch's exhaustive study.

What does all this mean for the Western armies of the next decade? Some of the parallels are obvious. The mechanized armies deployed in Europe are organized and equipped to fight a rapid war of maneuver similar to that fought during World War II, the last great war fought there. The more recent Arab-Israeli wars have served to reinforce our belief in the success of mechanized forces engaged in maneuver warfare. War-game scenarios repeatedly portray a furious Warsaw Pact offensive into Western Europe, halted by NATO forces which, after being reinforced by REFORGER units, mount a vigorous counteroffensive and restore NATO borders after a few weeks.

Faith in our ability to defeat Warsaw Pact forces in a conventional war is based on confidence in our high-technology forces armed with state-of-the-art munitions and equipment. Could our military arsenal long endure equipment expenditures on the scale of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War? Members of Congress often complain that our peacetime military budget is excessive, yet it would soar unbelievably if this nation were to prepare for a long war. Could this nation bear the financial burden? As in the years prior to 1914, many think not. Will the treasure that this nation has been pouring into modernization programs keep the next European war successfully short, as we hope, or will it make war longer and more expensive in materiel and personnel? In the realm of recent war fiction, the novels of General Sir John W. Hackett, popular a few years ago, and Tom Clancy, very popular today, both portray the next European war in short-war scenarios.

The most obvious difference between earlier long wars fought in Europe and any future battles fought there is the possible use of nuclear weapons. The length of any future war will probably be gauged by whether or not nuclear weapons are employed. The explicit assumption made in this conclusion is that nuclear weapons will not be used. This assumption is not necessarily invalid. Nuclear weapons ought to be used only as a final alternative in stopping a Soviet penetration. Yet, in doing so, NATO will destroy the very territory it has pledged to defend and protect. First use of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw Pact will destroy the lands it seeks to acquire. Furthermore, the possibility of escalating from a tactical nuclear war to something much larger and more destructive becomes an alarming reality. The opposing forces, therefore, will be very hesitant to employ nuclear weapons on any scale on the battlefields of Europe.

Perhaps deployment and mobilization plans, and our expectation of a come-as-youare war, ought to be closely reexamined with the view that the next great war in Europe, should one occur, may be conventional and longer than expected. $\stackrel{\text{whe}}{\to}_{E}$

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MODERN THEORY for N'S CIStrateg

Colonel Michael A. Andrews. **US** Army

On 22 July 1861, newly cleared President Abraham Encountround himself and his country perate situation: Amalecontinued statistic country country is polaristic polaria indecisive leadership) feat

perae summer Amagement contrasting the provider of the provider of the art and science of warfare.

He identifies national purpose, values and interests, then he evaluates the domestic and international environiments in terms of attitudes, alliances and geography. He addresses application of diplomatic, economicif socia-psychological and military instruments of power, and then focuses them into an overall strategy capitalizing upón capabilities and enemy vulnerabilities, culminating in definitive military objectives.

This type of national command authority process is necessary in order to establish definitive objectives before committing military forces.

> DUE TO A LACK OF PHOTOGRAPHIC CONTRAST BETWEEN TEXT AND BACKGROUND. THIS PAGE DID NOT REPRODUCE WELL.

THE PRESIDENT entered the room shortly after 5 o'clock. He looked tired, but I found myself once again impressed by the very presence of this tall man. He walked slowly, wearily to the front of the room and softly asked us to be seated. He then walked to the window and thoughtfully gazed outside for several minutes, without speaking.

I wondered what he would say, what he *could* say, after yesterday. If we had been divided and uncertain before, Manassas seemed now to make the future unspeakably bleak.

He returned to the center of the room, then looked at us intently.

"When I was a boy, growing up near Pigeon Creek, Indiana, I'd sometimes visit with an old man who lived nearby—his name was Elijah Haines. He claimed he had been with Andrew Jackson at New Orleans. Now Elijah was an absent-minded old man and he would sometimes seem to just drift off, recollecting battles he had been in and fighting he had seen. He somehow seemed intent on relling me all about war.

"I seem to have a lot of people trying to tell me about war lately. I am sometimes reminded of old man Haines. There seems to be one big difference, though. Old Elijah kept talking about how it was—how the men had acted and reacted, how he felt. You know, I could almost see it, smell it, when he talked. All I knew about war was what he told me. Oh, he described it in many ways. But one thing he never described it as being . . . was complicated. As a matter of fact, Elijah said war was pretty simple. He said it was about as simple as one man imposing his will upon another man.

"That was a long time ago. By a strange twist of fate and the grace of God, I now find myself surrounded by different kinds of military advisers—sophisticated, educated men who have studied war at fancy places like West Point and talk about war in terms of science and geometry and mathematics and what folks in Europe do. The trouble is, in this desperate hour of our country's need, they all keep telling me how complicated war is now; which makes a simple man like myself somewhat apprehensive, having never had the occasion to study war like our distinguished generals have. And I seem to have more different kinds of advice from more dif-


"Old Elijah used to tell me that a man ought to know what he's fighting for . . . Like all noble causes, it is also very simple. It is the preservation of the Union! It is the national survival of this great nation—this great country that our forefathers established in the face of terrible adversity and impossible odds—this great country that has been a model of equality and self-determination for all mankind . . ."

ferent sources than a man can digest. It reminds me of the fable about the man and the boy and the donkey. I can't seem to please everybody or do anything right. There is one thing, however, upon which everyone seems to agree. That is that the president of the United States, using his constitutional authority as commander in chief of our Armed Forces, should provide vision and direction to our nation and to the prosecution of this wat:

"Gentlemen, that's why I've called you here today. My generals tell me they're adjustomed to more specific command guidance. Well, after seeing our boys at Manassa'yesterday and reviewing our progress thus far, I intend to provide that to you right here and now. I will tell you *what* and *why* and leave the details of *how* to you.

"I expect you distinguished gentlemen to listen carefully and to proceed with the execution of this conflict as expeditiously as possible.

"Old Elijah used to tell me that a man ought to know what he's fighting for. Well,



the objective of this conflict is the most noble I know. Like all noble causes, it is also very simple. It is the preservation of the Union! It is the national survival of this great nationthis great country that our forefathers established in the face of terrible adversity and impossible odds-this great country that has been a model of equality and selfdetermination for all mankind. There are no Confederate States of America. There is one America. States have no nght to secede. No states rights can justify an attempt to dissolve that which has been fairly decided upon by due democratic process and in accordance with the law. There is either a union or there is not a union. Peaceful coexistence is not possible. Neutral states are not possible. We are one people, indivisible. I will not dignify

those rebels with a name nor this conflict with a cause justifying war. This is a rebellion, an insurrection."

He was silent for a moment, rubbing his chin and looking thoughtfully at the floor. One could have heard a pin drop in that room.

"That seems simple enough to me. But I continue to read and hear many other explanations for this conflict. Sometimes I wonder just how many conflicts there are. Oh, it is true we have another national interest at stake here. It's incumbent upon us to maintain the values upon which this great nation was based—the proposition that all men are created equal, free, with inalienable human dignity. Well, by circumstance, we now find ourselves in a position to stop the perpetuation of the great evil that is slavery. We cannot change the past. But in God's name I cannot understand how any man can stand by and condone the continuation of that hideous condition. And in God's name I cannot understand how any human being can fail to acknowledge and applaud the moral supremacy of the Union cause in this conflict. We are , right! Slavery and dissolution of the Union are wrong. Almighty God is on our side! Celebrate that. Transcend self-flagellating, doubting Thomases and uncertain speculations. Rally and sustain our national will and let's get on with the bitter task at hand—how to end this conflict quickly.

"Of special and immediate interest to me is the international community. We must demonstrate stability in the eyes of the world. We must strengthen our ties with the major foreign governments. Our emissaries must visit them quickly and explain this situation and our position. We must isolate the rebels diplomatically and not permit their recognition by foreigners. We must emphasize our moral supremacy to our foreign friends and also emphasize that we will not permit foreign intervention. They should join us in treating this conflict as a mutinous insurrection that will soon be quelled; they should understand that it is not in their long-range interests to recognize it, let alone to intervene.

"Now I don't know much about exactly how to wage war. I always thought that the generals knew all about that. I'm getting a lot of advice now that tells me to wage war *slowly*. I'm told that we're in a better position to fight a protracted war than the rebels are and that they'll eventually be worn down. Advis-'ers have shown me information that purportedly substantiates that. Our population and industrial capacity and resources are greater. They have to form a whole government and army and navy, and they depend upon foreign trade to sustain themselves. We have the upper hand and ought to proceed slowly, I'm told. "Well, I don want to do that. I don't know how to fight slowly. From this minute on I want it clearly understood that our strategy is to take the offensive, to maintain the initiative and to end this conflict as quickly

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as possible! Seems to me that the most important asset in war is not things, but ideas will. It also seems to me that while some of their materiel may be lost with time, Southern will will grow stronger! From what I've seen of late, I can't say that about Union will. I believe the longer this terrible conflict continues, the greater the propensity for the Northern public to lose its resolve. The longer it continues, the greater the danger also of foreign intervention and international complications.

"The rebels are on the defensive now. They're satisfied with the status quo and want only to be left alone, to have their secession condoned. They'll gain more legitimacy, with time. We must correct this injustice quickly. We must capitalize upon our manpower and resource advantages in order to obtain quick, decisive results. I want to end it! So I want to avoid a slow war. Gentlemen, organize, equip and train your forces quickly and prepare to take the fight to our enemices!

"I want two theaters and only two, in this conflict. The first is Virginia—between Washington and Richmond. The second is the Deep South, east of the Mississippi River. There is to be no western theater, west of the Mississippi, yet. Nor will there be actions by our forces in the frontier against the Indians. The preservation of the Union is at stake and I want all available forces massed in these two

"... Now it could be said that Richmond is as important to them as Washington is to us. But I don't think so. Imagine the impact on the international community if Washington fell. I therefore have no intention of concentrating forces and of fighting this war so perilously close to Washington. Move it elsewhere."

theaters and instilled with a sense of urgency in order to terminate this conflict. Each of these two theaters will have its own strategy and objectives—they're different. We'll proceed in distinct phases. I think of the Deep South theater as an area inside a boundary running up the Mississippi River from New Orleans to Cairo then over to Atlanta and Savannah. I traveled through North Carolina once and could see nothing I considered of strategic value. I'm reminded of an early colonust's description of the dreary land between his Virginia Colony and Charleston—all dismal swamp and sand dunes.


"As we proceed, it will take time for them to realize that we're not interested in North Carolina. But they'll have to worry about defending it and use up some forces that way, which will be to our further advantage, as we gather our forces elsewhere. Likewise, I want us to stay out of the Appalachian Mountains and Florida. We need to focus our forces, to concentrate them into the most decisive areas.

"For that reason, I also want to retract my previous guidance that our forces enter the bordef states for the purpose of winning their support and of isolating the rebel states. I now see that such a course would weaken our forces in view of the strategy I am proposing today. We need to mass. The mountains restrict some east-west movement. If we control the Mississippi River, it'll cut the Deep South from the West. Ignoring the area from Savannah to Richmond will help cut them again into north-south areas of operation.

"Now, when my advisers compare our resources with those of the rebels, one advantage that we have that always jumps out at me is the wide difference in our naval capabilities. They have an army of sharpshooting farm boys who will continue to do well, just like they did vesterday at Manassas. But they have no navy. Seems to me a military man ought to exploit his enemy's vulnerabilities and I intend to capitalize upon our naval advantages. It also seems to me that ships are faster than foot soldiers and we can therefore move around from theater to theater more quickly and mass at important times and places better than they can. As I now describe our strategy in each of these two theaters, keep in mind it's all predicated upon implementation of an aggressive, offensive maritime strategy.

"While it can be argued that our capacity and potential for rapid naval expansion is very limited, it is greater than theirs. It can be argued that we have insufficient assets even to establish an effective blockade, but that's the point. It takes fewer assets to mass at a decisive time and place than it does to seal the entire coast.

"Let's discuss the strategy for the Northern Virginia theater first. It must be our initial priority, but these operations must not be sequential. Generals tell me that great soldiers focus on the destruction of enemy forces, not places. But, unfortunately, we must defend the nation's capital. Its symbolic importance cannot be overstated in terms of public opinion and consequent support for our cause among our citizens. Its retention is also critical in the international arena. But I want it clearly understood that the defense of



"The rebels are on the defensive now. They're satisfied with the status quo and want only to be left alone, to have their secession condoned. They'll gain more legitimacy with time. We must correct this injustice quickly. We must capitalize upon our manpower and resource advantages in order to obtain quick, decisive results. I want to end it! So I want to avoid a slow war..."

"... They have an army of sharpshooting farm boys who will continue to do well, ... But they have no navy. Seems to me a military man ought to exploit his enemy's vulnerabilities and I intend to capitalize upon our naval advantages... As I now describe our strategy in each of these two theaters, keep in mind it's all predicated upon implementation of an aggressive, offensive maritime strategy." Washington is not the only objective in the Northern Virginia theater. I want to defend it with the smallest force possible-you gentlemen will have to tell me what size force that is. I then want to divert the rebels from this area in order to relieve the pressure on Washington and to take the fight to the South. I can't imagine why those rebels selected Richmond for their capital anyway. We must get away from the Washington-Richmond area. To do otherwise would constrict our movement and would pose a constant threat to our capital. Now it could be said that Richmond is as important to them as Washington is to us. But I don't think so. Imagine the impact on the international community if Washington fell. I therefore have no intention of concentrating forces and of fighting this war so perilously close to Washington. Move it elsewhere.

"The second tactic used in the Northern Virginia theater must be to threaten Richmond. As I've said, I see no strategic value in Richmond. But it must be threatened in order to keep those boys on their toes out of fear it might be captured. They'll defend it and use up forces worrying about it. That will also take some pressure off Washington.

"But I want Richmond threatened from the sea, not from Northern Virginia by land. I want to get out of that constricted battlefield and exploit our advantages. Threaten Richmond by way of the Chesapeake Bay, Norfolk and the James River. Raid. Hit and run at first. Keep 'em busy. Then land ground forces and move them toward Richmond. Don't get tied down or lose many forces in a siege. Back up or go back to sea if necessary. If Richmond fell in our laps I'd be happy, but that is not to be our main effort. Its only value is to tie up their forces and to help the defense of Washington. If the Army of Northern Virginia can be kept occupied by our secondary efforts around Richmond, rebel forces will be further diluted.

"My final point relative to the strategy in the Northern Virginia theater deals with the

blockade I previously directed. I now believe we have insufficient naval assets to seal over 3,500 miles of coastline. I want to mass those naval assets in a more concentrated offensive manner which I'll describe in a moment. I don't want our sea fight to degenerate into a blockade-running conflict, and I believe our diplomatic pressure will discourage excessive trade from foreigners coming into the Confederacy. We're not going to fight a defensive war. We are required, however, to blockade Richmond, so that it cannot be assisted from the sea. The navy is to seal off Richmond and prepare for a more aggressive strategy than I previously indicated. We'll probably eventually have to blockade and raid Wilmington and Morehead City, North Carolina, in order to seal Richmond, but we can do that later. That will have two advantages. First, it'll allow us initially to mass at more critical places in the Deep South. But also, it'll leave a back door open for Richmond. While that may seem strange, I think it's important not to press Richmond too hard at first, lest they fight too vigorously. I learned a long time ago that a man who is backed into a corner tends to fight for his survival too ferociously and it's sometimes smarter to leave him a way out. So don't worry too much about Wilmington and Morehead City resupplying Richmond during our first phase of this strategy. It'll contribute to the greater good of our main effort being elsewhere.

"So our strategy in the Northern Virginia theater is to defend Washington, threaten Richmond from the southeast, and blockade Richmond from the sea. We must do this first, before proceeding with the *Deep South* theater strategy.

"Let's now turn to the strategy for the Deep South theater. It is our main effort. It is predicated upon an aggressive maritime strategy. It is to be conducted in three phases.

"During Phase I, we are to rapidly build up our naval and amphibious capabilities, and at the same time destroy the enemy's. He has no navy. Don't let him get one! We need sort of a maritime cavalry philosophy during this phase. Raid. Destroy shipyards. Shell shipbuilding facilities and capabilities. Minimize our own losses and don't become decisively engaged. Keep him off balance, wondering where we will strike next. Feint. Hit Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, New Orleans, Probe seacoast fortresses. Drop some small amphibious assaults. Damage harbors, railroads and communication centers. Keep him guessing, Wear on his nerves. Make him react, divert forces. Keep the initiative. During this phase we also need to blockade the Mississippi River-control it all if possible, but as a minimum, seal it off from outside support from either direction. Get New Orleans and Cairo.

"During Phase II, we will mount major campaigns from the sea in order to gain a foothold for ground forces in the Deep South from which we can expand our offensive operations. Build three viable fighting forces at Savannah, New Orleans and Cairo. Push up the Mississippi from New Orleans to Vicksburg and down it from Cairo to Memphis. Control the river! If our assets permit, blockade Mobile and the Chattahoochee River that flows to Columbus, Georgia.

"During Phase III, we will launch a threepronged attack into the interior of the Deep South—one from the general direction of Memphis to Birmingham; one from Vicksburg to Jackson, Meridian and Montgomery (perhaps joined by another force coming up the Alabama River from Mobile); and one from Savannah 'to Atlanta. During this phase, "During Phase II, we will mount major campaigns from the sea in order to gain a foothold for ground forces in the Deep South from which we can expand our offensive operations ... During Phase III ... we'll orient on and destroy the Confederate armed forces in the Deep South. Tighten the circle and destroy his means to wage war. Sever his internal lines of communication down there."

we'll orient on and destroy the Confederate armed forces in the Deep South. Tighten the circle and destroy his means to wage war. Sever his internal lines of communication down there.

"Now that's how l intend to proceed in this conflict. Where we go from there will depend upon the enemy and the proverbial situation at the time. We'll probably then deal with Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia. Then we'll consolidate and mop up the remaining insurrectionists west of the Mississippi and in the border states. This way, they'll become weaker as we get stronger and this conflict will soon be over.

"Gentlemen, that's my concept of the operation. Return to your headquarters and begin your preparations. I'll reset with you again very soon. At that time, I'll expect you to tell me the details of how this concept will be implemented. Be positive. Be aggressive Let's get on with the grim task at hand."

"Godspeed!"

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Gary A. Klein

This article posits that military decision makers have come to rely too heavily on analytical decision-making processes, contributing to a reduction in the effectiveness of training and decision support systems. The author examines the strengths and weaknesses of competing decision-making processes and offers a "recognitional model" for use in most combat or field situations. His recommendations have impact on training and decision-aid development.

T IS TIME to admit that the theories and ideals of decision making we have held over the past 25 years are inadequate and misleading, having produced unused decision aids, ineffective decision training programs and inappropriate doctrine. The Department of Defense (DOD) often follows the lead of behavioral scientists, so it is important to alert DOD policy makers to new developments in models of decision making.⁴

The culprit is an ideal of analytical decision making which asserts that we must always generate options systematically, identify criteria for evaluating these options, assign weights to the evaluation criteria, rate each option on each criterion and tabulate the scores to find the best option. We call this a model of concurrent option comparison, the idea being that the decision maker deliberates about several options concurrently. The technical term is multiattribute utility analysis.

Another analytical ideal is decision analy-

sis, a technique for evaluating an option as in a chess game. The decision maker looks at a branching tree of responses and counterresponses and estimates the probability and utility of each possible future state in order to calculate maximum and minimum outcomes. Both of these methods, multiattribute utility analysis and decision analysis, have been used to build decision training programs and automated decision atids.⁴

These strategies sound good, but in practice they are often disappointing. They do not work under time pressure because they take too long. Even when there is enough time, they require much work and lack flexibility for handling rapidly changing field conditions.

Imagine this situation (which we actually observed): An Army brigade planning staff engages in a 5-hour command and control exercise. One requirement is to delay the enemy advance in a specific sector. The operations and training officer (S3) pinpoints a location that seems ideal for planting mines. It is a choke point in a wooded area where the road can be destroyed. A plan develops to crater the road, mine the sides off the road and direct the artillery on the enemy as he either halts or slows his advance to work around the obstacles. During the planning session, there are objections that it is impossible to have forward observers call in the artillery, and that without artillery support to take advantage of the enemy slowdown, the mines would do no good. Someone suggests using FASCAM (family of scatterable mines), but another person notes that FASCAM will not work in trees, only in open areas. Only after this thorough consideration and subsequent rejection of his initial choice, does the S3 consider an open area also favorable for an artillery attack and select it as the point of the action.

Suppose the planners had tried to list each and every available option, every possible site all over the map, and then evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each? There was simply not enough time in the session to do this for each possible decision. We counted 27 decisions made during the 5 hours, an average of one every 12 minutes. Even this is misleading, since it does not take into account time taken by interruptions and communications. We estimate that about 20 of the decisions took less than 1 minute, five took less than 5 minutes and perhaps only two were examined for more than 5 minutes. Obviously, there is not enough time for each decision, using analytical concurrent option comparisons. And if we try to approach only a few choices in this way, which ones? It is even more complicated to screen decisions for deliberation. Analytical strategies just will not work in this type of setting.

I am not saying that people should never deliberate about several options. Clearly, there are times to use such analytical strategies. We have watched DOD design engineers wrestle with problems such as how to apply a new technology to an existing task. Here it *did* make sense to carefully list all the options for input devices and displays and to

The point . . . is that there are different ways to make decisions, analytical ways and recognitional ways, and that we must understand the strengths and limits of both in order to improve military decision making.

systematically analyze strengths and weaknesses to get down to a small number of configurations for testing.

The point for this article is that there are different ways to make decisions, analytical ways and recognitional ways, and that we must understand the strengths and limits of both in order to improve military decision making. Too many people say that the ideal is for soldiers to think more systematically, to lay out all their options and to become, in effect, miniature operations researchers. This attitude is even built into military doctrine. For example, US Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, advises decision makers to go through the steps of multiattribute utility analysis.3 Such advice may often be unworkable and sometimes may be dangerous. To understand why, we must get a clear idea of what skilled decision makers do.

For the past four years, my colleagues and I have been studying experienced decision makers, faced with real tasks that often have life and death consequences. We have studied tank platoon leaders, battle commanders engaged in operational planning at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Riley, Fort Hood, Fort Stewart and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. (Prior to that, we observed Air Force and Artmy battle commanders at BLUE FLAG.) We studied urban fireground commanders and wildland fireground commanders (with over 20 years of experience) as they conducted actual operations. We also studied computer programmers, paramedics, maintenance officers and design engineers. Many of the decisions we examined were made under extreme time pressure. In some domains more than 85 percent of the decisions were made in less than 1 minute.

We found that concurrent option comparison hardly ever occurred. That is, experienced decision makers rarely thought about two or more options and tried to figure out which was better. In this article, I will describe the recognitional decision strategies we did find, differentiate between the situations that call for analytical or recognitional strategies and examine some of the implications for military decision making.

Recognitional Decision Making

When we told one commander that we were studying decision making, he replied that he never made any decisions! What he meant was that he never constructed two or more options and then struggled to choose the best one. After interviewing him, we learned that he did handle decisions all the time. After studying over 150 experienced decision makers and 450 decisions, we concluded that his approach to decision making is typical of people with years of experience and we have derived a model of this typical strategy.

Basically, proficient decision makers are able to use their experience to recognize a situation as familiar, which gives them a sense of what goals are feasible, what cues are important, what to expect next and what actions are typical in that situation. The ability to recognize the typical action means that experienced decision makers do not have to do any concurrent deliberation about options. They do not, however, just blindly carry out the actions. They first consider whether there are any potential problems and only if everything seems reasonable, do they go ahead.

A recognitional approach can save time and effort for more important concerns. An experienced brigade commander looked at a map and selected a site for an engagement area (a place to set up artillery and air attacks on an enemy advance). Other sites were then proposed that he had not even bothered to consider, although they seemed plausible to his less-experienced subordinate. He was able to explain why each alternative was defective and seemed surprised that anyone would even think about them. In other words, his skill enabled him to generate only plausible options so that he did not have to bother with computing advantages and disadvantages. He could use all of his experience to judge what was needed for the situation. He could generate a workable first option, so there was no reason for him to generate many more options and then have to perform a painstaking evaluation of them.

We call this a "recognition-primed decision (RPD)." The officer used experience to recognize the key aspects of the situation, enabling a rapid reaction. Once a decision maker identifies the typical action, there is usually a step of imagining what will happen if the ac-




Figure 1 Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model

tion is carried out in *this* situation. If any pitfalls are imagined, then the decision maker will try to modify the action. If that does not work, the officer jettisons it and thinks about the next most typical action.

Notice that the experienced decision makers are not searching for the best option. They only want to find one that works, a strategy called "satisficing." We have found many cases where decision makers examined several options, one after the other, without ever comparing one to another. Because there is no deliberated option comparison, experienced decision makers may feel that they are relying on something mysterious called "intuition" and they may be mildly defensive about it if they are questioned carefully. One implication of our work is that this is not a mysterious process. It is a recognitional, pattern-matching process that flows from experience. It should not be discounted just because all aspects of it are not open to conscious scrutiny.

Figure 1 shows a schematic drawing of the RPD model. It shows that if the events contradict expectancies, the experienced decision maker may reexamine the way the situation is being understood. The basic thrust of the model is that decision makers handle decision points, where there are several options, by recognizing what the situation calls for rather than by calculating the strengths and weaknesses of the different options. The concept of recognitional decision making has been developing only in the last few years.

We have found that even with nonroutine incidents, experienced decision makers handle approximately 50 to 80 percent of decisions using recognitional strategies without any effort to contrast two or more options. If we include all decision points, routine plus nonroutine, the proportion of RPDs goes much higher, more than 90 percent. For novices, however, the rate of RPDs can dip to 40 percent. We have also found that when there



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is deliberation, experienced decision makers deliberate more than novices about the nature of the situation, whereas novices deliberate more than experts about which response to select. In other words, it is more typical of people with lower levels of experience to focus on careful thinking about the best option.

What about team decision making? Since many decisions are made within a network of coordinating organizations and by several 4

The RPD model assumes that decision makers evaluate typical actions by imagining how they will be carried out in that situation. Such an evaluation lets the decision maker improve the option and also reject it, if necessary. Analytical models present strong methods for evaluating sets of options. These models make it inconvenient for the user to improve options since that would force the evaluation to begin again.

people at each node in the network, we have also examined distributed decision making.

Teams and networks demand more justification and conflict resolution, so we expect to find more examples of concurrent option comparison; that is, contrasting two or more options. However, in our studies, this has not occurred. Earlier I described a 5-hour command and control planning session in which we tabulated 27 decisions.4. Only one of these showed any evidence of concurrent option comparison. My earlier example of the operations planning officer choosing a site to disrupt the enemy advance illustrates recognitional decision making by a team. Similarly, our other studies of team decision making found the team behaving much like individuals-generating a plausible option, evaluating it by imagining what could go wrong, trying to "satisfice," trying to improve the option to overcome its limitations and sometimes rejecting or tabling an option to move on in a more promising direction.

How is the RPD Model Different from Analytical Decision Making?

The RPD model describes how choices can be made without comparing options: by perceiving a situation as typical; perceiving the typical action in that type of situation; and evaluating potential barriers to carrying out the action. This recognitional approach contrasts to analytical decision making in several ways:

 The RPD model concentrates on "satisficing," whereas models of decision analysis and concurrent option comparison have emphasized optimizing (trying to find the best option).

• The RPD model asserts that experienced decision makers generate a good option as the first one they consider. However, concurrent option comparison assumes that generating options is a semirandom process, with some coarse screening to ensure that only relevant options are considered.

• The RPD model focuses on situation assessment. In contrast, concurrent option evaluation models have placed more of the emphasis on selecting among options than on recognizing situations.

• Another difference is the evaluation of options. The RPD model assumes that decision makers evaluate typical actions by imagining how they will be carried out in that situation. Such an evaluation lets the decision maker improve the option and also reject it, if necessary. Analytical models present strong methods for evaluating sets of options. These models make it inconvenient for the user to improve options since that would force the evaluation to begin again.

• The RPD model assumes that decision makers will usually have an option available regardless of how tight the time constraints are. Experienced decision makers usually start with a typical option. If time permits, this option will be evaluated; if defective, it will be replaced by the next most typical option. In contrast, analytical models provide no guidance until after options are generated, evaluation criteria and weights established, ratings accomplished and tabulations completed. If a reaction is needed before this process is finished, the decision maker is out of luck.

By contrasting recognitional and analytical decision making, we can see the strengths of each. Recognitional decision making is more important when experienced personnel are working under time pressure on concrete, contextually dependent tasks in changing environments and have a "satisficing" criterion of selecting the first option that looks like it will work. It comes into play when the unit is an individual or a cohesive team that does not reach deadlocks over conflicts. Recognitional decisions can ensure that the decision maker is poised to act. Its disadvantages are that it is hard to articulate the basis of a decision and it is difficult to reconcile conflicts. Furthermore, it cannot ensure "optimal" courses of action and this is especially important for anticipating the opponent's strategies in preparation for the worst case. Also, it is risky to let inexperienced personnel "shoot from the hip."

Concurrent option comparison has the opposite strengths and weaknesses. It is more helpful for novices who lack an experience base and for seasoned decision makers confronting novel conditions. It is apt to be used when there is ample time for the decision. It comes into play when the data are abstract, preventing decision makers from using concrete experiences. It makes it easy to break down new tasks and complex tasks that recognition cannot handle. It is especially important when there is a need to justify the deci-

Factor	Effect on Using Analytical Decisions
Experience Level	Decrease
Time Pressure	Decrease
Dynamic Events	Decrease
Abstract Data	Increase
Justification	Increase
Conflict Resolution	Increase
Optimization	Increase
Computational Complexity	Increase

Figure 2 Factors affecting the use of recognitional and analytical decisions



Once a decision maker identifies the typical action, there is usually a step of imagining what will happen if the action is carried out in this situation. If any pitfalls are imagined, then the decision maker will try to modify the action. If that does not work, the officer jettisons it and thinks about the next most typical action ... the experienced decision makers are not searching for the best option. They only want to find one that works.

sion to others, since justification usually requires us to list reasons and indicate their importance. Analytical decision making is more helpful when there is a conflict to be fesolved, especially when the conflict involves people with different concerns. It is usually a better strategy to use when one needs an optimal solution. And finally, analytical decision making is needed when the problem involves so much computational complexity that recognitional processes are inadequate. However, its cost is more time and effort, and more of a disconnect with the experience of the decision maker. Figure 2 presents the conditions that increase a decision maker's tendency to use analytical strategies rather than rely on recognitional decision making.

I am not claiming that there is a right way

Decision aids can interfere with and frustrate the performance of skilled operators. It is no wonder that field officers reject decision aids requiring them to use lengthy analytical processes when the time available is not adequate.

or a wrong way to make decisions. Different conditions call for different strategies. My goal is not to reject analytical decision making, but to make clear what its strengths and weaknesses are so that it can be applied more fruitfully.

For too long we have emphasized one strategy—the analytical one. That is the one required by doctrine. That is the one we have been teaching. That is the one we have been building decision aids to promote.

Problems with Analytical Decision Making

We create problems of *credibility* when we present doctrine about one right way to make decisions—the analytical strategy—and thereby force officers and soldiers to ignore doctrine in making the vast majority of timepressured operational decisions during training exercises. It does not take them long to realize that doctrine is irrelevant in this area and to wonder whether it can be trusted in other areas.


We can create problems in *efficiency* when we teach analytical decision techniques to military personnel who will have little or no opportunity to use them. Worse yet, we create problems in *effectiveness* for personnel who try to apply these techniques and fail.

We create problems of *competence* when we build decision aids and decision support systems that assume analytical decision strategies. These systems are likely to reduce inputs to the form of abstract alphanumeric data and to restrict the operator's job to that of assessing probabilities, entering subjective utilities, providing context-free ratings and so forth. This misses the skilled operator's ability to size up situations, to notice incongnuities and to think up ways to improve options. In other words, these decision aids can interfere with and frustrate the performance of skilled operators. It is no wonder that field officers reject decision aids requiring them to use lengthy analytical processes when the time available is not adequate.

Human error is often explained in terms of decision bias.⁵ The concept of decision bias is that people are predisposed to make poor decisions because of several inherent tendencies, such as inaccurate use of base rates, overreliance on those data that are more readily available or appear more representative, low ability to take sample size into account and difficulty in deducing logical conclusions. This argument is often made by scientists who want to convince us that human decision makers (other than themselves) cannot be trusted, and we therefore need these scientists to develop decision aids to keep the rest of us from making grievous errors.

However, the decision bias argument has been recently attacked as unjustified and selfserving.6 The evidence that humans are inherently biased decision makers comes from experiments run under artificial laboratory conditions. Furthermore, judgment biases appear to have a very small impact outside laboratory conditions. It is easy to use the benefit of hindsight to label each accident an example of decision bias that can best be controlled by more rigorous analytical procedures. For example, expert testimony was given by some psychologists about the Vincennes episode. With the benefit of hindsight, it was clear that something had gone wrong and there was an assumption that human error was to blame. One piece of testimony suggested that the crew was guilty of expectancy bias. They were expecting an F-14 attack and focused on cues that fit that expectation.

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However, if the error had been in the other direction, an F-14 attack that was missed, then the blame would have been placed on base-rate bias, failure to take base rates and prior expectancies into account. My impression is that with hindsight, every error can be explained as a bias, but this may not be telling us much. I am more in agreement with the testimony showing how the Vincennes' control room failed to provide the crew with the cues and information that would have enabled them to take advantage of their expertise. They were prevented from using recognitional decision stratesies.

My own impression is that experienced decision makers do an excellent job of coping with time pressure and dynamic conditions. Rather than trying to change the way they think, we should be finding ways to help them. We should be developing techniques for broadening their experience base through training, so they can gain situation assessment more quickly and accurately.

If we can give up our old single-theory analytical perspectives and appreciate the fact that there are a variety of decision strategies, we can improve operational decision making in a number of ways.

One opportunity is to improve strategies for effective team decision making. Staff exercises are too often a charade, where subordinates present options to a commander who then picks the best one. Usually, however, the subordinates know which option they prefer. They present, as other options, ones that had been rejected to round out the field. This procedure can be inefficient because it divorces the situation assessment activities from the response selection step and it gives the subordinates the more demanding tob of assessing the situation. It asks the commander to make a choice rather than working with the team to modify and improve options. There may be times when it is more effective to have the commander work with the staff to examine the situation and then turn over tothem the job of preparing implementation plans. If alternative viewpoints and criticisms are wanted, they should come during the assessment and initial planning, so as to strengthen the option to be implemented.

A second opportunity is to understand how

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commanders can present their strategic intent so that subordinates are able to improvise effectively. It is dangerous to have subordinates ignoring direction and carrying out their own plans, but it is also dangerous to have subordinates carrying out plans that no longer make sense. Improvisation arises when there is recognition that the situation has functionally changed. We need to understand how commanders can communicate their situation assessment so that their subordinates can recognize and exploit changed conditions.

A third opportunity is to revise training procedures. Certain specialties need training and analytical decision strategies. But generally, training can be more productive by focusing on situation assessment. Along with teaching principles and rules, we should present actual cases to develop sharper discriminations and improve ability to anticipate the pitfalls of various options. The goal of analytical decision training is to teach procedures that are so abstract and powerful that they will apply to a wide variety of cases. If this had been successful, it would have been quite efficient. However, we have learned that such rules do not exist. Instead, we need to enhance expertise by presenting trainees with a wide variety of situations and outcomes, and letting them improve their recognitional abilities. At the team level, we can be using after-action reviews to present feedback about the process of the decision making and not just on the content of the options that should have been selected.

A fourth opportunity is to improve decision support systems. We must insist that the designers of these systems have appropriate respect for the expertise of proficient operators and ensure that their systems and interfaces do not compromise this expertise.⁷ We must find ways to present operators with displays that will make situation assessment easier and more accurate. We also want displays that will make it easier for operators to assess options in order to discover potential problems. In other words, we want to build decision support systems that enhance recognitional as well as analytical decision strategies. ME

NOTES

 For a fuller view, see G. A. Klein (in press), Recognition-Primed Decisions, Advances in Man-Machine Systems Research, ed. W. Rouse, (Greenwich, CT JAI Press), 5

2. For the purposes of this article, the term 'analytical decision making' will be used to refer to these two methods, and particularly to concurrent option comparison

3 US Department of the Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, DC US Government Printing Office, May 1984). 5 9 to 5-10

4 M Thordsen, J Galushka, S Young, G. A. Klein and C. P Brazovic, Dstibuted Decision Making in a Command and Control Planning Environment (KATR-863(C)-87-08F) (Yellow Springs, OH Klein Associates Inc., 1987) Prepared under contract MDA903-88-C-0170 for the US Army Retionary Contract MDA903-88-C-0170 for the US Army Research institute, Alexandria, VA.

5 D Kahneman and A Tversky, "Intuitive Predictions. Biases and Corrective Procedures, TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12, 1979, 313–27

⁶ L Lopes, The Photonc of Irrabonality, paper presented at Colloquium in Mass Communication, Maisson, Wii, November 1986 (currently under envision) J J Christensan-Szalanski, "Improving the Practical IIIy of Judgment Research," New Directors in Research on Decision Making, ed. B Brehmer, H, Jungerman, P. Lourens and G. Sevon (North Holland Elsevier, 1966).

7. I have made some suggestions in an earlier paper, see G. A. Klein, "Automated Aids for the Proficient Decision Maker," *IEEE Proceedings*, (1980), 301–4

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Lieutenant Colonel Ken Strafer, US Army

The role of the Reserve Components in the Total Army mission continues to gain in scope and importance. The author here cites numerous problem areas which are detracting from Army capabilities. He describes many weaknesses in manning and resourcing policies and offers specific steps to improve combat readiness for the Total Army.

In peacetime the Regulars are anxious, Yes, in peacetime they're anxious to serve—, But just let them get into trouble, And they call out the Goddamned Reserves.

Korean era military song

"HE PALE of the early morning lifts on the eastern field of a future conflict, revealing a battleground of scarred monuments, weary earth and wakeful American soldiers exhausted from the unremitting days in battle. Without a word toward relief, replacement appeared out of the question. Broken sleep, double watches and missing rationsand the thought of a mere hour's respite the making of dreams. But behind a ridge, a radio crackles into life as a unit commander tries again, his quiet, emotionless, accepting voice belving the true essence of the tactical situation. He pauses, and the same voice tersely thanks his senior commander. "Tomorrow? Roger." The unit commander's smile turns almost audible, but for the moment. The day will fly, for a Reserve brigade fresh with troops and equipment is moving up tonight and will be ready for combat by tomorrow. The commander has been asked to hold his ground.

Later in the week, the revitalized, nowintegrated component command observes lead tanks of the enemy's second offensive rolling out of the ever-turbulent mist, the first line having been wiped out by the accufate, deadly antimank fire that has enveloped the battle area for the last few days. A soldier picks up his radio handset to report the contact and then flips on his low-light optical sights as he prepares to engage the enemy. With the force mix the services have today, perhaps the first shot of that renewed battle will be fired by a Reserve tanker or antitank gun crew member.

Today, as the Army enters a period of austere budgets, there is tremendous reliance on both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to execute a major operational plan. If a global crisis unfolded today. Active Component (AC) forces would be required for our nation's first line of defense: to restore peace, or if this is not immediately possible. to contain the enemy until Reserve forces can be called and deployed overseas. With the shift of many essential support skills and missions to the Reserve Components (RC), the burden of sustained military success rests with the RC and not with the AC. In an earlier era of long, drawn-out conventional warfare, a lot of planning and staging time was available. Campaigns fought over the lengths of seasons could require months of preparatory strategizing and planning. It often took that long merely to move the troops into place. A foot soldier's marching speed of "double time" has not changed appreciably over the centuries-and the firing range of early cannonry did not bring the battlefield much closer. Somehow, the technological improvements that have given us so many benefits have also removed much of the flexibility in preparation time. Leaders today may not see a gathering storm, but rather feel the results of a bolt-like offensive. The earlier attitude---and the policies it engendered-must change to keep pace with the evolving "longer shortwar scenario" Army of the 21st century.

By increasing the RC force structure and relying on it for global operation plan (OPLAN) execution and the servicewide wartime mission sustainment support, the Army and the Congress have accepted a "risk-on-risk" planning reality unprecedented in American history. It begs the question of reliability of the RC for accomplishing vital federal missions.

Military reserve forces claim a heritage dating back to the 16th century English constabulary patrols. It was Frederick II of Prussia who recognized that if the local population served, not only would it add to the ranks, it would create a public consensus or national will for the planned campaigns. Similarly, in the United States, use of the RC is a form of consent of the people; it stems from the grass roots of our nation.¹ Currently, the RC, made up of both Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, comprise 53 percent of the total number of authorized structured units beginning in 1988, with a slight increase in personnel level projected for 1989.²

The United States first organized its RC for response to a federal mission just before World War I, but did not begin full operational planning integration with the Total Force policy until driven in that direction by the post-Vietnam force structure draw down. Unfortunately, the Total Force policy suffered from paper integration without requisite dollars for modernized equipment. Since implementation of the policy was pursued in earnest during the post-Vietnam decade, major upgrades in equipment for the RC have been programmed, and equipment actually purchased. However, the lack of prior attention will take many years to correct.

The Reality of "Risk on Risk"

Today, Reservists and Guardsmen are being asked to maximize their peacetime training and preparedness, which is necessary for execution of our global wartime commitments. Taskings for the RC represent a new and demanding chapter of American military history. More RC units are being asked to maintain a high state of readiness based on the requirements determined by the first two months of a full mobilization scenario, and they are achieving that high level of readiness. The question is whether, in the face of constrained funds, RC commanders will be able to sustain the "maximum efforts" required during previous years.

For the military planners in the Pentagon, this Active/Reserve force balance represents true operational "risk on risk," which the Army and the Defense Department's leadership have accepted in their force structuring for the 1980s and 1990s. Such a planning risk

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There is a genuine concern about relegating these wartime skills to the RC and having only residual forces in the AC. These units are not closely monitored by the AC cadre of the proponent schools. Management requirements are lost from the corporate military leadership. Operational doctrine has not been updated; moreover, specialized equipment necessary for these RC units may . . . not be purchased.

exists if insufficient forces are in place, as is the case today. In Europe, our full commitment to the allied defense is not "forward deployed." Only a small portion is deployed in Europe, with the majority of the total required forces in the Continental United States (CONUS). Not to have the "right" amount of forces deployed in Europe requires the commander in chief to accept a risk—he may have to execute his OPLAN with less than his full complement of required forces.

The CONUS-based force structure is made up of Active forces, augmented by a large contingent from the Reserves. Current mobilization planning envisions the Active forces moving before the Reserve forces, with the Reserves requiring some mobilization station time. Historically, Reserve forces have also required post-mobilization preparation time, a delay which results in slower availability for deployment, causing planners to accept another risk—hence, the use of Reserve forces assumes a greater "risk on risk" situation.

Whether the risk is a valid planning strategy depends on the answers to several questions. Are the Reserves "ready" to assume their mission; that is, are they properly trained and adequately manned and equipped? Is their equipment compatible with that of the Active Army? And are they familiar with their operational areas? This article presents a discussion of these points and gives some More RC units are being asked to maintain a high state of readiness based on the requirements determined by the first two months of a full mobilization scenario, and they are achieving that high level of readiness. The question is whether, in the face of constrained funds, RC commanders will be able to sustain the "maximum efforts."

ideas for thought. Any change to the current system discussed here, however, must be questioned not only as to its military soundness, but also as to its political acceptability. Keeping both requirements in mind, let us take a quick overview of the genesis of our current reliance on the RC.

During the mid-1970s, the Active Army was cut back in size and force structure composition. The Defense Department's leadership realized that those units with predominantly wartime-related missions were uneconomical for continued service in the constrained Active force structure. In an August 1973 policy memorandum, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger commented that integrating the Reserves with the AC would be the cornerstone of the "total force policy"-a "homogenous whole." In the face of mandated changes, the Army transferred many of the AC combat support and combat service support units to the Reserves.

Further, it should be noted that in the wake of the recent across-the-board federal budgetary reductions, the Active Army was capped at a strength of 780,900 soldiers in Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 and was further reduced in FY 1989 to 772,300 soldiers. /Therefore, only primary combat and support forces can be justified for retention on active duty. The follow-on support and prolonged sustaining forces, such as supply, maintenance, transport

tation, civil engineers and training base expansion units, are more economically maintained in the RC structure. The wartime workload demand for these units does not exist during peacetime, but rather occurs on or shortly after M-day (the day on which mobilization is ordered). In the Army National Guard or Army Reserve, the wartimedeployed force structure can be retained at a fraction of the active-duty life cycle costs.

However, there is a genuine concern about relegating these wartime skills to the RC and having only residual forces in the AC. These units are not closely monitored by the AC cadre of the proponent schools. Management requirements are lost from the corporate military leadership. Operational doctrine has not been updated; moreover, specialized equipment necessary for these RC units may have a lower priority and so may not be purchased. An example of this situation can be found in our railroad force structure.

Since the mid-1970s, RC unit manpower has had a manifold increase. This was an Army leadership directed trade-off for AC modernization. The AC/RC mix went from approximately 55/45 percent in 1980 to 47/53 at the beginning of FY 1987. The last time the RC's manpower surpassed the AC's was before World War II. Beginning with FY 1988, the RC troop strength received a manning restriction from Congress.⁴ Before this action by the Senate and House Armed Services committees, Reserve strength was allowed to grow based on Total Force needs and on availability of equipment for new units. Further constraints are envisaged for FY 1990.

The increase in RC troop unit structure and strength places an increased management responsibility on the Army's leadership infrastructure. Structural decisions should be made with the realization that in order to respond to a crisis beyond a low-intensity conflict, access to the Reserves would require, as a minimum, a presidential Executive Order. This presidential call-up authority has never been



Guard units in the northeast are seeing their civilian population shift out of the area----and with them go the "old reliable" members of the unit. Many units in the New England and mid-Atlantic states are now below 90 percent strength. A review and perhaps consolidation of some units is warranted.

exercised because of the political connotation associated with its use. During Grenada in 1983, the necessary Reservists volunteered or went in a training status, negating the need for any further call-up requirement. In 1988, the multibillion-dollar budget for the RC consisted of about 97 percent federal support for the Reserves, with the remainder from the states for the Guard.¹This level of Active Army investment mandates a heightened staff-level management interest.

While the reduced military force is today's "unpleasant reality," we can adapt by making the best use of what we have and by considering our Reserve forces as a full partner to our AC forces. But in order to do this, we must improve the individuals' capabilities and we must field compatible equipment throughout the force. By correcting the problems of personnel readiness and equipment overdiversification, our forces will not be left vulnerable on tomorrow's battlefield.

Manpower: Chain of Command

Current laws, regulations and policy inhibit the fluid integration and management of the RC by centralized staffs in Washington; Atlanta or any of the Continental US Army (CONUSA) commands. Through the efforts of the Honorable James H. Webb Jr., former assistant secretary of defense for Reserve affairs, the law governing management of the RC was significantly changed. This provision, the Montgomery Amendment to the FY 1987 Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act, provides for greater centralized command and control over Army National Guard units during annual training. Through this amendment, Guard units are no longer under the control of state governors during periods of annual training. This ensures that

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management of unit training for the Guard is centralized and standardized (conducted under the supervision of either the wartime chain of command or CONUSA as the eventual goal). Efforts are currently being made to ensure that command and control planning is logical and realistic.

Many of the Army National Guard units dispersed throughout the United States have unique historical origins. Unfortunately today, history may play against the Army's ability to effectively manage that same force structure. Guard units in the northeast are seeing their civilian population shift out of the area-and with them go the "old reliable" members of the unit. Many units in the New England and mid-Atlantic states are now below 90 percent strength. A review and perhaps consolidation of some units is warranted. This idea is not actively encouraged, especially in the more history-laden New England Guard, because it could mean the movement of units from states and localities where their heritage has grown over the last 250 years. Such a review does not advocate disbanding units such as the batteries of companies. Rather, it advocates either a liberalized "policy" for fills to encompass greater geographical areas or a modified unit structure to allow more subunits to keep their aggregate population high. Senior RC management must be the instrument to effectively accomplish this task.

This same management element needs to be assisted in its mission. Senior commanders and noncommissioned officers (first sergeants, selected staff, master sergeants and sergeants major, battalion commanders, brigade commanders and all general officers) should have the opportunity to work full time in their RC positions. In view of the Army's emphasis on the RC, it is time to make a serious commitment to those "leaders" trying to manage a family, civilian career and a Reserve or Guard career. Not all RC commanders have the luxury of being allowed time off from their civilian jobs to attend to the multitude of challenges presented to today's RC commander. Today, the best commanders have balanced careers/RC interest, but quite often, because of realistic family and fiscal concerns, Reserve and Guard commitments come second.

In response to this issue, Defense policy gives priority to supporting the field; however, the question of full-time manning of commander spaces is still a heated issue. Many senior commanders in the Army National Guard are full-time manning personnel, either as members of state staffs or as Active Guard and Reservists under Title 10, US Code. Most National Guard major generals are full time, while most in the Army Reserve are not. This affects the RC's ability to effectively manage those commands requiring a general officer. In my view, the National Guard does a better job than the Army Reserve; it is a better-managed RC force.

Between 1982 and 1984, the Army revitalized the CONUSAs that are slowly evolving into the senior headquarters for wartime mission management of the RC. Moreover, by working through the CONUSAs, US Army



[An] example of the variety of equipment found in the RC inventory today is that of the main battle tanks: M48A5 series, M60, M1 and M551—four different major weapons systems, with four different logistic support requirements...RC communications equipment [also] will not "net" with most AC communications equipment.

Forces Command (FORSCOM) (a dualhatted headquarters in Atlanta) could further coordinate RC functions. The greatest yield from this evolutionary growth is in the benefit derived by the Reserves, the component that requires the most improvement to attain satisfactory levels of performance on essential wartime tasks and effective command management. In contrast, under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) has been required to relinquish some daily wartime management functions.

Firepower: Equipment Capability

Based on current Army reports to Congress and on congressionally directed fiscal reductions, the RC forces that respond to global OPLAN requirements may be at a decreased level of combat readiness but will have an increased variety of equipment. Beginning with FY 1989, readiness and maintenance funding fell victim to budget cuts. Additionally, some RC units required to be in-theater within the first 90 days of a declared full mobilization may deploy with equipment that is incompatible with AC counterparts. One example of the variety of equipment found in the RC inventory today is that of the main battle tanks: M48A5 series, M60, M1 and M551—four different major weapons systems, with four different logistic support requirements (compared to'two in the AC inventory: the M60A3 and M1 series). But in all fairness to the service, there are plans for the M48A5s to be replaced by the M60 or M1 variants by 1992, or as soon as possible thereafter. Meanwhile, the soldiers in the field make do while awaiting the simplicity and efficiency of a more streamlined inventory.

To further illustrate equipment compatibility problems highlighted in recent Army reports from major exercises such as RE-FORGER, let us look at RC communications capabilities which are critical to combag sustainment and maneuver response. RCs communications equipment will not "net" with most AC communications equipment. Thus, even if units are rapidly ferried overseas, somehow establish their battle positions and are ready to begin their assigned tasks and roles, they may not be able to form a communication network. Therefore, they may not be able to tell anyone they are prepared to assume their associated wartime tasks. This is of extreme concern at the corps level. where logistics and operational measures must be coordinated.

The National Guard, during FY 1987, had only 62 percent of its total military equipment compatible with and supportable by the AC supply and maintenance system. For the same year, the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve estimated the Reserve/AC compatible equipment status to be less than 50 percent. As the budgets for the Guard and Reserve approach the \$15 billion mark by FY 1994, most of the money should be appropriated to buy compatible equipment and to train RC personnel on its proper use.

Now is the time to step back and accept a moratorium on increases to the RC force structure, if not "scrubbing it" and reducing the "political support" units that permeate both elements of the RC. Both the Guard and Reserve should delay the idea of forming two additional infantry divisions (for a total of 12 of 30 combat divisions) and work to provide the requisite combat service support to sustain the current structure. This means the Guard and Reserve should be prepared to accept a decrement in the number of seniorlevel positions. At present, there are more general officers in the RC than there have been at any other time: 115 in the Army Reserve and 92 in the Army National Guard, with more than 50 additional positions for the State Adjutant Generals.

Equipment improvements for the RC are programmed over the next five years, with most of the planned purchases occurring in 1993. But, historically, the Army has adjusted the programmed purchases downward over time. "Program dollar" amounts for FY 1993 are tremendous compared to the real dollars expended in the year Congress actually appropriates them. Equipment modernization has engulfed both the Guard and Reserve perhaps more visibly in the Guard. (Visibility is a product of political prowess on the part of the NGB, National Guard Association and industrial lobby groups rather than of pure military requirements.⁹) The Annual Report to the Congress for FY 1988 notes, "Following the 'first to fight, first to be equipped' policy, early deploying Army National Guard and Reserve units are receiving modern weapons systems before later deploying active duty units. During FY 1988, we plan to issue to Army Reserve Components approximately \$2.1 billion in new equipment, including the M60A3 tank, AH-1S and UH-60 helicopters, and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle."⁶ These are highly visible major weapons systems in limited numbers for deterrence, not sustainment capability systems, found in combat service support, where the Army has a great deficiency.

Rounding Out the Forces

The need to keep manpower and equipment in the highest fighting status is not new to military planners. No matter how great the resources of soldiers and arms, any waste dulls a force's fighting edge. We need not look solely to the future to solve present problems: instead, we may adapt an earlier practice, refreshing it as necessary with new outlooks and methods. In the Army, one such earlier practice is known as "roundout," wherein RC brigades, battalions and in some instances technical support companies, fill out the Active force structure. Roundout, implemented in the late 1970s, proved to be an efficient and innovative program. By improving the RC chain of command and building on the present reality of the Total Force, roundout can make the "integrated force" feasible.

During this period of personnel austerity, the organizational structure of selected Army units has been reduced (for example, a division organized at fewer than the traditional three brigades). This reduction in organizational structure saves about 2,000 Active force combat manpower spaces in each CONUS division while retaining the requisite command and organic support umbrella. Under the roundout program, an RC unit is designated as an organic element of the Colorado Guardsmen inspect their medical vehicles during a REFORGER exercise.



Those units under the roundout program have become a highly professional combat-ready fighting force. This was accomplished through the cooperation and dedication of the National Guardsmen in the brigades and of those AC soldiers detailed from the parent units. They proved that the program works, but that it required considerably more time than the legislated 12 weekends and 14 days of annual training.

AC division. The RC element deploys with, or as soon after the division as practical, usually within the first month following the lead elements. Additionally, to assure similarity in equipment and maintenance priorities, the roundout unit enjoys the same materiel distribution priority as the AC parent unit.

AC sponsoring divisions are also tasked to provide year-round training assistance to roundout units. This is done to improve those mission-related tasks that support the wartime assignment. The training relationship is designed to improve the RC unit's tactical skill and technical proficiency. Hence, in terms of technical proficiency, the RC unit receives the greatest benefit. Training, equipment resourcing and individual tactical readiness have produced marked improvements.

The benefit of the roundout program can be seen in the commendable performance of RC roundout units at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Those roundout units organized as "organic augmentations" to an AC force have significantly improved in overall unit readiness and operability. The Army needs to expand on the roundout concept in order to have a significant improvement in the RC as a whole.

Instead, during FY 1985 and 1986, the Army converted selected infantry divisions to the "light force concept," and the 7th, 9th (termed a "motorized division") and 25th infantry divisions gave up their respective roundout units. Even though Army policy, requires these units to retain a loose training affiliation with their former AC units, the cohesive bond developed under the roundout concept has been loosened.

In FY 1989, it appears that the roundout concept will be retained at four divisional participants, while two new AC divisions, are added to the force structure. In view of proposed FY 1989 budget reductions and strength constraints, roundout should receive new life—not as a mere concept, but as a Defense Department policy—instead of having to compete with other requirements for dedicated personnel resources and time.

Roundout was and is a bold innovation. Army leadership must accept a greater OPLAN readiness risk than previously entertained. For the first time in recent history,

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military planners must accept that "first-line" combat-ready units are teamed with less available forces from the Army National Guard or Army Reserve (205th Infantry Brigade with the 6th Infantry Division). Yet, their basic planned deployment dates are not altered to reflect the essential post-mobilization combat training time for their augmenting RC units. The pressure rests on the AC units to get their partners ready to execute their wartime missions during peacetime. Whatever level the RC partners achieve during peacetime will be the reality of performance on tomorrow's battlefield.

Perhaps with the increased commitments and wartime mission requirements placed on the RC, the roundout program should be increased rather than allowed to stagnate or languish. It would not be unreasonable to have each CONUS-based Active division contain at least one roundout battalion; more effectively, it should be one brigade. This approach would require 10 roundout brigades, including those for the newly formed 10th and 6th infantry divisions.

Even the 82d and 101st airborne divisions could participate in the roundout program. Because of their high priority and heavy commitment schedule, perhaps they could be included, but be limited to one RC battalion per division. They could be rounded out by like infantry battalions: airborne- or airmobile-capable units. Currently, the airborne and air assault divisions do not have a pretrained military manpower pool. Should these divisions be committed—as the 82d Authorne Division was in Grenada-and sustain heavy losses, there would be no readily available pretrained Reserves to augment them. Replacement units would have to be reconstructed from existing individual assets or from the training base pipeline, which by law takes at least 12 weeks to form, equip and properly prepare before deploying.

Perhaps the roundout concept could even be expanded to the combat service support units necessary to sustain the combat capabilities of the fighting elements. An engineer or transportation battalion could have an additional company or substituted units from the RC—that is, a mix of AC and RC companies in a battalion or battalions in a brigade or group. A ratio of 3-to-1 would be manageable, with current readiness levels sustained.

While the idea of the "integrated force" may be new to the United States, it has already been put into practice in Western Europe. In 1986, the Federal Republic of Germany introduced the concept of mixing their unit composition between active and reserve forces. They are gaining additional active force structure by organizing units around a model which has the combat maneuver units of a given battalion attached to other active battalions during peacetime and the headquarters company and technical service platoons led and filled by reservists. It is not the ideal; however, it allows the formation of additional battalions without the administrative overhead of conventionally structured units. Again, the Army should not discount the idea without first exploring the concept.

If the United States is going to support NATO with a rapid reinforcement, then postmobilization training for each required early deploying roundout unit will have to be done in-theater. Those units under the roundout program have become a highly professional combat-ready fighting force. This was accomplished through the cooperation and dedica-' tion of the National Guardsmen in the brigades and of those AC soldiers detailed from the parent units. They proved that the program works, but that it required considerably more time than the legislated 12 weekends and 14 days of annual training each year. One former commander of the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) Georgia Army National Guard, for example, became a full-time Guardsman to ensure that his time was focused on the task of helping the brigade achieve its goal: a fully combat-ready force.

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One only has to review the record of that brigade or of the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mech) Louisiana Army National Guard to sense the tremendous efforts put forth to make the roundout policy work.

Training Schedule

While roundout is an outstanding readiness and wartime mission preparation program for relatively few RC units, it falls short of greatly enhancing the overall total readiness of the Reserves. Current laws regulating the RC had their beginning in the early 1950s, when the Army acknowledged its increasing reliance on the Reserves. Since the enactment of Title 10 in 1952, progress in attaining early access or greater use of RC units during peacetime has been extremely difficult. Although the Montgomery Amendment, part of the FY 1987 DOD Authorization Act, did allow greater access to National Guard units during peacetime annual training, this amendment was and is being contested by Massachusetts and by several constitutional rights groups. (Round one of the court action supported DOD's position; however, the waters have not yet been calmed.) The NGB reported that "Senator Exon (D-KY) introduced a bill that would permit governors to block training of the National Guard overseas anytime they objected to place, policy, or type of units. The Bill required the President to personally override the gubernatorial disapproval by certifying to the Governor concerned on a caseby-case basis 'that the national security of the United States requires such action by the President.' The Exon Amendment was considered by the full Senate on September 17, 1987 and was defeated 66 to 29."7

When it looked as if no further challenges to the Montgomery Amendment appeared likely, the federal appeals court in St. Paul, Minnesota, reversed the 1st US Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Massachusetts. This challenge reopens the issue of "states' rights" versus federal authority during peacetime and the use of the Guard. The issue argued by the Justice Department will probably be adjudicated by the 8th US Circuit Court of Appeals

Currently, the airborne and air assault divisions do not have a pretrained military manpower pool. Should these divisions be committed—as the 82d Airborne Division was in Grenada—and sustain heavy losses, there would be no readily available pretrained Reserves to augment them. Replacement units would have to be reconstructed from existing individual assets or from the training base pipeline.

where it is being heard by a full panel of judges. No one can predict the decision, but most officials in Washington, DC, acknowledge the issue will probably be challenged another time and will wind up being heard by the US Supreme Court, perhaps as early as fall of this year. Should the court ruling strip the federal government of the authority to order the Guard overseas for training during peacetime, then much of the modernization effort during the last eight years could be undone. Yet, the issue is still debated in many political camps.

Another area that requires review is that of training time. In recent years, RC responsibilities have increased while planned postmobilization time availability has decreased. Yet, the Army is still operating under legislation and some administrative policies that reflect the RC as being called up under a full mobilization with "plenty of time to get ready." But several military planners have recently noted: "We currently rely on the Reserve Component to complete the mission. We cannot do it without them. This is the real-world situation."⁸ Today, the Army must call upon the RC to fill out the vast majority of combat support and combat service support requirements that are critical to the effective execution of any major OPLAN. Given this level of reliance on them, the US Code and perhaps public law must be considered with a view toward more serious access

Units that are called up, mobilized and deployed during the first 30 days should anticipate no post-mobilization training time. In the next conflict, the action will not start without the RC. The RC must be in place, on-line, ready to go with the best of the AC units.

and management changes. The Total Force policy was adopted during the early part of this decade; perhaps now, an integrated force concept should bring us into the 1990s.

Based on the recent REFORGER exercise experiences, military planners at the senior staffs realize that the current annual drill periods may be insufficient for the "citizensoldiers," and that more federal management of the RC is needed. Annual drills need to be increased and administrative training requirements and inspections need to be redefined and tasked as either biennial or triennial requirements. Likewise, drill periods being expended on nonwartime related tasks must be minimized. Annual training assemblies must be intensive, prime training time, getting full and optimal usage of that two-week period. The 14 days' training time currently allocated must be used more efficiently, eliminating the mid-weekend break, before the subject of additional man-days or drill periods is considered. While the Army and NGB may debate the weekend break issue, they should recognize the need to maximize their training period. Too much training time is lost in standing down and then starting up for the second week.

Some units, aiming for more efficient use

of their limited time, incorporate presently required riot-control drills and the like with other related tasks into their mission-essential tasks lists. However, for early deployable groups such as RC Special Forces groups, this practice has little if any merit. Units that are called up, mobilized and deployed during the first 30 days should anticipate *no* postmobilization training time. In the next conflict, the action will not start without the RC. The RC must be in place, on-line, ready to go with the best of the AC units.

Mission readiness of RC units required to deploy within the first 30 days of a US-called crisis or mobilization should be monitored closely by FORSCOM, the NGB and the chief. Army Reserve Office, to ensure everyone actively pursues means to better prepare themselves during peacetime. While the National Guard and perhaps the Army Reserve leadership may dislike the thought, annual individual training requirements should be extended through appropriate legislation from 12 weekend drill assemblies to 15 per year on a regular basis. Annual training for units with early deployment missions should also be extended by the addition of a third week of training every third year, bringing the requirement to 21 consecutive days of training. with these three weeks to be used for regularly scheduling RC units' participation at the National Training Center or overseas training deployments.

Caution must be exercised when discussing additional time for annual training, because the Reservists and Guardsmen alike must manage not only their families and military duty, but also their civilian occupations. Members of the RC should receive some form of increased protection under law from civilian agencies and firms firing or harassing them because of the annual time spent away from their employment. Employers should be monitored, through appropriate legislation, for "nonsupport" of the RC mission. Annual training periods should be scheduled to coincide as a minimum with the wartime command host units planned for two years in advance. RC commanders should be required to be in attendance with 80 percent of their authorized personnel strength at each annual training period in order to receive a rating of combat ready. If a unit fails to achieve an 80 percent show rate of authorized strength, this then should be a significant readiness indicator for establishing that unit's future availability date for assumption of its wartime mission. All units that deploy within the first 45 days of a US call-up should adopt this standard.

Military leadership and the Congress know that the need for better trained and equipped forces and for improved management of the RC. The AC must learn and accept that one of its primary missions is to train, prepare and integrate the RC units for their wartime mission. No longer can the RC wait until a crisis: they are now part of the Total Force structure and would improve by being part of an integrated force structure. This nation cannot allow these problems for the RC to go uncorrected. The RC must be organized, trained and "fit to fight" during peacetime. Our defense strategy is backed by the full spectrum of military capability found in units from the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve. These forces must be moderne ized, filled and in turn, give creditability to the Total Force policy. This is not a call for national rearmament; it is rather a recognition of reality. Our failure to achieve a more conventional force through improvement in professional skills, education, equipment, and command and control methods for our RC forebodes military failure-a failure that dooms not only the soldier and his unit, but perhaps a nation that relies heavily on its RC to meet its national security needs.

When the enemy's line of advancing armor approaches a soldier's position, that soldier must have the confidence developed during peacetime training. He must have compatible equipment to allow him to win the forthcoming battle, so that instead of conveying an ominous silence, the platoon radio network should come alive with: "I've got many tanks to my front-am engaging now! Out."

MATES

1. The Honorable Caspar W Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense, speech to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984.

 David C. Monison, "Weekend Warnors' Playing Key Role As First Line of U. S. Wartime Defense," National Journal (1 February 1986), 256-62. By 1990, about 1.2 million troops, or more than 60 percent of the Army's total strength, will be in the Reserve Components (RC), compared with a 50 percent split at the beginning of this decade.

3, "The National Guard as a National Priority," National Guard Magazine (December 1981), 13. Note. On 9 April 1984, Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations and Logistics, expanded Dr. James R. Schlesinger's policy statement, which said, We should assume in our active/reserve force mix decisions that Reserve Component units will be made available for any contingency for which they are needed.

4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1987, Part B,

Reserve Forces, Section 411, End Strength for Selected Reserve, 46-47, Oct 86. Prior to FY 87, the Congress granted a floor number to the RC; however, the Armed Services Committees concerned with readiness issues switched to a ceiling figure for more control.

5. Representative G V (Sonny) Montgomery (D-MS), Chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, National Journal (1 February 1986), 260 He noted that Congressional interest was spawned through the jecognition that the Reserve and National Guardsmen have a unit or annory in "everybody's district in Congress." They are citizens first, then soldiers. 6. DOD Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1988, 79–80

7 Unpublished Information Paper, National Guard Bureau, unklated, subject. "Exon Amendment S-505 to DOD FY 88 Authorization Act. Washington, DC

8. A status report on the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve, Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Arlangton, VA, 1980, 1.

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MREVIEW ESSAY

By Colonel Henry G. Gole, US Army, Retired

Friction, Fun, Fog and Fiction

The Hunt for Red October. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland. 1984. \$14.95.

Red Storm Rising. Putnam Publishing Group, New York. 1986. \$19.95.


Patriot Games. Putnam Publishing Group, New York. 1987. \$19.95.

The Cardinal of the Kremlin. Putnam Publishing Group, New York. 1988. \$19.95.

· Tom Clancy needs no praise from an obscure reviewer writing for a professional military journal. The four novels he has produced to date have been enormously successful. He brings out the basest envy in journeymen writers-his earlier books moved from the hardcover best-seller lists to the paperback best-seller lists, just as his most recent book cracked the hardcover bestseller list! A weekly news magazine has reported that Clancy received a \$4 million advance for his fifth book that was not even outlined in his head when the contract was signed. And soon there will be film versions of his books. Considering the popularity of his novels, and anticipating how well his hi-tech action scenarios should play on the screen, Clancy will be able to keep the wolf from his door without a plug from Military Review. Nevertheless, this is a plug for Clancy and for creative writing on military themes.

Clancy's novels are fun because they make the military look good in the eyes of our fellow citizens. They allow us to feel good about ourselves as Americans; they focus our attention on Clancy's imaginative manipulation of real-world possublities. They invite us to stretch our own imaginations; and they portray a fairly realistic picture of the technology of modern warfare. US Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono has suggested that Clancy do for the US Army what he has done for the Navy, FBI and ClA—write a technothriller about the Army. In addition to an understandable institutional desire for good ink, we can profit as private persons and as professionals by reflecting on good fiction, diaries, memoirs, poetry, letters and biographies that bear on our line of work. Clancy's thoroughly entertaining novels sharpen our critical faculty as our training and experience engage his imagination at a point halfway between our left and 1 right ears.

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, former chief of naval operations, in his favorable Proceedings review of Red Storm Rising, has some very kind words for Clancy. Unfortunately, the admiral prefaces his praise with, "It may be a novel, but ..." suggesting an apology to all those ensigns out there for reading fiction when they could



Colonel Gole was assigned to the US Army War College pror to his retirement. His article, "Literature and History for Soldiers," appeared in the May 1988 issue of Military Review.

have been reading Navy regulations. Professional officers, and most particularly those of the more technical services, seem to relegate the reading of fiction to the dust bin of trivia along with comic books and Saturday morning cartoons.

Fiction supplements our understanding of history, our general education, our personal experience and our technical training to shape our mature judgment. It stimulates free play in our imaginations. Fiction allows us to test ideas and push our creativity without material investment: it is a kind of research and development on the cheap. It allows us to feel the past as well as to understand it. For example, when reading Nicholas Monsarrat's Cruel Sea, we need no technical training to appreciate the brave men who crewed the tiny corvettes and destroyers that escorted merchant vessels through the treacherous weather and submarine-infested North Atlantic waters in 1940. For the flip side of the experience, read Lothar-Guenther Buchheim's Das Boot to feel the terror of the German submarine crew under depth-charge attack in a cramped, stinking boat.

C. S. Forester, of Captain Hornblower fame, wrote a World War I novel, The General, that allows us to understand, as nothing else can, how British generals could repeatedly send Tommy "over the top" to his slaughter after it was evident that machineguns, rapid firing artillery, barbed wire, torn-up or flooded terrain, and field fortifications made frontal assault suicide. The general of the title is, at the same time, the best and the worst produced by Britain. His career taught him that tenacity in the performance of duty was the highest military virtue. The war meant rapid advancement to high responsibility, but the man was an unimaginative plodder as a junior officer and such he remained as a corps commander. He simply knew no alternative to sending Tommy over the top. Literature can inform us of the feel of combat as nothing short of the actual experience can. The General, an insight into the waste of life, is more powerful and convincing than anything else on the subject.

We should not apologize for reading fiction or for reflecting on plays and films, nor should we overlook the degree to which we are formed by what we read throughout our lives. How many of us made the military a career because we were stirred by the nobility of military self-sacrifice in, for example, Shakespeare's night before the Battle of Agincourt scene in Henry V, or in a youthful reading of Beau Geste or The Song of




Roland? Some long-forgotten book read at age 12 might have determined our life's work or otherwise shaped us in ways we know not.

Films too can inspire, teach and shape the professional soldier. Rarely has determination been better depicted, or anything better filmed, than in Zulu; loyalty is seldom better treated than in Tunes of Glory or in Gunga Din. Both the law of land warfare and the distance between combat soldier and staffer are powerfully treated in Breaker Morant. The loss of perspective and the infinite variety of human personality are shown in The Bridge Over the River Kwai. Operational decisions can be painful for the entire chain of command, as we see in 12 O'Clock High and in Command Decision. For those who want a realistic feel for infantry combat, try Battleground or A Walk in the Sun. Art has much to teach us about all aspects of life, including the military profession. Good leaders consider films and books for use in military training; no one. said that training must be dull, but it too often is. Let's have fun doing our job!

For those who are untamiliar with Clancy's works, his best sellers as of 1988 are: The Hunt for Red October, Red Storm Rising, Patriot Games and The Cardinal of the Kremlin.

The Hunt for Red October was a surprise block-



buster by the then-unknown Maryland insurance salesman. It is the story of a disaffected Russian submarine skipper who defects to the United States along with his crew and his supersub. It is a great sea chase; the Soviets are out to prevent his defection, and the US Navy is at first unaware of his benign intent.

The tactics, techniques and hi-tech wizardry of contemporary undersea warfare are fascinating and so realistic that US officials assumed that an insider had given Clancy highly classified secrets. Clancy denies that. He claims that sea stories from Navy buddies, open source publications and a fertile imagination permit a clever chap to put it all together. He got the idea from a newspaper account of an actual attempt by disaffected Soviet sailors to flee to Sweden on a warship after a mutiny. They failed. Red October does not.

Also important to his future books, the military services wooed him, gave him access to information and allowed him to put his hands on hardware that would be unavailable to a less friendly writer. For a similar white-knuckle adventyre, this one in carrier operations and combat aboard an attack aircraft, read Stephen Coonts' Flight of the Intruder.

The general setting for Clancy's second book,

Red Storm Rising, is World War III. The war is limited to a US-led NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact "duking it out" in Europe, in the Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea. It never goes to all-out nuclear war, but our author keeps us up past our bedtime by completely absorbing us in the measures, countermeasures and countercountermeasures of "conventional" warfare on land, sea and in the air. Moreover, Clancy starts the war, fights it and terminates it, a didactic point that will not be lost on the thinking soldier—those who decide for war should be thinking from the beginning how they will stop it.

As a result, the military fell in love with Clancy and he with us. He makes us look good, and he forces us to think through war-fighting scenarios. Clancy's fielding, deployment and employment of Stealth-like bombers years before we got around to it in real life will grab your attention as will his appreciation of the strategic significance of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap and his feel for the clash of armored forces. Insights like these suggest that he has done his homework. He is one fine armchar general!

The US Army War College selected Red Storm Rusing for the 1987 Contemporary Military Reading List, a departure from the usual focus on nonfiction works. Those with a taste for similar plot lines and good writing should also read General Sir John Hackett's A History of the Third World War and Harold Coyle's Team Yankee: A Novel of World War III.

Next out of Clancy's seemingly bottomless bag of tricks was Parnot Games. Clancy turned his talents to terrorism and the toys, techniques, and tradecraft of terrorists and those who combat them. He took the opportunity to praise the FBI for minimizing terrorism in the United States, quite a feat in an open society that insists upon due process and civil liberties.

Jack Ryan, the protagonist of Patriot Games, is on the most familiar terms with the British royal family since Wally Simpson caused a king to give up his throne for the woman he loved. The book is pure fun. The shoot 'em up at the end of Patriot Games is the most fun since The French Connection chase scene in New York, the shoot-out at the OK Corral, and the battle at the Alamo all rolled into one!

In August 1987, Clancy's books were at the top of both hardcover and paperback best-seller lists. Then, in July 1988, came *The Cardinal of the Kremlin*. To no one's surprise, it shot to the

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top of the hardcover best-seller list, as Patriot Games did the same on the paperback list.

The Cardinal of the Kremlin is a thriller about a Red Army colonel who is executive officer and confidant to the Soviet Defense Minister, a CIA agent, and the Soviet Union's greatest hero of the Great Patriotic War. He has access to his country's most guarded secrets, including the latest developments in the Soviet space defense system. Get it? This puts the book in today's headlines and right in the middle of the SDI debate, not a bad way to stay on the best-seller list! Clancy also gives us: an Afghan freedom fighter who knocks Soviet aircraft out of the sky with dexterity not seen since King Kong hung from the Empire State Building swatting at biplanes; a raid into the Soviet Union by an Afghan band; a kidnap of one of our SDI wizards by a Soviet team in the United States; Russian counterintelligence rolling up a US spy net in Moscow while engaged in Soviet-style bureaucratic infighting; a US submarine infiltrating a tough agent into a Soviet port city to rescue the wife and daughter of the Soviet Numero Uno; and a US negotiating team that sneaks the defecting Soviet first secretary out of the Soviet Union from under the very noses of the KGB! Clancy books aren't dull!

Clancy exploded onto the publishing scene just when it was once more acceptable to draw characters as representations of good and evil, which is the way our author views the superpower confrontation. His audience seems prepared to accept that depiction of hfe as a morality play rather than to blush at its lack of sophistication. In the world according to Clancy, children, mothers, doctors, FBI agents and the military are good. Unlike Dante, Clancy does not assign his bad guys to specific circles in hell, but you can be sure that they are consigned to hell. That is why the military likes Clancy.

Clancy is hardly the first writer to find war and warriors inherently fascinating. From the Old Testament account of Joshua's use of psychological operations at Jericho to the description of noble German barbarians by Tacitus and the national epics of El Cid, The Song of Roland and Beowulf, war and warriors have been celebrated by historians and poets.

Popular American novelists have praised both the military professional and the citizen soldier who sets aside personal pursuits to take up arms in time of national need. Books in this genre are often made into successful films and television movies, such as those of James Michener and Herman Wouk. Michener and Wouk come to mind as one thinks about Clancy's books, because all three raise the issue of a selfish and materialistic society finding men ready for selfsactifice.

In The Bridges at Toko-Ri, Michener has the salty admiral commanding a carrier bartle group musing about Brubacker, a lawyer, devored family man, and World War II vet recalled to fly dangerous missions over ivorth Korea from an aurctaft carrier. The admiral, clearly Michener's voice, wonders where the United States gets such men. Our essentially civilian-oriented culture does little to promote the martial spirit, but Americans have always responded when called. The professionals are equally admirable men ready to lay down their lives for their friends, as the rescue helicopter pilot does precisely that.

In War and Remembrance, Wouk's sequel to The Winds of War, we see land, air, sea and undersea combat; Atlantic and Pacific; tactics, operations strategy, and policy; trigger pullers and heads of state; war and concentration camps; birth, death, love and hate. In The Caine Muany, Wouk was at his best and showed his essence (later confirmed in his autobiography) when he had the lewish defense lawyer praise the unattractive and pathetic Captain Queeg, the career officer. It was the military professionals, men like Queeg, who kept the faith and made personal sacrifice a way of life in the lean years between the wars. When the nation called in extremis, the tiny band of regulars molded the puny forces of the 1930s and the amateurs of the 1940s into the most powerful military force the world had ever seen.

At a dining-in at the United States Military Academy in the late 1970s, Wouk thanked us, career officers all, for keeping the flame alive so that the nation would be prepared for "the next time." The younger officers had heard only scathing criticism from fellow citizens for over a decade. Wouk is apparently convinced that the US military is a decent lot essential to man's last best chance, the United States. It was good to be stroked by the distinguished author then and more recently by Clancy. Clancy finds himself in good company as an admirer of the military. Officers of Clancy's age had the bad luck to suffer the slings and arrows of the late 1960s and 1970s, an unhappy consequence of the American experience in Vietnam. They don't know that Americans generally like their soldiers.

Clancy's political views are fairly transparent. He has not been guarded in his admiration and



praise of Ronald Reagan nor in his contempt for Jimmy Carter. Tom Clancy is a conservative. In another age, he would have been foursquare in support of Crown and Altar. He likes guns, gadgets and games; his country, president and family; and everybody's mom and kids. He is also a classic Walter Mitty.

Readers will note that Jack Ryan, his protagonist in all four novels is, to understate it, an allaround guy. As a matter of fact, Ryan makes James Bond look like a couch potato. Before he was a professor of history at the US Naval Academy, Jack made a bundle in the stock market. While teaching at Annapolis helps out at the CIA where, of course, they want him full time. Even as a part-time analyst, his work regularly comes to the attention of the director and not infrequently requires Jack to brief the president.

Jack is also a veteran Marine Corps officer who goes hand-to-hand with terrorists. He is on friendly terms with the British royal family (grateful to Jack for saving the lives of the heir apparent and the princess), and usually has a ringside seat to whatever the action is. He is often the only civilian in a combat information center, nuclear submarine, or combat aircraft in the thick of the action. His wife is beautiful, a gifted surgeon, and never gives Jack any lip as he risks life and limb—and his family—as the mood strikes him. His child is another Shirley Temple; she is not in films, but she can probably sing "On the Good Ship Lollypop" better than Shirley. In brief, Jack hobnobs with royalty, and the guys on a construction site would consider him a helluwa man!

This is not to mock Clancy. The novels race ahead, and readers willingly suspend disbelief. There is a bit of Rambo in him, but most of us will enjoy the Clancy books for what they are without quibbling about technical detail that might bother experts. For example, special operations folks certainly blanched as they read in Red Storm Rising of the Air Force lieutenant, the pregnant Icelandic girl, and the several Marines who conduct long radio conversations with higher headquarters as they stumble about Iceland after the Soviets grabbed the island. As the only intelligence source operating under the noses of an elite Soviet force that has demonstrated a high level of planning and combat skills, it is very likely that Clancy's band of likeable amateurs would have been rounded up or erased in a matter of hours after their first broadcast. US Army veterans of long-range reconnaissance operations would point out that Soviet radio direction-finding capability, vintage 1950, and heliborne operations, vintage 1960, would have done in the gritty group like so many bugs under a boy's magnifying glass on a sunny day.

Likewise, submarine and aircraft drivers, SWAT team members, CIA analysts, space scientists and other technical gurus will find glitches as Clancy gambols on their turf. So what? Let us agree that Clancy is a gifted amateur. He gives us pleasure while stretching our minds; he tests our imagination as we puzzle through the human condition. If one thinks there is value in wrestling with the big ideas of our time, such as war and peace, Clancy invites us to engage those ideas. If one takes pleasure in watching clever chaps strutting their stuff, Clancy shows his characters taking a turn or two. However, with few exceptions, such as Crane's The Red Badge of Courage, the feel of combat is out of the reach of even the most empathetic creative writer if he hasn't personally experienced combat.

This pronouncement is more than chestthumping by an old warhorse, and it is not just the difference between knowing and feeling; good novelists are skilled precisely in narrowing that gap with the artist's gift—imagining. The problem is that without having felt it, it is almost impossible to know what is meant by persistent discomfort combined with constant danger, uncertainty and the sure knowledge of only one thing: that things always go wrong.

Aside from the unusual fact that the full-time concern of combat troops is to stay alive and to kill, their lives are almost always in the hands of others—pilots, artillerymen, commanders before one even takes the enemy into account. That is hard to know or to imagine. Clancy is very good at the strategy, the war game and the planning. He is also good at the conduct of war, but neither he nor his average reader knows how little control combat troops have over events and the extent to which even the generals are small corks in a heavy sea.

Strategy and war are two different propositions. Strategy is an intellectual exercise; war requires a touch of the poet. A physicist or a chief executive officer in a large business may have the untellectual tools necessary to design national strategy, should he focus on it. The same cannot be said of conducting war and engaging in combat. It is difficult to know in advance who will be good at the conduct of war, but one can learn to be a strategist.

Art Lykke, a retired US Army colonel and master teacher at the US Army War College, has translated commentaries on strategy usually presented in turgid prose—into a backof-the-envelope outline that permits the beginning of orderly strategic thinking. Lykke says that strategy is about ends, ways and means. The first trick is to identify national objectives, the ends of US policy. Next, we ask how we get there from here: the concept or ways the strategist would employ to secure the ends or national objectives. Finally, Lykke has his students consider the means, or as the so-called defense community puts it, the resources available.

Reasonable men can and do differ on ends, ways and means; strategy unaffected by bureaucratic politics probably never existed. The services have preferences for divisions, carrier battle groups and wings. They are this way, not because our military is evil or stupid, but because they have convinced themselves, as products of an interesting socialization process, that their respective services can do most in defense of the nation.

Strategy inevitably becomes a matter of resources that boils down to who gets the bucks. Lykke shows us strategy as pure reason before grubbing for bucks makes it another kind of an exercise. Clancy understands all of this. As a matter of fact, one could read his novels as polemics for the very expensive "gee-whiz gadgets" that win wars. Clancy is a superpatriot to whom the sophisticated American systems and our American boys are an unbeatable combination. He is less attentive to some ever-present problems in the conduct of war, because he, along with the rest of the world, probably underestimates them.

What makes Clancy such a wonderful storyteller is his common sense, the absolute clarity of his story line, and the dependability of his characters and systems. His schemes require split-second timing; his people act on cue; his systems work. In an interview, Clancy speculated that he would have made a good, tank commander because he had read all of the Rommel books. In another interview, he said that he took up chess when he washed out of ROTC. Reading books, even good books, and playing chess, even expert chess, prepares one admirably for war gaming and probably for strategy, but it does not necessarily prepare one for the conduct of war.

Clausewitz pointed out that tasks easily accomplished in peace are hard to do in the atmosphere of war. He called that friction. Fog is uncertainty. In war, soldiers know that they might celebrate a local victory as the war is being lost, or they might lament a lost battle as the war is being won. They also know that going from war to peace is like stepping through Alice's mirror: things get curiouser and curiouser. Consequences are serious, and outcomes are unknowable. Reason counts, but so does passion.

Clausewitz made much of friction in his oftcited and little-read book, On War. It is not just that things go wrong in war. Things go wrong in all human activities for the most basic reason: men are imperfect. Clausewitz noted that in war things so regularly go wrong-despite the most meticulous planning and exacting supervision that friction is a permanent part of war. Meters are confused with feet; rounds land short and kill friendly soldiers. The radio that had always worked fails at the critical moment. A map is misread; orders are misunderstood; fatigue takes its toll. These things are absolutely normal in war. Soldiers know that; armchair generals do not. Armchair generals are even more inclined than real generals to confuse the arrows and pins on a situation map with the situation! To believe that playing chess or reading Rommel is like war at the cutting edge is the equivalent of believing that one is qualified to sing in the Metropolitan Opera for having read a biography

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of Pavoratti or Caruso. Clancy is aware of what Clausewitz called friction, but he is probably aware in the same way that one is aware of someone else's toothache.

Clancy's novels belong on your professional reading list because they are a painless way to engage you in issues of interest to all literate people, some bearing on our line of work. Your reviewer enjoyed all four novels, but in declining order. Red October worked best as a novel; Red Storm Rising most directly applies to what we do for a living. Perhaps because of the many improbabilities, not least the breezy relationship Jack Ryan enjoys with the heir to the British crown, Patriot Games is a pure lark and more fun than a barrel of monkeys. The Cardinal of the Kremhn is a good novel of soy and countersoy in the USSR and the United States. It is the least successful of the Clancy books and fun to read, one way of saying that anything the fellow writes is worth reading!

Your reviewer's observations about preparation for war and the conduct of war are one man's opinion. Good writing provokes and invites dialogue with the writer; that is the best reason to read Clancy.

One notes in reviews appearing in military journals a disproportionate number that conclude with a resounding call for "mandatory reading." If we took the command seriously, we would have time for nothing but reading. Clancy is not mandatory reading; you merely deny yourself a felicitous blend of business and pleasure if you skip Clancy.



THOUGHTS ON DEVELOPING STRATEGY

The Principles of Deterrence

By LTC John D. Parry, USA, and Steven Metz

Last spring in this same column, Multary Review published a "think piece" titled "The Spectrum of International Interaction—Peace, Crisis and War" (March 1988), which caused some interesting things to happen. We incorporated the spectrum mentioned in the article (and shown at right) into our theater operations curriculum at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and pressed our CGSC students to perform operational analyses using it.

After looking at this spectrum and working with it for a time, some students said, "If we have principles of war, do we also have principles of deterrence?" Wheels turned vigorously, some office and desk lights stayed on longer than usual, and after a literature search and a few interesting debates and brainstorming sessions, we identified the following embryonic principles of deterrence:

Cooperation, Competition and Conflict. This principle stresses the use of elements of power most likely to influence others. If a nation-state or interest group is attempting to influence an area and a material gain is perceived as achievable, other groups may get involved to compete for that same influence. For

PEACE CRISIS MAR DETERRENCE WARFIGHTING

example, after the United States sold Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait asked to purchase them also for protection in the Gulf. The United States refused, and the Soviets subsequently stepped in and sold their version of the missiles to Kuwait. Later, the Soviets offered to reflag Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf, but the United States stepped in and did it instead.

This spectrum of cooperation-competitionconflict is central to everything an actor does. Within it, the purpose of deterrence is to move behavior from the right to the left side by lowering the utility of conflict behavior. This movement can be accomplished by either negative or positive inducements in conjunction with nego-

⁽LTC Parry and Dr Metz are members of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)

tiations, but at any given time, the international system varies in its proportion of cooperative, competitive, or conflict actions.

Usability. Central to this principle is the idea that certain geographic areas are more likely to see conflict behavior than others. Geography (air, land, sea, space) has been used and will continue to be used in consistent ways; that is, as specific sea lanes, as traditional land trade routes, or as strategic invasion corridors. Additionally, during the 20th century, certain air-space corridors have been used repeatedly and have become strategic in nature. George Kennan, for instance, argues that there are only five great industrial areas capable of supporting a modern power-the northeastern United States, the English midlands, the lower Rhine Valley, the Dnieper/Don/Volga rivers basin, and Central Honshu in Japan. An understanding of global geography and how it is used or not used will help reduce our attention "to a mere handful of spots on the globe."1

Balance. To achieve national purpose, we must strive to keep things in harmony and direct our efforts toward a positive world order that is balanced regionally. By doing so, certain features are enhanced, such as growth and the quality of life.

Prevention. The key here is to develop a strategic and operational vision by uncovering, preventing and solving problems before they enter the crisis or conflict mode. At the heart of this principle is identifying threats and counteracting intimidation as early as possible.

Coalition. Success here means developing patterns of cooperation with similar nationstates and interest groups, because these groups normally exhibit common bonding and similar purpose, interests and objectives. Therefore, they generally develop similar policies, programs and commutments. However, coalitions may actually hamper deterrence if allies are not able or willing to punish an aggressor.

Change. Norhing remains the same except geography; social, economic, political, military and psychological changes will continue. Even though the degree and pace of change will be difficult to predict, we must anticipate and plan for change. Short-, medium- and long-term vision may also be required.

Clarity. Here we must consider the use of political, economic and military actions to enhance national purpose, interests and objectives. This principle may be the very essence of deterrence—building strength and communicating explicitly how it can be used, but not stating the exact conditions of use. This latter point was made in the 1950s when Dwight D. . Eisenhower, in his approach to national security, argued that Harry S. Truman invited invasion of South Korea by being too explicit about US use of power. The application of this principle will squeeze maximum efficiency from national power resources.

Productivity. Productivity is tied to the availability or nonavailability of resources, as well as to trade deficits and surpluses. Although basically economic in nature, this principle is frequently tied to conflict between nations. Scholars disagree as to whether nations are more prone to conflict when in decline or on the rise. One argument contends declining states start wars to "seize the moment" before further decline (Germany, 1914; Germany, 1939; Japan, 1941) or to distract their publics from domestic problems (Argentina, 1982; Iraq, 1981; Egypt, 1973). Another theory of international conflict is based on the belief that conflict derives from competition for scarce resources and that increased productivity on a world scale actually lowers the incentive for conflict.

But increased productivity within a nation may not increase its capacity for deterrence. Part of the paradox of security is that if you increase your strength without altering how others perceive your intentions, you may really make the environment more insecure. In other words, deterrence has both a *tangible* dimension (power) and an *intangible* one (perceptions, intentions and motives).

Exchange. In this area, we seek substitutions when we are at a disadvantage or need leverage. We must ask ourselves whether there is an acceptable substitute for the objective being sought. Note here the similarity to a strategy of horizontal escalation.

Credibility. We must always ensure the nation's ability and will to deter are communicated. Historically, this has caused problems for the United States. "The U.S., for example, once counted on threats of massive nuclear retaliation as a cure-all for low-level conflicts ."¹⁰ Our ability to use nuclear means has existed for some time, but was considered inappropriate in crises such as those in Korea, in Lebanon in 1958, at the Berlin Wall, during the Cuban missile blockade, and in Vietnam.

The reality of this situation likely caused Colonel Robert H. Reed and his colleagues to conclude in 1975 that "if U.S. national security interests and those of its allies are to be protected without resort to nuclear conflict, a spectrum of credible conventional capabilities for theater and subtheater use will be required.¹⁹ Balancing the ends, ways and means has become a continuous nightmare for strategists and operational planners because a nation's abilities often do not match very well with the spectrum of capabilities required to protect national interests.

The implications of these principles are many and varied. Basically, we consider them tools for strategists, statesmen, commanders in chief (CINCs) and their operational planners who are saddled with the daily chore of reducing the risk to our national security. As we review the track record in each CINC's area of operations, it is clear that most of their staffs' time and effort is spent providing for national security without actually engaging in combat operations.

We, therefore, suggest that it is not enough for a CINC to simply be proficient as a warfighter; he also has a major role in applying the principles of deterrence. And these principles point to a pervasive psychological component which makes it imperative that the architects of deterrence understand the dynamics of perception and communication.

NOTES

1. John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), xill.

2. John M. Collins, "Principles of Deterrence," Air University Review (Maxwell AFB, AL. November-December 1979), 27

Robert H. Reed, "On Deterrence. A Broadened Perspective," Air University Review (Maxwell AFB, AL. May–June 1975), 8.

THOUGHTS ON DEVELOPING STRATEGY


The Real Risk to US National Interests By LTC Joseph W. Arbuckle, USA

The concept illustrated in figure 1 is a commonly accepted one that suggests low-intensity conflict (LIC) poses the least risk to US interests and security. This is dangerously misleading, and if accepted, could influence decisions affecting force size and configuration, doctrine, resource allocation, political priorities and strategic objectives.

My position is that the risk to the United States actually increases as we proceed along the probability axis, and it follows then that fundamental changes in the factors mentioned must occur. In short, if my argument is correct, we must significantly change our strategic thinking and the way we posture our forces to meet the most likely threat to the country.

Since World War II, our focus has been on NATO because this area is perceived as the most risky threat in terms of the conflict scope even though it is the least likely conflict to occur, according to the model in figure 1. I think the conflict curve should show an upward swing on the probability side for LICs because they pose much more risk than currently believed and, therefore, seriously threaten our national security. I realize it is not possible to quantify the curve's true shape or actual value but it does serve to illustrate the concept.

I believe that although the model (fig. 1) clearly illustrates the inverse relationship between the probability of conflict and the risk to US interests, it is inaccurate because it is incomplete.



The model fails to include two other essential variables which must be considered when studying risks and the probability of occurrence—the number of conflicts concurrently affecting us and the influence time has on US resolve. When these are plotted, the relationship would be somewhat linear as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2 shows that as the cumulative number of LICs that affect the United States increases worldwide, the risk to US security increases simply because multiple conflicts have an additive effect. In today's world, both superpowers are anxious to avoid a direct military confrontation that might escalate into strategic nuclear war.

⁽LTC Arbuckle works in the Resource Management Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at Department of the Army, Washington, $D \subset$)

However, LICs in Third World regions have been, and will continue to be, meeting grounds for both nations because the risks to either power in any single conflict are relatively small.

But as their number increases, the cumulative effect also increases the likelihood of direct military confrontation. This is shown by the upward trace of the curve relative to the cumulative number of conflicts at the LIC level.

Figure 2 also shows that the longer the United States is exposed to and influenced by conflicts, the greater the risk. Again, time increases exposure to events and conditions that may threaten US interests. I must emphasize that time itself is 'not damaging, but the impact of events on American attitudes that occurs over time is potentially damaging.

One aspect of the time variable reflects our citizens' low tolerance for long-term conflict as manifested by reduced public support for US involvement in LIC. This low tolerance may be our center of gravity because it is culturally based and, therefore, not easily changed. Even though we are a superpower with global responsibility, our nation tends to look inward and avoid involvement in world events that do not pose an immediate threat.


When these variables—time and cumulative LICs—are included in the standard model, the curve takes an upward swing in risk on the LIC side as shown in figure 3. Figure 4 shows how time and number of conflicts relate to risk.

In summary, figure 3 is probably a more accurate depiction of the relationship between conflict probability and risk. We must recognize that although the probability of LIC is certainly higher than nuclear war, the risk to US interests at the low end of the conflict spectrum normally does not decline as shown in figure 1. Instead, it increases with time and the additive nature of conflicts.

The Soviets clearly understand this reality and reflect it in their political strategy toward the United States. For many years, the Soviets have managed to tie down a preponderance of US forces with preparations for nuclear war in a NATO setting, while constantly nubbing away at the United States on the Third World fringe. The Soviets know we are vulnerable to LIC, while the long-term nature of LIC is well suited to their tightly controlled, centralized and opportunistic government, which is able to provide a clear path toward global strategic objectives. 3

Conversely, the US government is shortsighted and reacts to perceived public opinion. In an environment where the news media and key political leaders play such dominant roles in shaping public opinion, it is extremely difficult to chart any clear strategic path regarding LIC and then maintain it through changing elected officials and other domestic fluctuations. Such factors cause us to vacillate in our execution of foreign policy and to appear unreliable as ailies.

Moreover, the LIC environment is likely to expand over the next 15 to 20 years, as growing technology provides the tools for deadly conflict



in regions of the world that are relatively quiet today. Additionally, the Soviets are experiencing severe internal problems that are selfthreatening, a factor that could raise their national anxiety level and cause them to be more aggressive in backing LICs as a means of diverting internal attention to external threats.

We must now recognize that regional LICs do threaten our country as their numbers accumulate and erode our resolve to defend our interfect of multiple LICs could cause the United States to box itself into a corner with no options other than a total loss of prestige or a direct military engagement with the Soviets.

Perhaps the most important question raised by figure 3 is how high on the risk axis the end of the curve will rise. The answer, I believe, lies in how we define "risk."

It is clear that global strategic nuclear war presents maximum risk to the United Statés, because it means our society will be destroyed. But, is it not possible for LIC's eroding effects to drain our national vitality to a point where the fabric of our society is destroyed along with our way of life? If so, then the curve should rise to almost the same level as that of nuclear war. What is clear is that the curve does turn upward at some point along the probability axis, and this turn represents a real threat to our welfare. It is only from an understanding of what is happening to US interests globally that we can tailor our strategy, doctrine, forces, training and other resources to meet the most likely threats. Changing the conventional risk-probability model is a first step toward broadening our understanding of world conflict and seeing the real risk to our national interests.



The High-Stakes Game of Competitive Strategies

By George E. Pickett Jr. ARMY, November 1988

Competitive strategies—a key thrust in longrange Department of Defense planning enunciated in 1987 and already endorsed by the newadministration—stand to benefit all of the services but "could be most useful" in the Army arena, according to George E. Pickett Jr., an employee of the Northrop Analysis Center in Washington, DC.

Writing in the November 1988 edition of ARMY, Pickett says the concept of competitive strategies grew out of a series of assessments conducted in the 1970s directed toward the question of how to effectively use US defense capabilities in what was projected to be a period of long-term competition with the Soviet Union.

"While the concept of competition was not new, what was original," according to Pickett, "was the idea that the United States could develop technologies, systems, forces and the like to influence its opponent's development of technologies, systems and forces."

The author points out that several "fundamental assumptions about the use of military forces in general and the nature of the relationship between the United States and its potential or actual adversaries underlie competitive strategies." These are:

• The notion of a long-term competitive defense environment is foremost.

• The expectation that both the United States and the Soviet Union will operate in "resource-limited environments."

• The idea that in military competition, each side is influenced to some degree by its opponent's actions.

• That competitive strategies are as useful in peacetime as they are in wartime.

Competitive strategies, therefore, have come to be defined as "actions or investments in most forces, systems, technologies, doctrine . . . that exploit U.S. advantages or an opponent's disadvantages to obtain important edges in peacetime deterrence or wartime combat," writes Pickett.

The continued US dominance in long-range aviation was one example of this concept cited by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Another would be AirLand Battle, says Pickett, in which "Western initiatives to observe Soviet units far to the rear . . . and to attack mechanized forces at long range . . . are forcing the Soviets to question the effectiveness of their doctrine and war plans."

Pickett notes that the concept of competitive strategies is continually being refined and potential new applications are being developed. But he sees several clear contributions to Army force development:

• The concept "adds an additional and very important criterion" in evaluating weapons, technologies and force design choices.

• The concept can also improve the Army's ability to protect program funding in times of decreasing resources.

• It will assist in "developing very long-term perspectives in investing in certain technologies, systems and force structure."

• It will probably allow the West "the basis for a more optimistic view" of its ability to deal with the Soviet threat.

Pickett believes the Army will have the most difficulty in dealing with the Soviets because "to some extent" we will always be "playing in the other guy's ballpark. Ground warfare tends to be an enduring Soviet strength."

This is why Pickett says competitive strategies can be most useful—because they "can locate those niches in the competition in which the United States can exert leverage and keep the Soviets off balance and constantly reacting to the West." After all, he writes, most forces give up because they lose control of the situation, because "they are outmaneuvered—and that is the tactu of competitive strategies."—ELH

MELETTERS

Not a Melting Pot

Having read the article of Major Jeffrey W. Anderson, "Operational Art on the Eastern Front," (Miltary Review, June 1988) and the letters that followed, I was a little surprised that no mention was made of the statement on page 49 that "... the Oreat Patriotic War was fought in 'Mother Russia." Although one would think that this statement is insignificant, we know, or should know, that most of the war was fought on the territory of Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic republics and some parts of Russia.

We should also remember that the Soviet Union, itself an empire, is a direct descendant of the former Russian Empire, having reconquered most of the nations that were part of the old Russian Empire.

While searching for the truth, we should always attempt to find it and present it fully. Especially now, when those nations are searching for their identity and groping for a future, we should not inadvertently place them in one pot and call them all Russians, thus doing with one "swoop" of a pen what the empires were unable to do for centuries: create one nation from many.

LTC Orest M. Kraus, USAR, Retired, Parma Heights, OH

Supports Currey's Views

Recently, while waiting to deliver a lecture at the USAF Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Florida, I began reading the fascinating issue on Vietnam (*Military Review*, January 1989).

I did make it through several articles, however, and the first, by Chaplain (COL) Cecil B. Currey, "Preparing for the Past," is one of the best, most thoughtful articles I have read on our involvement in Vietnam. He said things that will make many of our colleagues angry, but in virtually every respect, what he wrote is a good reflection of where I come down, nearly 14 years after the fall of Saigon. It is time we started thinking seriously about Vietnam. We have had a hard time doing that, until now.

David Passage, Director, Office of African Regional Affairs, United States Department of State, Washington, DC

LIC—A German Perspective

I recently read the introductory editorial to your series on low-intensity conflict (LIC) (Military Review, January 1988), written by Major General Gordon R. Sullivan, former deputy commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College, and would like to contribute some thoughts on the subject. My ideas are derived mainly from observations and experience as a military attaché in South America from 1981 to 1985.

In seemingly endless discussions with Latin Americans of all classes, I tried to learn why such potentially rich countries could not convert their human and natural resources into organized prosperity. Rather, they appeared doomed to repeat the three stages of an eternal, vicious cycle: democracy, anarchy and military rule.

The symptoms of instability are everywhere: corruption at all levels and branches of government; uncontrolled crime; insecurity; disregard of all law and authority; immediate profit attitude; brain drain; capital flight; lack of savings and investment; inflation; black marketeering; shadow economy; demagoguery; excess wealth and poverty; underdevelopment; and dependence. I wonder whether these phenomena are related and if root causes for the whole syndrome can be identified. And based on these causes, is there a remedy?

I know that thousands of researchers, professors and analysts have spent decades on tigse questions, and still there is no general agfecement, no explanation and no quick solution. To arrive at a stable society, law and order alone are not sufficient. As someone once said, "You'can do everything with your bayonets, except sit on them." Long-term stability requires structures to be elastic enough to absorb, without chaos, the inevitable regional or temporary instability that accompanies every development.

The role of the military can only be that of supporting a nonmilitary, political strategy \rightarrow more through its presence than employment. If foreign intervention occurs, however, the use of military force will become necessary, but on the clandestine battleground of guerilla operations, ł

where traditional military ethics are sometimes counterproductive and gallant actions are not cited in newspapers. In this setting, soldiers are subject to criticism from all sides and must accept tighter political control than in conventional warfare.

Is LIC war? According to Carl von Clausewitz, the answer is ves. He has written that "war is the continuation of political relations, with the incorporation of other means." Even shows of force, power projections, military deployments and exercises in the vicinity of a troubled area are war in the broadest sense. Regardless, I think it is undesirable to develop special units or special ethics for LIC. Every country should maintain a uniform code of conduct for the entire military, one that can be condensed to a single, all-important rule: absolute mutual confidence among soldiers and in their leaders, based on similar spiritual values. We never know who will fight what war; the armed forces must be ready for all types of warfare and must conduct war in accordance with their military ethics whenever politicians want to add some "other means" to influence the course of events.

For the individual soldier, LIC may well be a high-intensity conflict (HIC). Conversely, many participants in a HIC often sit in very quiet places. These terms do not really help the military very much and simply express, at the highest political level, the degree of attention, importance, effort, personnel and weapons devoted to a specific conflict. As other countries intervene, this political assessment may rapidly change LIC to HIC, even if only for a limited amount of time.

Theorists often point to the vagueness of missions in LIC—preserve the status quo and law and order, avoid hostile advances, keep a friendly government established. But these "orders" are entirely political and normally express the desires of an ambassador directing a small military contingent operating in the host country.

Specific military tasks are derived from the commander's (ambassador's) intent and knowledge of the enemy, terrain, environment, our own forces and capabilities. In LIC, environment means knowing the language, customs, traditions and beliefs of the local population and merging with the populace's lifestyle for a sufficient time to win confidence.

There is nothing more successful in creating a strong, stable, resilient, incorruptible community than local self-government with a mayor, judge and aldermen elected by the peasants for themselves. If soldiers help install this kind of home rule, preferably before a conflict intensifies, they might have a clearer, more imaginative concept of what to do on the scene. In practice, this often means warding off inapplicable or counterproductive central government instructions that disturb the traditional way of life and diminish local authority. Changes must be gentle, slow, circumspect and persuasive to avoid disruption, alienation and the shock of development.

The anarchic situation in the cities where more and more uprooted peasants move is a greater problem; but I believe stability can also be restored here using the same method—local self-administration. In the slums, euphemistically called "young villages," migrants tend to live in zones according to the province from which they came in order to maintain or revive ancient local traditions, dialect and lifestyles. There are examples of proud, confident suburbs with a community spirit distinctly different from neighboring ones. However, the amount of independence each gains derives from legal chaos and not from deliberate government policy.

In such an emotionally insecure and diffuse environment, these villagers-turned-suburbanites struggle to survive as a group and to create some order out of chaos to suit their aspirations. The sad reality is that political structures discourage citizen initiative. American democracy, with its constituency-based election of judges and representatives, separation of powers and decentralization, would benefit everyone, but also make countries stronger, more independent, nationalistic, self-conscious and assertive while producing strong popular leaders. We all must admit that philanthropy ends when the weak become disobedient and less easy to exploit or dominate.

This very real schism between ideals (true American-style democracy for everybody) and state policy (mantenance of national interest in terms of power, trade, influence and hegemony) is something every soldier must face. Therefore, the weakest, most corruptible, chaotic form of democracy will prevail in all countries we wish to dominate; that is, those in which citizens determine only the proportions between political parties and not specific representatives or anything else in "their" government. It is also at this point that many soldiers lose their enthusiasm for promoting stability in the Third World.

LTC Claus Plantiko, Army of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Bonn, FRG



Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, US Army, Retired

Since the initiation of this monthly feature, I have been fascinated by the books and authors selected by your contributors and I am honored to have been invited to submit my selections. I must add that I have made several lists and I agree with Sir John Hackett that it is a difficult job as there are so many excellent choices. After much winnowing and screening, I believe that the books listed below will provide a young officer broadened perspectives, a better vocabulary and hopefully the desire to read further. If one studies the Great Captains, it becomes obvious that they all had one common attribute: they were compulsive and voracious readers. They never missed a chance to read anything that pertained even remotely to their profession.

Let me start by recommending **Henry V** by Shakespeare. No one has defined the professional ethic or cohesion better than he did in this play some 400 years ago.

Since we take an oath to defend the Constitution, I would recommend as a primer the Federalist Papers by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton. I would follow that by reading Democracy in America, written by Alexis De Tocqueville. Although the book was written over 150 years ago, it is still relevant today. You should also go to a good library and borrow the two volumes that comprise American Commonwealth by Lord Bryce. These books were written in 1891 and are long out of print. Any officer who reads any or all of the above will find himself completely at ease when confronted by any hostile audience concerning what our country stands for.

The American Civil War has produced a literature of its own and I endorse all the previous choices. But, I would recommend the five volumes of **Lincoln Finds a General: A Military** Study of the Civil War by Kenneth P. Williams. These books equal or exceed the quality of Lee's Lieutenants by Douglas S. Freeman. One of the best stories of the Civil War is John Brown's Body by Stephen Vincent Benét. In thus epic poem, the American Civil War is presented as the dynamic experience of the nation.

Books on World War II are an industry in themselves, but let me offer you a few. As far as I am concerned, the two best books by fighting generals in World War II were **Defeat Into Victory**, by Sir William Slim, and **Command Missions** by Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott. This latter book, long out of print, is a remarkable work. If you want to learn how to conduct a river crossing, read the chapter titled "Crossing the Volturno."

There are two outstanding books on the war in Russia: The Road to Stalingrad and The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany by John Erickson. In these two books, you will find all the examples you desire of ArtLand Battle, even though it is not called that. If you have not read these books by John Masters, Bugles and a Tiger. and The Road Past Mandalay, you are missing the pre-World War II British army, the World War II British army, jungle fighting, desert fighting, special operations, armobility, and so forth—all, at division-level operations and below.

If you want to know what the profession of arms is really about, read **The Profession of Arms** by Sir John Hackett and follow that with **The Edge of the Sword** by Charles DeGaulte.

Sometimes it benefits us all to have others assess us and tell us what they think about our profession and, more personally, what they think about professional soldiers, individually and as a group. We usually have reservations about this, but it not only makes for interesting reading, it also makes us stop and think. So, for a couple of critical views, try **Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait** by Morris Janowitz and **The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations** by Samuel P. Huntington. Chances are they will make you think about what you are doing.

⁽Leutenant General Richard G. Trefry was the US Army Inspector General prior to retirement. He has also served as the Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army. He is currently a consultant for Military Professional Resources, Inc. of Alexandria, Virginia, and is a senior associate of the Association of the US Army.)

I happen to like anthologies. One of the best, although long out of print, is **Men at War**, edited by Ernest Hemingway, which was published in 1942 and republished in 1955. It should be republished and brought up to date for every war we have. On the lighter side, but still good, is an anthology edited by Alexander Woolcott for the soldiers and sailors in World War II titled **As You Were**. It is not all military, but any anthology that ends with the inscription that is on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier cannot be all bad.

We hear much these days about strategy and jointness, as well as structure and doctrine. For my money, read Research Study Number Two, dated August 1984, **Toward Combined Arms Warfare** by Captain Jonathan M. House. Published by the Combat Studies Institute at the Command and General Staff College, this study will provide you an excellent background. If you want to see how soldiers can suffer, and particularly because warlords run amok, read **The Forgotten Soldier** by Guy Sajer, and **Gallipoli** by Alan Moorehead. These two books should inspire any true professional soldier to strive to excel.

Finally, we live in an age of lists (and this article is one of them), but in addition to the Annual Reading List of the Army, I suggest you obtain a copy of **Historical Bibliography Number 8: Military Classics**, published by the Combat Studies Institute at the Command and General Staff College, edited by Dr. Robert A. Berlin. Then, get a copy of **The Challenge of Command** by Colonel Roger Nye. These two will lead you to all kinds of interesting reading.

We have not really even scratched the surface, but I hope this will whet your appetite for many satisfying adventures in reading while you develop yourself as a citizen and a soldier.



THE NIGHT TOKYO BURNED: The Incendiary Campaign Against Japan, March-August 1945 by Hotto Edoin. 248 pages. St. Martin's Press, New York. 1988. \$16.95.

More than 40 years later, strategic bombing during World War II remains a controversial subject. Certainly it was costly to the allies in terms of resources committed and actual losses. Less certain were the results. Most would agree that the bombing was not decisive, but writers vary widely on its impact between the extremes of very significant to wasteful or counterproductive.

Many recent books have viewed the bombing campaign from the standpoint of morality and the impact on civilians. The Night Tokyo Burned falls into this category. Even though the title implies this work focuses on the major Tokyo raid in March 1945, Hoito Edoin looks at the entire US bombing campaign against Japan. He examines US attempts to bomb Japan and Japanese measures to defend the homeland. While better accounts of the bombing campaign can be found, Edoin's treatment briefly and adequately puts the story into context. The importance of this book is its treatment of the Japanese views reearding the bombing. Edoin shows just how crude and inadequate both Japanese civil and air defenses were. Japan's efforts, compared to Germany's efforts during World War II, were certainly rudimentary. Due to the nature of Japanese cities, fewer resources and poorly developed defense efforts, the United States' use of fire bombs resulted in much greater damage to Japan than more intense bombing did to Germany.

The author effectively taps a variety of Japanese sources, both secondary materials and contacts with participants and survivors. He vividly depicts the terror of the bombing, as well as the fatalism and fanaticism of both Japanese civilians and military personnel. Most of all, Edoin makes this a personal and forceful story.

The Night Tokyo Burned is a readable and solid account that gives an excellent view of the bombing from a Japanese perspective. As such, it is a valuable supplement to the existing literature. I recommend this book to those interested in learning about how the Japanese true to defend themselves, how they viewed the destruction of their homeland and what effects the bombing had on civilians.

> Kenneth P. Werrell, Radford University, Radford, Virginia

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WINTER WAR WITH RUSSIA, 1918–1919: A Diplomatic and Military Tragicomedy by Benjamin D. Rhodes. 192 pages. Greenwood Press, Inc., Westport, CT. 1988, \$35.00.

This concise study of the Allied intervention in northern Russia encompasses a broad range of military activities: alliance warfare, training of indigenous troops, close air support, riverine operations and combat in an arctic environment. For readers who are unaware that the US Army was actively involved in the Russian Civil War, this compact chronology is both enlightening and quite readable. It would also be a good supplement to joint and combined operations courses offered at the US Army Command and General Staff College.

In some instances, the author's brevity detracts from the value of the work. For example, General Edmund W. Ironside, the British commander of the combined force, noted that the American 339th Infantry Regiment had a high percentage of Poles, Russians and Jews. The author fails to address this remark, an observation that invites examination of factual data. In a similar vein, the description of difficulties with the operation of weapons in subfreezing temperatures deserves some comment on what, if any, remedies were devised. A few wiring diagrams of the combined force also would have been particularly helpful.

This book can be read in one evening. However, a more deliberate approach pays much higher dividends. For the scholar, *The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia* offers an abundance of worthwhile research topics. For the military reader, this work provides valuable insights that will remain pertinent as long as soldiers of Western democracies fight small wars in faraway places.

MAJ Neil M. Franklin, USAR, Montgomery, Alabama

THE FALL OF AFGHANISTAN: An Insider's Account by Abdul Samad Ghaus. 229 pages Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, McLean, VA. 1988. 525.00.

Written by a former Afghan deputy foreign minister, this book attempts to examine the internal stress that culminated in Afghanistan's 1978 communist coup and the Sovier Union's 1979 intervention. Unfortunately, the title is largely a misnomer. The author apparently envisioned the book as a diplomatic history of Afghanistan, especially the foreign relations of the Afghan Republic from 1973–1978. However, Abdul Samad Ghaus devotes about 25 pages to the 1978 coup, while half of the text covers diplomatic events prior to 1973, when former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud's coup founded the republic.

Ghaus blames the 1978 coup on Soviet expansionist ambitions, a handful of determined communist officers, and Soviet planning and support. To an equal extent, he blames the United States. After the British countervailing force withdrew from India, the United States, handicapped by "inhibitions unfitting a superpower of global responsibilities," refused to fill the vacuum and replace British influence in Asia. Ghaus argues that a meaningful US presence, coupled with Afghanistan's positive nonalignment, would have offset Russia's predominance and discouraged its eventual southward movement. Instead, in the 1950s, Afghanistan gambled with its survival and accepted massive Soviet military and economic aid. That gamble eventually failed.

Ghaus, who was imprisoned in the 1978 coup, escaped to the United States in 1981. As a victim, not a participant, of the communist officers' clique, the authors views are those of an ousted opponent. Ghaus discusses major events and viral meetings with Leonid Brezhnev, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul-Haq. He meticulously describes relations with Pakistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Iran and major Arab countries. Although the book contains extensive footnotes, it lacks sufficient maps and a compiled bibliography.

If you want an examination of social and eqonomic tensions, the inner workings of the communist factions on the eve of the coup; of fasthand accounts of the men who fought on either side, *The Fall of Afghanistan* is not the bonk to read. Someone else will have to write the real "insider's account"; however, after 10. years of constant infighting and assassinations, that person nay no longer exist.

MAI Dianne L. Smith, USA, Headquarters, AFCENT, Brunssum, The Netherlands

NATO AND THE UNITED STATES: The Enduring Alliance by Lawrence S. Kaplan 237 pages. Twavne Publishers, Boston, MA 1988 \$24,95

Since its creation in 1949, NATO has played a critical role in US defense planning. In prepaBeginning with the meetings and Western defense discussions that took place immediately after World War II, this book explains the international climate that served as NATO's foundation. With chapters covering the impact of the Korean War, the early resistance to West German military participation and the withdrawal of French forces, the author shows that the alliance has repeatedly survived political upheaval.

With the exception of some rare historical inaccuracies and/or typographical mistakes, this work provides excellent coverage of the evolution in NATO's response doctrine as it was influenced by the varying commitments and capabilities of the alliance members. Although some of this book's information may have been overcome by events like the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the material remains a part of NATO's history.

While NATO's anniversary will certainly provide opportunities for critics to resurface the standard questions regarding the continued viability of the defense alliance, Kaplan notes, "The purpose of the alliance was not simply to defend against attack but also to create a viable West that can convince communism of the futlity of its goals. These functions are as valid in the 1980s as they were in the 1940s."

CPT Scott R. Gourley, USAR, Arcata, California

CLASH IN THE NORTH: Polar Summitry and NATO's Northern Flank. Edited by Walter Goldstein. 215 pages. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Elmsford, NY. 1988. \$24.00.

This book's title leads one to presume that the subject is limited to the Arctic regions. However, NATO's northern flank is secondary to a review of the "dynamics of superpower confrontation" and strains within the Atlantic Alliance between the United States and our Western European alles.

A common theme in this book is the tension between the United States and its Western allies caused by American "obsessions" with the Strategic Defense Initiative program and the Soviet Union's threat to the West. The 1986 Reykjavik, summit is used as a "perfect" example of the American penchant to adopt a "go it alone" attitude and make strategic decisions without consulting its allies.

Certain European politicians and intellectuals appear determined to use our "preoccupation" with Star Wars and the Soviet threat as a reason to shift away from the United States and adopt a more neutral stance. Our attempts to restrain the Soviets through trade boycotts are derided as counterproductive, while free-trade policies with the Soviets are praised as the best means to soften that country's aggressive tendencies.

This book recites the all too familiar complaints against the United States. NATO members want a powerful defense and the peace and prosperity that come from a strong US presence in Europe. However, they do not want the United States to dominate the alliance or even appear to dominate NATO. Although accommodation may assuage our NATO partners, it would not change the fact that many Western Europeans consider the United States almost as guilty as the Soviets in causing world tensions.

The chief virtue of Clash m the North is that it highlights Europe's apparent displeasure with American policies; its chief weakness is that it lacks balance against this anti-American trend.

MAJ Albert J. Golly Jr., USAR, Elmont, New York

RELUCTANT WARRIORS: The United States, The Soviet Union, and Arms Control by Cont D. Blacker. 193 pages W. H. Freeman & Co., New York. 1987. \$19.95.

This work on the primary political issue of our tume is relevant and instructive. As a discussion of US-Soviet relations in the context of nuclear power and efforts at arms control since 1945, it is must reading for career military persons and those responsible for making judgments in these important areas.

Cort D. Blacker's stated purpose is to "supplement instinct with fact," to "inform rather than persuade" and to "raise as many questions as answers." He does so in an easy, informative style, devoid of the strident tones prevalent in some of today's political science polemics. He lists four schools of thought on US-Soviet relations: realists who believe in the survival of the fittest; historical determinists who see a permanent pattern of suspicion and hostility in Russia; cultural determinists who believe that nations are inherently unable to understand each other; and those who are convinced that ideological imperatives alone determine national attitudes and actions. Ample tables and statistics on nuclear weapons, a glossary of terms, source notes and an extensive bibliography provide good reference sources.

During the period 1945–1986, an uneasy truce existed in US-Soviet relations, because, according to Blacker, "nuclear weapons . . . drastically reduced the range of military options." In fact, he writes "nuclear weapons have led to a kind of paralysis in superpower relations."

In summary, Blacker discerns three actions essential to establishing better US-Soviet relations and furthering progress in arms control negotiations:

 Restore confidence in arms control procedures by reaffirming commitments to abide by the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) Treaty.

• Defer all Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) testing in violation of the ABM Treaty.

 Resolve the dispute over treaty noncompliance.

This important book demonstrates the intractability of arms control under existing power relationships, but sounds a positive note for improvement of US-Soviet relations in the future.

GEN Theodore J. Conway, USA, Retired, St. Petersburg, Florida

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY: Key Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War with Japan by Ronald H. Spector. 285 pages. Scholarly Resources, Inc., Wilmington, DE. 1988, \$50.00.

This especially well-researched and thoroughly documented compendium contains the latest declassified material on World War II communications and intelligence information with Japan. Although World War II codebreaking efforts against Germany were shrouded in secrecy, the efforts against Japan were not as secretive. News leaks openly described the US Navy's detailed knowledge of Japan's strength and disposition before the Battle of Midway. Yet, the Allies in the Pacific continued to obtain valuable information throughout the war.

Ronald H. Spector's introduction clearly states that this work was compiled topically, not chronologically. Unless the introduction is read carefully, confusion reigns.

Spector addresses prewar communications intelligence and its use in protecting the US Fleet and providing time-sensitive intelligence to submarine commanders. The entire Japanese air force order of battle in the southern areas was constructed from one net alone. These efforts were so successful that one admiral stated "no Task Group Commander in the Fleet can now afford to be withour a radio intelligence unit."

The author discusses the difficultues in rapid and secure dissemination of critical intelligence to operating commands and the commands' resulting actions to protect the source and specificity of the intelligence. He then writes that Japanese intelligence was at work against us, although its efforts were not as successful.

Spector shows the political advantage we ganed through intelligence. From this, the United States obtained information on Japanese efforts to use the Russians as mediators in order to secure more favorable peace terms from the Allies.

The topics in Listening to the Enemy are well chosen. The various documents used to chart the war are coherent and logical. For those with a penchant for communications intelligence and its uses in the Pacific in World War II, this is a superb book.

LTC William C. Malkemes, USA, Fort Knox, Kentucky

THE WAR DESPATCHES OF KENNETH SLESSOR. Edited by Clement Semmler 493 pages. University of Queensland Press, Manchester, NH. 1988. \$47.50

If nothing else, this book says it is not such a bad idea to send a poet to cover our wars, however screwy the idea seems on its surface. This collection attests to the insights that a poet can bring to an event such as war.

Kenneth Adolph Slessor was not an off-thewall choice to become one of the few official correspondents sent by his country to report, on the Australian Imperial Forces. By the time he was appointed in 1940, he had been a writer, editor and reporter for a number of Australian dailies and periodicals and had established himself as a leading poet in his country.

An official correspondent, he explained to a gathering of soldiers, was one paid by the government to report the war and make dispatches ("despatches," in Australia) available to those publications that wanted them, as opposed to being an accredited correspondent sent by a specific newspaper or wire service. He followed the Australians from training camps in England to the disastrous defense of Greece, into the .

Some of the dispatches are unexceptional feature stories about the routine and the extraordinary exploits of his countrymen. However, many have an understated eloquence: "The shells poured over our heads with the kind of chuffling noise made by locomotives in a busy railway-yard. Meanwhile, waving mushrooms of shellburst curled their fumes slowly along the flat top of the ridge. The gunfire was continuous." His essay on the horrendous problems of jungle warfare, where "the infantryman is king," is a classic, worthy of rereading.

Slessor was a patriot to the core, but occasionally frank about military ineptitude. This kind of reporting caused a nervous public relations officer to recommend his dismissal. Slessor resigned instead, some months before the ultimate victory in the Pacific.

Taken as a whole, his insights into the problems of training, leadership, discipline, morale, sustained combat in difficult climate and terrain, and the importance of close air support have a universal quality not confined to the World War II era. The War Despatches of Kenneth Slessor shows that sending a poet to the battlefield was not, after all, such a wacky idea.

> COL Wallace B. Eberhard, USAR, Retired University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia

SEAPOWER IN GLOBAL POLITICS, 1494–1993 by George Modelski and William R. Thompson. 348 pages. University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA. 1988. \$35.00.

The waxing and waning of world power has been a theme of recurrent interest to historians. Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasized that without a navy, no nation, however powerful on land, could enforce its will beyond the shoreline. In a previous volume, George Modelski noted how during the past 500 years, the cycle of dominance occurred at roughly 100-year intervals.

The theme of this book is that such world dominance coincided with naval dominance, which can be quantitated and plotted by the number of capital ships in a nation's inventory. At least one-third of this book contains inventory tables of existing and challenging superpowers. These numbers are then translated into graphs that illustrate the rise and fall of national power as it parallels the relative number of ships in national inventories.

The authors claim no nation reaches global superiority until it has at least 50 percent of the world's operational warships. They meticulously list the names of capital ships for each superpower during the past 500 years. The lists will be valuable to historians and those writing doctoral theses, but they will not make fascinating bedside reading.

Surprisingly, this is not a dry, uninteresting book, for interspersed between the inventories and graphs is some extremely well-written prose. Political and economic reasons for a country's rise and fall are summarized succincity and clearly. Naval battles are put in perspective. Ship types considered for line-of-battle capital ships are described and categorized with clarity. Differences between galleys, galleons and carrocks are described without undue technical jargon.

The authors show that Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States progressed as leading naval powers in their day due to the emergence of ironclads, steam- and propeller-driven vessels, dreadnoughts, aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submatrines. Ironically, the authors rate Portugal a naval superpower and argue that Spain was never more than a powerful challenger. They speculate that dominance in space may soon replace dominance at sea in influencing emerging global political and military power.

This work serves as a good reference source for those seeking perspective of emerging and declining world political powers. If casual readers are ready to skip the summaries of national ship inventories, they will find Seapower in Global Politics an interesting, well-researched naval history.

RADM Ben Eiseman, USNR, Retired, Englewood, Colorado

Don't Forget the Writing Contest

Submissions to the annual Multary Review writing contest will be accepted through the end of May on the topic, "The Technological Future of War." The winning essay will earn its author \$500. Send your articles to Multary Review, US Army Command and General Staff College, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910.

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BOOT: The Inside Story of How a Few Good Men Became Today's Marines by Daniel da Cruz. 308 pages. St. Martin's Press, New York. 1987. \$17.95.

This book threatens to be no more than the macho dust cover promises—another rehash of how tough it is to go through Marine boot camp. The author, a Marine, indeed traces the course of hapless recruits through the wellknown process of transforming undisciplined civilian youths into proud members of a military organization. He does this through a day-to-day diary of a single platoon, focusing on its individual members.

However, the most interesting message of this carefully documented book lies not in the familiar physical and mental stress tests or the education in basic infantry arts of survival and combat, but in the criticisms of the operational policies forced on the Corps in recent years.

For example, in 1956, there was an enormous outcry in the media when six Marine recruits drowned at Paris Island, South Carolina, due to serious judgment errors by drill instructors. The resulting congressional investigation imposed strict limitations on what could be done with military recruits during basic training. The author describes these strictures: no physical contact, no harsh words and no swearing at recruits. Channels for complaints and appeals by recruits are explicitly and frequently explained.

The author emphasizes how such artificial rules are recognized as slly by both recruits and their frustrated instructors. Moreover, he also believes they threaten the preparation of Marunes for combat.

Such diatribes against official policy could not have been written or published without at least some degree of official approval, and it requires little imagination to suspect that the ideas expressed by the author as a free-lance reporter are consistent with some of those in higher echelons of the Marine Corps. This would certainly not be the first time a literary stalking horse has been used to air criticism.

The author takes numerous swipes at the executive and legislative branches of government, saying he believes they interfere with the operations of the Corps. With simplistic pride, he assigns responsibility for Corps failures to higher authorities outside the Corps. Such claims of a stab in the back by civilian supervisors is a wellknown cop-out used by many military types seeking to explain defeat. Inevitably, it convinces few and serves to weaken confidence in the historian more than in those accused. Second-guessing is recognized as a cheap shot.

Nonerheless, the military is seldom accorded recognition as the largest educational institution in the country. This book will, therefore, be of value to military officers who must adapt training methods to the prevailing societal strictures placed on educators. Predictably, it will also be popular reading for recruits who are literarily inclined and who want to learn what to expect if they sign on as one of the Corps' few good men.

RADM Ben Eiseman, USN, Retired, Denver, Colorado

THE KEY TO FAILURE: Laos and the Vietnam War by Norman B. Hannah. 335 pages. Madtson Books, New York. 1987. \$19.95.

As time passes, it appears our understanding i of US involvement in Vietnam is becoming it clearer. I contend this book by Norman B. Hannah will be seen as a major contributor to that process.

Hannah's point is clear—we never viewed the conflict in Southeast Asia as an overall regional phenomenon but instead saw it as a series of unconnected problems in individual nations, each requiring a separate solution.

Using this approach, we "neutralized" Laos by treaty, then politically limited ourselves to ground operations in South Vietnam designed to help defeat an "insurgency." We loosely buttressed this with an air campaign designed to coerce Hanoi to stop its aid to the Vietcong. In the long run, our efforts failed. Why? That is what this book is all about.

Hannah contends we failed in Vietnam because our approach was "incrementalist"—we tried always to reduce big choices into smaller bits, each to be taken singly and thus keep our options open to deal with bigger issues. This method prevailed at all levels and prevented us from ever taking truly decisive actions.

The most glaring example of this approach was our handling of the issue of Laos. President Kennedy, early on, recognized North Vietnamese violations of that country, but he feared that a military confrontation would lead to a quagmire. He sought a political solution, resulting in the 1962 Geneva Accords, in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed Laos should remain neutral. They further agreed they would not allow their allies to use Laos as a transit area or base for interfering in the affairs of other states.

But the Soviets did not force the North Vietnamese to observe Laotian neutrality. Indeed, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) continued to move forces down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Faced with such blatant violations, our leaders decided to continue to accept the concept of a "neutral" Laos but agreed that Laos would be split into spheres of influence. Neither side would seriously challenge the other's control of its respective sphere, and implicit in this agreement was an understanding that Laos' fate would be resolved in South Vietnam. This was a monumental error in logic because the eastern half of Laos was the key terrain in Southeast Asia and by assigning that sphere to North Vietnam we ceded to the NVA a tremendous strategic advantage.

The author shows how we incrementally deployed troops to Vietnam, always looking for the correct number to defeat the insurgency, and how we incrementally used air power against North Vietnam, always looking for the right amount of force to stop the flow of men and materiel southward. And finally he shows how the Cambodian and Laotian incursions were really attempts to deal with the Laotian problem. Unfortunately, these operations occurred in the wrong place and at the wrong time.

This is a very interesting book, but requires careful reading. Viewed from the perspective of Laos, the Vietnam War takes on a different look. Perhaps it should be called the Southeast Asia War. As the author makes clear, the North Vietnamese certainly viewed it that way and this book gives increased weight to the argument that the North Vietnamese, not the Vietcong, were the true enemy. The author also makes strong case that Laos was the key to victory.

> MAJ Darrel D. Whitcomb, USAFR, Overland Park, Kansas

LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties. Edited by Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. 250 pages. Pantheon Books, New York. 1988. \$19.95 hardcover, \$8.95 paperback.

Officers will be infuriated by this book, but should read it nonetheless. Coeditors Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh combine a series of essays critical of efforts to develop US lowintensity conflict (LIC) capabilities into a major contribution to what can be called the "counter-LIC" literature.

The arguments that emerge will seldom, if ever, appear in an officer's normal reading material, but will find receptive audiences in Congress, the media and the public. Thus, familiarity with these ideas is central to the military professional's ability to participate in developing LIC doctrine and capabilities.

The central theme of the book is that current LIC efforts are another manifestation of the "interventionist impulse" in US foreign policy. It is assumed that US intervention in the Third World is invariably destructive and evil and, the argument goes, if the United States is denuded of LIC capability, our interventionist urges will be restrained.

The book is a descendant of the "radical revisionist" critiques of US foreign and security policy from the 1960s. The introduction, written by the editors, and a conclusion by noted leftist scholar Richard J. Barnet are general and powerfully argued indictments of the "new interventionism."

Other chapters include examinations of the origins of US counterinsurgency doctrine and practice; current doctrine; current force capabilities; and case studies of El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Afghanistan. All are built around detailed research in government documents and secondary sources.

Together the essays constitute a political diatribe with a thin veneer of scholarly objectivity. This method of analysis is useful so long as the undergirding value content is explicit and reasonable, but this is not the case here. The only unifying value in the book is nonintervention. But intervention itself is value-neutral because intervention against evil can be good. The authors focus on what they believe the United States usually intervenes for in the Third World and illustrate the seamy side of our preferences in great detail. What is naively or intentionally ignored is the essential evil of those things the United States intervenes *against*.

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The contributors to this book thus fail to understand the most basic truth about LIC in the Third World: it usually does not entail a struggle and a choice between good and evil, but rather between the lesser of two evils. One can only wish that the authors had been willing and able to compare the attitudes of the people of Grenada with those living under "progressive" Third World regimes in Loos, Kampuchea, Ethiopia and Vietnam on the question of whether their rights and human dignity were augmented or eroded by US intervention.

> Steven Metz, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, USACGSC

SAUDI ARABIA IN THE OIL ERA: Regime and Elites, Conflict and Collaboration by Mordechai Abir. 247 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1988. \$38.50.

To the degree that Southwest Asia is a vital US interest, stability of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States must be seen as a critical factor in our regional strategy. Professor Mordechai Abir's latest work provides a comprehensive overview of the destabilizing forces that, until now, have been held in check by the descendants of Abdal-Aziz Al Saud.

This book sharpens the focus of the author's earlier study of regional politics and describes the evolution of the Saudi power structure over the past 20 years. Unlike some, who have predicted the impending demise of the Al Saud dynasty, Abir offers no forecast of the kingdom's future.

A succession of kings has balanced this country's historic power centers—the House of Saud, the ulama (religious leadership) and unaral (tribal sheikhs) against the rising expectations of a growing bureaucracy. The royal family, now numbering as many as 5,000, retains its absolute authority by orchestrating the competition between these groups.

The king has ensured the support of the ulama with a judicious sharing of control over the kingdom's daily life. The king's role as protector of Islam's shrines deflects criticism by fundamentalist groups and provides a platform from which to control the activities of the country's only significant external threat—an Iranian-inspired Sunni faction.

The Sudayrı branch of the House of Saud, while sharing some authority within the family, has consolidated its position at the head of the oligarchy and is in the process of coopting the power of the unaral by assuming provincial governorships. Within the nonroyal bureaucracy, competition exists between conservatives in the central province and a more liberal group in the western province. Good times have favored the latter; however, the kings have traditionally turned to the former during periods of stress. Saudi businessmen are barely mentioned because most have no desire to alter the existing social contract.

Abir's work is thoroughly researched, almost of necessity. He has never entered the kungdom and, as an Israeli, has no prospects of doing so in the foreseeable future. The author has drawn extensively on the work of Saudis studying overseas as well as close reading of current literature. This vicarious learning carries some risk of bias, but none is evident in this scholarly work as Abir presents a clear picture of the political dynamics of this critical country.

COL John W. Messer, USAR, Northport, New York

LUXURY FLEET: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 by Holger H. Herwig, 316 pages. The Ashfield Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ. 1987. \$17.50.

In the July 1988 issue of Multary Review, General Wallace H. Nutting cautioned that "in this era of increasing jointness, no serious soldier" could avoid the "essential study" of naval power. Luxury Fleet, the revised paperback version of Holger H. Herwig's 1980 original, should be read by officers who take Nutting's advice to heart, even though Herwig expends only a few pages on interservice relations or joint operations.

The history of the Impeñal German Naw is indeed rich in administrative, political, strategic and personnel lessons of as much use to the Army as to the Navy officer. During 1888–1914, the German navy was transformed from a minor component of national power commanded by army officers into the world's second greatest sea power. This astounding build-up entailed political, administrative, technological and warfighting dexterity worthy of emulation.

On the other hand, the Imperial fleet neither deterred war nor ensured victory. Rather, the "luxury fleet," as Winston Churchill dubbed it, isolated Germany diplomatically while undermining the evolution of parliamentary government domestically.

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By recounting with unmatched completeness and interpretive balance the rise and demise of a German battle fleet able to challenge Britain in the North Sea, Herwig does more than significantly expand our knowledge of European and German affairs in the period preceding and culminating in World War I. He provides a stunning case history of how the highest competence in funding, materiel and technical matters can be rendered utterly worthless by a political and military leadership driven by a flawed strategic concept; hostility to reasoned political discourse, moral courage and independent thinking in the officer corps; discriminatory personnel policies: contempt for the dignity and well-being of the rank-and-file; fear of a unified command

structure; and false heroics.

While contradicting Tirpitz's self-serving contention that nothing had been done to build German sea power until he became State Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office in 1897, Herwig rightly focuses on Tirpitz's role in constructing a fleet that entered World War I second only to the British Royal Navy. Both Tirpitz and his master, Kaiser Wilhelm II, accepted without question Alfred Thayer Mahan's thesis that world power depended on sea power, which in turn derived from a concentration of naval force in battle fleets; largescale blockades and colonies.

However, they willfully overlooked Mahan's admonition that sea power required the favorable geographical position that Germany lacked

ASS *in review*

THE KOREAN WAR: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command by Burton I. Kaufman. 381 pages. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA 1986 \$34 95

ROOSEVELT AND DE GAULLE: Allies in Conflict, A Personal Memoir by Raoul Aglion. 237 pages. The Free Press, New York. 1988. \$22,50.

SEND PORT & PAJAMAS! by Dan Raschen. 246 pages. Buckland Publications, Ltd., London, UK. 1987. £9.50. This is not a study of the military aspects of the war, but one of the inner workings of US foreign policy during it. The crisis portion concerns the atmosphere around the "red" scare and the McCarthy hearings plus the resultant fear of communist expansion throughout the world. The credibility section, which discusses President Truman's difficulty in maintaining credibility at home and abroad, is well written and offers true insight into party politics. The command portion covers fighting a war in which we had to accept something less than total victory. Overall, this is a scholarly historical account of Korean War diplomacy, both domestic and foreign.—COL WayneC. Boyd. USA. While Sands Missile Range. New Merico.

The turbulent relations between General Charles de Gaulle and President Franklin D. Roosevelt are recounted in exquisite detail by one of the principal representatives of Free France during World War II. Aglion has produced a useful book for historians and anyone with a general interest in this subject. His work shines brightest when he writes movingly about the frustrations and confusions of lobbying the Roosevelt administration on behalf of an officially unrecognized diplomatic mission representing a country that existed only in the hearts and minds of a few exiles for much of the war.— D.M.Gaagreeo, Kanss Cir, Missouri.

This is Dan Raschen's second book of military reminiscences. A 33year veteran of the British army, he provides a lighthearted account of his 18 months in the Korean War. Strictly autobiographical in nature, the book makes no pretense to be serious history and the result is an entertaining, highly personalized account. Readers will delight in the author's struggle to pass the mechanical drawing portion of his engineering exam and his abortive attempt to capture the war's first Chinese prisoner and earn the "general's bottle of whiskey" as a prize. This book is as unusual as its title and as unpredictable as its author.—LTC Cole C. Kingsed, USA, Schöled Barneks, Harvii. and Britain possessed in spades. As a result, they wrongly assumed that they could build a fleet strong enough to defeat the Royal Navy in the North Sea.

Predictably, the German High Seas Fleet alienated Britain, for whom maritime supremacy was a necessity not a luxury, and unleased a naval arms race that Germany, with her need for a mass army of unmatched efficiency, could not win, superior resources notwithstanding. When the war that Oerman navalism helped cause came, Britain's location astride the sea lanes from Germany to the Atlantic permitted the Royal Navy to take the strategic offensive.

Thus, Herwig's story is an implicit cautionary tale on the high cost of misreading military classics. Since the successive chiefs of the Prussian General Staff refused to stand up for their conviction that the navy-first policy with its underlying strategic concept was ruinous, Herwig also provides an apt illustration of the price to be paid when generals value their stars more than national security.

Tirpitz's sudden conversion to submarines in 1915 did not reflect a new strategic flexibility. By then, the sterility of his battleships had become apparent. Required to take the offensive by Britain's geographical position but not powerful enough to do so, the High Seas Fleet seldom ventured out of port.

To salvage the navy's plummeting reputation, Tirpitz and others became undiscriminating, in-

THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE 1986–1987: North Adantic Assembly Reports by John Cartwright, David Clark, Bruce George, Lothar Ibureger, Jules de Waart and Ludolf-Georg von Wartenberg, 376 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1987, 533-50.

THE GENERALS: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee by Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson. 523 pages. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. 1988. \$24 95

CAPTURED ON CORREGIDOR: Diary of an American P.O.W. in World War II by John M Wright Jr. 181 pages. McFarland & Company, Jefferson, NC. 1988 \$20.95. This book contains the six committee reports given at the North Atlantic Alliance 1986 session in Istanbul, Turkey, and includes an appendix of current policy recommendations endorsed by NATO legislators. Subjects covered range from economic policy and public relations to arms control and SDI. The major strength here is the diversity of the topics and the timely commentary on issues facing the alliance. The recent vote in Denmark, worker unrest in Poland, leadership tussles in the Soviet Union and prospects for reducing conventional forces underscore the continuing significance of these issues even two years later.—Thomas H. Lawrence, Program for Regional Studies, Baylor University, Waco, Teas.

This book is a dual biography of these Civil War generals who found their individual destinies commanding armies locked in batrile. It is also a book about character. The initial chapters build, through contemporary memoirs and family letters, two.lives wrought with frustration and disappointment. The war thrug's together each man's courage, operational brilliance and unyielding spirit from the carnage in the Battle of the Wilderness to the stillness at Appomattox. It is a balanced, respectful summation of two great military careers.-MAJ Lary Johnson, USA, Office of the Surgeon General, Washington DC.

The author's foreword is dated 1946, yet this book was published in 1988. Whatever the reason for the delay, John M. Wright's detailed account of his Japanese captivity is welcome, indeed. There is no better account of the organization of Japanese prison camps, of everyday life and survival, or of the relationship with Japanese guards. Wright's description of life aboard the several ships that took him to Japan superbly depicts the awful conditions experienced by the prisoners. If war is hell, the experience of these Allied prisoners represents life at the lowest level.—Brooks Kleber, Nempor News, Virginia.

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flexible adherents of unrestricted submarine warfare. They deluded themselves as to the likelihood of destroying British commerce and in the end, this type of warfare failed to sever Britain's economic arteries and succeeded in provoking the fatal belligerence of the United States.

Herwig also shows the grim consequences of Tirpitz's failure to remember that "men fight, not ships." Tirpitz was ingeniuous in creating the material conditions—that is, the fleet of capital ships—needed to implement his strategic concept. Indeed, he fathered modern public relations, propaganda and managerial techniques to create these conditions. World War I, moreover, confirmed the durability and firepower of the battleships built under his direction.

However, his personnel policies, and those of his fellow admirals, did as much to devalue these material triumphs as did the strategic misconceptions upon which they were based. Ships were fielded faster than they could be manned, bringing physical exhaustion, diminished efficiency and compromised morale to the force. Before 1914, Tirpitz also systematically snuffed out moral courage and innovation by driving out of the service any officer advocating cruser warfare, submarines or naval air.

As a consequence, the material development of the Imperial Navy never had much room for air power and stressed submarines only after the sterility of the High Seas Fleet was unmasked in the war. Personnel considerations hampered the submarine effort even after it was seen as the key to victory, since a decisive shift from capital ships would greatly reduce the need for flag officers. By trying to sustain the executive officers as a social elite, Tirpitz alienated the engineer and deck officers who were pushed down toward the noncommissioned officers, themselves bedeviled by poor wages and low social status.

Herwig's book is not a classic of strategic thinking like Mahan's treatise on the origins of Brutsh sea power or a monument of definitive original research like Arthur J. Marder's volumes on the pre-World War I Royal Navy. It never fully captures the face of maritime battle in World War I, nor does it make concessions to busy-officers by summarizing in a concluding chapter the lessons learned from the build-up and bankruptcy of the luxury fleet.

Yet Herwig's readable case history of the life cycle of one of history's most potent yet misconceived military machines is based on total mastery of the secondary literature and his own impeccable monographs. It makes exceptionally profitable reading for military professionals, whatever their service, and other students of military or European affairs.

Rodler F. Morris, Combined Arms Center History Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BRITAIN, POLAND AND THE EASTERN FRONT, 1939 by Anita J. Prazmowska. 240 pages. Cambridge University Press, New York. 1987. \$39.50.

This book offers an in-depth look at the diplomatic events leading to the outbreak of World War II. Taking advantage of her fluency in Polish, Anita Prazmowska provides us with a wellresearched, carefully organized, very readable study. She limits her primary sources to British and Polish archives and thus reduces the scope of the book.

'She stresses themes which are familiar to most of us: the blunders of Great Britain's prewar diplomacy and the incredible short-sightedness of Marshal Pilsudski's Polish government. It seems the closer we look at this period, the more illconceived the Allies' policies appear.

Prior to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's guarantee to defend Poland, the British government had avoided becoming ensnarled in Eastern European affairs. In 1938, however, Great Britain reluctantly attempted an about-face. The Czechoslovak crisis led to a diplomatic plan to build an Eastern European "front" composed of Poland, Hungary and Romania to resist German territornal gains. Discord between the new allies quickly doomed such a coalition.

By 1939, British actions were too little too late. The British government balked at even token assistance and military support for Poland amounted to 10,000 outmoded Hotchkiss guns. Financial loans were blocked by a fearful treasury, and the hunt for additional allies stumbled on the ideological barrier of Bolshevism.

Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939 gives detailed insight into British and Polish actions during the prewar years, but does not attempt to provide a new or more general assessment of the era. The study also does not examine German or Soviet activities and their impact on the Allies. Its appeal is thus limited to students of Polish or British diplomatic history. I do not recommend it for the military reader because of its specialized content and perspective.

> LTC Robert R. Ivany, USA, Fort Bliss, Texas

JUDAH P. BENJAMIN: The Jewish Confederate by Eli N. Evans. 469 pages. The Free Press, New York. 1988. \$24.95.

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Judah P. Benjamin represented "the best and the brightest" of the newly formed Confederate States of America at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. He rose to prominence and eventually became the most loyal confidant of President Jefferson Davis, holding posts as attorney general, secretary of war and secretary of state of the Confederacy from 1861 to 1865.

Eli Evans, a noted authority on American Jewish history, has authored this scholarly. volume which reflects on Benjamin's life and accomplishments in politics and law. He places Benjamin in the "Jewish context," illustrating the dilemma of Jews in the 19th century South. He writes about Benjamin's early childhood in Charleston, South Carolina, and his involvement with Jewish life. While Benjamin matried outside his faith, failed to keep Jewish laws or celebrate Jewish holidays, Evans says that to dismiss him as a nonbeliever "represents a fundamental error in Southern history and has been the main reason for the shroud of mystery that surrounds him."

Evans also deals with Benjamin's relationship with Davis. Davis' wife said the men were "two master minds which seemed to be the complement of each other." Evans views the relationship as "pieces of a puzzle, together less of a mystery than apart." When Davis appointed Benjamin attorney general, he referred to him as having "lucidity of intellect, systematic habits, and a capacity for labor."

The author also describes the evolving attitudes of both Davis and Benjamin toward slavery. Although Benjamin's lavish plantation, Bellechasse, required 140 slaves, he "took care to have a plantation noted for its humaneness and sought to be known across Louisiana as a gentleman who treated his slaves well."

Evans also emphasizes Benjamin's constant "thrust for recognition and fame." He presents an excellent account of Benjamin's rise to fame as an English lawyer, during which he became Queen's Counsel, a rank that qualified him to practice before the House of Lords. He later became a noted international commercial lawyer in England during the latter part of the 19th century.

This is a sterling example of true historical scholarship. An excellent annotated bibliography and a combination of photographs and prints make Benjamin's biography a significant contribution to Civil War literature. CPT Michael E. Long. USA.

Headquarters, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia

SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL: Setting the Record Straight. Edited by Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass. 380 pages. Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA. 1987. \$34.95.

By "setting the record straight," the editors mean to cut through the claims of both hawks and doves to objectively examine the results of a quarter-century of arms control negotiations. The two, both at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, in concert with nine other Harvard specialists, present 12 essays.

Seven are case studies of specific negotiations: test bans, accident prevention, nonproliferation, SALT I and II, antisatellite systems and biological weapons. Three deal with elements common to all arms talks: verification, linkage to other issues and whether agreements have a lulling effect on US defense efforts. An introductory chapter establishes the common format of each essay, and the editors summarize the findings in a concise and useful conclusion.

Each chapter begins with a list of statements about the issue made by advocates and opponents. Then, the negotiations are evaluated in terms of these partisan claims. Neither camp will be wholly pleased by the conclusions reached, though on balance, the advocates of arms control fare the worst.

The editors find that arms control talks have neither slowed the arms race nor improved US-Sovie: relations. They also find no evidence to support the idea that unilateral US restraint will be copied by the Soviets. In fact, US restraint on ICBM and first-strike deployments, the dismantling of the ABM system and politically mandated delays in the B-1 and ASAT programs were all ignored as the Soviets pursued their own objectives.

In general, arms control has merely produced agreements on systems of marginal value and then only when the two sides were roughly equal. Also, agreements have not prevented technological advances nor have they lulled the United States into complacency. Instead, they have served to redurect resources toward more promising or useful systems, while domestic politics and Soviet actions have been the prime determinants of US military budgets.

William R. Hawkins, Knoxville, Tennessee

CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION: International Implications. Edited by Larry Wortzel. 224 pages. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. 1988. \$37.95.

In its Contributions in Military Studies series, the Greenwood Press has produced an extensive list of useful books on military topics. China's Military Modernization is no exception. The topic is significant, timely and comprehensive. The authors, all serious students of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), have produced articles that are useful for both the China specialist and the international observer.

Since China and the PLA are implementing fundamental changes at a mind-boggling pace, writing about Chinese military modernization is like hitting a moving target in the dark. Deng Xiaoping has labeled these changes, which represent a basic reorientation of past policies, as the "Second Revolution."

China is now grappling with its version of a familiar US problem—organizing a military institution to deal with both a primary threat, where conflict is least likely, and with a less dangerous threat, where conflict is more likely. For the PLA, the "Second Revolution" marks a basic change in thought and operating style for organizing, preparing and employing military forces to achieve national goals.

China's response, consistent with broader domestic trends, is to develop a professional military force that no longer relies on the Maoist theory of "People's War." According to one keen observer, the new theory, "People's War under Modern Conditions," is more modern than People's. Tactics and operations are no longer predicated on mass militia or on giving up industrialized and populated areas to an invading force. Strategically, a more confident, outward-looking China is ready and able to use force in support of national policy.

In "Problems of Modernizing the PLA: Domestic Constraints," Chong K. Yoon discusses the practical constraints, primarily money and technology, that limit the PLA modernization drive. Lonnie D. Henley's article, "China's Military Modernization: A' Ten Year Assessment," focuses on the software side of defense modernization—strategies, operations and tactics of the PLA. He points out that the PLA is concentrating its assets on the professionalization component of modernization.

One of the most comprehensive pieces of research ever done on the Chinese nuclear program, "The Nuclear Industry in China," by Bradley Hanh, lists facilities and personnel involved in that program. Robert E. Johnson's "China's Nuclear Forces and Policies" complements Hanh's article by dealing with the human or policy side of the nuclear issue.

Additional articles discuss possible causes of Sino-Soviet tensions, space operations and the Chinese view on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Larry M. Wortzel's conclusion fittingly summarizes the mechanics and impact of US exports of technology to China.

Characterizing PLA modernization as good or bad depends on whether US and Chinese interests remain parallel or become convergent. Shifting regional and global patterns make such an analysis problematic. However, China's Military Modernizanon provides a better base from which to make that analysis.

> LTC Michael T. Byrnes, USA, Assistant Army Liaison Officer, Hong Kong

THE DAY I OWNED THE SKY by Robert Lee Scott. 238 pages. Bantam Books, New York. 1988. \$17.95.

Generations of aviators know Brigadier General Robert Lee Scott as the author of God Is My Co-Pilot, an exciting account of the Flying Tigers battling incredible odds against the Japanese.

The Day I Owned the Sky is Scott's autobiography. From his days as a young, swashbuckling fighter pilot to his days of walking the length of the Great Wall of China, this book covers nearly all of Scott's dynamic life. An ace five times over, Scott has logged 30,000 flying hours, 5,000 jet hours and 1,000 hours in the F-84 in one year alone. At age 76, he passed the same demanding flight physical that Air Force fighter pilots take and flew the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Scott's memoirs offer an insightful look at the early days of the US Air Force, from delivering mail in atrocious weather to the first aerial combat in China.

One of the author's greatest dreams was to walk the length of the Great Wall of China. At age 72, he fulfilled that dream, often walking 30 miles a day. As a travelogue alone, this book is incredible.

Robert Lee Scott—fighter pilot, combat commander, author, romantic and individualist. This autobiography leaves one with the feeling that perhaps the only thing better than reading this book is meeting the man.

> COL Harry J. Kieling Jr., USAF, England Air Force Base, Louisiana